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T H E
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OF THE
Second SESSION
OF THE
THIRD PARLIAMENT
O F
King *George II.*

Held in the Years 1742 and 1743.

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1742

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
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THE
HISTORY
AND
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
House of Commons,
DURING
The SECOND SESSION of the THIRD
PARLIAMENT of King GEORGE II.



AN Order of Council was issued on the 27th ^{An. 16. Geo. II.} of July, in Pursuance of an Address from the House to his Majesty, on the 4th of ^{1742.} June, for putting in Execution the Laws in Being against the Exportation of Wool from ^{Order of Council against exporting Wool,} Great Britain and Ireland to Foreign Parts:

The Means to prevent which had taken up so much Time in the Committee of the whole House in the former Session.

Some few Days before the Meeting of the Parliament, Instructions were sent from several Counties, and most considerable Cities, as *London, Westminster, Edinburgh, York, Worcester,*

THE
HISTORY and PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
Second SESSION
OF THE
THIRD PARLIAMENT
OF
King *George II.*

Held in the Years 1742 and 1743.

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

‘ with all the urgent Solicitations of Men fully convinced
 ‘ that their All is at Stake, the Rights and Privileges of
 ‘ ourselves and Posterity, with every valuable Advantage
 ‘ purchased for us by the Blood of our Ancestors, conjuring
 ‘ you to postpone every other Consideration, particularly
 ‘ the Supplies for the current Service of the ensuing Year ;
 ‘ till you have renewed the Secret Committee of Enquiry ;
 ‘ procur’d an effectual Bill to reduce and limit the Number
 ‘ of Placemen in the House of Commons ; restor’d the Fre-
 ‘ quency of Elections, and restrain’d the Abuse of Power in
 ‘ Returning Officers. Yet, after these salutary Provisions,
 ‘ when you shall think fit to grant the Supplies, at the same
 ‘ Time have some Regard to their Application. A Na-
 ‘ tion burden’d with Taxes, oppress’d with Debts, and al-
 ‘ most exhausted by one lavish Administration, can but ill
 ‘ undergo a fresh Profusion of its Treasure in the Parade of
 ‘ numerous Land Armies, and the Hire of Foreign Forces,
 ‘ without the Appearance of any Service in the Behalf of
 ‘ his Majesty’s *British* Dominions.

‘ These Points alone can give Safety to the Kingdom, and
 ‘ appease the general Discontents ; and the vigorous Prose-
 ‘ cution of them, in Concurrence with all true Friends of
 ‘ the Public, (independent of Party, or of any invidious Di-
 ‘ stinction whatsoever) will insure to yourselves the lasting
 ‘ Favour and Affection of this great Metropolis.

M A N.

But the following Paragraph in the *Westminster* Instructions
 is too remarkable to be omitted.

And from West-
minster ;

‘ We acknowledge his Majesty’s Goodness in removing,
 ‘ without Application * of Parliament, a Minister from that
 ‘ Post he had so long wickedly abused and disgraced ; and
 ‘ expect it will now be your earnest Endeavour to oppose
 ‘ every *Confederacy* that may be form’d either to screen the
 ‘ Offender or perpetuate the Offence.

It would be inconsistent with the Impartiality hitherto ob-
 served thro’ this whole Work, not to take Notice of an Ad-
 dress from *Bristol*, which was followed by one of the same
 Import from *Nottingham*.

To the Right Hon. Edward Southwell, Esq; surviving Re-
 presentative in Parliament for the City of Bristol.

Also from Bri-
stol.

‘ I N the present difficult Conjuncture, when the Honour
 ‘ of the Crown, the Interest of the Kingdom, and the
 ‘ Tranquility of *Europe*, demand the Attention of the Le-
 gislature,

* See Lord Percival’s Speech in the First Session, p. 159.

gislature, We the Mayor, Recorder, Aldermen, Sheriffs, An. 16. Geo. II.
and Common Council Men of the City of *Bristol* in Com- 1742.
mon Council assembled, take the Liberty of addressing
ourselves to you, who have the Honour to represent this
City in Parliament; and we flatter ourselves you will not
be displeased that we use the Freedom on this Occasion,
not unbecoming Persons sensible of the Importance of the
present Crisis, and concerned for the Welfare of their
Country.

It hath been for more than an Age past, the ruling
Ambition of a neighbouring State, to render all the other
Potentates of *Europe* the meer Creatures of her Power,
and Ministers of her Will: Upon this System all her Poli-
ticks have turn'd; to this Point have all her Councils been
directed; with this View she hath been lately kindling
the Flame of a general War in *Europe*: And to facilitate
this Scheme of Universal Monarchy, she has actually in-
vaded a natural and ancient Ally of this Kingdom, in open
Violation of the most solemn Engagements. And tho'
with the utmost Duty and Gratitude, We acknowledge
the Wisdom, Equity, and Magnanimity of his Majesty's
Councils, and rejoice in the great and glorious Effects of
them; yet we cannot reflect on the Dangers which but
lately engaged the Attention, and awaken'd the Fears of
good Men of every Party in the Kingdom, without a ve-
ry sensible Concern for the future Event of Things; for
it will still depend on the Conduct of *Great Britain*, and
on the Part his Majesty may farther be enabled to take in
the present uncertain State of Things, Whether the Ba-
lance of *Europe* shall be yet maintain'd? or, in other
Words, Whether *Great Britain* shall for the future be a
free or a dependent Nation?

Your known Attachment to the Interest of your Coun-
try, unbiass'd by personal Views, nor moved by popular
Clamour, leaves us no Room to doubt, that at this critical
Juncture you will steadily and uniformly pursue such Mea-
sures as conduce to the Stability of his Majesty's Govern-
ment, the Protection and Advancement of our Trade, and
to the Safety, Honour, and lasting Interest of the King-
dom; particularly, that you will chearfully concur in
granting to his Majesty early and effectual Supplies for the
Service of the ensuing Year. This is a Service the present
State of Publick Affairs, and the High Trust you bear,
require from you: And did we not presume, that your
own Sense of the Importance of the Service renders all
other Motives unnecessary, we cou'd in the most earnest
Manner

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

‘ Manner recommend it to you. — For, without the necessary Supplies, *Great Britain* must be wholly unactive at a Season, when the utmost Prudence, Vigour and Resolution is necessary, to avert the Dangers which threaten her and her Allies : The War with *Spain*, a War undertaken by his Majesty in Defence of our most valuable Rights, and with the concurrent Voice of the whole Kingdom, must end to the eternal Reproach of this Nation, without Satisfaction for past Injuries, or Security against future Injults : And the Liberties of *Europe* will, we fear, become an easy Prey to the boundless Ambition of a formidable Power, ever jealous of the Prosperity of *Great Britain*, and equally a Foe to our Civil and Religious Rights. In this View of Things, we cannot fear that the necessary Supplies will be denied ; or even, that they will be postponed to Considerations of a more Domestick Concern.

‘ We are not ignorant that this Measure hath been recommended by some of our Fellow-Subjects with an uncommon, (we wish we cou’d not say an indecent and unreasonable) Zeal. For our own Parts, we declare, that as we esteem the Freedom and Constitutional Independency of the Commons in Parliament among the most valuable of our Legal Rights, if not the Foundation of all the rest ; so we are convinced, that every consistent Advocate for *British* Liberty must pay a just Regard likewise to the Freedom and Constitutional Independency of the other Branches of the Legislature. And since a peremptory Demand of new Laws, as preliminary to the granting the Necessary Supplies in a Time of actual War, hath in our Opinion a fatal Tendency, either to destroy that Freedom and Independency, or to leave the Nation defenceless, we assure ourselves you will not give into a Measure so repugnant to our Constitution, and in its Consequences so destructive to our Country.

‘ We cannot, we ought not, to conclude this Address without making our publick Acknowledgments to you for your unwearied Attendance on the Duties of your Trust, and the constant Attention you have given to every Point in which the Trade of the Kingdom, or the Interest of this City, have been concern’d.

CANN, *Town-Clerk.*

Observations on
the Practice of
sending Instructions
to Members from their
‘ctors.


But as a Controversy ensued among our Political Writers, in which it was asserted by some, That the sending up Instructions from Counties and Corporations to their respective Members is without Precedent, and subversive of the Constitution,

tution, we shall content ourselves with barely observing, that when the Bill for excluding the Duke of *York* from the Crown, was brought into the House of Commons, in the thirty-third Year of the Reign of King *Charles* the Second, and the Fourth Parliament had been dissolved by the King to prevent the Progress of that Bill, the Lord Mayor, and Citizens of *London*, sent up Instructions to their Members, requiring them to insist on the passing it; and Sir *Robert Clayton* gave it as one Reason, in his Speech * upon that Occasion, that his Duty to his Electors obliged him to be for the Bill.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

And the same Practice was again repeated from the Citizens of *London* to their Members, upon concluding the Treaty of *Utrecht* in the latter End of the Reign of Queen *Anne*.

* See Chandler's History, Anno 33. Car. II. p. 115.



ON the 16th of *November*, the Parliament met at *Westminster*, after several Prorogations; and a Bill for farther punishing Persons who shall assist or encourage Prisoners, to escape, was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Then Mr Speaker reported to the House his Majesty's Speech, as follows:

My Lords and Gentlemen,

“ THE present important Conjunction of Affairs will, The King's
 “ I am persuaded, be thought a sufficient Reason for Speech at open-
 “ calling you thus early together. ing the Second
 “ I have, in Pursuance of the repeated Advice of my Par- Session.
 “ liament, taken such a Part as appeared to me most con-
 “ ductive to the Support of the House of *Austria*, and to the
 “ restoring and securing of the Balance of Power. In this
 “ View, I order'd a considerable Body of Troops to be sent
 “ from hence into *Flanders*; and, at the Close of the last
 “ Session, I foresaw, and pointed out to you, that it might
 “ be incumbent upon me, to enter into further Measures
 “ for the same great and desirable Ends. The Augmentation
 “ of our Strength in the *Low Countries* became a necessary
 “ Step; for which Purpose I sent, in Concert with my Al-
 “ lies, Sixteen Thousand of my Electoral Troops thither,
 “ with the *Hessians* in the *British* Pay, in order to form
 “ such a Force, in Conjunction with the *Austrian* Troops,
 “ as might be of Service to the common Cause in all Events;
 “ and

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

“ and I doubt not but I shall have your Assistance in the Support of these necessary Measures.

“ The Magnanimity and Firmness of the Queen of Hungary, notwithstanding so many numerous Armies sent against her; the resolute Conduct of the King of *Sardinia*, and his strict Adherence to his Engagements, though attack'd in his own Dominions; the Stop which has been hitherto put to the ambitious Designs of the Court of *Spain* in *Italy*, (to which, the Operations of my Fleet, in the *Mediterranean*, have so visibly contributed;) the Change of Affairs in the *North*, which has appeared by the publick Requisition, made by *Sweden*, of my good Offices, for procuring a Peace between *Russia* and that Crown; and the Defensive Alliance agreed upon, not only between me and the *Czarina*, but also between me and the King of *Prussia*, are Events, which could not have been expected, if *Great Britain* had not shewn a seasonable Spirit and Vigour, in Defence and Assistance of its ancient Allies, and in the Maintenance of the Liberties of *Europe*, as well as of its own true, and lasting Interest.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

“ I have ordered the proper Estimates for the Service of the ensuing Year to be prepared, and laid before you, and also an Account of the Expence of those particular Services, which I have already mentioned, and which you will find to have been concerted in as frugal a Manner, as the Nature of them would admit. I am persuaded, that you will readily grant me such Supplies, as shall be found necessary for the Security and Welfare of the Nation, requisite for the Support of the Common Cause, and adequate to the present Emergency.

“ *My Lords and Gentlemen,*

“ The Importance of your Deliberations at this Time is so evident, that I will say nothing to enforce it. The Honour and Interest of my Crown and Kingdoms; the Success of the War, wherein I am engaged against *Spain*; and the Re establishment of the Balance and Tranquility of *Europe*, will greatly depend on the Prudence and Vigour of your Resolutions. Let it be your Care to avoid every Thing that may either delay or weaken them; and to convince the World, that you are determined to make a right Use of the present Opportunity.”

Hereupon a Motion was made, That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, to return his Majesty the Thanks of

of this House for his most gracious Speech from the Throne ; An. 16. Geo. II. to express our great Satisfaction at the constant Attention his Majesty has been graciously pleased to give to the Advice of his Parliament ; and to assure his Majesty, that, as we think the Support of the House of *Austria*, and the restoring and securing the Balance of Power in *Europe*, are inseparable from the true Interest of these Kingdoms, We have a grateful Sense of the early Care his Majesty took in forming such a Force in the *Low Countries*, as might be of Service to those great and desirable Ends ; which, we are satisfied, could not, at that Time, have been so readily and effectually done, as by his Majesty's sending a Body of his Electoral Troops, together with the *Hessians*, to join the *British* and *Austrian* Forces in those Parts ; and that this House will cheerfully and effectually support his Majesty in all such necessary Measures ; to congratulate his Majesty on the happy Turn of Affairs in the *North* ; and to declare, that we are fully convinced, that it is owing to the Spirit and Vigour, which his Majesty has shewn in the Defence of his Allies, that the King of *Sardinia* has been enabled to act a Part so useful to the common Cause, and that the Queen of *Hungary* has been encouraged to bear up amidst extream Difficulties, and notwithstanding the numerous Enemies sent against her ; to assure his Majesty that this House will grant to his Majesty such Supplies, as shall be found necessary for perfecting the great Work, in which he is engaged, for prosecuting with Vigour the just and necessary War with *Spain*, and for maintaining the Honour and Security of his Majesty and his Kingdoms ; and that in all our Deliberations we will endeavour to make manifest to the World, that we have nothing so much at Heart, as the Honour of his Majesty, the Support of his Government, and the true Interest of his Crown and Kingdoms.

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Debate on a Motion for an Address of Thanks for the King's Speech.

This Motion being Seconded, a Debate ensued, in which several Members objected to the same, as implying too hasty an Approbation of the Measures of the Ministry : And Sir *Watkin Williams Wynn* spoke to the following Effect :

Sir W. W. Wynn

Mr Speaker,

What happened towards the End of last Session, gave me a strong Suspicion, that our new Ministers would not only tread the Steps of the old, but would endeavour to improve every bad Precedent introduced by any of their Predecessors : Their Conduct since that Time has added to this Suspicion ; and the Motion now made to you has confirmed it. Every one must remember how violently some Gentlemen in both Houses of Parliament have for several Years

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been

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been exclaiming against the late Custom of making long complaisant Addreses to the Crown, by Way of Answer to his Majesty's Speech from the Throne; and with how much Zeal they endeavoured to persuade us, to^{us} return to our old Custom of presenting a short General Address upon such Occasions. Yet no sooner have those Gentlemen got into Power, and I believe but a very small Share of it, than they quite alter their Tone, and propose to us a much longer, and, I think, a more parasitical Address than was ever proposed by any of their Predecessors.

' Surely, Sir, they must have a most contemptible Opinion of this House, if they expect, that we should plunge into high Encomiums upon Measures which we know nothing of, and assert Facts which it is not possible for us to tell whether they be true or not. If we comply with such a Request, I must say, they or their Successors, for I foresee their Reign will not be long, will have Reason to cry out with the *Roman* Emperor, they are shock'd with the slavish Complaisance of the *British* Senate. When I say this, Sir, every Gentleman must see, that I point at those Expressions in the Motion, which propose our declaring that we have a grateful Sense of the early Care his Majesty took, in forming such a Force in the *Low Countries*, as might be of Service to the Support of the House of *Austria*, and restoring the Balance of Power; that this could not have been so effectually done as by his Majesty's sending a Body of his Electoral Troops into those Parts; and that the King of *Sardinia's* being enabled to act a Part useful to the common Cause, and the Queen of *Hungary's* being encouraged to bear up amidst her Difficulties, are owing to the Spirit and Vigour his Majesty has shewn in the Defence of his Allies.

' For God's sake, Sir, what have we now before us, that can give the least Authority for any of those flattering Declarations? His Majesty's Speech, indeed, seems to give some Sort of Authority, but it is an established Maxim in this House, to look upon that as the Speech of the Ministers; and Ministers, we know, are not very scrupulous in asserting Facts, which, they think, may tend to a Justification of their Conduct, as is manifest from many Speeches during our late Administration, and particularly from that Speech made by our Ministers in the Year 1726-7 * which is, perhaps, one of the longest and most stuff'd with bold Assertions, that was ever attempted to be passed upon a *British* Parliament; and every one may now see the Misfortunes

* See the Speech at large, and the Imperial Resident's Declaration on that Occasion in Chandler's History, Anno 13, Geo. I.

tunes naturally flowing from the Conduct which that Speech was intended to justify. The Facts asserted in that Speech were such as have since appeared to be false, and, indeed, they were such as from the very Nature of Things would have appeared suspicious to an independent and unprejudiced Parliament; we therefore never ought, in our Address, to repeat any of those Facts mentioned or referred to in the Speech from the Throne; much less in our Address, to declare our Satisfaction with regard to any Circumstance that may probably, upon a strict Examination, appear to be false, which is, I think, the Case with regard to several Circumstances mentioned in this Proposition. That his Majesty has sent a few of his *British* Troops to *Flanders* is certainly true, and, I believe, we shall very soon find it to be so, by the Demands made upon us for their Support and Transportation; but how they can, in that Country, be of any Service to the Queen of *Hungary*, or to the restoring of the Balance of Power is more than I can comprehend, unless it could be said, that the *Dutch* are to join with us, in order to form an Army for attacking *France* upon that Side; and if I am rightly informed, the contrary of this is true; for, I believe, they have declared to us, that whoever strikes the first Blow in that Part of the World, they will look upon as their Enemies, and will treat them as such. But suppose, Sir, that the Force we have sent to *Flanders* could there be of any Service to the Queen of *Hungary*, or the Balance of Power, can we say, it has been done early? Early with regard to what, Sir? Surely, it cannot be said to have been done early with regard to the Season of the Year; for the Time for Action was almost over before they were sent there. And with regard to the War now carrying on against the Queen of *Hungary*, I am sure, it cannot be said to have been done early; for if it had not been for the surprising Fidelity and Bravery of her own Subjects, and the more surprising ill Conduct of her Enemies, she had been obliged to submit to a *Carte-Blanche* long before we sent a Man into *Flanders*. This Word, *Early*, can therefore be supposed to relate only to our new Ministers; and in this Case it ought to have a Consequence which I wish it may, but it is such a one as they, I believe, do not wish to see. It ought to engage us in an Inquiry, why this was not done by our former Minister; for if it is such a wise and such a necessary Step in our new Ministers, why was it not thought on? Why was it not made by our old?

* For these Reasons, Sir, the sending of our Troops to *Flanders* is a Measure which we ought not to precipitate our-

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selves into an Approbation of : At least we cannot, I think, say to his Majesty that it has been done early. As the Affair cannot yet come properly before us, I shall not determine myself upon either Side of the Question ; but in the Light it appears to me at present, I cannot think the Measure right, and if it was, I am sure we cannot say, it was early enough undertaken, unless we design our Address for our new Ministers and not for our Sovereign. This Part of the Proposition I cannot therefore agree to, and the next is really surprizing. To desire this House to assert positively, that a proper Force could not be formed in *Flanders* without taking *Hanoverians* into our Pay, before we have had any one Proof of the Fact laid before us, is really a Piece of Assurance in our new Ministers, superior to any that was ever practised by any of their Predecessors. Whether we have amongst us, now the Blue Ribbon is fled, any one that is of his Majesty's Cabinet Council, I do not know ; but this, I am sure, is a Fact that cannot be asserted by any but such as have been for some Time there ; and therefore I must beg of our Ministers not to desire us to assert a Fact which we neither do nor can know any Thing about. I think it highly improbable, that we could get no Troops to hire in all *Europe*, beside these *Hanoverians* ; and if there were any other Troops to be had, in *Europe*, they might have been marched into *Flanders* Time enough for any Use we can make of them ; for it is certain, we cannot now make use of them, either in *Flanders*, or any where else, till next Spring, before which Time it is as certain, that Troops may march to *Flanders* from the remotest Corner of *Europe*.

‘ I shall not anticipate the Debate, Sir, either upon our sending our own Troops to *Flanders*, or upon marching the *Hanoverians* and *Hessians* thither ; but I must observe, that as Things appear to me at present, if we design that our Troops should be of any real Service to the Queen of *Hungary*, we should have sent our own Troops to *Hanover*, in order to have formed such an Army there, as might have prevented *M. Maillebois's* March to the Relief of *Prague*, or to have drove him and all his Ragamuffins back to his own Country ; for if we had formed a sufficient Army in *Hanover*, and had been ready to attack him, or follow him, I believe he would hardly have ventured to have marched his Army into *Bobemia* ; and if he had been forced to march back to his own Country, I believe, all the *French* Troops then in *Germany* would soon have been at the Mercy of the Queen of *Hungary*, and the *Emperor* would have been oblig'd to come to an Accomodation with her, upon such Terms as we had thought fit to propose. This, Sir, I shall grant, is foreign

reign to the present Debate ; but it is, I think, a very good Reason for our resolving to say nothing in our Address either about sending our own Troops to *Flanders*, or about marching the *Hanoverians* thither. If our Ministers are fond of having Compliments from this House upon their Measures, I hope they will stay till those Measures are brought properly before us, and then our Compliments will come with a greater, and, I think, a much more desirable Weight.

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‘ The late Turn of Affairs in the *North*, I shall allow, Sir, to be happy both to this Kingdom and to *Europe* ; because it has disappointed the Tools of *France* in *Sweden*, and may bring some of them to the Block. I wish, I saw some *French* Tools nearer Home brought into the same Sort of Danger. But let that Turn be as happy as it will, we have no Business with congratulating his Majesty upon it, because it implies, as if we thought it owing in some Measure to the Conduct of our Ministers ; whereas it is entirely owing to the Wisdom of the *Russian* Court, the Conduct of their Generals, and the Bravery of their Troops.

‘ I shall likewise grant, Sir, that the present Conduct of the King of *Sardinia* is of great Use to the Common Cause ; and that the Queen of *Hungary* has bore up in a very surprising Manner amidst the many Difficulties she has been, and still is surrounded with ; but I cannot be so complaisant as to say, that either the Conduct of the King of *Sardinia*, or the Courage of the Queen of *Hungary*, is owing to the Spirit and Vigour our Ministers have shewn in the Defence of our Allies. I say, I cannot pass such a Compliment, because I do not think it is true. The Conduct of the King of *Sardinia* may, indeed, be partly owing to our Money, and the Neighbourhood of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean* ; but it is chiefly owing to his own Interest, and to the Spirit which the Queen of *Hungary* has shewn in her own Defence. And as to the latter, her bearing up under so many Difficulties is so far from being the Effect of Vigour shewn by our Ministers, that all the Difficulties she has been brought into are owing to the Conduct of our late Minister ; for if he had made any one right Step upon the Death of the late *Emperor*, I am persuaded, the *French* would not have dared to send a Man into *Germany*, nor would the Duke of *Bavaria* have dared to attack the Queen of *Hungary*. 'Tis true, our new Ministers have made at least a Shew of a little more Spirit and Vigour than their Predecessor ; but as yet it is but a Shew, and before they made even that Shew, the Queen of *Hungary* was extricated out of her greatest Difficulty,

An. 16. Geo. II. Difficulty, by the Bravery of her Troops, and the treacherous Conduct of the *French* towards the King of *Prussia*.
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‘ I have now, Sir, gone through this long complicated Motion. I say complicated, because it is evidently made up of Professions of Duty and Affection to his Majesty, and of Compliments to the Ministers upon their Conduct. As to the former Part of it, I shall be for making those Professions as strong and explicit as you please: I shall even be for enlarging them if it be desired; but as to the other Part, I think, we ought never on such an Occasion to pass Compliments upon the Conduct of our Ministers, and especially such as appear evidently false. I hope I have shewn that all those desired by this Motion are such, or at least highly improbable; therefore, I hope, the Honourable Gentleman will leave them all out, and content himself with that Part of his Motion which contains our Professions of Duty and Affection to his Majesty only.

Sir Will. Yonge. Sir *William Yonge* spoke in favour of the Motion.

Sir,

‘ I hope I shall never be accused of having opposed a proper and dutiful Return to his Majesty’s Speech from the Throne: I was always of Opinion, that when his Majesty is graciously pleased, in his Speech, to descend to Particulars, and to give us some Account of the State of our publick Affairs, we are in Duty bound to return an Answer, of some Kind or other, to every Particular mentioned in his Majesty’s Speech; and I do not well know what Gentlemen mean when they say, this is contrary to the Custom of our Ancestors. I am sure, Sir, this Method of addressing has been a Custom ever since I can remember, and, I believe, it has been the Custom ever since our Kings have been pleased to give us any particular Account of our Affairs in their Speeches from the Throne. This, it is very well known, was not the Custom in antient Times; for in those Days the King made but a very short Speech, perhaps a general Compliment to the two Houses, and left it to his Chancellor * to descend to Particulars, and to give the Parliament an Account of the State of publick Affairs, and the Reasons for calling them together.

‘ In those Times therefore, Sir, it was right in both Houses to return a general Answer; for they could not with any Propriety take Notice, in their Address to the King, of any Thing that had been said to them by the Lord Chancellor,

* Instances of this see in King Charles the Second’s Reign, *Annæ* 2660. Tom. 1. p. 24, &c.

cellor. But it being now the Custom, and a most gracious An. 16. Geo. II.
and respectful Custom, I think, it is : I say, it being now 1743.
the Custom for the King himself, in his Speech from the
Throne, to communicate to us a particular Account of the
State of our Affairs, we ought at least to be as respectful to
him as he is to us ; and consequently, in our Address, to
take some Notice at least, of every Thing he has been pleas-
ed to mention. Nay, as our Addresses upon such Occasions
are never held to be an Approbation of any Measure men-
tioned in them, we ought to make some Sort of Compli-
ment upon every Thing he has been pleased to say, unless
the Measure be evidently wrong, and such as will certainly
meet with a Censure, in that Session of Parliament.

‘ This being the Case, Sir, I think, there is nothing pro-
posed by this Motion but what may be safely, and I think,
ought in Duty to be agreed to. We have not, ’tis true, as
yet had Time to consider fully every particular Circumstance
in his Majesty’s Speech, and proposed to be inserted in our
Address ; but, in my Opinion, there is no Measure men-
tioned in either, that appears evidently to be wrong. I am
convinced, that upon a thorough Examination they will all
appear to be right, and will receive the Approbation of this
House. As to our sending our Troops to *Flanders*, tho’ I
do not pretend to be in the Secrets of the Cabinet, yet from
those Circumstances that were publicly known I must con-
clude, it was not only right but necessary for us to send a
Body of our Troops to the Continent, in order to shew to
those who secretly, perhaps, inclined to enter into an Alli-
ance with us against the ambitious Projects of *France*, that
we not only would, but were ready to protect them against
the Resentment of that powerful and aspiring Nation. And
if it was necessary for us to send a Body of our Troops to
the Continent, *Flanders* was the most proper Place we could
send them to, for answering this Purpose, not only because
it was the most Centrical, but because we could from thence,
with the greatest Ease, carry the War into *France* itself,
in Case that Court should resolve to send any more of its
Troops into *Germany*, or to attack any of those Powers
that might declare in our Favour.

‘ This had accordingly, Sir, the intended Effect : It not
only prevented the *French* from sending any more Troops into
Germany, but it prevented their sending any Troops to the
Assistance of the *Spaniards* in *Savoy*. Would our sending
our Troops to *Hanover* have had this Effect ? Could we
thereby have drove *M. Maillebois* back to his own Country ?
No, Sir, the *French* being then secure against any Attack
upon their own Dominions, if *M. Maillebois* found he could
not

An. 16. Geo. II. not safely march directly into *Bohemia*, he would have
 1742. marched up the *Rhine* towards *Alsace*, and after being joined there by a fresh Body of Troops, he would have marched to *Bohemia*, and thereby have made that Country the Seat of War, which would have been dangerous for the Queen of *Hungary*, and extremely inconvenient for us. At the same Time, and for the same Reason, the *French* would have sent a Body of Troops to the Assistance of the *Spaniards* in *Savoy*, which would have forced the King of *Sardinia* to desert his Alliance with the Queen of *Hungary*, and to accept the Terms offered by *France* and *Spain*. Besides these Disadvantages, Sir, there is another of equal Consequence, which would have attended our sending our Troops to *Hanover*: It would have furnished the King's Domestick Enemies with a Pretence for saying, that *England* was going to be involved in a War for the Sake of *Hanover*; and this Pretence, tho' very ill grounded, might have had a fatal Effect upon the Minds of our common People, and perhaps upon the Minds of our Soldiers.

‘ From these Considerations, Sir, it is apparent, that *Flanders* was the only proper Place we could send our Troops to; and as they could not by themselves, even after being sent there, have any great Effect upon the Councils of *France*, it became necessary to increase our Force there, by the Addition of Foreign Troops, hired from some Potentate or other. Whether we could get any other Troops to hire beside those of *Hanover*, I shall not take upon me to determine; but I can see no Reason why we should not take the Troops of *Hanover* into our Pay as soon as any other; and in the present Case, they were certainly the most ready, because they were nearest, and because an Agreement for taking them into our Pay could be much sooner concluded, than an Agreement for such a Purpose with any other Prince or Potentate in *Europe*. In the Circumstances we were then in, the Season for Action was not in the least to be considered. We were to give Spirit to the Friends of publick Liberty: We were to give Terror to its Enemies, by forming a great Army in *Flanders*; and this was to be done as soon as possible.

‘ This, Sir, was to be his Majesty's Care: It is this we are to declare our grateful Sense of; and this Care his Majesty took as early as the Circumstances of the Affairs of *Europe* would admit. We need not therefore be at a Loss to find out what the Word *Early* relates to. It neither relates to the War, nor to our new Ministers: It relates only to that Turn the Affairs of *Europe* took by the Peace concluded between

tween

tween the Courts of *Vienna* and *Berlin*. Whilst the Court An. 16. Geo. II.
of *Vienna* continued obstinate with Regard to the King of *Prussia*: Whilst that Prince continued firm to his Alliance
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with *France* and *Bavaria*, we could not so much as think of giving any Assistance by our Armies to the Queen of *Hungary*, or of forming any Confederacy in her Favour; but no sooner did this become practicable, by these two Courts beginning to give Ear to our Mediation, than his Majesty began to think of forming such a Force in the *Low Countries*, as might be of Service to the Queen of *Hungary*, and to the restoring and securing the Balance of Power in *Europe*.

* Now, Sir, with regard to the happy Turn of Affairs in the *North*, as it is and must be acknowledged to be a happy Turn with regard to *Europe* as well as this Kingdom, we have Reason to congratulate his Majesty upon it, whether he had any Hand in bringing it about or no; and therefore our Congratulation can be no Implication of our thinking that he actually had. But suppose it were, I should be for agreeing to it, because, I am convinced, it is true; and from the very Nature of the Thing we must believe it to be so. His Majesty had a Minister at the *Swedish* Court: He had another at the *Russian*; can we think, that those Ministers had not Instructions to labour with all their Might to bring about a Reconciliation between those two Powers? I shall grant, that the Wisdom of the *Russian* Councils, the Conduct of their Generals, and the Bravery of their Troops, contributed not a little towards rendering his Majesty's Endeavours successful; but can we suppose, that the King and Senate of *Sweden* would, publickly, have made a Requisition of his Majesty's good Offices, if they had not beforehand been informed, not only that his Majesty was ready to employ his good Offices in their Favour, but also that his good Offices would have great Weight at the *Russian* Court? I wonder how any Gentleman can doubt of this, and I much more wonder how any Gentleman can object to our congratulating upon an Event, which he himself allows to be happy for this Kingdom as well as for *Europe*.

* As to the Conduct of the King of *Sardinia*, it is so evidently owing to the Engagements his Majesty has entered into with that Prince, and to the vigorous Conduct of our Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, that I am surprised to hear that Part of the Motion objected to; and as to the Courage or Resolution of the Queen of *Hungary*, I shall grant it was surprisingly great, even before we thought, or could think of sending any Troops to her Assistance; but tho' I would avoid as much as possible, saying any Thing that might look like

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a Reflection upon that illustrious Princess, yet I must say, that her Conduct with Regard to *Prussia* was to be called Obstinacy rather than Courage and Resolution ; for if she had continued to hold the same Conduct with Regard to him, it would have been impossible for her to extricate herself out of her Difficulties : It would have been impossible for us, or for any Power in *Europe*, to have given her effectual Assistance : But since her concluding a Treaty with that Prince, by Means of his Majesty's Mediation, her Bearing up against the united Armies of *France* and *Bavaria*, may properly be called Courage or Resolution ; and this is certainly owing to the vigorous Measures his Majesty began to take upon her entering heartily into a Treaty with the King of *Prussia*.

‘ Thus, Sir, I hope, I have shewn, that there is no real Foundation for objecting to any Part of the Motion now before you ; and that it would be a Want of Respect in us, not to take some Sort of Notice, in our Address, of every Thing his Majesty has been pleased to communicate to us by his Speech from the Throne. This, I hope, you will avoid being guilty of : If you consider the present Circumstances of Affairs, I am sure, you will avoid it with the utmost Caution. *Europe* engaged in a War which may end in the Overthrow of its Liberty : This Nation engaged in a War which may end in the Ruin of our Trade and Navigation : In these Circumstances would you do any Thing, would you neglect any Thing, that might be construed as a Want of Respect to your Sovereign ? Would not this dishearten our Friends, would it not encourage our Enemies ? What terrible Consequences should we not then have Reason to expect ? I must therefore beseech Gentlemen not to give themselves up to cavilling upon this Occasion. If they think any Part of our late Conduct wrong, there is nothing now proposed that can prevent their censuring it when it comes properly before them. Why then should they object to the most respectful Address that can be thought of upon this Occasion, when they must be sensible, that the more respectful it is, the more unanimously it is agreed to, the greater and the better Effect it will have upon our Affairs both Abroad and at Home ?

Mr Selwyn.

Major *Selwyn* spoke to the following Effect :

Sir,

‘ I rise not up to enter minutely into the Purport of what is now moved and seconded, an Undertaking, Sir, rather too delicate for one whose Retirement from this Place may be

be deemed a Misfortune, and I look upon it as such, because of that laudable Spirit which was frequently exerted in the last Parliament, much beyond what I ever knew, during the Time I formerly sat here. God be thank'd, Sir, I have seen it again revived, without the least Innovation in our Parliamentary Constitution.

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In that Light I look upon the Motion now before you, Sir, with Respect to the Form of this Address. But alas, Sir, fond as we are of modern Precedents, yet it were to be wished that such of them, and such only had been followed, as were most conducive to the Honour and Dignity of Parliaments. The amiable Precedents left us by our most worthy Ancestors, are the strongest Instances, that they in their greatest Exigencies of State, had nothing so much at Heart as to gain the good Opinion of all Mankind; and this they happily effected, because their Conduct in this Place so justly deserved it. As they were always apprised, that Honour consists not in the Power only of any Assembly whatsoever, but in the Opinion the People have of their Virtue; a Principle strictly honourable, exalting the Mind above Hopes and Fears, above Favour and Displeasure, because uniform and consistent with itself; their Addresses were dutiful, tho' short, yet suitable to the Time they were allowed to sit, where in struggling hard for the Liberties of the People, they sometimes lost their own, and some their Lives for only daring to be free. Thus gloried they in a true publick Spirit, and had the Comfort to say, *Temporibus malis ausi sumus esse Boni*; therefore, their Names and Memories are still revered, and so they ought to be in all future Ages. They never held a long Address crammed with a Volubility of Compliments, as essential to Loyalty: No, they said Loyalty well became the Dignity of their House, but as for all fawning Complaisance, that they properly confined within the Boundaries of the *Court of Requests*, and would not so much as suffer it to insinuate, no nor yet to creep up the Lobby-Stairs.

Sir, upon my Observation of this House, I am thoroughly convinced, that there is not one of us, but must think it requisite to support the Honour of the King, the Honour of the Nation, and his own Honour; which having all but one and the same natural Center, we cannot avoid being unanimous in the most essential Proofs of our Loyalty, by giving true and faithful Advice, as the faithful Commons of *Great Britain*, pursuant to the Tenor of the Writ that calls us here.

Sir, I have but one Objection to the Form of this Address,

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which is its Length, and I cannot see why a Composition of so many dutiful Expressions should not stand by themselves, by Way of Congratulation only, without a Promise or Grant of Supplies in the Tail of it. Thus the Motion stands at present, and this I cannot think right ; because in our critical Situation to resolve precipitately upon a Supply, altho' in general Terms, I think is dangerous and immethodical. Such a Resolution would be much more proper for the Work of another Day, when it might be attended to with a more mature Deliberation. I know it hath been often urged in this Place, that a Resolution taken and agreed upon the first Day of a Session, for a Supply, as a Part of our Address, is a mere Matter of Form only ; but, Sir, I have sat long enough within these Walls to have seen Forms, and Figures too, most essentially misapplied. It is, therefore, to obviate such Inconveniences as may again arise by this modern Practice, that I shall take the Liberty to end what I have yet to say, with a Motion ; for I shall never be for this House's coming precipitately to any Resolution with regard to Supplies, notwithstanding my being one of those that shall never think our Lives or Fortunes too much for the Support of this State : A State that can never be too fond of its Freedom and civil Rights, which our Neighbours have long since lost by their own Meanness and Corruption, holding their All in Vassalage and base Tenure.

Sir, I have read that *Constantine the Great* accounted the Purse of his Subjects as his *Exchequer* ; but we may justly fix the *Exchequer* of our Sovereign in a more noble Situation, even in the Hearts of his Subjects ; and why ? Because he has always found his paternal Care and Maintenance of our antient Rights and Liberties to be the surest Basis of his Glory : A Glory doubtless it is, to be at the Head of a brave and a free People : Brave because we are Free : People may be desperate and irrational ; but none can be truly brave, unless they are free. Our People pay their Taxes and Imposts with all that Chearfulness and Alacrity that becometh dutiful Subjects, not doubting of their Money's being well apply'd, and doubting still less of their having an Account of its Appropriation ; for believe me, Sir, in all Cases of publick Inquiry, a fair and candid Reckoning with the People, will be the surest Means for making their Allegiance still to sit tight about them. Crafty Inventions may pick the Purse of the People ; but nothing can legally and fairly open it, but a Parliament which lies in the Eye of Sovereignty upon all the publick Calamities of the State, and shews a becoming Vigilance for the Preservation of our
antient

antient Rights and Privileges, which I must beg Leave to say were always a little precarious, and never so totally established as upon the Arrival of the present Royal Family. Since then it is but natural to preserve the Root of our immediate Happiness, how can we enough admire the glorious Branches, nay even the tenderest Twigs, which, with the Blessing of Providence, and our hearty Prayers for them, must grow into so beautiful a Shade, by Nature formed to shelter and protect you from the Violence, Oppression and arbitrary Power which neither we nor our Forefathers were ever able to bear.

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However, let us enjoy the more immediate Prospect of such Halcyon Days as we may reasonably expect from the Conduct of the present Administration, and especially too if we consider, Sir, how much the Change of Men and Measures hath already wrought a happier Change in the Face of Affairs upon the Continent, where the Distresses of a great Princess have prevailed upon you to undertake her moving Cause; so that I cannot help flattering myself, that this Administration will not so strictly follow the Tract of their Predecessors; tho' one cannot recollect or fix any Period of Time when this Nation ever was the Object of the Care of our Ministers in the first Instance, as it ought always to have been; or that even after the Revolution, there ever was a Contest among them, which should outdo the other in Acts of Resentment for Injuries done to this their Mother Country.

Surely, Sir, if that had been the Case, you had not heard of so many pernicious Treaties formed abroad, no, nor yet of so many late scandalous Contracts at home, to the Detriment of our Friends, Fellow-Soldiers and Countrymen. Nevertheless, whatsoever may have been otherwise suggested by some without Doors, yet it is to be hoped, that Time will convince them too, that it was impracticable to corrupt the Fountain, or to strip the third Estate of its Freedom and Independency; and that it cannot be thought a Crime for the present Parliament to bear some Resemblance of such as were once the Glory of this Nation; for as Independency is the greatest Comfort that can attend the Individual, so it never centers in the Body Politick, but it immediately becomes a National Benefit, and in Return you will always be rewarded with the Applause of the People, to whom, indeed, you owe no small Regard: For surely, Sir, it was high Time to shut close *Pandora's* Box, at the Close of the last Session, or such a Complication of Distempers as were therein contained, must have infected the

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the very Air we breathe, with their infernal Vapours ; and altho' I cannot allow that, *Terras Astræa reliquit*, is applicable to us, yet I could never hear or read of any Government whatsoever, that had for a long Series of Time been supported by Corruption, but a Saying of my Friend *Horace* always occurred to my Mind, *O Cives, Cives, quærenda Pecunia primum est : Virtus post Nummos*. Yet to prevent such Disasters as may hereafter happen again to affect our State, why should we not revert to that antient and laudable Practice of our Ancestors, in letting Grievances and Supplies go Hand in Hand together, and like them too, always take Care to begin right, with a dutiful and short Address ? Therefore my humble Motion is, That this Address may consist of Congratulations only.

After several Members had declar'd their Opinions, Sir *John Barnard* spoke to the Effect following.

Sir,

Sir John Barnard.

* As I shall, I believe, give my Vote for the Address proposed, I think it incumbent upon me to give the Reasons which prevail with me to do so, because they are very different from those that have been insisted on by most Gentlemen who have spoke in favour of the Motion. It is not, Sir, because I now begin to approve of our making Compliments to our Ministers upon every Part of their Conduct, before we have examined, or know any Thing about it : It is not because I approve of every Step that has been lately taken, or because I think the happy Change in the Face of the Affairs of *Europe* is owing to the Spirit or Conduct of our Ministers : But it is because of the extreme Danger to which I think the Liberties of *Europe* as yet exposed, and the Necessity there is for this Nation to act with the utmost Spirit and Vigour, in order to extricate *Europe* from that Danger ; therefore I shall be against our opposing this new Administration in any Thing we can safely agree to, least it should furnish them with a Pretence for following the Example of their Predecessor. I wish they had been a little more modest in the Motion they have now made to us : I wish they had shewn a little more Regard to what some of them have so often recommended upon the like Occasions ; because it would have been a Testimony to the People, that they have not changed their Sentiments with their Situation ; and that their former Opposition to such Addresses proceeded from Principle, and not from their having no Share in drawing them up. Such a Conduct would have convinced the People without Doors, that we within have always acted from

from Motives of a generous and publick Nature, and not from corrupt or selfish Motives, either upon one Side or the other ; for in my Opinion, there is very little Difference between a Gentleman's voting always with the Court, for the Sake of a Pension or pecuniary Gratuity, and another's voting always against it, for the Sake merely of forcing himself into the Administration. The latter may have more Pride or Ambition than the former, but their Motives are equally corrupt, and when discovered, equally tend to overthrow our Constitution, by destroying that Principle of Action, I mean a disinterested Love for the publick Good, upon which alone a free Government can subsist.

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‘ For this Reason, Sir, I must deal plainly with our new Ministers by telling them, that, so far as relates to our Domestick Affairs, if they go on as they have begun, they will do more real Harm to our Constitution, than our late Minister ever did, with all his Schemes, for Corruption and arbitrary Power ; because they will make the People believe, that our Contention here never was, nor ever will be, about the Preservation of our Constitution, or the publick Good of our Country, but about Titles, Places, Pensions, and Preferments ; and if this Opinion should ever prevail generally among the People, they will give over supporting any Opposition to the Administration for the Time being : Nay they will rejoice to see Parliaments entirely laid aside.

‘ I shall grant, Sir, that with regard to Foreign Affairs, our Conduct seems to be a little altered : Our new Ministers seem to act with more Vigour, and to shew a little more Regard to the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe*, than their Predecessor ever did ; but I question much if this be owing to their Virtue or publick Spirit, so much as to their Complaisance towards the Crown. The late haughty and insulting Behaviour of the *French* towards a certain Foreign Court, has, I believe, produced an Alteration in the Politics of that Court, and that Alteration may probably have had an Influence upon our Court here at home. This Alteration, I shall readily admit, is lucky for *Great Britain* as well as *Europe* ; because it obliges our Ministers, or at least leaves them at Liberty, to pursue the true Interest of both ; but I cannot easily admit, that this Change in our Measures proceeds from the late Change in our Administration, for the extreme Complaisance our new Ministers have shewn to the Crown, with regard to Domestick Affairs, convinces me, that they would have shewn the same Complaisance with regard to Foreign Affairs, and would have been as ready to have sacrificed the Liberties of *Europe*, as they
now

An. 16. Geo. II. now seem ready to sacrifice the Liberties of their Country to a wrong Bias in the Crown, had it unhappily taken such

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a Bias. But, thank God ! it has taken a right Bias, at least with regard to foreign Affairs ; and as Fortune seems to favour that Bias, I hope our Ministers will make the best Use of it : I am sure, I shall be against our refusing any Thing we can with Safety comply with, that may tend to encourage them in the Prosecution of those Measures they now seem resolved to pursue : And as the Address proposed is allowed on all Sides to be nothing but a Matter of mere Compliment ; as it does not tie us down to approve of any Measure that has been concerted, if upon a proper Examination we should see good Reason to find Fault with it, therefore, since it has been asked, I shall be for complying with it.

But my Compliance in this Respect does not proceed from my approving of our making Panegyricks upon every Part of our Ministers Conduct, in our Address to our Sovereign ; and if this must be the Consequence of his being so gracious as to communicate to us, from his own Mouth, a full State of our Affairs, and all the Particulars of his past Conduct so far as his Ministers may think proper, I wish, this Piece of Condescension were laid aside ; but I can see no Reason why this Complaisance in us should be a necessary Consequence of such a gracious Condescension in our Sovereign ; nor is it true, that this Complaisance and Condescension were at the same Time introduced ; for in former Times, especially in the Reigns of King *James* and King *Charles*, the Speeches from the Throne were much longer and more particular than they are at present, and yet in those Days the Parliament never thought itself bound to return a Long Address, nor did they in their Address take notice of any Thing mentioned in the Speech ; because tho' it was made by the Kings they look'd upon it as the Speech of the Minister, and very often, the first Notice they took of it was, after due Consideration, to remonstrate against several Things contain'd in it.

Whether we may have Occasion to remonstrate against any of the Measures mentioned in this Speech, is what cannot now, nor even in this Session, I think, be determined. If a proper Use be made of the Forces sent from hence, and from *Hanover* to *Flanders*, I hope, we shall not. It will give foreign Powers some Reason to think, that we are now sincerely resolved to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, to the utmost of our Power, and this, I think, we ought to do, if we give her any Assistance at all. This may encourage some of them to shake off those Shackles of Fear, they seem now to have

have upon them ; and considering our Conduct for many Years, I think, it was become necessary to give some speedy and solid Proof of our Sincerity in this Respect. I shall not therefore pretend to find Fault with our sending a Body of our Troops to *Flanders*, till I see what Use is made of them. I hope, those who advised putting their Country to such an Expence, were well assured of its being in their Power to make a proper Use of the Troops we have sent thither, before they advised sending them. If it should afterwards appear, that they had no such Assurance : If it should hereafter appear, that this Army has been sent out, as our Squadrons have formerly been, only as a Raree-Shew for our Neighbours to stare at, I must now enter my Protestation, that my approving of this Address shall be no Argument with me to approve of the Measure.

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* As for the *Hanover* Troops, Sir, we have as yet no Reason to suppose, that they are to be taken into *British* Pay. The Electorate of *Hanover* is as much obliged, both in Honour and Interest, as we are, to support and assist the Queen of *Hungary* ; At least we know as yet of no Advantage it is to reap by her Destruction ; and as no Addition has upon this Account been made to the Armies of that Electorate, we must suppose it sufficiently able to maintain those Troops in *Flanders*, or any where else, as well as at home. The People there have been lately relieved from some of their most burdensome Taxes, which is a Pleasure and an Advantage the People of this Country have never yet met with ; therefore if the present Revenue of *Hanover* be not sufficient for maintaining those Troops in a foreign Country, that Revenue may be increased by a Revival of those Taxes. I therefore hope, his Majesty will not desire to lay upon his *British* Subjects the Burden of maintaining his *Hanover* Troops in *Flanders*. He has expressed no such Desire in his Speech from the Throne ; and as we are not by this Motion desired to promise to take this Burden upon ourselves, I can see no Reason for our bringing the Affair of the *Hanover* Troops into this Debate. If the Electorate is to be at the Expence of maintaining them in *Flanders*, I believe every *British* Subject will approve of his Majesty's sending them there ; and if this Nation should be desired to bear the Charge, it will be Time enough to consider it when the Demand is actually made.

* I am far from thinking, that our sending our Troops to *Flanders*, or the March of the *Hanoverians* thither, has as yet been of any Service to the Common Cause ; and I have some Suspicion that the King of *Sardinia's* declaring so openly

An. 16. Geo. II. ly against the Designs of the *Spaniards* in *Italy*, proceeds rather from a Connivance in *France*, than from any Spirit or Vigour we have hitherto shewn; for as it is not the Interest of *France* to increase too much the *Spanish* Power in *Italy*, and as it is their Business to defer as long as possible the Accomplishment of the Queen of *Spain's* Designs in that Country, or at least to convince her that she cannot accomplish them without their Assistance, it is highly probable, they have privately intimated to the King of *Sardinia*, that his Opposition to the *Spaniards* would rather be a Pleasure than an Offence to them, especially as he was thereby to disburden us of a little of that Treasure which, for many Years, we have been ready to throw away upon any Project, except such as might tend immediately to our own Advantage. I am likewise not very apt to believe, that the Peace between *Muscovy* and *Sweden* is owing to the Influence, or the Dexterity of the Ministers we had at either Court. But, Sir, as both these Events must be allowed to be for the Interest of the Common Cause, and may in some Measure be owing to the late Change in our Conduct, I cannot be against congratulating his Majesty upon them; and as our Complimenting the Crown upon every extraordinary Event that happened in our Favour abroad, has of late Years been customary, I shall not be for our shewing ourselves more cool than usual at this dangerous and critical Conjunction; lest our Ministers should from thence take a Pretence to say, that our Coolness upon this Occasion had destroyed their Credit at foreign Courts, and thereby prevented their being able to form such Alliances as might have been sufficient for restoring a Ballance of Power in *Europe*, and giving effectual Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*.

Several other Members, who usually appear'd in the Opposition, declaring their Approbation of Sir *John Barnard's* Sentiments of the Measures of the Ministry, it was resolv'd, by a Majority of 259 against 150, to present an Address to his Majesty in the Terms propos'd.

New Writ for
Bristol.

Ordered a new Writ for *Bristol*, in the Room of Sir *Abraham Elton* *, Bart. deceas'd.

Committees ap-
pointed.

On the 17th the House made the usual Orders and Resolutions at the Beginning of every Session, and appointed Committees for Religion, Grievances, Courts of Justice, Trade, and also of Privileges and Elections.

The same Day a Motion being made, That a Day be appointed

* Robert Hoblyn, Esq; was elected without Opposition.

pointed to take into Consideration the State of the Nation, it was resolved to adjourn, Ayes 169, Noes 129. An. 16. Geo. II.
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Nov. 18. The Commissioners of the Customs presented to the House an Account of prohibited *East India* Goods remaining in the *East India* Warehouses; and also, in his Majesty's Warehouse, in *London*, at *Michaelmas* 1741. Also, an Account of *East India* Goods prohibited to be worn in this Kingdom, remaining in the respective Warehouses in the Out-Ports at *Michaelmas* 1741, what have been since brought in, what exported; as also, what remained at *Michaelmas* 1742, in all the afore-mentioned Warehouses. Also, An Account of prohibited *East India* Goods which have been delivered out of the Warehouses since *Midsummer* 1742, in order to be dyed, glazed, &c. What have been return'd, and what remained out of the said Warehouses at *Michaelmas* 1742. And also, an Account of Naval Stores imported from *Russia* into the Port of *London*, and into the Out-Ports of *England*, from *Michaelmas* 1741, to *Michaelmas* 1742. Accounts presented.

All which Accounts were ordered to lie upon the Table, to be perused by the Members.

A Petition of *Griffith Philips*, Esq; complaining of an undue Election and Return for the County-Borough of * *Caermarthen*; and of *Hugh Barlow*, Esq; for the Town of * *Haverford-West*, were referred to the Committee of Privileges and Elections. Petitions for Caermarthen and Haverford West.

The same Day the House waited on the King, with their Address of Thanks as follows:

Most Gracious Sovereign,

WE your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Commons of *Great Britain* in Parliament assembled, beg Leave to return your Majesty our sincere Thanks for your Majesty's most gracious Speech from the Throne. The Commons Address of Thanks for the King's Speech.

It is with the greatest Satisfaction, that we have seen the constant Attention your Majesty has been graciously pleased to give to the Advice of your Parliament; And, as we think that the Support of the House of *Austria*, and the restoring and securing the Balance of Power in *Europe* are inseparable from the true Interests of these Kingdoms; we desire, in the strongest Manner, to express our grateful Sense of the early Care taken by your Majesty in forming such an Army in the *Low Countries*, as might be of Service to those great and desirable Ends: And as we are

* satisf-

* See the Last Resolutions of the House, relating to the Right of Election for these Boroughs, in Vol. XIII. p. 51, and 54.

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‘ satisfied, that a Force sufficient for that Purpose could not
 ‘ have been so readily assembled, as by your Majesty’s send-
 ‘ ing a Body of your own *Eleſtoral* Troops, together with
 ‘ the *Heſſians*, to join the *British* and *Auſtrian* Forces in
 ‘ thoſe Parts; we are determin’d chearfully and effectually
 ‘ to ſupport your Majesty in all ſuch neceſſary Meaſures.

‘ We beg Leave to congratulate your Majesty on the
 ‘ happy and unexpected Turn of Affairs in the *North*; We
 ‘ aſſure your Majesty, that we are fully convinced, that it
 ‘ is by the Vigour and Spirit ſhewn by your Majesty in
 ‘ Defence of your Allies, that the *Queen of Hungary* has
 ‘ been principally encouraged to bear up amidſt extreme
 ‘ Difficulties, notwithstanding the numerous Armies ſent
 ‘ againſt her; and we are perſuaded, that the ſame Spirit
 ‘ and Vigour have enabled the King of *Sardinia* to act a
 ‘ Part ſo uſeful to the Common Cauſe; to which the Vig-
 ‘ lance and Activity of your Majesty’s Fleet in the *Medi-*
 ‘ *terranean* have ſo remarkably contributed.

‘ Your faithful Commons aſſure your Majesty, that they
 ‘ will, with the greateſt Alacrity and Readineſs, grant ſuch
 ‘ Supplies as ſhall be found neceſſary for perfecting the great
 ‘ Work, in which your Majesty is engaged, for proſecuting
 ‘ with Vigour the juſt and neceſſary War with *Spain*, and
 ‘ for maintaining the Honour and Security of your Majesty
 ‘ and your Kingdoms.

‘ Your faithful Commons, in all their Deliberations, will
 ‘ endeavour to make maniſeſt to the World, that they have
 ‘ nothing ſo much at Heart as the Honour of your Majesty,
 ‘ the Support of your Government, and the true Intereſt
 ‘ of your Majesty’s Crown and Kingdoms.’

A Motion being made, that a Supply be granted to his
 A Supply voted. Majesty, it was reſolved to conſider thereof in a Committee
 of the whole Houſe on the *Monday* following, Ayes 135,
 Noes 105.

Nov. 22. The Houſe ordered a new Writ for electing a
 New Writs. Burgeſs for *Burroughbridge*, in the Room of *James Tyrrell* *,
 Eſq; and another for a Commiſſioner to ſerve for the Shire
 of *Renſſew*, in the Room of *Alexander Cunningham* †, Eſq;
 both deceaſ’d.

Farther Petitions for Caermarthen. A Petition of *Thomas Philips*, late Mayor, and ſeveral
 other Burgeſſes of *Wiſton* in the County of *Pembroke*, and of
Rawleighb Manfell, of the County-Borough of *Caermarthen*,
 Eſq;

* William Murray, Eſq; lately appointed Solicitor General, on the
 Reſignation of Sir John Strange, was unanimouſly elected.

† William Mure, Eſq; was choſen.

Esq; were severally presented to the House, complaining of An. 16. Geo. II. an undue Election and Return for the Borough of *Pembroke*. 1742.

Then a Motion being made, that the said Petitions be heard at the Bar of the House, it passed in the Negative; and they were referred to the Committee.

After which Mr Speaker reported his Majesty's Answer to their Address:

Gentlemen,

" I thank you for this dutiful and affectionate Address, and for the great Marks of Confidence you repose in me.

The King's Answer to the Address.

" The extraordinary Supplies, that I am obliged to ask of my People, have become necessary for supporting that Cause which is inseparable from the true Interests of my Kingdoms.

" You may be assured I shall wish for nothing more, than an Opportunity to ease my Subjects of all those extraordinary Charges, which the present Exigency of Affairs may require.

A Petition of *John Symmons*, Esq; complaining of an undue Election and Return for the County of *Pembroke*, was referred to the Committee.

Nov. 23. Ordered that an Estimate of the Ordinary of the Navy, with the Half-Pay of the Officers of the Navy and Marines, of the Charge for Guards and Garrisons, and other Land Forces and Marines: And of the Charge of the Office of Ordnance for Land-Service, for the Year 1743, be laid before the House. Estimates, Lists, and Accounts ordered in.

Ordered also, That a List of the Regimental and Warrant Officers, who are to be in Half Pay; and an Estimate of the Charge of the Out-Pensioners of *Chelsea* Hospital, for the Year 1743; as also, that an Account of Services incurred, and not provided for by Parliament, be laid before the House.

Ordered likewise, That an Account, shewing the Monies arisen within the respective Half Years, ending at *Ladyday* and *Michaelmas* last, of the Surplus of the Aggregate Fund, of the Surplus of the South-Sea Fund, as also of the Surplus of the General Fund: And that an Account, shewing how the Monies given for the Service of the Year 1742, have been disposed of, distinguished under the several Heads, be laid before the House.

Nov. 24. A Petition of several Freeholders, Burgesses, and Inhabitants of *Haverford West*, paying Scot and Lot, was presented to the House, and read, complaining of an undue

An. 16. Geo. II. undue Election and Return for the said Town, and referred to the Committee of Elections.

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Forty Thousand
Seamen voted.

Nov. 25. Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply, the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House, *viz.* That 40000 Men be employed for the Sea-Service, for the Year 1743: That Four Pounds per Man per Month be allowed for maintaining the said 40000 Men for thirteen Months, including the Ordnance for Sea-Service.

Nov. 26. Sir *William Yonge* * presented to the House, pursuant to their Address, an Estimate of the Charge of Guards, Garrisons, and other Land Forces; also, of the Charge of his Majesty's Forces in *Flanders*, and in the Plantations, *Minorca*, and *Gibraltar*, and also of Ten Regiments of Marines for the Year 1743, which were ordered to lye upon the Table, to be perused by the Members.

New Writs and
Petitions.

Ordered a new Writ for *Plympton*, in the Room of *Thomas Clutterbuck*, Esq; † deceased.

A Petition of the Hon. *George Mackay*, complaining of an undue Election and Return for the County of *Sutherland*, was referred to the Committee.

Nov. 29. Dr *Lee*, one of the Lords of the Admiralty [See Vol. XIII. p. 55.] was unanimously elected Chairman of the Committee of Elections.

The same Day a Deputation of the Electors for *Westminster* waited on their Members. The following was printed in the News-Papers, upon that Occasion, as Lord *Percival's* Answer: His Lordship having voted with the Majority in the first Division, on the Motion for an Address of Thanks.

Gentlemen,

Lord Percival's
Answer to a De-
putation from
the Electors for
Westminster.

YOU are welcome to me upon all Occasions, and I look upon this Application as a fresh Instance of your Friendship—As I never conceal'd my Principles from you, so will I never depart from them—The only Motives that direct my Conduct, are the Preservation of the Constitution of my Country, the Security of the present Royal Family upon the Throne, and the common Liberty of Europe.—These Views I shall always think inseparable.—In the Prosecution of them, my Judgment sometimes may, my Heart shall never fail me.—I remember on my Part, that to your independent Voice, I owe my Seat in Parliament:—On Yours, you will not forget that I ought to be independent there. — When I differ

* Secretary at War.

† Removed from being one of the Lords of the Admiralty soon after the Change in the Ministry, but appointed Treasurer of the Navy, in May following, on the Resignation of Mr Speaker. Hon. *Richard Edgcumbe*, Esq; was chosen in his Place.

differ from your Sentiments, I shall do it with great Reluctance, and then only when I am convinc'd that your true Interests must extort it from me. — In such a Case the Crime is equal to flatter Popularity, or to court Power. — It becomes me to respect both; but it is my Duty to follow neither, beyond those Limits, which the Circumstance of Time, Prudence, Necessity, and the publick Safety can alone determine.

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1742.

About the same Time *John Jeffereys*, Esq; Knight of the Shire for *Brecon*, was made Joint Secretary of the Treasury in the Room of *Henry Furness*, Esq; who had been so appointed in the Room of *Mr Legg*, on the late Change in the Treasury.

A Petition of the Prisoners for Debt at *Bodmyn*, was presented to the House, and read; complaining of their Distress, and praying Relief, and ordered to lye upon the Table.

Petition from Debtors.

Resolved, that *William Forrester*, having counterfeited the Hand-writing of a Member of this House, upon several Covers for Letters, be, for his said Offence, committed to *Newgate*.

Mr Francis Fane reported from the Committee of Supply, the Resolution following, viz. That towards raising the Supply granted to his Majesty, Four Shillings in the Pound be raised in the Year 1743, upon Lands, Tenements, Pen- sions, Offices, &c.

Land Tax of 4 s. voted.

A Bill was ordered in, pursuant to the said Resolution; which was the next Day read the first Time and ordered a second Reading.

A Motion was made, and the Question being put, that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give Directions, that there be laid before this House, Copies of the Defensive Alliances agreed upon between his Majesty and the *Czarina*, and also between his Majesty and the King of *Prussia*, together with Copies of the separate Articles; it passed in the Negative.

Motion for Copies of Treaties.

A Petition of *Arthur Trevor*, Esq; complaining of an undue Election and Return for the several Boroughs of *Denbigh*, &c. was referred to the Committee: As was also a Petition of *Jones Raymond*, Esq; for *St Michael*; of *Nicholas Robinson*, Esq; for *Wotton Bassett*; of General *James Campbell* for the County of *Air*; of *Richard Lloyd*, Esq; for the Borough of *Cardigan*; of *Matthew Ridley*, Esq; for *Newcastle upon Tyne*; and of *Roderick Gwynne*, Esq; for the County of *Radnor*.

Petitions for Undue Elections.

Decem-

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

December 1. The Serjeant at Arms having summoned the Members to attend the Service of the House, a Motion was made by Mr *Edmund Waller*, and seconded by Sir *Watkin Williams Wynne*, That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the Conduct of *Robert Earl of Orford*, during the last Ten Years of his being First Commissioner of the Treasury, and Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of his Majesty's Exchequer; which, after Debate, passed in the Negative, Ayes, 186, Noes 252 *.

Dec. 2. Ordered new Writs for a Commissioner for the Shire of *Gromarty*, in the Room of Sir *William Gordon* †, Bart. and for the Stewartry of *Kircudbright* ‡, in the Room of *Basil Hamilton*, Esq; both deceas'd.

The House being informed, That the Petition of *Nicholas Robinson*, Esq; complaining of an undue Election and Return for *Wotton Bassett*, which had been referred to the Committee of Privileges and Elections, was not signed by the Petitioner, it was Ordered, that it be an Instruction to the said Committee, that, before they proceed on the said Petition, they do examine into the Manner of signing the same, and make Report thereof to the House.

Lists of Officers
address'd for.

Resolved, That an Address be presented to his Majesty, to give Directions, that there be laid before this House, a List of the General Officers, with an Account how many of them are now employed and paid, and where they are at present, with the Dates of their respective Commissions, as such, and of their first Commissions in the Army; also of the Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, Second Lieutenants, Cornets, and Ensigns, of his Majesty's Forces on the *British* Establishment, and on the Establishment for *Gibraltar*, *Minorca*, and the *British* Plantations in *America*, with the Dates of their respective Commissions as such; and also of the Dates of the first Commissions, which such Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants, had in the Army.

Likewise of the Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, Cornets, and Ensigns of his Majesty's Forces on the *Irish* Establishment, with the Dates of their respective Commissions as such; and also the Date of the first Commissions, which such Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants had in the Army.

Decem-

* The same Question pass'd in the Affirmative by the same Number of Votes last Session, as the Number for the Negative in this. See the Debate thereupon, Vol. XIII.

† Sir John Gordon,
‡ Capt. John Maxwell,] were elected,

Dec. 3. Sir *William Yonge* presented to the House, by his Majesty's Command, an Account of the Charge of the Troops of *Hanover*, in the Pay of *Great Britain*, from the 31st of *August* to the 25th of *December* 1742, being 117 Days; and also the Estimate of the Charge of the said Troops from the 26th of *December* 1742, to the 25th of *December* 1743: And also of the *Hessian* Troops paid by *Great Britain*, from the 26th of *December* 1742, to the 25th of *December* 1743, both inclusive, which were ordered to lie on the Table. As was also a Petition of the Prisoners for Debt, in the Goal of the County of *Salop*.

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Estimates of the
Hanoverian and
Hessian Troops
presented.

Then a Motion was made by Mr *Cornwall*, That Leave be given to bring in a Bill for the better securing the Freedom of Parliaments, by limiting the Number of Officers in the House of Commons: Sir *Watkin Williams Wynne* seconded the Motion to the following Effect:

Debate on a Mo-
tion for bringing
in the Place-
Bill.

Sir,

As this Motion was last Session agreed to, and as the Bill itself was brought in, and in every Step approved of, by this very House of Commons, I should with great Confidence of Success rise up to second this Motion, if I did not from Experience know, that Gentlemen often change their Sentiments with their Situation, and that a Gentleman, after he becomes a Placeman, begins to entertain Notions of the Prerogatives of the Crown and the Liberties of the People, very different from those he entertained whilst he was a plain, honest, Country-Gentleman. If any Thing like this should happen in the present Debate, it may tend to disappoint the Motion, but with all those who are neither Placemen nor Pensioners, I am sure, it ought to be an Argument in its Favour; and, I hope, it will prevail with some Gentlemen, who in former Sessions opposed this Motion, to alter their Sentiments and their Way of voting upon this Occasion, when they have such a plain Proof before their Eyes, that if a Place does not induce a Man to vote against his Honour and his Conscience, it at last biasses his Judgment, and makes him conclude that to be wrong, which he before thought and declared to be right.

Sir Watkin Wil-
liams Wynne.

Another strong Argument in Favour of this Motion, Sir, is the melancholy and distressed Condition which the Affairs of *Europe*, as well as of this Nation, are now reduced to. We have for near thirty Years been in a Course of approving and supporting almost every political Measure the Crown seemed resolved to pursue: With regard to foreign Affairs, we have approved and supported every one

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of them without Exception : Thank God ! I have had no Concern in this general uninterrupted Approbation : I have at the respective Times publickly declared my Dislike of many of them, and yet I am far from thinking, that any of those who approved, voted at any Time against the plain Dictates of their Conscience ; but I am convinced, that many of them were biased in their Judgments by the Fears of losing the Places they possessed, or the Hopes of getting the Titles, Places, or Preferments they expected. In all Political Disputes it is very easy to impose upon Gentlemen, who have never made that Science their Study, and are never let into any Secrets of State unless with a Design to deceive them ; therefore in all such Cases, I have great Charity for those who happen to differ from me in Opinion. But when the Wickedness or Folly of the Measures begins to appear from the fatal Consequences they have produced, my Charity begins to cease with respect to those who persevere in their Opinions, and refuse coming into any Method for preventing themselves or their Successors in this House from being deceived by the same Bias towards a Court.

‘ I have, Sir, as great an Opinion as any Gentleman can, as any Gentleman ought to have, of the Honour and Impartiality of those who are Members of either House of Parliament ; but it is arguing against common Sense, common Reason, and common Experience, to pretend, that no Member of this House will be biased in his Opinion, or influenced in his Voting, by 500 or 1000, or perhaps 5000*l.* a Year. It has in all Countries and in all Ages been held as an established Maxim, that no Man ought to be allowed to sit as Judge, or even as a Jurymen, in any Cause where he is to get or lose by the Event of the Suit ; and as we sit as Judges, almost in every Case that can come before us, between the People and their Sovereign, or those employed by him in the executive Part of our Government, surely no Man ought to be allowed to sit here, who is to get or lose the Whole, or the chief Part of his Substance, by the Judgment he passes upon any Affair depending in this House.

‘ In former Times, Sir, when we had no standing Army, nor any Officers of our Army kept in continual Pay : When we had no Navy or Ships of War but such as were fitted out when Occasion required, and commanded by Officers appointed by those that fitted them out : When we had no Excises, nor Excise-Men : When we had few or no Taxes, and as few Tax-Gatherers ; it was not necessary to have any such Law enacted ; because no publick Officer then ever thought of getting himself chosen a Member

ber of Parliament. Whilst he remained in Pay, he was obliged to attend the Duty of his Office, and consequently could neither attend the Business, nor be chosen a Member of Parliament. This is the true Reason why the High Sheriff of a County cannot even now be chosen a Member of this House; and when this Maxim was first established, I am persuaded, it was a Maxim observed with regard to every other publick Officer; but as it was established by Common Law, or, as the Lawyers call it, Common Reason only, it fell by Degrees into Disuse, and publick Officers of all Ranks and Degrees may be, and are now chosen Members of Parliament, except High Sheriffs, and some few others who have been disqualified by express Statute.

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‘ Thus, Sir, our Constitution stands at present, and as the Number of our publick Officers of all Kinds, and in all Stations, has been of late Years vastly increased, and is every Day increasing, as their yearly Profits and Emoluments have been vastly augmented, and as their Power is growing every Year more and more extensive, they have now a great Sway in all our Elections, especially those for our Cities and Boroughs, so that in a few Years we may, nay we must expect, that a Majority of this House will always consist of such as hold or expect Offices, Places, or private Pensions, at the Pleasure of the Crown; and what Justice or Mercy the People can expect from such a House of Commons, common Sense, I had almost said, common Experience may instruct.

‘ For this Reason, Sir, if we have a Mind to preserve our Constitution: If we have a Mind that Parliaments should ever be of any Use to the King or his People: If we have a Mind to prevent a Parliament’s being a cumbersome Clog to a good King, and a cruel Instrument of Oppression in the Hands of a tyrannical one, we must pass a Law for limiting the Number of Officers in this House; and this we ought to be the more ardent to have speedily done, because if we are once caught in the Snare, it will be impossible for us ever to escape; for if a Majority of this House should ever once come to consist of a Majority of Officers and Placemen, it is not to be supposed, they would pass a Bill for their own Exclusion. Upon the contrary, if they should entertain the least Jealousy of their not being able to get themselves, or a Majority of such as themselves, chosen at a new Election, they would, by the Authority of a late Precedent*, continue themselves, or they would pass an Excise-Bill, or some such Bill, for giving the Crown an absolute Command over a Ma-

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ajority,

* See the Debate on the Repeal of the Triennial Act, Anno 2. Geo. I. 1716.

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majority of our Elections; and thereby establish an arbitrary Power of the most expensive, cruel, and tyrannical Kind, I mean an arbitrary Power supported by a corrupt Parliament and a numerous mercenary Army. To prevent this, Sir, I rise up to second the Motion made by my worthy Friend. I shall always endeavour to prevent it by my Vote in this House, and if ever it should become necessary, by the Risk of my Life and Fortune in the Field.

Edward Walpole, Esq; spoke next to the following Effect :

Sir,

Mr Edw. Wal-
pole.

‘ As I have sometimes conversed with some of our young Lawyers, who are more ready than the old ones to communicate their Knowledge without a Fee, I have from them learned this Maxim, *Nolumus Leges Angliæ mutari*. This I take to be a good Maxim with Regard to Law, and I take it to be no less a good one with regard to Politicks. We know, we have for many Ages experienced the Happiness of our present Constitution; but no Man can foretel what will be the Consequences of any material Alteration; for which Reason I am, and shall always be against an Alteration, or what the Projectors are always pleased to call an Amendment, unless I have very sensibly felt the Inconvenience of what is proposed to be amended. In the present Case, perhaps my Want of Feeling may proceed from my Want of Experience; but young as I am, as I have the Honour to be a Member of this House, I think myself bound to judge for myself, and not to pin my Faith upon the Feeling or Experience of any other Gentleman; and therefore, I hope, I shall be excus’d if I differ from the two Hon. Gentlemen who have made and seconded this Motion.

‘ I shall readily admit it to be a right Maxim in private Affairs, not to allow any Man to sit as a Judge in a Cause where he has an Interest in the Event of the Suit. This, I say, Sir, is a right Maxim in private Affairs; but in those relating to the Publick it is impossible to admit it; for every Man of the Society must have an Interest in every Thing that relates to the Society in general; and besides this general Interest, there is hardly any Thing comes before us, in which the private Interest of many amongst us has not a particular Concern upon one Side or other. In one of the most important Kinds of Affairs that comes before this Assembly, every Man has a private Interest in being against what is proposed by the Court. When I say this, Sir, I believe, you will readily suppose, I mean the Business of granting Money for the

the publick Service. As this Money must be raised upon the Subject, every Subject, and consequently every Member of this House must have a private Interest in refusing the Grant; and it is certain, that nothing but his Regard for the publick Welfare, or his Expectation of some Favour from the Crown, can prevail with him to consent to a publick Grant, which must necessarily take from him some Part of his private Property.

' In passing of Laws, Sir, the Case is the same. There was never, I believe, a Law passed in this House, which did not some way or other injure the Property, the Privilege, or the Friends or Relations of some of the Members; and many Laws have been proposed here, which were inconsistent with the publick Good, but tended to promote the Interest of some of the Members. In all such Cases nothing but a superior Regard for the publick Good, or an Expectation of some Favour from the Crown, can tempt Men to vote against their private Interest. And even in Cases where private Interest can have no Concern, the Satisfaction of private Passions, such as Repentment, (just or unjust, makes no Difference) Malice, Envy, and the like, must always become a Sort of private Interest or Motive with many Gentlemen in this House, to oppose what is proposed by Ministers, or to propose or support what may tend to distress their Measures; and nothing but a superior Regard for the publick Good, or an Expectation of some Favour from the Crown, can prevail with such Men to act contrary to what would give them such an exquisite Pleasure as the Gratification of any violent Passion.

' In all these Cases, I hope, Gentlemen's Concern for the publick Good, is generally such a prevailing Motive as to overcome every Motive of a private Nature; but however generally this may be the Case, our Constitution has not trusted entirely to it; and therefore it has provided the Crown with the Disposal of all Honours, and many other Favours, to be distributed as a Reward to those who, in all their Actions, shew a disinterested Regard for the public Good, or as a Temptation to the Selfish and Interested for drawing them off from factious Measures, or for inducing them to join with the Government in such Measures, as are really calculated for the Service of the Publick. This, I say, Sir, has been provided by our Constitution, and in my humble Opinion, it is a most wise and necessary Provision; for, I believe, it would be impossible for the most prudent and just Administration, to govern such a numerous Assembly, and to prevent its being often influenced by Faction, if the Crown had no such Favours to bestow.

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‘ I shall grant, Sir, that those Favours may sometimes be misapplied: They may by some Administrations be bestowed upon those only that shew a blind Obedience to Ministers, without any Regard to the Publick; and this may enable Ministers to get some Things passed in Parliament, which would otherwise have been rejected with Disdain; but if Ministers were forming Designs against the publick Liberty, or pursuing Measures that manifestly tend to the Ruin of the Nation, I do not believe, that all the Favours the Crown has now to bestow, could procure a Parliamentary Approbation of such Designs, or Measures; because nothing but private Interest could prevail with Men to approve of such Measures or Designs, and every Man, qualified to be a Member of this House, would find a private Interest in opposing them, I mean the Preservation of his own Estate; and that he would look upon as an Interest superior to any Pension, Place, or Office, the Crown could bestow; for he would consider, that if the Nation were ruined, his private Estate would be sunk in the general Desolation; or if an arbitrary Government was set up, his Property in his Estate would become precarious; and every Man of common Sense will prefer an Estate of 300, or 600*l.* a Year, secured by the Laws of a limited Government to him and his Posterity, I say every Man of common Sense will prefer such an Estate to an Estate, Salary, or Pension, of ten Times the Value, depending upon the Will of an arbitrary Sovereign.

‘ We have no Occasion therefore, Sir, to dread the Introduction of arbitrary Power, from any Number of Officers being Members of this House, as long as those Officers are possessed, in their own Right, of Estates of more Value than any precarious Post or Pension the Crown can bestow, and this we have already provided for sufficiently by express Statute; but if we were to exclude all or the greatest Part of our Officers, civil and military, from having Seats in this House, it would, in my Opinion, certainly introduce Anarchy, which must necessarily be followed by arbitrary Power in some Shape or other; for if the Crown had no Power to reward any Member of this House for shewing a disinterested Zeal for the publick Service, nor any Temptation to throw in the Way of the Selfish or Faction, it would often be impossible to obtain the Consent of such a numerous Assembly, even to the most necessary Measures of Government; and the Wheels of Government being thus entirely stopp’d, a State of Anarchy would ensue, in which Case we may suppose, that all our Officers, civil and military, would rank themselves upon the Side of the Crown,

Crown ; and the Members of this House being without Interest or Character, either in our Fleets or Armies, we may easily judge what the Consequences would be ; for if the Gentlemen concerned in the executive Part of our Government, should once perceive it to be impossible to carry on our publick Affairs, by the Authority of what some Gentlemen are pleased to call an independent Parliament, they would certainly join with the Crown in laying Parliaments entirely aside.

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* Having mentioned, Sir, what some Gentlemen are pleased to call an independent Parliament, I must observe, that they seem thereby to mean an Assembly of Men, no one of whom is governed or biassed in the least by any Regard to his own Interest or Advancement in the World, and that this Assembly should be chose by Electors as disinterested as themselves ; such a Choice, Sir, as well as such an Assembly I must look on as altogether *Utopian* and imaginary : We may please our Imagination with such Representation, but no such Thing had ever any real Existence. Therefore, I shall always call a Parliament independent, if no violent or forcible Means are used for compelling the Electors, or the Members, to vote according to the Direction of him that makes use of such Means ; and it is by such Means only that our Constitution can be overturned ; for mercenary Considerations alone, without the Interposition of any compulsive Method, will never tempt Men to consent to what would render those very Considerations precarious, which would be the infallible Consequence of overturning our Constitution and establishing arbitrary Power ; therefore, I shall never think our Liberties in any Danger, as long as the Crown neither has it in its Power, nor attempts to make use of any violent Method for directing any Man's Vote either at Elections or in Parliament. The Expectation of a Reward may induce a Man to vote with the Court in Questions that are doubtful, and where it is not quite evident to him, which Side of the Question is most for the Publick Good ; but when the Court Side of the Question is apparently inconsistent with the Publick Good, or almost directly tending to the Overthrow of our happy Constitution, tho' I have no very great Opinion of the Virtue or publick Spirit of Mankind, I have so good an Opinion of their common Sense, that I am convinced, no mercenary Expectation could prevail upon a Man of any Fortune or Figure in his Country to vote with the Court in such a Question. Nothing but the Fear of losing his Life, his Liberty, or his private Estate could in such a Case prevail ; and as long

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long as no such Method is attempted to be made use of, we have nothing to fear from the Honours or Offices in the Disposal of the Crown. By a cautious and prudent Distribution of those Honours and Offices amongst the Members of this House, the Ends of Faction may be disappointed, but the Constitution can never be overturned.

‘ I hope it will now appear, Sir, that this Question is not of so clear a Nature as the Gentlemen who moved it seem to imagine. It is a Question of such a perplexed Nature, that it is very excusable in any Gentleman to change his Sentiments with regard to it ; and therefore, if any Gentleman should now appear against it, who formerly appeared to be for it, it would be very uncharitable to conclude, that this Alteration in his Conduct proceeded from an Alteration in his Situation. We ought in Charity to suppose, that his Sentiments with respect to it are really changed ; and I believe, every Gentleman who is transferred from being a Country Gentleman to be a Minister of State, will find more Reason for a Change of Sentiments in this Respect, than he ever before suspected he should. He will then acquire a Knowledge of Mankind, which he never could before acquire : He will then be able to penetrate further into the private Views by which Men are actuated, and he will see how difficult it is, to get a Majority of this House to unite in the most prudent and necessary Measure that can be thought of. This may furnish him with very sufficient Reasons for a real Change in his Sentiments, and if any such Change should appear in this Debate, it ought, I think, to be a strong Argument with all those, who have upon former Occasions appeared against this Question, for adhering to their former Opinion.

‘ Then, Sir, as to the distressed Condition which the Affairs of *Europe*, or the Affairs of this Nation are in, I shall grant that the Affairs of *Europe* are in a very distressed Condition at present, but as to the Affairs of this Nation, I cannot conceive them to be in any distressed Condition ; and if I did, should avoid insisting upon it in such a publick Assembly, at a Time when a good Opinion of our Affairs at Foreign Courts, is so necessary for giving Weight to those Negotiations, we must be supposed to be carrying on, for forming a Confederacy in Opposition to the ambitious Views of those that have long been Enemies to publick Liberty. But thank God ! whatever may be said by some Gentlemen in this House, no Foreigner who knows any Thing of this Nation can suppose, that our Affairs are in any Sort of Distress. Our publick Credit is so well established that, instead of receiving

ceiving a Shock from the present Confusions in *Europe*, it has rather been improv'd; and tho' our Trade may suffer a little in one Branch by our present War with *Spain*, yet notwithstanding the Interruption it meets with from *Spanish* Privateers, it is certainly now in as flourishing a Condition as ever it was in any Time preceeding. We have, 'tis true, still remaining a great Load of publick Debts; but this is not owing to any Mismanagement at home, but to the many Broils we have been of late Years engaged in by the Ambition of Foreign Courts, and to the great Tendernefs both his late and present Majesty have shewn towards their People, especially the Landed Interest.

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' Our own Affairs therefore, Sir, can afford no Argument for shewing, that ever our Parliament has been prevailed on by a corrupt Influence to approve of any wrong Measures; and as to the Affairs of *Europe*, tho' they are at present in great Confusion, I am sure, it can no Way be imputed to any Misconduct in our Administration. Will any Gentleman pretend, that our War with *Spain* was provoked by any rash Step in our Ministers? Can it be said, that we gave Encouragement to the King of *Prussia*, or the Elector of *Bavaria*, to attack the Queen of *Hungary*; or that we encouraged the *French* to send their Troops into *Germany*, or the *Spaniards* to send their Troops into *Italy*? Are not all the Confusions in *Europe* owing to the Ambition or Obstinacy of Foreign Courts, and not to any Misconduct of ours? Has not our Court tried all the Methods that could be thought of, for preventing or putting an End to those Confusions? The Parliament had therefore good Reason to approve of all our Foreign Measures, and consequently that Approbation could not be owing to their Judgments being biassed, or their Votes directed, by any Favours enjoyed, or expected from the Crown.

' Therefore, Sir, as we have never suffered any Prejudice from the Number of Officers in this House: As we have no Reason to apprehend Danger from any Number that can be in it, in any future Parliament; and, as I think, that the excluding them from Seats in this House would be of the most dangerous Consequence to our Constitution, I must be against the Motion.

Lord *Strange* * spoke in Favour of the Motion.

Sir,

' As we seem to improve every Day in those Doctrines that are introductory of arbitrary Power, the Doctrine of Corruption has this Day been pushed farther than ever, I believe

* Eldest Son of the Earl of Derby.

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believe, it was in this House. It has been represented not only as a harmless but a necessary Implement of Government; and all the Laws we have for excluding Pensioners, and several Sorts of Officers, from having Seats in this House, may, by the same Sort of Reasoning, be proved to be subversive of our Constitution, and introductory of Anarchy, Confusion, and arbitrary Power. If a Gentleman of a small Estate, or of an Estate, however large, that cannot supply the Wants of his Luxury or Avarice, cannot be supposed capable of being induced, by any mercenary Motive the Crown can throw in his Way, to consent to Grants or Regulations, or to approve of Measures that tend towards the Introduction of arbitrary Power, or that appear to be inconsistent with the publick Good, why should we exclude Pensioners, why should we exclude the Commissioners and Officers of our Customs and Excise, from having Seats in this House? If the Power of granting pecuniary and mercenary Rewards to Members be so necessary for the managing of this House, and for answering the necessary Ends of Government, why should we in any Respect abridge that Power, which, if never so extensive, can do us no Harm, and which, if too much abridged, may overset both our Government and Constitution? Surely, no Man of common Sense would make the least Approach towards a Precipice, if he could keep his Distance without the least Danger or Inconvenience; therefore, if we admit this Doctrine, we must suppose those Parliaments void of common Sense, in which the Laws we now have for excluding Pensioners and several Sorts of Officers were agreed to.

But Experience in all Ages and all Countries, Sir, must convince us, that this Doctrine is false, deceitful and pernicious. In all Countries where arbitrary Power ever was, or is now set up, Corruption was the Footstool upon which it mounted into the Throne. By Corruption Men are induced to arm their Magistrates, or supreme Magistrate, with such Powers as enable them to destroy, first the Essence, and afterwards the very Face of publick Liberty. Whilst arbitrary Power is in its Infancy, and creeping up by Degrees to Man's Estate, no Doubt it will, it must refrain from Acts of Violence and Compulsion. It will by Bribery gain the Consent of those it has not as yet got Strength enough to compel; but when it is by Bribery grown up to its full Strength and Vigour, even Bribery itself will be neglected, and whoever then opposes its Views will be ruined, either by open Violence, or false Informations, and cook'd up Prosecutions.

* I shall grant, Sir, that if the Question were put in plain An. 16. Geo. II.
 and direct Terms, no Man, or at least very few, would agree to give up their Property in their Estates, for the Sake of a much greater Estate or Pension, depending upon the Will of an arbitrary Sovereign. But such a Question never was, nor ever will be put by those who aim at arbitrary Power. They always find specious Pretences for some new Power, or some little Increase of Power, and then another new Power, or another little Increase of Power, till at last their Power becomes by Degrees uncontrollable; and Men of corrupt Hearts are, by mercenary Motives, prevented from considering or foreseeing the Consequences of the new or additional Powers they grant. It is, I think, highly probable, that *Julius Cæsar* had laid the Scheme of enslaving his Country, before he obtained the Province of *Trans-Alpine Gaul*. For this Purpose he rightly judged, that it was necessary to get a great Army under his Command, and by his Continuance in Success in that Command, to render that Army more attached to him than to the Laws and Liberties of their Country. For obtaining that Command, and for continuing in it, he knew he must depend upon the Votes of his Fellow Citizens; and that for his Success in it he must depend upon his own Conduct. If he had told his Fellow Citizens that he wanted from them such an Army as might enable him to oppress the Liberties of his Country, they would certainly have refused it: Notwithstanding the Avarice, Luxury, and Selfishness then prevailing amongst them, he could not by all his Bribery have got them to agree to such a direct Question. He therefore at first proposed to them only to give him the Command of *Cis-Alpine Gaul*, with *Illyria* annexed, which by Bribery, and by having insinuated himself into great Favour with the People, he obtained, and by the same Means he got the *Trans-Alpine Gaul* added to it. This gave him the Command of a great Army, and the People being blinded by his Largeesses and his Successes, they continued him in that Command till he made his Army so absolutely his own, that it established him in arbitrary Power, and so effectually destroyed the Liberties of the People, that they could never again be restored; for the short Interval between his Death and the Establishment of his Successor, *Augustus Cæsar*, was no free or regular Government, but a continued Series of Usurpation, Murder, and Civil War.

* If the People of *Rome*, Sir, had foreseen the Consequences of their Favours to *Julius Cæsar*, they would certainly have refused granting him so many; but they were

so

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so blinded by their Corruption, that they did not consider the Consequences. This destroyed irrecoverably that glorious Republick; and this will destroy every Republick, where any one Man has Wealth or Power enough to corrupt a great Number of People. Let us consider, Sir, in what Liberty and Property truly consists, and we shall see, that where any one Man has in his Power a large Fund for Corruption, both may be absolutely destroyed, and an arbitrary Power established, before People become generally sensible of their Danger. A Man's Liberty consists in its not being in the Power of any Man or Magistrate, with Impunity, to imprison or kill him, or inflict any personal Punishment upon him, unless he has been formally tried, and justly condemned by that Method of Trial, and by those Laws, which have been established, and are approved of by the Majority of the Society to which he belongs. Property again consists in a Man's being secure of enjoying, and transmitting to his Posterity, what has been left to him by his Ancestors, or acquired by his own Industry, unless the Whole, or some Part of it, be taken from him, in Pursuance of Laws that have been established, and are approved by the Majority of the Society to which he belongs. Whilst this is the Case, every Man of the Society enjoys Liberty and Property in their full Extent; and this will be our Case as long as our Elections and Parliaments remain free from any Influence, either compulsive or corrupt.

But suppose, Sir, a Majority of our House of Commons consisted of such as held lucrative Places from the Crown, and suppose a Judge were to be brought before them, who, for the Sake of some corrupt Consideration, had, at the Desire of the Crown, illegally and unjustly condemned and imprisoned many of his Fellow Subjects; would not the Crown, I mean the Ministers of the Crown, endeavour to protect such a Judge? Would not they give Hints to their Officers in this House, that a Dismission would be the certain Consequence of their giving a Vote against this Tool of a Judge? And can we suppose, that many of those Officers would chuse to lose a Place of 500 *l.* or 1000 *l.* a Year, rather than give a Vote in Favour of this Judge? Sir, I have a very great Opinion of our present Judges, but without any Reflection upon them, I will say, that it is upon the Independency and Integrity of our Parliaments that we must depend for the Integrity and Impartiality of our Judges; for the Crown has many Ways to reward a pliable Judge, and as many to punish an obstinate one: Nay,

if

if Parliaments were once become dependent upon the Crown, An. 16. Geo. II.
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 an obstinate Integrity would of itself be sufficient for getting a Judge removed by the Address of both Houses of Parliament; for if the Majority of Parliament were such as depended upon the Crown for getting or holding some lucrative Employment, they would be easily persuaded, that such a Judge had done Injustice to the Crown, or had fomented Sedition by shewing Favour to the Seditious, and under this Pretence, they would vote for addressing to remove him, without considering, that they thereby established arbitrary Power, and made not only their own Estates, but their Lives and Liberties dependent upon the arbitrary Will of their Sovereign; for by this Precedent all our Judges would be convinced, that they must take Directions from the Ministers of the Crown in all Prosecutions, Trials, and Causes that might afterwards come before them; and what Man could say, he had any Liberty or Property left, if the Ministers of the Crown had it in their Power to take his Life, Liberty, or Estate from him, whenever they pleased, by a false Accusation, and a mock Trial?

* Even after such a fatal Turn in our Constitution, as long as a Spirit of Corruption prevailed among the People, and the Court kept within the Bounds of common Decency, there would be no Occasion for any compulsive Methods either at Elections or in Parliament, because the Ministers would always find People enough that would be ready to take their Money or their Favours, and in Expectation or Return would agree to vote as directed; but if by the ridiculous Conduct of the Court a Spirit of Liberty should arise among the People, the violent and compulsive Methods usual in such Cases would be made use of. Informers, or *Dilatores*, as the *Romans* called them, would be found out and retained, and spread over the whole Nation, in order to bring false Informations against those who dared to oppose the Court either at Elections or in Parliament; and in both, Men would be forced to vote according to the Directions of a Minister, in order to preserve that Property by a slavish Subjection, which they had before been endeavouring to encrease by a villainous Corruption.

* After what I have said, Sir, I hope, I need not particularly mention all the other Methods, by which a corrupt dependent Parliament may sap the Foundations of our Constitution: Ensnaring Laws may be made, or the Laws we have for securing our Liberties may be repealed or suspended, upon various Pretences, without a corrupt Man's being sensible, that he is thereby exposing his own Estate to the precarious
 Tenure

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Tenure of Arbitrary Power. On Pretence of a sham Plot or a pretended Disaffection, the *Habeas Corpus* Act, that Corner Stone of our Liberties, may be suspended for a Twelvemonth, and under the same Pretence that Suspension may be renewed for another, and a third Twelvemonth, till at last the annual Suspension of that salutary Law may go as glibly down as the Mutiny or Malt-Tax Bill now does ; for when these two Bills were first introduced, no Man supposed, they would ever become Bills of Course, to be passed without Opposition in every succeeding Session of Parliament.

The keeping up a standing Army in this Island in Time of Peace, was always till the Revolution deemed inconsistent with our Constitution. Since that Time, indeed, we have always thought, that the keeping up of a small Number of regular Troops is necessary for preserving our Constitution, or at least the present Establishment. How far this may be right I shall not pretend to determine, but I must observe, that the famous Scheme for overturning our Constitution, which was publish'd in the Year 1629, required but 3000 Foot for this Purpose ; and if King Charles the First had, in the Year 1641, been provided with such a Number of regular Troops, upon whom he might have depended for overawing the Mob of the City of *London*, his Fate, I believe, would have been very different from what it was. I am very far from thinking, that such a very small Number, even now our People are so much disused to Arms, would be sufficient for overturning our Constitution ; but there is a certain Number which would be infallibly sufficient for this Purpose, and it is not easy to determine how near we may now be come to that Number. Now suppose, we are come within 2 or 3000 of that Number, and that a Minister, in order to render his Success against our Constitution infallible, should upon some specious Pretence or other desire the Parliament to consent to an Augmentation of 2 or 3000 Men to our Army ; can we suppose that such a small Augmentation, upon a plausible Pretence, would be refused by a Parliament, chiefly composed of Officers and Placemen ? Can we suppose, that any Man would risk his losing a lucrative Employment, by voting against such a small Augmentation ? Some Civil Powers to be executed by Civil Officers, and some Military Powers to be executed by a Standing Army, or a standing Militia, are certainly necessary in all Governments : I am afraid, it is impossible to preserve a free Government, when all those Powers are lodged in one single Man ; but when they are not only lodged in one single Man, but greatly increased beyond what is necessary for

for the Support of a free Government, I am sure the Freedom of that Government must soon be at an End ; and it is very hard to distinguish between the Powers necessary for the Support of a free Government, and those that are sufficient for establishing an arbitrary one : The Partition is so thin that it may easily be mistaken, and certainly will be mistaken, by most of those who are under a Temptation to judge partially in Favour of arbitrary Power.

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‘ This, Sir, must convince every true Lover of Liberty, how necessary it is, that no Member of this Assembly, or at least as few as possible, should lie under such a Temptation. I shall grant, that in most Things that come before this House, some of our Members may have a private Interest in opposing or agreeing to it, but as long as this private Interest does not proceed from the Favours they enjoy or expect from the Crown, it can never injure the publick Good ; because if some have a private Interest in opposing, others will have a private Interest in agreeing to what is proposed, and those whose private Interest is no Way concerned, will always cast the Balance in favour of the publick Good. The granting of Money is the only Case where we can suppose the Members generally engaged, by their private Interest, to oppose what is necessary for the publick Service ; but this Interest is so small with regard to each particular Member, that it can never be of any Weight : This is demonstrated, Sir, from the whole Course of our History ; for I defy any Man to give me an Instance, where the Parliament denied granting what was necessary for the publick Service, unless they were denied Justice with regard to the Redress of Grievances, or unless they had well grounded Apprehensions that the Money would be misapplied.

‘ But let us see, Sir, how this Argument will stand upon the other Side of the Question. It is certain, that the Parliament ought never to grant more than is absolutely necessary for the publick Service : It is likewise certain, that we never ought to grant even what is necessary, till all Grievances be redressed, and our former Grants regularly and strictly accounted for. This is our Duty as Members of this House, but shall we perform this Duty, if a Majority of us be greatly concerned in Interest to neglect it ? And this will always be the Case, if a Majority of us hold or expect some lucrative Office or Employment at the Pleasure of the Crown ; because it will always be the Interest of Ministers, and even their Safety may sometimes be concerned, in our not performing this Duty. Suppose, they ask from Parliament 500,000 l. or a Million for carrying on some whimsical, perhaps pernicious

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An. 16. Geo. II. ous Scheme of their own ; will a Member of this House, who is to pay for his Share not above 50 l. of this Sum, refuse granting it, when he is to get or hold 500 l. or 1000 l. a Year by consenting to the Grant ? Will a Member of this House insist upon first redressing a Grievance, by which he suffers little, perhaps no sensible Prejudice, when he is to get or hold 2 or 300 l. a Year by letting it remain ? And finally, Sir, will a Member of this House call Ministers to a strict Account, by which he can never expect to put a Farthing into his own Pocket, when by neglecting to do so, he may get or hold a good Post or Employment, and perhaps preserve a round Sum which he himself has purloined from the Publick ?

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‘ Sir, I was sorry to hear a young Gentleman talk so much of Mens private Passions and Affections, and of every Man’s having a View to the Service of some favourite private Passion, in every Vote he gave in Parliament or at Elections. I hope the Case is far otherwise, but if it is not, we ought to endeavour to make it so, by putting it out of the Power (at least as far as we can by such Laws as this) of any Man to serve himself, by his Way of voting in Parliament or at Elections, any farther than may result to him from the general Good of his Country. If we can do this : If we can put it out of the Power of the Selfish and Mercenary to sell their Votes in Parliament, no Man will purchase a Seat there at any high Price, and this will of course put an End to Bribery and Corruption at Elections ; for no mercenary Soul will purchase what he cannot sell, and those who are prompted by their Ambition to purchase, will never go to any high Price, nor will they submit to be the Slaves of a Minister after they have purchased. Even Ministers themselves would cease their Bribery at Elections, because they could not depend upon having their Candidate’s Vote in Parliament, if he had no lucrative Office depending upon his voting always with the Minister ; and if the Flood-Gates of the Treasury were not opened at any Election, I am convinced, we should soon have little or no Bribery in the Kingdom.

‘ Whilst there are Purchasers, Sir, there will be Sellers : I am afraid there are at present too many of both ; but if you can make it worth no Man’s while to purchase, you will put an End to the Traffick ; and this is the Design of the Bill now proposed. I have shewn, that if you do not agree to it, there will be, there must be a corrupt Dependency in Parliament ; that by such a Dependency our Constitution may be overturned, without any compulsive Dependency ; and

and that the latter may be made use of by an arbitrary Government, and certainly will be made use of, as soon as it becomes necessary for the Support of its arbitrary Power. Upon this Side, Sir, the Danger is certain and inevitable; let us then consider the Danger pretended to be on the other. If we exclude Officers, or the greatest Part of them, from having Seats in this House, it is said, it will introduce Anarchy and Confusion, because it will be impossible to govern such a numerous Assembly as this, without a Power in the Crown to reward those who appear zealous in its Service; and that as soon as this Impossibility is perceived, all our Officers, civil and military, will join with the Crown in laying aside the Use of Parliaments.

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What the Hon. Gentleman may mean, Sir, by governing such a numerous Assembly, I do not know; but according to the common Acceptation of the Word, I should be sorry to see it in the Power of Ministers to govern either House of Parliament, by any other Method than that of convincing the Majority, that nothing is proposed or intended but what is for the publick Good; for if either House were to be governed by the Hopes of Reward, I am sure, it could be of no Service to the People, and of very little even to the Crown itself; because the Design and Use of Parliaments is, that they may be a Check upon the Conduct of Ministers; and no Man whose Behaviour in this House is governed by his Hopes of Reward, will ever set himself up as a Check upon the Conduct of those who alone can bestow the Reward he expects. We must therefore suppose, that Ministers may prevail with a Majority of this House to approve or agree to what appears to be for the publick Service, without having it in their Power to give a Title, Post, or Pension, to every one that approves of their Measures; or otherwise we must conclude, that no such House ought to exist, and, consequently, that the very Form of a limited Government ought to be abolished in this selfish and corrupt Nation. What Effect some late corrupt Practices may have had upon the Genius and Morals of the lower Sort of People, I do not know; but, I hope, it has as yet had little or no Effect upon the Generality of those that have any Chance of being Members of this House; and unless they are become very much degenerated, we must from Experience conclude, that when our Ministers pursue popular and right Measures, they may depend upon the Assistance and Approbation of Parliament. This, I say, we must from Experience conclude, for in former Ages our Ministers had but few Rewards to bestow, and yet they never failed of having the Parliament's

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Approbation, when their Measures were such as were agreeable to the People. Nay, from the very Nature of the Case we must draw the same Conclusion ; for a House of Commons freely chosen by the People, must approve of what the People approves of: If from selfish Motives they should disapprove, or oppose such Measures, the opposing Members would be sure of being turned out at the next Election ; and as the King has it in his Power to bring on a new Election whenever he pleases, his Ministers may easily get rid of such selfish, mean spirited Members, and may, consequently, if they desire it, always have a Parliament generally composed of Gentlemen of true Honour and publick Spirit ; but the contrary is what most Ministers desire, as has of late been manifest from the Characters of those who were generally set up as Candidates upon the Court Interest.

‘ We can never therefore be in Danger of Anarchy or Confusion, from its not being in the Power of a Minister to bribe a Majority of this House into his Measures, nor can we suppose that the People will refuse a Majority of those who have, in a former Session, opposed what was agreeable to the greatest Part of their Constituents ; but when Bribery and corrupt Motives prevail within Doors, they will certainly prevail without, and then we may see a Member burnt in Effigy one Year in the publick Streets of his Borough, and rechosen the Year following as their Representative in a new Parliament : We may see the most notorious fraudulent Practices carried on by the Underlings in Power, and those Underlings encouraged by the Minister, and protected by a Majority in Parliament : We may see the most unpopular and destructive Measures pursued by our Ministers, and all approved, nay applauded by Parliament. These Things we may see, Sir : These Things we have seen within these last twenty Years ; and this has brought our Affairs both at home and abroad into the melancholy Situation which is now acknowledged by all, and will soon, I fear, be severely felt by the whole Nation.

‘ If the present Distress of our domestick Affairs were a Secret, I should avoid mentioning it as much as any Gentleman whatever ; but alas ! it is no Secret either to our Enemies or Friends ; and this makes the former despise us, and the latter shy of entering into any Engagements with us. We may threaten, but our Enemies know, we are unable to carry our Threats into Execution ; We may promise, but our Friends know, we are unable to perform our Engagements. This Knowledge has made those who are the professed Enemies of publick Liberty more daring in their Attempts, and,

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I am afraid, it will render it impossible to form any Confederacy sufficient for defeating their present ambitious Projects; and it is so evident that this Misfortune has been brought upon us and *Europe* by our bad OEconomy at home, and our wicked, wrong-headed, or pusillanimous Conduct abroad, that I am surpris'd to hear the contrary asserted now, when the fatal Consequences of our Conduct are become so glaring.

I shall grant, Sir, that the Nation has been of late Years involv'd in many Broils, but I will affirm, and it has been fully proved at the respective Times those Broils happened, that every one we have been engaged in since his late Majesty's Accession to the Throne, has proceeded from some Scheme of our own contriving, or from some wrong Step in our own Administration. I shall not trouble you with taking Notice of every Particular, because it would be tedious, and, I think, unnecessary; therefore I shall confine myself to the three Wars now carrying on in *Europe*, I mean that between *Spain* and us; that between the Elector of *Bavaria* assisted by the *French*, and the Queen of *Hungary*; and that between the *Swedes* and *Muscovites*; and I shall shew, that every one of them proceeded from the ridiculous Conduct of our Ministers. With regard to the *Spanish* War, if our Ministers had, at the Time of the Treaty of *Seville*, insisted upon an Explanation of former Treaties, which had, before that Time, been misinterpreted by *Spain*: If they had insisted upon *Spain's* giving up her Pretence of visiting, searching, or seizing, in Time of Peace, any Ships in the high Seas of *America*, on Account of what they called contraband Goods, I am convinced, the Court of *Spain* would have agreed to give up that Pretence, in the most explicit Terms, rather than lose the Advantages stipulated for them by that Treaty. Even after this false Step, if our Ministers had properly resent'd the Treatment our Commissaries met with at the Court of *Spain*, and had peremptorily insisted upon immediate Satisfaction for the first Insult our Merchant Ships met with in the Seas of *America*, the *Spanish* Court would have complied, rather than enter into a War with this Nation, at the very Time they were engag'd in a War with the *Emperor* in *Italy*. But instead of this, our Ministers, ever since the Year 1720, appeared so complaisant in every Negotiation with that Court, and submitted so tamely to every Insult, that the Court of *Spain* began to imagine, that we would give up the Point in Dispute, rather than come to an open Rupture with them; and this, I am perswaded, would have been the Consequence of the

An. 16. Geo. II. late Convention, if the Indignation of our People had not
 1742. at last got the better of the Submission of our Ministers.

Our present War with *Spain* is, therefore, evidently owing to the ill-timed Complaisance and Pusillanimity of our Ministers, and yet this Complaisance and Pusillanimity was in every Step approved by our Parliaments, and has not even yet been censured, notwithstanding the fatal Consequence it has produced, and the Disappointment of all those Hopes, with which our Ministers so confidently flattered us, that their tedious Negotiations would at last end in an honourable and advantageous Peace.

Then, Sir, with Regard to the War in *Germany*, even the King of *Prussia*'s invading *Silesia* was owing to the bad Conduct of our Ministers; for if they had insisted upon Satisfaction, with regard to his Claims upon *Silesia*, before they guaranty'd the *Pragmatick Sanction*, they might have obtained a Stipulation for that Purpose from the Court of *Vienna*, which would have prevented that Invasion. But even after this Neglect, they might have prevented the War now carrying on in *Germany*; for the King of *Prussia* offer'd such Terms as ought in Prudence, perhaps in Justice too, to have been accepted by the Court of *Vienna*, and would have been accepted by that Court, if we had insisted upon it as the Condition *sine qua non* of our giving them any Assistance. If we had done this, it is evident from Facts and Dates, that the Elector of *Bavaria* would never have been chosen *Emperor*, nor would he have attack'd the Queen of *Hungary*, and in that Case no *Frenchman* would have enter'd *Germany* in a hostile Manner; for none of the *French* Troops enter'd *Germany*, nor did the Elector of *Bavaria* commit any one Act of Hostility against the Queen of *Hungary*, till the King of *Prussia* was drove into their Alliance by the Obstinacy of the Court of *Vienna*; and that Court was encouraged in their Obstinacy by our Ministers, which I need not trouble you with demonstrating, because it is evident not only from the Papers upon our Table, but also from the Resolution of this House in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary*, before she had any other declared Enemy beside *Prussia*, and especially from the violent Speeches that were made by some Gentlemen upon that Occasion.

Having thus shewn, Sir, that it was by the bad Conduct of our Ministers that the *French* and *Bavarians* were encouraged to attack the Queen of *Hungary*, I need not use many Words to prove, that the War between *Sweden* and *Muscovy* is owing to the same Cause; for from the Time
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that War was declared by *Sweden* it is evident, that if the *French* had not resolved to send their Troops into *Germany*, the *Swedes* would not have declared War against *Muscovy*; and consequently, if the Conduct of our Ministers was the Cause of the *French* resolving to send their Troops into *Germany*, it was the ultimate Cause of the *Swedes* declaring War against *Muscovy*.

It is therefore evident, Sir, that not only the present Distresses of this Nation, but all the Distresses and Confusions in which *Europe* is at present involved, are owing to the late Measures of our Administration; and tho' the Consequences were not perhaps at first so visible as they are at present, yet it cannot be said, they were not foretold; for what we now see has been often foretold both within Doors and without; and, appeared manifest to a great Majority of the Nation, tho' to our great Misfortune it never appeared so to a Majority of this House, which I am not at all surpris'd at, considering the great Number of Placemen and Expectants we had always in this Assembly. That any of those Placemen or Expectants were wilfully blind, I shall not pretend to say: I do believe, that many, if not all of them, were impos'd on by the specious Pretences made use of upon each respective Occasion; and I the rather believe so, because, I know how easy it is to impose upon Men, when their own private Interest is made the Harbinger of the Deceit; but the Misfortunes we now labour under, and the Evidence from whence those Misfortunes have all proceeded, ought to be a prevailing Argument with us, to prevent any publick Deceit's being hereafter introduced into this House by the same Sort of Gentleman-Usher. That this Bill will be altogether effectual for this Purpose, is what I shall not pretend to assert, but I am convinced, it will have some Effect; and as it is the best Remedy I can think of at present, I am therefore for agreeing to the Motion.

Mr Philips spoke next to the following Effect;

Sir,

Mr Philips,

As I had the Honour to be one of those that received the Commands of the House last Session, to bring in a Bill of this Nature, I can't sit still, and not testify my Approbation of it now. — If ever there was a Time when it was necessary to preserve the Purity of this House, and to guard against the Influence that the Enjoyment of Power and Profit is too apt to have on the Minds of Men, this is the Time,

An. 16. Geo. II. when the Nation is poor, groaning under the Burden of heavy Taxes, and yet luxurious and extravagant in the Pursuit of Pleasures. — Nothing can so effectually preserve this Nation from Ruin, as the maintaining of innate Freedom within these Walls, and nothing can so effectually attack and get the better of that Freedom, as the Allurements of Places and Offices, which insensibly lead Men away from their first Resolves, and at length, by Custom and Example, quite harden and corrupt them. — A Bill therefore of this Nature, that so evidently tends (if you'll give me Leave to use the Expression) to lead Men out of Temptation, must necessarily deliver them from Evil; therefore I heartily concur in the Motion.

Mr Sandys. Upon this Occasion Mr *Sandys*, Chancellor of the Exchequer, spoke to the following Purpose :

Sir,

‘ As it is very well known, and, I doubt not, very well remembered, that I had last Session the Honour not only to be one of those that received the Commands of this House to bring in such a Bill, as is now propos’d, but was also the first Mover for it, and as I shall now be against the Motion, I think myself bound in Duty to my Sovereign, to myself, to my Country, and to the Liberties of *Europe*, to give my Reasons for this Change in my Behaviour, which, without an Explanation, might, perhaps, by some Gentlemen, be presumed to proceed from Motives of a mercenary or ambitious Nature; and I must begin, Sir, with assuring you, that this Change in my Behaviour does not proceed from any Change in my Situation, or from any Change in my Sentiments with regard to the Bill itself, but merely from a Change in the Circumstances of our Affairs both Abroad and at Home.

‘ With regard to the Necessity of our having such a Bill as this passed into a Law, my Sentiments are rather confirmed than altered by my Change of Situation; but, I hope, there is no Gentleman in this House so deficient in that Respect which is due to his Sovereign, as to chuse to have his Majesty’s Assent to any necessary Bill rather compelled than freely obtained. When I talk of his Majesty, Sir, every Gentleman must be sensible, that my Duty as a Subject, and now as a Servant, obliges me to express myself with the greatest Caution; but as the great King *William* sometimes altered his Sentiments with regard to Bills in Parliament, I hope, I may say, without any Breach of my Duty, that the wisest of Kings are in some Cases too much influenced in their Sentiments, with regard to Bills offered to them by Parliament, by the artful
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Insinuations of those who have accidentally and undeservedly An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.
the Honour of being in their Councils. Tho' his present

Majesty's Sentiments, with regard to the Bill now proposed, were never publickly known: Tho' he never was brought under a Necessity to declare them, yet we have great Reason to believe, that he was last Session prejudiced against any such Bill as was then passed by this House. This, I believe the Majority of us were then convinced of; but we had then the Misfortune to be convinced likewise, that he had no Man in his Councils who would attempt or presume to remove those Prejudices. This made it necessary for the Parliament to interfere, and by passing such a Bill to endeavour to remove those Prejudices, by shewing him it was agreeable to his supreme, however disagreeable it might be to his subordinate Councils. But thank God! our Circumstances in this Respect are very much altered. I hope, we are all convinced, I am sure, I am convinced, that his Majesty has now some Gentlemen in his Councils that will take the Liberty to endeavour to remove his Prejudices, by shewing that such a Bill as this, no Way inroads upon his Prerogative, and is absolutely necessary for preserving the Liberties of his People; and as soon as they have done this Piece of Service to their Country, I am convinced, they will themselves propose the bringing of such a Bill into this House, which would certainly communicate a more exquisite Pleasure to every Man who wishes well to our present Royal Family, than can be communicated by his Majesty's bare Assent to such a Bill.

* I shall grant, Sir, that we are obliged, and ought to acknowledge our Gratitude to our Sovereign, even when he does no more than barely give the Royal Assent to an useful, necessary, and popular Bill; but the Obligation is certainly much greater, and will contribute more towards gaining his Majesty the Affections of his People, when such a Bill flows originally from the Crown itself, and is introduced here by those who are the known Servants of the Crown; therefore as this Bill is an useful and popular Bill, it must be the Desire of every Gentleman who has a Regard for the present Royal Family, that it should come from the Crown itself; and as we have great Reason to expect this from some of those who have been lately introduced into his Majesty's Councils, as soon as they can gain a prevailing Influence there, it is well worth our While to wait a Session or two, for an Event which is so much to be wished for by every true Friend to the Protestant Establishment.


* Thus, Sir, I have shewn such a Difference in the Circumstances of our Affairs at Home, as ought, I think, to prevail

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prevail with every Gentleman to suspend, at least for one Session, his Desire of having such a Law passed ; and with regard to the Circumstances of our Affairs Abroad, there is likewise a Difference, which ought to be an additional Argument for suspending our Desires in Favour of this Bill. The Affairs of *Europe* were last Session at such a Crisis as demanded the most vigorous Resolutions in our Councils, but we had then the Misfortune to have a Person at the Head of our Administration, from whom we could expect no such Resolution. From his Influence we could expect nothing but an inglorious Peace, or a sham War. In these Circumstances a Contest with our Sovereign could be no Detriment, but might be of great Advantage to the Nation, because it could produce nothing of worse Consequence than such a Peace or War as was to be expected from that Minister's Conduct, and it might produce a Change in our Administration. This was a Reason for our pushing the Bill at that Time, even tho' known to be contrary to our Sovereign's Inclination. His Majesty's Wisdom and Goodness, and his Regard for the Cries of his People, at last prevailed : The obnoxious Persons were removed from the Administration, and in their Stead have been put some Gentlemen, from whom we may expect the most wise as well as the most vigorous Measures with regard to our Foreign Affairs. They have already given us Testimonies both of their Wisdom and Resolution. From their Conduct, supported by a perfect Harmony between his Majesty and his Parliament, we may expect a glorious Peace, or a vigorous and successful War ; and therefore, we ought to be extremely cautious of doing any Thing that may interrupt that Harmony ; because such an Interruption can now be attended with no Advantage either to this Nation or to *Europe*, but would certainly expose both to a Ruin which might otherwise have been prevented.

Now, Sir, let us consider the Circumstances in which we stand at present. We have all the Reason in the World to believe, that this Bill has been represented to his Majesty, by some of those that were lately about him, as an Incroachment upon the Prerogatives of the Crown, and a Step towards introducing a Republican Form of Government. We have Reason to believe, that by such Misrepresentations his Majesty has conceived some Prejudices against it ; and we cannot suppose, that those who have so lately been introduced into his Councils, have yet had Time to eradicate those Prejudices. If this Bill should be offered to him for his Assent, whilst he remained under such Prejudices, he would look upon it as a most ungrateful Return
from

from a Parliament to which he had made such a Sacrifice : An. 16. Geo. II. 1742. 

Nay, he would look upon it as an Attempt upon his Crown, and an Affront to his Person ; and in such a Case, from his Majesty's known Courage and high Spirit, must we not suppose, that he would reject it with the utmost Disdain ?

* This, Sir, would certainly produce a Rupture between his Majesty and his Parliament ; and in the present Circumstances of *Europe*, I tremble to think of the Consequences of such a Rupture. What has hitherto been the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*, what has encouraged her Subjects to venture their Lives and Fortunes so bravely, I may say, so desperately, in her Defence, has been the Hopes that Assistance would at last come from afar, even from the remotest Corners of the *British* Dominions. But if such a Rupture should ensue, what could she or her Subjects expect from us ? Instead of being able to assist her, we should be involved in endless Disputes, perhaps in a tedious and destructive Civil War amongst ourselves : Thus that brave and heroic Queen would at last be obliged to submit to the Power of *France* ; and *Polyphemus's* Favour, of our being the last Morfel, would be the only one we could expect from that insolent Nation.

* For these Reasons, Sir, tho' I am as great a Friend as ever to the Bill now proposed, tho' I shall be ready to embrace the first favourable Opportunity for having it passed into a Law, yet I am against pushing for it at present, especially as I have, I think, good Reason to believe, that I shall in a very short Time have the Pleasure of seeing it readily agreed to by every Branch of our Legislature.

Mr *Velters Cornwall* replied to the following Effect :
Sir,

Mr *Velters*
Cornwall.

* Notwithstanding what has been alledg'd, I shall take the Freedom to speak my Opinion of this Bill and of the present Measures ; and I do assure the House, I have had no Share in the Scramble for Places. My Political Ambition, according to the old Expression, has cost me many a grey Groat ; it has brought me nothing. A Gentleman has said, that if the Lords had expected this Return, they had not pass'd the last * Bill. We have nothing to do with the Lords,

* The Author of a late Pamphlet, call'd *FACTION DETECTED*, who, if he was not Himself principally concern'd in the Direction of Affairs, at the Grand Crisis in February 1741, [See Vol. XIII.] was at least furnish'd with Materials by those who were, gives the following Account of this Bill. He begins with observing, That the Crown and the Lords are known to be jealous of the Growth of the Popular Interest ;

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Lords, nor any Reason to consult their Approbation or Dislike. The Gentleman too makes a Merit of having conducted that Bill in this House, and been the Means of its passing. Don't let him take all the Merit to himself. I was one of * those who had the Honour to receive the Commands of the House to bring in that Bill, who help'd to conduct it, and to procure that Benefit to the People of *England* which they expect from it. I too, Sir, perhaps, help'd to bring him into the great Honour and Employments he now enjoys. If I had ever solicited a Place, that Gentleman must have known it, but I have been only one of the Rounds of the Ladder by which that Gentleman climb'd; and now his Turn is serv'd, like some others, he is for kicking the Ladder away.

' You, Sir, [*Turning to Mr Speaker*] have set us extremely right, as you always do every Thing extremely well: — And I agree we must say, that every Gentleman here is a Man of strict Uniformity and great Honour. — I beg I may not be thought Ironical. — Now, Sir, as to Instructions from our Constituents, suppose my Instructions contained a Desire that I would be for a Place-Bill, suppose I had promised to be for it, and yet exerted my utmost Abilities against it. — Abroad, Sir, we see many strange Things; within these Doors, according to your Admonition, we must see none. — Imagine now, Sir, I had a young Gentleman or Pupil to advise in the Regulation of his Conduct, and he should apply to me to know by whose Advice to form his Opinion of publick Affairs? I should say to him, Pri'thee, hast thou no Friend nor Acquaintance whose Advice thou canst rely on, and in whose Integrity thou canst confide; apply to thy Representatives, surely they won't de-
ceive

terest; and, that it is by mutual Jealousies of this Kind, that our Constitution can alone subsist. — That therefore the only Method that could be taken with any Prospect of Success, was to enter into a tacit Treaty with the Lords, to agree upon some Bill of this Nature, which they should previously engage not to reject. — That the Lords agreed to this: — They consented not to oppose a Law, that should exclude above thirteen considerable Employments then actually enjoyed by Members of Parliament, and above two hundred smaller Offices; which, by conferring three or four upon one Person, might have made a vast Number of additional Preferments, a Thing still in the Power of the Crown, notwithstanding any former Laws, to have done. — But at the same Time, they absolutely declared they would go no further at that Time, till they had seen how far this would operate upon the Constitution. P. 57.

* Mr Pulteney, Mr Sandys, Mr Cornewall, Sir Watkin Williams Wynne, Mr Philips, Mr Cholmondeley, and Lord Gage, were the Gentlemen appointed by the House to bring in this Bill. See Vol. xiii. p. 223.

ceive thee; for if People can't trust their Representatives, whom can they trust. Parallel to this would be the Case of a Member for a City, to whom Instructions conformable to his constant Advice should be delivered, he should receive them, promise to observe them, and not to deceive those who had chosen him for their Representative; but shortly after, having alter'd his own Measures, should call his Constituents a Parcel of Fools, and totally disregard what they say to him: When one observes these Transactions, what must one say? I should incline to follow the Example of the Play-House, and cry out in the Phrase of Mr John Trott, *Gentlemen, have a Care of your Pockets.*

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Sir John Barnard spoke to the following Effect:

Sir J. Barnard.

Sir,

* From what has been said by some Gentlemen in the Debate, I foresee, that if our Parliaments continue, in Time to come, as complaisant to our Ministers as they have been in Time past, the Fate of this Question under this Administration, will be the same with that which was the Fate of the Question about reducing our Army under the last. The worthy Gentleman who was at the Head of our former Administration, and is now so deservedly sent to the other House, had, whilst he was a Country Gentleman, so strenuously opposed * keeping up a numerous standing Army in Time of Peace, that after he became a Minister, tho' Excess of Modesty could never be reckoned among his Foibles, he had not the Assurance directly to oppose a Reduction. No, Sir, during the first Part of his Administration he always declared himself for a Reduction, as soon as a favourable Opportunity should offer; but he always endeavoured to shew, that the present was not a proper Opportunity, and at last both he and his Friends gathered Assurance enough to tell us, that even in Times of the most profound Tranquility, a greater Number of regular Troops was, and always would be necessary, than that he had so strenuously opposed in the Year 1717, when there was the highest Probability of our going to be engaged in a War both with Sweden and Spain.

* This, Sir, was the Conduct of our former Minister, with regard to the annual Question about reducing our Army,

* In the Year 1717, the Sum of 681,618 l. which had been voted, in the Committee of Supply, for maintaining the Land-Forces, was upon the Report thereof to the House, reduc'd to 650,000 l. And this principally through the Opposition of Mr R. Walpole, who had some little Time before resign'd his Places. — See Chandler's History, Anno 4. Geo. I. p. 172.

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my, and this, I could almost lay a Wager, will be the Conduct held by our present Ministers with regard to the bringing in and passing this Bill. They cannot directly oppose a Bill which they have upon former Occasions so often and so strenuously patronized ; but tho' last Session did, yet this Session does not, it seems, afford us a proper Opportunity for applying a Remedy to an Evil, which, they themselves allow, has brought *Europe*, as well as this Nation, to the Brink of Destruction ; and this, I am afraid, will be their Way of reasoning, as long as they continue Ministers, or at least till they become as hardened as their Predecessor, which they may probably do, if they continue as long in Power, and then like him, they will freely declare, that they have actually changed their Sentiments, and that no such Bill ought ever to be passed.

I would not have any Thing of what I have said, Sir, applied to the Hon. Gentleman who formerly used to sit very near me, and whose Assistance I have often had in Matters which I thought might tend to the Advantage or Security of my Country. As for him, I do not doubt his Sincerity, but I very much doubt his Influence, and therefore if his Majesty has been unjustly and wickedly prejudiced against this Bill, I am afraid, we must wait a very long Time, if we resolve to wait till those Prejudices be removed by his Influence. But whatever be his Majesty's Way of thinking about this Bill, it is what we have nothing to do with. As Members of this House we ought to agree to every Bill we think necessary, without regard to our Sovereign's Way of thinking ; because in Duty to him, we ought to suppose, that his Sentiments will always be right ; and if he should refuse the Royal Assent to a Bill which we think absolutely necessary for the Security of our Liberties, we ought in the very next Session to take that Method for having it pass'd into a Law, which was taken in King *William's* Time with regard to the Triennial Bill. I question much if it was a Change of Sentiments that made King *William* pass that Bill. On the contrary, I am apt to believe, both the King's and his Ministers Sentiments were the same with what they had been the preceding Session ; but as the Bill was passed by both Houses the very Beginning of the ensuing Session, and before this House had granted the necessary Supplies, that wise King foresaw, that, in the Humour this House was in, he could expect no more Supplies if he refused to pass that Bill, and therefore he prudently complied with the Desire of his Commons, perhaps contrary to the Advice of some of his chief Ministers. Can we suppose his present Majesty

Majesty less wise, or less regardful of the Desires of his People? God forbid we should. At least, I who am no Minister, but a faithful Subject, will not dare to presume any such Thing.

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* I must therefore suppose, Sir, that if the Bill had been passed last Session by the other House, his Majesty would have given his Assent to it; for he must be sensible, that it is a Bill designed against the Ministers of the Crown, and not against the Crown itself; therefore, I think, we ought always to be more apprehensive of its not passing the other House, than of its not receiving the Royal Assent, after it has passed both Houses; and as, I hope, I may without Derogation suppose the other House more liable to the Influence of wicked Ministers, than we can ever suppose a wise King to be, therefore, now is the only proper Time for pushing this Bill, because some, I hope, of our present Ministers will promote its being passed by the other House, which is a Favour we cannot, in my Opinion, expect from any of them a Year hence. We must, I think, get such a Bill as this passed in the Infancy of an Administration, or never. When Ministers first enter upon their Administration, they are innocent, they are fond of Popularity; but very few of them long continue either their Innocence or Fondness. They soon find the Sweetness of being able to purchase those they cannot persuade: To this they sacrifice their Fondness for Popularity: Thus they soon become criminal; and then their own Safety makes it necessary for them to oppose the passing of any Bill that may tend not only to prevent their future, but detect their past corrupt Practices.

* But allow, Sir, that it would be decent in us to suppose his Majesty prejudiced against this Bill by some former Misrepresentations, and that he had not of himself Strength of Mind enough to remove those Prejudices, without the Assistance of some of his new Ministers, we must suppose, that those Ministers have already attempted it, or that they have not. If they have attempted it, and have not succeeded, we ought to interpose, because their Advice will certainly acquire a new Weight with his Majesty, when he finds it seconded by the Advice of both Houses of Parliament. And if those new Ministers have not attempted, in six or eight Months, what is so necessary for the Happiness of their Sovereign and Security of their Country, it must proceed either from their not having the Boldness, or their not having an Inclination to make any such Attempt. If they have not had the Boldness to make the Attempt, we ought to pass the Bill, in order to give them Courage, and to furnish them with

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with an Excuse for speaking freely to their Master upon a Subject of such Importance; and if they have not had an Inclination to make proper Remonstrances upon this Subject, I am sure, we ought to pass the Bill, in order to force them to perform what is their Duty both to their King and their Country.

‘ To come now, Sir, to the Argument made use of for shewing, that we have not the same Reason for pushing the Bill this Session, as we had in the last; they are chiefly founded upon a Supposition, that we have not only changed Men but Measures, which, in my Opinion, is a Sort of begging the Question; and considering what a small Number of new Members have been introduced into the Administration, and what a great Number of the former still remain in the most eminent Posts of our Government, it is a Question which, I believe, very few will grant. But suppose this Question were granted, and that our new Ministers are all sincere Friends to this Bill, it is a strong Argument for pushing it during this Session, because we do not know, but that these new Ministers who are Friends to this Bill, for I much question if all of them are, may be turned out before next Session; and surely we have more Reason to expect his Majesty’s Concurrence in this Bill, whilst there are some Gentlemen in his Councils that will dare to advise him right, than we can have after all such are removed.

‘ Thus, I think, Sir, with regard to our Domestick Affairs, there is no Difference in their Circumstances, but what is an Argument for pushing this Bill, with at least as much Vigour in this Session as we did in the last; and with regard to Foreign Affairs, I shall readily grant, they now bear a much better Aspect than they did a Twelvemonth ago; but this, I think, is owing to the unexpected Success of the Queen of Hungary’s Arms, and to the bad Conduct of the French, much more than to any Change in our Administration. The ridiculous, I may say, treacherous Conduct of the French towards the King of Prussia, was the true and original Cause of detaching him from their Alliance: The Views of the Hanover Ministers being defeated, they became his Friends, since they saw they could not with Safety or Advantage become his Enemies; and the Success of the Queen of Hungary’s Arms having drawn M. Maillebois away from their Frontier, left them at Liberty to concert new Projects. These Changes our old Minister, with all his Blundering, would, I believe, have taken Advantage of, as well as the new, and might perhaps have done it with as great Effect, and perhaps with a less Expence to the Nation, than the new have done; for
Tho’

tho' we have already been put to a monstrous Charge, it cannot be said, that our new Ministers have as yet given any Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*, but what we may suppose the former Minister would, in the same Circumstances, have been as ready to give as they ; so that we cannot justly suppose our Conduct, with regard to Foreign Affairs, to be in the least altered.

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* But suppose, Sir, that our new Ministers are to act in the most vigorous Manner : Suppose they are to involve the Nation in a War with *France*, is this a Reason for our delaying to take Care of our own Liberties ? Shall we sacrifice our own Liberties for the Sake of preserving the Liberties of *Europe* ? Did such a Thought ever enter into the Heads of our Ancestors ? On the contrary, Sir, we know, that in Times of the greatest Foreign Danger, they took Care to vindicate their Domestick Liberty, and never upon that Account scrupled a Contest with their Sovereign, if he refused to comply with their just Demands. The memorable Contest in King *Richard* the II^d's Time, when the *French* had an Army and a Fleet actually ready to invade the Nation, will, and ought to be a Precedent for all future Parliaments ; and the Triennial Bill itself was extorted from King *William* in the very Heat of a *French* War. Therefore, the Foreign Danger we are in, were it much greater than it is, can be no Argument against our passing this Bill, even suppose we were sure of its being rejected by his Majesty ; but we are so far from being sure of this, that we have no Reason to suppose it. His Majesty has always shewn such a Regard for his Parliaments, and has so lately given us a Proof of that Regard, that we neither can nor ought to suppose, he will reject any Bill which is thought necessary for securing our Liberties, not only by the Parliament, but by a great Majority of the People.

* The Cause of the Queen of *Hungary*, Sir, which has been so emphatically recommended to us on this Occasion, deserves, I shall grant, our highest Regard. I wish the Cause of her House had been more regarded by us, than it seems to have been for several Years past : I wish we had no Way contributed to the pulling down of the Power of that House ; and I wish, now we are again come to our right Senses, it were in our Power to give her a more effectual Assistance than we are able or likely to give ; but if we have a Mind to give her any effectual Assistance, the passing of such a Bill as this will be the best Way we can take for enabling us to do so. It will reconcile the People to their Sovereign, and put an End to all the Jealousies now reigning
amongst

An. 16. Geo. II. amongst them : It will render our Government popular, which will restore to us a Confidence amongst those who ought to be our Allies, and enable us to form a Confederacy sufficient for supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, and restoring the Balance of Power. Thus, Sir, in every Light we can view this Question, the present is not only a proper, but the most proper Time we can take, for attempting to have such a Bill pass'd into a Law, and therefore, I hope, the Motion will be agreed to.

Mr Carew,

In the Course of this Debate, Mr *Carew*, Member for *Minehead*, stood up, and declar'd, ' That as he could not pretend to enforce the Necessity of such a Bill, by weightier Arguments, than had been formerly urg'd by a now Right Honourable Member, he would beg Leave to repeat them to the House : And thereupon read Mr *Sandys's* Speech made in the last Session.

Other Members.

Several Members, who had upon former Occasions voted for a Place-Bill, gave it as a Reason for their Opposition to this, That as there had been a * Bill pass'd the last Session for excluding the Seven Commissioners of the Revenue of *Ireland*, the Seven Commissioners of the Navy and of the Victualling-Offices, the Clerk of the Pells, and all the Deputies, Inferior Officers and Clerks of those Commissions, and of the Treasury, Exchequer, Pells, Admiralty, Secretaries of State, and Paymaster of the Forces, or of the Salt, or of Appeals, or of the Wine-Licences, or of the Stamps, or of Hackney-Coaches, or of Hawkers and Pedlars, (Two or Three only excepted,) together with the whole Civil and Major Part of the Military Establishment of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* ; there was the less Necessity for another.

The Motion for a Place-Bill rejected.

At length the Question being put, it was Resolv'd in the Negative, Ayes 196, Noes 221.

Dec. 6. *Stephen Sherlock* having counterfeited the Hand-Writing of a Member upon a Cover of a Letter, was committed Prisoner to *Newgate*.

Sir *Joseph Ayloffe*, Clerk to the Commissioners for building *Westminster Bridge*, presented to the House a State of the Proceedings of the said Commissioners : Also of Contracts made

* In the Progress of this Bill, a Clause for excluding all Officers of the Army under the Rank of a Lieutenant-Colonel, was rejected by 146 against 113 ; and it was Resolv'd by a Majority of 152 against 75, that the Bill should not take Place 'till the Dissolution of the present Parliament. — It was carry'd up to the Lords by Mr *Sandys*. See *Chandler's History*, Vol. XIII.

made by them from *November 24, 1741, to November 3, 1742* : And also Accounts of the Treasurer to the said Commissioners from the 29th of *September 1741, to the 29th of September 1742.*

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Sir *William Yonge* presented to the House, pursuant to their Address, a List of the General Officers, with an Account, how many of them are employed and paid, and where they are at present, with the Dates of their respective Commissions as such, and of their first Commissions in the Army, which was referred to the Committee of Supply, as was also the Estimate of the Charge of his Majesty's Forces in *Flanders* ; and of the Guards, Garrisons, and other Land Forces : Likewise of his Majesty's Forces in the Plantations, *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* : And of Ten Regiments of Marines for the Year 1743.

Lists and Estimates refer'd to the Committee of Supply.

Then the House Resolv'd itself into the said Committee, and Sir *William Yonge* open'd the Debate to the following Effect :

Debate on Sir W. Yonge's Motion for granting 534,763 l. for the British Troops in Flanders.

Sir,

As we are now in a Committee for considering further of the Supplies granted to his Majesty, and as the several Estimates of the Expence of the Land Forces to be kept up for the Service of the ensuing Year, have been referred to us, it is now our Business to consider those Estimates, and to grant the proper Supplies, if we think them necessary for the publick Safety or Service. By the Estimates you will see, what Number of Men his Majesty thinks necessary for the several Services mentioned, and as the Estimates have been exactly calculated to the lowest Farthing, every Gentleman, by looking upon the Estimate, will see, what Sum of Money will be necessary for each respective Service. As this depends upon Calculation, and may be easily calculated by every Gentleman present, it can admit of no Doubt, or Difficulty ; therefore the only Question that can come properly under our Consideration, is that relating to the Number of Men necessary for each Service ; and in this too, considering the dangerous Situation *Europe* in general, as well as this Nation in particular, is in at present, I hope, we shall be pretty unanimous. As the Nature of the Office * in which I have the Honour to serve his Majesty, makes it more particularly incumbent upon me to explain the Nature of the several Services mentioned in those Estimates, and to make the proper Motions, I shall begin with that which was in Course first referred to the Committee, and which in its own Nature

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stands

* Secretary at War.

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stands most in need of an Explanation, I mean the Estimate of the Charge of maintaining the Body of Troops which his Majesty hath sent to *Flanders*, and which he thinks necessary to be kept there for this ensuing Year at least.

‘ I am sure, Sir, I need not take up much of your Time in explaining the Danger to which the Liberties of *Europe* are exposed, by the numerous Armies which *France* has sent into *Germany*. This Danger is so evident to the whole Nation, that the only Complaint seems to be, why his Majesty has not long before this Time given more effectual Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*. This Complaint, ’tis true, can only be made by those who do not know or consider the Difficulties which his Majesty had to surmount, before he could give any such Assistance; but as such ignorant or inconsiderate Persons are by far the most numerous, this, like most other popular Complaints, tho’ without any Foundation, has become very general. Thank God! most of those Difficulties are now removed, and his Majesty is left at Liberty to give more openly, and, I hope, more effectually, an Assistance to that magnanimous Princess. I am far from saying, I am far from supposing, that his Majesty has it in his View, to restore the House of *Austria* to as great Power, and Splendor as it was lately possessed of. This is not, I think, necessary for securing the Balance of Power, and I doubt much if he could get any one Potentate in *Europe* to join with him in such a Project; but it is certainly necessary for us, and for most of the other Potentates of *Europe*, to prevent the House of *Austria*’s being too much reduced, and in particular, to prevent its being in the Power of *France*, by means of the Troubles which she has excited in *Germany*, to make any Addition to her own, already too extensive, Dominions.

‘ This, Sir, is the great Danger *Europe* is at present exposed to; this is the Danger which we are, if possible, to prevent, and in this we shall probably get most of the Potentates of *Europe* to join with us. Can we suppose, Sir, that *France* has been at such vast Expence of Blood and Treasure, merely for the Sake of the House of *Bavaria*? Can we suppose, she has no private View of getting some Addition to her own Dominions? She may declare, she may protest, she may swear, she has no such private View; but late Experience must convince us, that there is no Trust to be put in such Protestations. In the last War she got *Lorraine*, notwithstanding a most solemn Protestation at the Beginning of that War, ‘ That his Most Christian Majesty did not desire to enlarge the Bounds of his Dominions; and further, ‘ that

‘ that his Majesty, content with what he possessed, and far from desiring to turn the Success of his Arms to the Enlargement of his Borders, did not scruple to declare solemnly, that he had it not at all in View to make Conquests, nor to keep Settlements, wherein the Safety of the Germanick Territories might be concerned.’ Yet, Sir, notwithstanding this solemn and express Declaration, as soon as the Emperor was forced, by the Neutrality of the Dutch, to submit to French Terms, his Most Christian Majesty appropriated to himself the whole Dominions of Lorrain, some of which are within the Territory of the Germanick Body ; and all the German Territories on this Side the Rhine became thereby exposed to an immediate Invasion, whenever France should be prompted by her Ambition, Interest, or Resentment, to invade them.

‘ This, Sir, may shew us, how much the Declarations of France are to be trusted to ; and if the Queen of Hungary should be again dispossessed of Bohemia, and so much deserted, or so feebly assisted, which is much the same, by her Allies, as to be forced to submit to such Terms as France should prescribe, can we suppose, that in order to have Bohemia, and thereby a Vote in the Electoral College, restored to her, she would not yield up the Austrian Netherlands to France ? Can we suppose, that the Emperor would not agree to such an Exchange, if in lieu of Bohemia he should have the Tirol and Trentine, and all the Austrian Dominions in Swabia, secured to him by the Cession of the Queen of Hungary, and the Guarantee of France ? Can we suppose, that Spain or Sardinia would oppose such a Treaty, if a Part of the Milanese should be given to the latter, and the rest, together with the Mantuan, and with Parma and Placentia, to the Son of the Queen of Spain, now married to a Daughter of France ? The Dutch, ’tis true, would then have Reason to repent of the late and present Pusillanimity of their Councils ; but durst they attempt to oppose such an Exchange ? Would not they be glad to do as they did in the Year 1700 ? Would not they be forced to approve, in the most solemn Manner, of those Usurpations and Breaches of Faith in the French, in order to get their Troops back, who, as they were in 1700, would then be impounded in the Heart of Flanders, and destitute of any Communication with their own Country ? Could we then propose to form a Confederacy against the Power of France ? Could we be sure of being able to defend ourselves ?

‘ We may talk, Sir, of our being an Island : We may now boast of the Superiority of our naval Power : We may

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now in a great Measure depend upon it as a Security against our being invaded ; but in this State of Things, which *Europe* may probably be reduced to, if we do not powerfully interfere, I am afraid, we should not long have Reason to boast of the Superiority of our Navy. If *France* were again in Possession of the *Netherlands*, and freed from all Apprehensions of an Attack by Land, she would certainly apply herself with the utmost Diligence and Application to the Increase of her Navy, and might in a very few Years be able to fit out a most formidable Squadron : We know what powerful Squadrons she fitted out in King *William's* Time ; and in how many Sea Engagements Victory stood for some Time in Suspence, tho' we had at that Time both the *Spaniards* and *Dutch* to assist us ; tho' *France* had not then near such a Trade, or such a Number of Seamen, as she has now ; tho' she was then obliged to keep up numerous Land Armies, to carry on the War, or to defend herself in *Flanders*, in *Spain*, in *Italy*, and upon the *Rhine* ; and tho' she was then in Possession but of a very small Part of the *Low Countries*. Have we not then great Reason to apprehend her becoming superior at Sea, if every one of these Circumstances should be altered in her Favour, especially if in her War against us she should be assisted by *Spain*, which probably would be the Case, and we without any one Friend or Ally that dared give us the least Assistance.

* When we consider these Events which are at least possible, and, in my Opinion, Sir, highly probable, we must be convinced of its being absolutely necessary for his Majesty to form a considerable Army in *Flanders*, in order at least to prevent its being in the Power of *France*, to model out the Kingdoms and Provinces upon the Continent of *Europe*, according to her Good-liking, and to take what Part of them she pleases to herself. This, instead of leading us into the War now carrying on in *Germany*, may prevent its becoming necessary for us to engage in it ; because when *France* sees that we are resolved to interpose in the present Contests in *Germany*, and have a numerous Army upon the Continent to protect such of the Potentates of *Europe* as shall join with us in Defence of Publick Liberty, or even to carry the War into her own Dominions, in case by her Conduct she should force us to do so, she will then set Bounds to her ambitious Views, and will submit to such Terms of Peace as may be thought proper for restoring the Balance of Power, and establishing it upon a solid Foundation.

* The very Arrival, Sir, of our Troops in *Flanders* has already

already had a great and good Effect. Both the Emperor and *France* are already become much more moderate in their Demands, and have offered to restore the Peace of *Germany* upon Conditions which a few Months ago they would have rejected with Indignation. Therefore every one must, I think, approve of his Majesty's having sent a Body of his Troops thither: No one can suppose, that a less Number would have been sufficient for the Purposes designed; and every one must agree, that they ought to be kept there till those Purposes are fully answered. For this Reason, I need not, I think, take up any more of your Time upon this particular Branch, but as several other Branches of publick Expeuce are this Day to come under our Consideration, and as the Motion I am now to make, will consequently be followed by several others, now I am up, I shall beg Leave to explain a little the other Estimates this Day referred to us, and to shew the Necessity of each. As we are now in an open War with *Spain*, and as we have now, I may say openly, undertaken to set Bounds to the ambitious Views of *France*, both these Powers will certainly watch for, and as certainly embrace the first Opportunity for disturbing our domestick Tranquility, and therefore we ought now to be more cautious than ever of affording them any Opportunity for this Purpose. As we have now a Sea Force superior to any that both these Powers united together can send against us, we can trust to it for our Defence against any formidable and foreseen Invasion, but we cannot trust to it for preventing a small, sudden and unlook'd for Invasion; and tho' a small Number of Troops actually landed in any Part of *Britain* or *Ireland* could not pretend to make a Conquest of either Island, yet considering the great Number of disaffected Persons we have still amongst us, even the Landing of a small Number of foreign Troops might very much disturb our domestick Tranquility, if we had not a sufficient Number of regular Troops to send against them at their first Landing. If they should be allowed Time to march from one Place to another, and thereby afford the Disaffected not only Time but an Opportunity to join them, their Army might be so increased as to involve us in a Civil War amongst ourselves, and before we could extricate ourselves out of this domestick Danger, *Spain* might have an Opportunity to conquer or destroy some of our best Colonies in the *West Indies*, and *France* to compel the Queen of *Hungary*, and all the other Powers of *Europe*, to submit to such Terms as she should prescribe; so that at this critical Conjunction, unless we have a Number of Troops sufficient

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sufficient to repel an invading Enemy, at, or soon after their first Landing, a small Invasion may be as fatal in its Consequences as the most formidable and most successful Invasion at another Time; because as soon as the *French* and *Spaniards* had reduced the other Potentates of *Europe* to their Terms, that small Invasion would certainly be followed by an Invasion which we, with all our Power either by Sea or Land, could neither prevent nor repel.

Thus, Sir, every Gentleman must perceive, that in the present critical Situation of the Affairs of *Europe*, it is more necessary to keep a great Number of Troops at Home, than ever it was upon any former Occasion; and yet such is his Majesty's Regard for the Ease of his People, as will appear by the Estimate, that he desires but a very few more than was thought necessary the * first Year of his Reign, and not so many as was thought necessary in the Year 1735. But besides the Necessity of keeping a large Body of Troops at home for securing our domestick Tranquility at this dangerous Conjunction, his Majesty may perhaps find it necessary to send a few more of his Troops abroad; and if this should happen, which is not improbable, we ought to be provided with a few more regular Troops than are absolutely necessary to be kept at home, especially if we consider, that it is every Day becoming more and more difficult to raise new Regiments, or even to recruit or augment the old, than it was heretofore; for in this Country, the Government cannot do as it does in *France*: It cannot compel Men to enter into the Service of their Country, or to draw Lots † for that Purpose.

From these Circumstances, Sir, I hope, it will be generally agreed, that the Number of Troops proposed by the Estimate for Guards, Garrisons, and other Purposes, relating to *Great Britain*, is the least Number that can be thought sufficient for that Service; and with regard to the Forces to be maintained in *Minorca*, *Gibraltar*, and *America*, as the Number is not proposed to be augmented, I think, I need say nothing for explaining, or for shewing the Necessity of that Expence; for surely no Man would be mad enough to advise diminishing the Number and Strength of any of those

* The Number of Forces for the Year 1728, was 22,955, and for the Year 1735, was 25,744. See Chandler's History, Vol. 7th and 9th.

† All Fathers of Families, Master Workmen, &c. of the inferior Sort in France, are oblig'd to bring their Male Children, Apprentices, and Servants, to Commissaries appointed for that Purpose, in order to enrol the Names and Ages of such unmarried Men, betwixt 16 and 40, as are able to bear Arms; out of which every 6th Man is drawn by Lot: — By such Means as these the French King recruits his Army!

those Garrisons in a Time of such foreign Danger. For the same Reason, I think, I need not say much upon the Marine Estimate, since the Estimate does not propose, that they should be augmented, and no Man can suppose, that they are less necessary, or that the same Number is not necessary for the ensuing Year, that was thought necessary for the Year now near expiring. For if a sudden Rupture should happen between us and *France*, it will be impossible for us to get near a sufficient Number of Seamen to man the great Number of Ships of War we shall be obliged to fit out for Squadrons, Convoys, Cruizers, and Guardships, without putting an entire Stop to our mercantile Navigation. It will be necessary for us to put as many Marines on board every Ship of War, as the Nature of the Service will admit of; and if this should happen, double the Number of Marines now proposed will scarcely be sufficient; but as to this his Majesty trusts to the Wisdom, Affection, and Justice of his Parliament, not doubting but that they will enable him to take such Measures as may, upon any new Emergency, appear to be necessary for the Publick Service.

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‘ Having now, Sir, explain’d, in as few Words as possible, the Nature and Necessity of the several Branches of publick Charge which, in Consequence of the Estimates referred to the Committee, must this Day come under our Consideration; and having in particular shewn the Wisdom and Expediency of our keeping such a Body of Troops in *Flanders* as has been lately sent there, I shall conclude with a Motion to resolve, ‘ That the Sum of 534,763 l. 5 s. be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the Charge of 16359 effective Men (Commission and Non-Commission Officers included) to be employ’d in *Flanders*, for the Year 1743.’ and after this Motion is agreed to, which, I hope, it will without Opposition, I shall then take the Liberty to make such other Motions as of Course arise from the other Estimates this Day referred to the Consideration of the Committee.

Mr *John Philips* spoke to the following Effect:

Sir,

‘ I Have not been long a Member of this House, and how short a Time may be decreed me I don’t know*:—But while I have the Honour to sit here, I am determin’d to speak my Mind

Mr Philips.

* Griffith Philips, Esq; presented a Petition against this Gentleman’s Election for Caermarthen; but the Committee of Privileges and Elections afterwards gave it in favour of the sitting Member, by above Eighty Majority.

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Mind freely, and to declare my Aversion to a Standing Army, an Aversion not taken up on any Dislike or Distrust of the Officers that have the Command of it ; because I believe 'em to be Men of great Honour and Abilities, but founded on a Maxim I have early imbibed, That a Standing Army is absolutely inconsistent with the Liberties of *Great Britain*. Our naval Force is our natural Strength, and by Means of that we have in former Reigns been the Terror of *Europe*. I would not be understood to mean, that we are to have no Troops at all : A small Number may perhaps be always necessary for Guards and Garrisons at home, and in Time of War a larger Number to be sent abroad. The Question now before you is, Whether you shall grant 534,763 l. 5 s. for maintaining 16,359 Men, to be employ'd in *Flanders* ; but as the Hon. Gentleman who made you this Motion, opened to you the whole Number of national Troops proposed to be employ'd this Year, I shall beg Leave to consider 'em altogether, and that under two Heads : The Necessity of the Troops, and the Ability of the Nation to maintain them.

* The Number of national Troops proposed to be employ'd is 63,246, viz. 16,359 in *Flanders* : 23,610 for Guards and Garrisons at home and in the *West-Indies* : 11,727, in the *Plantations*, *Minorca*, and *Gibraltar* ; and 11,550 Marines. The Necessity of keeping up so great a Number of Troops must arise from some Danger the Nation would be in without them ; for no other Argument can justify the Measure. If we are in any Danger from *Spain*, the only Nation we are in War with, (and which War we seem to have forgot) surely a much less Number of Land Forces would enable us to carry on that War, while we have so many Ships in Commission, and 40,000 Seamen to man them ; and it is by our naval Force only, that we can humble that haughty Nation : 12,000 Men are sufficient for Guards and Garrisons at home, while we have so powerful a Fleet to defend us from Invasions. I am an Enemy to the Power of *France*, tho' we are in no immediate Danger from her, and I think it the Interest of *England* to maintain the Balance of Power in *Europe*, and to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, tho' I much question whether that will turn the Scale in our Favour ; but let us not be Knights Errant on the Occasion, and send an Army on the Continent to combat the *French* without any Allies. (For, I do not find we have any, the *Dutch* being too cautious to come into our Measures.) Such a Step may prove very fatal to us, and draw on lasting Inconveniences. The best Method to assist the Queen of *Hungary*,

gary, is with our Money : She does not want Troops, but the Means to raise them, which she can do at a Quarter of the Charge that it will cost us to send our own Troops to her Assistance, considering the great Expence of Transports, and the Difficulties we shall find in providing Ammunition, Provisions, and Recruits in a foreign Country. But I am aware, we shall be told, that we must give her Money too. The Queen of *Hungary* is certainly a gallant Princess, and a very fine Woman ; but we are not therefore to spend all we have upon her, and become Bankrupts in her Service. Let us have some Regard for *Old England*, our native Country, and not suffer her to fall a Sacrifice to any foreign Interest whatsoever ; which brings me to consider the Ability of the Nation to maintain so great a Number of Troops.

* As every Nation is circumscribed within certain Bounds, so there is a certain Degree of Expence that every Nation can with Safety bear, and should never exceed ; and it is the Opinion of some very wise Men, that whenever the Expences of *Great Britain* exceed *five Millions* a Year, I mean the ordinary Expences voted by Parliament, she goes beyond her Strength, and consequently must fall. During all the last War in Queen *Anne's* Time, when we had so great an Army on the Continent, and so many Allies, and contracted a great Debt, our Expences, one Year with another, did not amount to 5,300,000 l. † In the Year 1741, our Expences were above 5,267,000 l. Last Year above 6,137,000 l. The Troops now proposed (I mean the 63,000 Men) will cost us above 1,655,000 l. which, with the Seamen and other Expences

† The following is an Account of the Grants, during the Course of Queen *Anne's* War.

| Anno | L. |
|-------|------------|
| 1702 | 3,000,000 |
| 1703 | 3,694,136 |
| 1704 | 3,828,886 |
| 1705 | 4,670,486 |
| 1706 | 5,075,757 |
| 1707 | 5,540,167 |
| 1708 | 5,926,849 |
| 1709 | 6,457,830 |
| 1710 | 6,384,260 |
| 1711 | 6,609,295 |
| 1712 | 6,656,967 |
| Total | 57,844,633 |

N. B. The odd Shillings and Pence being omitted, a competent additional Sum must be allow'd for those Fractions of a Pound.

For the Particulars at Large, of each Year's Grant, See the APPENDIX to VOL. XIII. p. 122.

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pences of the Year, must come to above Six Millions. The Nation is in Debt 48,915,000l. (which Debt is every Day increasing) and groans under a heavy Load of Taxes; and tho' many Gentlemen in this House may not feel the Weight of them, the Poor daily do, and call aloud for Redress. These are serious Things, and deserve the mature Consideration of Parliament. For my own Part, I shall always think it my Duty, while I sit here, to oppose laying on any of my Fellow Subjects a greater Burden than they are able to bear; and therefore shall heartily give my Negative to the maintaining so great a Number of unnecessary Troops.

Mr Sandys spoke as follows.

Sir,

Mr Sandys.

I find, the Gentlemen who oppose this Question carefully, I shall not say artfully, drop the present Necessity we are under, and talk only of the Danger and Expence of maintaining and keeping up a great Number of Land Forces, and the Inability of the Nation to support that Expence. I have as great an Aversion to a numerous standing Army, kept up in Time of Peace, as any Gentleman can have, and shall readily admit of the Maxim, that a numerous standing Army, kept up in Time of Peace, is absolutely inconsistent with the Liberties of *Great Britain*. But I have no Aversion to a standing Army in Time of War, however numerous it may be, provided it be no more numerous than is necessary for putting a happy and speedy End to the War; nor can I think, that a numerous standing Army in Time of War is any Way inconsistent with the Liberties of *Great Britain*, especially when a considerable Part of that Army is sent abroad to the Assistance of our Allies, or to carry the War into the Bowels of our Enemies Country, in order thereby to compel them to submit speedily to reasonable Terms of Peace; for as this is a trading Nation, it is our Business to put an End to every War as soon as possible, that we may the sooner have an Opportunity to carry on our Commerce without Interruption. When we happen to be at War with a trading Nation, we may, 'tis true, by Means of our Fleet, put a speedy End to the War; because if we conquer them at Sea, we may put almost an entire Stop to their Trade, which will of course soon force them to submit to reasonable Terms; but when we happen to be at War with a Nation that does not much depend upon Trade, we must some Way or other employ a Land Army against them, otherwise the War may become eternal; for we can never do them so much Harm at Sea as they can do us, nor can we reap any Benefit by

by the War, whereas they will be yearly reaping a Benefit from it by Means of their Privateers ; so that unless we can fall upon some Way of attacking them with a Land Army, the War must endure for ever, or we must at last submit to purchase Peace from them upon their own Terms.

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‘ I would not therefore, Sir, have Gentlemen conceive such an utter Aversion to a Land Army, as to resolve never to have or employ such an Army upon any Occasion whatever ; and if the Land Army now proposed be necessary for restoring Peace to ourselves as well as *Europe*, the Measure must be complied with, however expensive it may be, however unable we may think ourselves to support the Expence ; for, I hope, we are not yet reduced to such Poverty as to submit tamely to put on the Chains either of *France* or *Spain*. I shall grant, Sir, the Nation is incumber’d with a great Load of Debts, and the People groan under the Burden of their Taxes ; but from whence arose this Load of Debt ? To what is this Burden of Taxes owing ? Why, Sir, to the very Spirit which now prevails, and, I am afraid, always will prevail : An universal Cry of Poverty when any Contributions are desired for the publick Service. I believe, it will be granted, that our Ancestors in King *William’s* and Queen *Anne’s* Wars were as rich as we are now, and that the Nation was then able to raise yearly as great a publick Revenue as it does now. If they had done so, we should now have had no Debts to pay off, nor any Taxes but such as might be found necessary for the current Service of the Year ; for the Nation now raises more yearly than ever was expended in any one Year during either of those Wars, as may easily be computed by any one who considers the present State of our publick Revenue. If we reckon the Civil List Revenue at 800,000 *l.* the Land and Malt Tax at 2,700,000 *l.* and the Funds appropriated to the Payment of the Principal and Interest of our publick Debts at about 3,200,000 *l.* we shall see, that this Nation now raises 6,700,000 *l.* yearly, which, I believe, is equal to the whole publick Charge of any one Year of these Wars ; at least, I am sure, it is a great deal more than the publick Charge was during that Time *communibus Annis* ; and therefore, if the People in those Days would have agreed to raise yearly as much as they might have done, the annual Revenue would have answered the annual Charge, and we should now have had neither Interest nor Principal to pay to any publick Creditor, and consequently might have held the Balance of Power in *Europe* with more Ease and Steadiness than we can do at present.

‘ But such, Sir, is the Humour of the People in all Countries

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tries and all Ages : Every one desires to live at Ease and in Safety, but every one is averse towards contributing his proportionable Share towards that publick Expence, which is absolutely necessary for securing his Ease and Safety. The Bulk of Mankind can see no Danger but what is directly before their Eyes, and consequently are unwilling to contribute to the Charge of guarding against a Danger which they cannot see ; and as it is at all Times popular to appear against taxing or burdening a People, those who see the Danger too often prefer their Love of Popularity to the Love of their Country. The Danger we are in at present is so near, that I cannot think, there is one Gentleman in this House that does not see it : The House of *Austria* is the *Ucalegon* of *Great Britain* ; for if ever that House should be destroyed by the Flames of a War lighted up by *France* and *Spain*, *Great Britain* will certainly be the next, because we are next in Power. *Holland* may be at last consumed, but the old *Spanish* Maxim, That the only Way to come at *Holland* is to pass through *England*, is now well known both at the Courts of *France* and *Spain* ; and both those Courts are sensible, that in order to subdue *England* they must first reduce the House of *Austria*, so as to render it unable to give them any Diversion upon the Continent.

————— *Jam proximus ardet*
Ucalegon,

ought therefore to be, it is most reasonably, the Cry all over *Britain*, and in every Man's Mouth that is not blinded or biased by some private View of Interest, Ambition, or Resentment. That this Nation will be the next Sacrifice to the Ambition of *France* is apparent, not only from the Reason of Things, but from the Behaviour of *France* immediately before the Death of the late Emperor. Can we have already forgot their sending their Squadrons to the *West-Indies* ? Can we now doubt of the Orders those Squadrons had, or that they would not have put those Orders in Execution, if the Hurricanes and Storms they met with, together with the excellent Disposition made by our Admiral then in the *West-Indies*, had not disabled them from attempting the Scheme they had projected ? Can we expect that *Spain* will submit to reasonable Terms of Peace with us, whilst she sees us so indolent or so cowardly as not to dare to oppose or interrupt her Schemes of Conquest in *Italy* ? Can we hope that the *French* will not join openly with her against us, after they have reduced the Queen of *Hungary* to their Terms, and modelled out *Europe* to their Liking ? Can any Man balance

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in the least which to chuse, to enter into a War with *France* An. 16. Geo. II. and *Spain*, whilst the Fate of *Europe* is yet in Suspence, and we may depend upon the Assistance of many, perhaps most of the Potentates thereof, or to enter into a War with those two powerful Monarchies after they have made themselves Masters or at least Arbiters of *Europe*? Sir, it is not the Cause of the Queen of *Hungary* alone I am now pleading: It is the Cause of *Great Britain* as well as hers. If it had not been for the Accident of the Emperor's Death, we should have had *France* as well as *Spain* a declared Enemy long before this Time. We had so much neglected, deserted, and disobliged that Prince, that *France* thought she might depend upon his not giving us any Assistance, and therefore she was preparing to declare War against us, or to act in such a Manner as might oblige us to declare against her. But the Accident of that Prince's Death made her suspend her Measures with Regard to us, and the Behaviour of the King of *Prussia*, with the Obstinacy of the Court of *Vienna*, in which they were too much encouraged by us, soon convinced her, that she had now got the long look'd for Opportunity of reducing the Power of her antient Rival, the House of *Austria*. The Character of our then Administration was such, that she had Reason to think she might be able to cajole us, till she had perfected her Schemes upon the Continent of *Europe*, and that then she might with more Safety and greater Certainty of Success resume those Measures with regard to us, which she had suspended upon the Accident of the Emperor's Death: I say suspended, for no Man in his right Senses will suppose, they were either altered or laid aside. By the late Change in the Administration, I hope she will find herself disappointed as to us: She cannot now hope being able to cajole our Administration, and, I hope, she will find herself as little able to cajole the Nation. So far as I am able, her most secret Views shall be laid open to the People of *Great Britain*, and from thence, I hope, they will be convinced, that in supporting the Cause of the Queen of *Hungary* they support their own, that in assisting to extinguish the Fire which now threatens Destruction to her, they may, and, I hope, will extinguish those Flames which would certainly next consume themselves.

* From what I have said, Sir, the Necessity of our entering into the War must appear. If the *French* and *Spaniards* do not depart from their present ambitious Schemes, and especially, if the latter do not agree to do us Justice with regard to our Navigation and Commerce in the *American* Seas, we must enter into the War, or we must submit

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mit to receive Laws from *France* in *Europe*, in *Africa*, and the *East Indies*; and from *Spain* in the *West Indies*. In a Case of such pressing Necessity, I am surpris'd to hear Gentlemen talk of the Poverty of the Nation, or its Inability to support such a necessary War. I hope there are no Foreigners in our Gallery, or if there are, that they may not believe what such Gentlemen say. At least, I hope, it will not be believed at any Foreign Court in *Europe*; for if it were, it would encourage the Enemies of publick Liberty to persist in the Prosecution of their ambitious and tyrannical Schemes; and it would dishearten the Friends of publick Liberty so as to prevent their entering into any Measures with us for its Preservation. Therefore, if those Gentlemen have really such a contemptible Opinion of their Country's Ability, I wish they would keep it to themselves, because, I am sure, they can do no Service by publishing it; for by endeavouring bravely to preserve the Liberties of *Europe*, and succumbing in the brave Attempt, we can be in no worse Condition than we shall be by sitting still, and tamely looking on till we see them overwhelmed. If we must become a Prey to our Enemies whenever they shall please to attempt making us so, the leaner we are, the less worth their while will they think it to make the Attempt; for few Conquerors ever thought of conquering a Country where nothing was to be expected but broken Bones; and therefore, I think, we do better, and shall be in less Danger by emaciating ourselves still further in making a brave Defence whilst we have some View of Success, than by battenning in Ease and Tranquillity till our Enemies have put it out of our Power to defend ourselves with any tolerable View of Success.

‘ But thank God! Sir, our Matters are not yet come to this Pass: We have still many and great Resources: We have many rich Men amongst us; and from the Nature of our Constitution, and the Regard that has always been shewn to Parliamentary Faith, we shall have the Treasures of all the money'd Men in *Europe* at our Service. These will still enable us to carry on a vigorous War for many Years; and I wonder to hear Gentlemen of many Hundreds, nay Thousands a Year, who pay but Four Shillings, perhaps but Two Shillings in the Pound, to the publick Service, for securing their Enjoyment of the other 16 or 18: I say, I wonder to hear such Gentlemen complaining of the Poverty and Inability of their Country. Would not they, would not any Man of common Sense give the 16 Shillings for the publick Service, rather than subject the Whole to the arbitrary

bitrary Will of a *French* Monarch ? In such Case I shall grant, they would be obliged to dismiss many of the Footmen, Coachmen, Cooks and other Men Servants they now keep for Pomp or Shew ; but such Fellows could not want Business, for most of them would make excellent Recruits for our Army and Navy ; and if mounted upon their Masters Coach Horses, they would make good Dragoons, or if mounted upon their running, riding, or hunting Horses, they would make fine *Hussars* for distressing the Armies of our Enemy. These Things, 'tis true, are dismal for a modern polite Gentleman to think of, but they are what, I hope, every Gentleman in *England* would frankly submit to, rather than see himself and his Country enslaved by any foreign Power whatsoever.

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‘ We are therefore far from being in such poor or desperate Circumstances as have been represented in this Debate, and as to what wise Men may have said, that if ever *England* should raise above five Millions a Year she must be ruined, Experience has shewn the contrary ; for we have raised above five Millions a Year for this forty Years, and are not yet ruined : Nay the Nation would have been in the most flourishing Circumstances, if a right Use had been made of the Money raised yearly, and proper Care taken to protect and improve our Trade. In a Country where the Land Revenue is reckoned to amount to twenty Millions a Year, and the Revenue of the trading and money'd People to at least three Times as much, it is, in my Opinion, ridiculous to say, that such a Country cannot spare to raise five Millions a Year for the publick Charge without ruining itself. I am far from supposing, that if our publick Debts were once paid off, it would be necessary for us to raise such a Sum yearly for our ordinary Expence ; but upon extraordinary Occasions we might certainly raise that Sum, and a great deal more ; and therefore, if those wise Men mean any Thing, they must mean, that *England* will be ruined by a bad Government, if it should ever be under such an unfrugal one, as to make the raising of above five Millions a Year necessary for defraying the ordinary Expence of the Government in Time of Peace. In this I shall agree with those wise Men, because such a ridiculous Government, if it continued for any Time, would ruin us by its bad Conduct, as well as by its Profusion of the publick Treasure. But is this the Case at present ? Can it be said, the Government desires five Millions a Year, or much above the Half of that Sum for its ordinary Occasions ? We are actually engaged in one War, and like to be engaged in another

An. 16. Geo. II. another of a much more dangerous and expensive Nature : We must provide for both ; and this makes such large Grants necessary as are now required ; so that this Opinion, were it right in every Particular, is no Ways applicable to the present Case.

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‘ I hope that Gentlemen are now convinced, that it is absolutely necessary for us to interfere so far in the present Troubles of *Europe*, as to prevent its being in the Power of *France* and *Spain* to dictate to all the other Powers upon the Continent ; and from what I have said, Sir, I hope Gentlemen will have the Pleasure of being convinced, that we are not yet reduced to such a despicable Condition as has been represented, but that we may still make a Figure in *Europe*, and by a right Conduct and vigorous Measures force the most daring to limit or desert their ambitious Schemes of Tyranny and Oppression. For this Purpose it was absolutely necessary for his Majesty to form an Army upon the Continent, and it is necessary to keep that Army there, till we have accomplished those Views that are so salutary for our own Preservation, as well as for the Preservation of *Europe*, and our antient and most certain Ally, the House of *Austria*. I say most certain, Sir, because there is no one Prince in *Europe*, whose Interest can so constantly and so invariably coincide with the Interest of *Great Britain*, as that of the House of *Austria*. Even the *Dutch* we cannot naturally be so sure of ; because many Disputes may arise between them and us, about Trade and Navigation, or they may conceive Jealousy of our naval Power ; but between the House of *Austria* and us no Contest of any Consequence, no Jealousy can ever happen, unless one or other be influenced by foreign, weak, or wicked Counsels. Can we desert such an Ally in the Time of such Danger ? Is it not our Interest to preserve her Power as entire as possible ? Her own Arms has already done a great deal : Let us assist her to do the rest. His Majesty has resolved to do so : In this he is seconded by the Voice of his People ; and, I hope, upon this and every like Occasion, he will find himself seconded by the Voice of his Parliament.

Mr *Bance* spoke next to the following Effect :

Sir,

Mr *Bance*.

‘ Tho’ the Hon. Gentleman who opened this Debate was pleased to tell us, that the Number of Troops for each respective Service was the only Question that could properly come this Day before us, yet I must beg his Pardon for thinking that the Quantum of the Sum demanded for each,

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is a Question which ought likewise upon this Occasion to have been brought under Consideration; and if the Estimates had been first referred to a select Committee, according to the Method which has been often proposed, and I wish were put in Practice, I believe, some very material Objections might have been found to several of the Articles in each particular Estimate. As this has not been done, it is not to be expected that Gentlemen should enter particularly into this Question; but in general I must observe, that we have always had, and have now too great a Number of Officers in our Land Army, and a much greater Number than is usual in any Country of *Europe* except *France*, where their Officers cost them very little; for their Colonels are generally Men of Fortune who spend their own Estates in the Service of their Country, and the Pay of their Subalterns is hardly equal to that of our Serjeants and Corporals. Then as to our Marines, tho' they are really as properly marching Regiments as any other in our Service, the forming them into Regiments was at first absolutely wrong, and, I remember, was strongly objected to*; but since they are to remain a Burden upon us, I think, we ought to make it as light as possible, by ridding ourselves of all the Field-Officers and Captains, and especially their particular Paymaster, who has a Salary, which, I am sure, it is not necessary for the Publick to pay, let them be continued in what Shape you will. It may be said, that this Salary is paid out of the Deductions usually made on that Account from all the Regiments in our Service; but now we have such a great Number of Forces on foot, I hope our Ministers are more frugal than to give the Whole to the Paymaster: I hope they do with him, as has been done, ever since *Cromwell's* Time, with the Paymaster of the Navy, which is to allow him a certain Salary, and apply the Surplus to the publick Service.

* With Regard to our Marine Paymaster, Sir, I really do not know whether his Salary be paid out of these Deductions, or out of the 4500 l. charged in this Estimate for Contingencies; but let it come from whence it will, it is paid by, and may be saved to the Publick, by having our Marines paid either by the Treasurer of the Navy, or the Paymaster of our Forces; and as the Gentleman who now most worthily fills the latter Post †, would not, I am sure, desire to sink

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* See the Debate on the proper Method for raising Marines, in CHANDLER'S History. Anno 1739, P. 152.

† Hon. Henry Pelham.

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in his own Pocket such a large Sum of publick Money as these Deductions now amount to, being above 40,000 l. a Year, I think an Account of them, if they are still made, ought to be laid yearly before Parliament. As I am upon this Subject, I must likewise take Notice of the Saving that has certainly been lately made, by the great Number of Officers and Soldiers that were kill'd, or died in the *West Indies*. In ordinary Cases, Sir, this Sort of Saving is not worth the while of Parliaments to inquire into; but when Regiments are, I may say, *Occisione occisi*, and such a long Time before they are or can be recruited, this Saving must become so considerable as to be well worth the Parliament's while to inquire into it; especially considering the dangerous Use that may be made by a Minister, of such large Sums, when left to his arbitrary Disposal, as must be evident to every Gentleman who has read the Reports left last Session * upon our Table.

* These Things I have thrown out, Sir, only to shew, that we ought to have another Question now under our Consideration, beside that single one, of the Number of Troops proposed; and likewise to manifest to you, how necessary it is to refer the Estimates laid before us yearly to a select Committee, before we take them into our Consideration in this Committee of the whole House; for if we are oblig'd to enter into the War now carrying on in *Germany*, as the utmost OEconomy and Frugality will be necessary, I hope this will be the Practice of every future Session; and if we once begin it, I believe, we shall soon find good Reason for never laying it aside.

* Now, Sir, with Regard to the other Question, that, I mean, relating to the Number of Troops proposed to be kept up for each respective Service, I shall first consider the Question in general, and, I believe, every one will grant, that for carrying on the War against *Spain*, we have no Occasion, nor ought we to keep up such a Number of Land Forces, even supposing we were in as free and as prosperous a Situation as ever this Nation could boast of; therefore by such a great Number of Troops being proposed, and especially by our sending a great Number of them to *Flanders*, I must suppose, that we are to become Sharers in the War now carrying on in *Germany*, not only by sending our Money, but also by sending our Troops thither, and consequently the Matter now before us will turn chiefly upon this

* See the two Reports of the Secret Committee, at large, in the 13th Volume.

this previous Question, whether it be absolutely necessary for us to enter so deeply into the War? The Determination of which is not pretended, even by those who have spoke in Favour of the Motion, to be founded upon any immediate and apparent Danger, but upon Apprehensions of a Danger we may hereafter be exposed to.

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‘ Apprehensions, Sir, are of divers Sorts: There are real and well grounded Apprehensions, there are imaginary Apprehensions, and there are vain and ridiculous Apprehensions; and I very much suspect, that upon a strict and impartial Examination, the Apprehensions we are now terrified with, will appear to be of the last Sort. Surely we do not imagine, that all the other Nations of *Europe*, except this, are fond of putting on the Yoke of *France*, and therefore if none of them will join with us in supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis Viribus*, as we seem resolv’d to do, we must suppose, either that all the rest of *Europe* are dull, or that we are mad. It is something amazing to see the Minds of some amongst us so very much altered in so short a Time. When the late Emperor died, and the Queen of *Hungary*, his Successor, was attack’d by the King of *Prussia*, we were so little afraid of the ambitious Views of *France*, that we seem’d to encourage her in her Obstinacy with regard to *Prussia*, in order to draw her into a Scheme, which was certainly formed somewhere, for stripping that young Monarch of a great Part of his Dominions. Whereas, if we had at that Time been afraid of *France*, we should have advised, and insisted upon her giving Satisfaction to the King of *Prussia*, in order to draw him into a Confederacy, which he offer’d, for getting the Duke of *Lorrain* chosen Emperor, and for guarantying all the rest of the *Austrian* Dominions in the Terms of the *Pragmatick Sanction*. This would have prevented its being in the Power of *France* to form any Schemes, and if it had been done, I am persuaded, no *French* Army would ever have entered *Germany*, nor would the Elector of *Bavaria* either have been chosen Emperor, or have declared War against the Queen of *Hungary*. But by our Schemes at that Time, we forced the King of *Prussia*, contrary to his Inclination, into an Alliance with *France*, and thereby enabled and encouraged them to form all those Designs they have since endeavour’d to carry into Execution against the Queen of *Hungary* and the Liberties of *Germany*: Nay, we join’d with *France* in one of the chief of them, which was that of getting the Elector of *Bavaria* chosen Emperor; and we gave no Obstruction to the *Spaniards* in their first Attack upon the Queen of *Hungary* in *Italy*.

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Thus, when the Queen of Hungary was in the greatest Danger: When Europe was in the greatest Danger, we seemed to have no Dread of the Designs of France; but now when the King of Prussia has been provoked by the Haughtiness, and I believe, the Treachery of the French Generals, to desert their Alliance, and when the Queen of Hungary, by her good Conduct, both in Germany and Italy, has by herself repelled her Enemies upon every Side, and obliged them to offer Peace upon the moderate Terms of *uti possidetis*, we have conceived most terrible Apprehensions of the ambitious Designs of France. Sir, this Change in our Way of thinking, and these pretended Apprehensions, are so evidently without any avowed Foundation, that there must be something *in Petto*, there must be some secret Cause which it is not fit the World, or at least the British World should be made acquainted with. The happy Events of these last 16 or 18 Months, and the Terms offered by the French last Summer, have so much altered the State of Things in Europe, and have so clearly manifested, that the French have at present no Designs against the Liberties of Europe, that whatever we do, or attempt to do now, cannot be said to be for the Support of the Queen of Hungary, but for extending her Power and lessening the Power of France. I shall grant, that both these Things are very desirable, but considering our Circumstances I cannot grant, that this is a proper Time for us to make the Attempt, or that we can reasonably hope, by ourselves alone, to succeed in it. It may be laudable, it may be even prudent for a Man in good Health to undertake difficult and dangerous Expeditions; but after he has been emaciated by a tedious consumptive Fever, he should content himself with sitting at home, and thinking only of Self-defence, till his Vigour be restored, and his Health re-established. If we had done so, we might have been both strong and healthful long before this Time; but we have been playing the Knight Errant of Europe for many Years past: Nay we have been doing what even *Don Quixot* himself never thought of: We have been setting up Windmills, in order to knock them down again. From the Year 1714 to the Year 1720, we put ourselves to a monstrous Charge, and involved ourselves in a War with Spain, in order to increase the Power of the House of Austria, which we then said the Treaty of *Utrecht* had left too feeble in Italy: From the Year 1720, till very near the Time of the late Emperor's Death, we put ourselves to a vast Expence in pulling down the Power of the House of Austria, and raising the Power of the House of Bourbon, tho' one of the Branches of that House was, during the

the whole Time of this our Knight Errantry in its Favour, An. 14. Geo. II. 1742. insulting and hurting us in the most tender Part. By this Conduct the Power of the House of *Bourbon* has indeed been raised to a dangerous Height; and now we are to involve ourselves in new Expence and Danger, in order to pull down this Windmill we have raised, tho' like a real Windmill, it can do us no Damage, if we do not approach too near it.

* As the Power of the House of *Bourbon*, especially considering the present Union of the two Branches, (which Union was restored and cemented by our late Designs against the House of *Austria*) is certainly greater than is consistent with the Safety of *Europe*, it is very easy, Sir, for a warm Imagination to raise that Power up into a hideous Phantom; and when the War first broke out in *Germany*, when the Queen of *Hungary* was forced to retire to *Presbourg*, and her Capital in Danger of being besieged, all the Terrors we have been frightened with in this Debate, had then some Foundation: At that Time we seemed to sit unconcerned, and even then we had more Reason to be so than any of our Neighbours; for if *France* had taken that Opportunity, contrary to her express Declaration, to propose any Accession to her own Power, either by the Cession of the *Austrian Netherlands*, or any of the *German* Principalities upon the *Rhine*, it would certainly have alarmed the *Dutch* and all the Princes of *Germany*: Even the Emperor himself would have resented such a Breach of Faith, and would have been ready to reconcile himself at any Rate with the Queen of *Hungary*, in order to form a Confederacy with the *Dutch* against *France*. They would then have been soliciting our Assistance, instead of our being reduced by our Knight Errantry to the Necessity of soliciting theirs; for this will always be the Case, whilst we are the first to take the Alarm, and to involve ourselves in a War with *France* on Account of preserving the Balance of Power.

* For this Reason, Sir, even at the Beginning of the War, when the Liberties of *Europe* were in the greatest Danger, and the Queen of *Hungary* in the greatest Distress, it was none of our Business to enter as Principals into the War, unless the *Dutch* and others Powers of *Europe*, equally concerned with us, had agreed to do the same. And suppose, that they had been all blind to their own Interest and Safety, that *France* had thereby got an Opportunity to model out *Germany* and *Italy* to her own Liking, and to take the *Austrian Netherlands* to herself: Suppose that the *Dutch* for the Sake of getting home their Troops, had submitted, and that all the Princes of *Germany* and *Italy* had for that Time at

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least found themselves under a Necessity of submitting to this new *French* Model; can we suppose, they would all have been really satisfy'd with it: Can we suppose, they would not have taken the first Opportunity to free themselves from the Yoke they had by their Blindness brought themselves under? *France* must then have kept Garrisons and Armies both in *Germany* and *Italy* to have preserved this forced Submission, or she must have left them at Liberty to rebel as soon as they found an Opportunity. In either Case, can we suppose, that she could have disbanded her Land-Armies in order to encrease her naval Force, so as to render herself superior to us at Sea? Can we suppose, that upon her first Breach with us, the *Dutch*, the Empire, and perhaps *Spain* itself, or at least most of the Princes in *Italy*, would not have taken that Opportunity to unite together for freeing themselves from the Yoke: Sir, it is my Opinion, that the Ambition of *France* can never deprive us of a powerful Alliance upon the Continent, if ever we should be unjustly attack'd by her: It is our own Conduct only can deprive us of such an Alliance: If upon one Hand we should appear so indolent or unsteady, that none of the Powers upon the Continent could put any Trust in our Counsels, this might prevent their involving themselves in a War upon our Account: We might then have Reason to complain, as we did upon our Breach with *Spain*, of our having no one Ally in the World. On the other Hand, if we should shew ourselves too busy, and pretend to dictate to the other Powers of *Europe*, in Affairs we had really nothing to do with, or perhaps but very little, this might render them cool to our Interest: They might even rejoice to see us a little humbled. Since I am upon this Subject, I must mention another Sort of Conduct, which not only may deprive us of Assistance from any of our Allies upon the Continent, but also render our best and most natural Friends jealous of us, and that is our shewing too great an Attachment to the Interest of the Electorate of *Hanover*, and a Readiness to enter into any Scheme for enlarging the Dominions or pursuing the Resentment of that Electorate.

'I hope, Sir, there is nothing of this at the Bottom of our present Measures; but, I am afraid, some of the Princes of *Germany*, and perhaps the *Dutch* too, have a Suspicion of it; and this makes them so shy of joining with us in any Scheme for reducing the exorbitant Power of *France*. This I am sure of, that unless the *Dutch* and the Empire, as a Body, join heartily with us, we cannot in common Prudence propose to undertake it. It is by much too dangerous for us, in our present Circumstances, to undertake such a Scheme,

with

with the sole Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*; and as the *French* have offered to withdraw their Troops out of *Germany*, and to leave the Queen of *Hungary* in Possession of all the Dominions she was possessed of at the Beginning of the War, except what she has yielded up by our Mediation and at our Request, I can see no Reason we had for sending our Troops to *Flanders*, much less for keeping them there, and still a great deal less for taking such a Body of *Hanoverians* into our Pay; for by the Estimates presented to us last Friday, [See p. 35.] we now see, that those *Hanoverian* Troops have neither been sent there, nor are to be kept there, at the Expence of that Electorate. Nay, I cannot as yet find, that the Electorate is, at its own Expence, to give any Assistance either to us or the Queen of *Hungary*, no not even the 4000 Men which it stands engaged to furnish her with by the Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*; so that if any War be carried on for increasing the Power of the House of *Austria* at the Expence of *France*, it must be almost entirely at our Charge; for considering how the Queen of *Hungary*'s Dominions have been exhausted, we cannot imagine, that she is able to bear any tolerable Share of it.

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' The Charge, Sir, will consequently fall so heavy upon this Nation, that, were our Circumstances much better than they are, nothing but the greatest and most imminent Danger should tempt us to undertake it; and this is far from being the Case as the Affairs of *Europe* stand at present. I have already shewn, that had *France* succeeded in the fondest and highest Wishes she could have at the Beginning of the War, this Nation could have been in no great Danger from her utmost Efforts. In the Reign of *Richard II.* we despised her Attempts by Sea, tho' she was then in Possession of, or at least had in Alliance with her, all the Seventeen Provinces of the *Netherlands*, and we no one Ally upon the Continent to make a Diversion in our Favour. In Queen *Elizabeth's* Time, we withstood the Attempts of *France* and *Spain*, tho' the latter by itself alone was at that Time really superior to us in naval Force; and can we now be so terrify'd with the Apprehensions of the *French*, when we have such a naval Force, that *France* and *Spain* together could not, with a ten Years uninterrupted Preparation, fit out such a naval Force as would be superior to ours. But suppose we ever had Reason for such Apprehensions, they are now removed by the Offers of Peace which *France* has made, and the Way to renew them will be by undertaking a Scheme which neither the Queen of *Hungary* nor we can execute; for if we should fail in the Execution, especially if our Armies should happen to meet with

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with a signal Defeat, it will rekindle the War in *Germany* with greater Fury than ever, and if *France* never had before, she will then begin to conceive Hopes of being able to model *Europe* to her own Liking, and to take what Part of it she pleases to herself. This may be the Consequence of our encouraging the Queen of *Hungary* to refuse the Terms that have been offer'd; and after our being exhausted by a bloody and expensive War upon the Continent, it would be more easy for *France* to get the Superiority of us at Sea, than it could have been had we never engaged in any such War.

* In my Opinion therefore, Sir, the greatest Danger we can have at present, is that which may arise from our engaging either as Principals or Auxiliaries in the War, and thereby encouraging the Queen of *Hungary* to refuse the Terms that have been offered, and to form Projects of making Conquests from *France* by the Assistance we are to give her. It may be true, Sir, that before the late Emperor's Death, the *French* had resolved to declare in favour of the *Spaniards* against us, or to behave in such a Manner as to provoke us, if it was then possible, to declare against them. It may be true, that the Squadrons they sent to the *West Indies* had Orders to join with the *Spaniards* in an Attack upon our Island of *Jamaica*; but I have a Suspicion, they had Encouragement from some People here to make that Attempt, and an Assurance that if they could make themselves Masters of that Island, the Nation would not be at the Expence of carrying on a War against the joint Power of *France* and *Spain* for its Recovery. I believe, both they and their Friends here would have found themselves disappointed in their Expectations; and the Disappointment and Dishonour they met with in that Expedition, must convince them, how vain it will be for them to form any Designs against us, till they can render themselves superior at Sea, which, I am persuaded, they will not attempt for several Years to come, because, I believe, their Coffers have been so drained by the present War, that they will not be able, in many Years, to spare such vast Sums as will be necessary for preparing a Navy superior to the Navy of *England*; and if they had the Ships and all other Materials, they would find it difficult to man them, either with Sailors or Soldiers fit for the Purpose. If they should attack us before their having such a Fleet ready, and we should confine ourselves to our own Element, without wasting our Strength in romantick Expeditions upon the Continent and maintaining numerous Land Armies, we should be Gainers by the War, by destroying their Plantations and putting an entire Stop to their Trade, and thereby ridding ourselves of
our

our greatest Rival in Manufactures and Commerce ; so that An. 16. Geo. II.
 I don't know, but it would be one of the greatest Favours
 the *French* could do us to provoke us to a Sea-War, and one
 of the greatest Injuries we can do ourselves, is, to engage
 without Necessity in an expensive Land one ; and as the
French want nothing now, but to be quiet, we can be under
 no such Necessity at present.

‘ Having thus, Sir, discussed the Point of Necessity, and
 shewn, that all the Apprehensions we can, with any Shadow
 of Reason, be frightened with, must arise from our engaging
 in the War, and not from our sitting still, give me Leave to
 say something with regard to our Abilities. I shall readily
 admit, Sir, that if it were absolutely necessary for us to en-
 gage in War : If Arms were of one Side and Chains of the
 other, I should be for flying to Arms, let our Circumstances
 be never so deplorable : I should be for our pawning or part-
 ing with every Thing but our Arms ; but this is far from be-
 ing the Case, and as our People are already so burdened with
 Taxes, and all those Taxes mortgaged for the Payment of
 old Debts, we ought not to engage in any War without an
 apparent and immediate Necessity. To guard against remote
 Dangers, and such as can be suggested only by a very fruit-
 ful Imagination, is, in my Opinion, very far from being a
 good Reason for our engaging in any War under our present
 Circumstances. We have, 'tis true, as yet many Resources,
 but most of them are such as we never ought, nor, I hope,
 ever will have Recourse to, unless we be obliged to fight
pro Aris & Focis.

‘ I am far from supposing, that we have not yet many
 Resources for carrying on a necessary War, and for prosecut-
 ing it with Vigour for several Years, if it were to be carry'd
 on by Sea, or in a Country where we could from hence pro-
 vide our Armies with all Sorts of Necessaries. Even the
 War we now seem inclined to engage in, at least we have
 put ourselves to a monstrous needless Expence, if we are not :
 I say even this War we might find Credit and Funds to sup-
 port, if this were our only Consideration. As our publick
 Credit is yet in a flourishing Condition, I believe, we might
 find Money to borrow, and might find Funds for securing
 the Repayment of that Money ; but in the present Case this
 is not our only Consideration. As all our Troops, both Na-
 tional and Foreign, must be provided for in a distant Coun-
 try, we must send out such vast Sums of Money, that, I am
 afraid, our Balance of Trade will not answer our Draughts,
 and if it does not, the Deficiency must be made good out of
 our National Stock of Gold and Silver, which may in a few
 Years drain us so much of our ready Specie, that we shall
 not

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not have enough to circulate the vast Sums of Paper Credit we have now current amongst us; and as soon as this happens, it will put an End to our Credit both publick and private. This may happen before we can put an End to the War upon any honourable Terms, and whenever it does, we must put an End to the War upon any Terms, at least we must call home our Troops, and dismiss our Mercenaries, for want of Money to pay them, which would be a fatal Consequence, and the more fatal, because of our publick Credit's being lost, and not easily recoverable; so that our Country might be exposed to the Danger of an Invasion, when our Government had neither Money nor Credit to raise an Army or fit out a Squadron; and, I am afraid, our People would not be very ready or hearty in supporting a Government that had brought them under such Difficulties.

* In the War during the late Queen's Time, we were exposed to no such Danger. Our Balance of Trade was much greater than it is at present. As *France* had then no Trade, we exported a great many more Goods than we do, or can be supposed to do now; and we had not then near such a large Sum to pay for Interest growing due Yearly to Foreigners, who have Money in our Funds. Besides, a great Part of the Provisions for our Army in *Flanders* was bought up here, and conveyed to them by the Way of *Holland* or *Ostend*. Even our Armies in *Spain*, were mostly provided for by what was bought for them in their own Country. Whereas, if we send our Armies to *Germany* or the *Upper Rhine*, which we must do, if we resolve they should assist the Queen of *Hungary*, we can send them little or nothing but Money from hence. This I thought necessary to mention, because it might not perhaps otherwise have occurred to Gentlemen who do not understand Trade; * and, I hope, our Ministers will think seriously of it, before they involve their Country in a War which must be attended with so many Difficulties, and which seems, from the late Turn the Affairs of *Europe* have taken, to be quite unnecessary.

* I shall grant, Sir, that it has been a popular Cry, ever since the Death of the late Emperor, to support and assist the Queen of *Hungary*; but among all reasonable Men, it was upon this Condition, as was expressed in our Address last Session, † that the other Powers of *Europe*, equally concerned with us, should join in giving her such Assistance as might be effectual. And since we find, that none of the Powers of *Europe* will join with us, that even the Electorate of

* This Gentleman was one of the Directors of the Bank.

† See the Resolution of the House, Vol. XIII. p. 216.

of *Hanover* refuses to join with us, or to assist us with any Troops, unless we pay a most extravagant Price for them, I believe no reasonable Man in *England* expects or desires, we should assist her any other Way than with our Money; especially as she does not now stand in need of our Assistance, unless it be to make Conquests. Gentlemen will therefore find themselves very much disappointed, if they expect the Approbation of the People in such a romantick Scheme as that of making Conquests upon *France* assisted by *Spain*, without any one Ally but the Queen of *Hungary*; and if they should fail in this Scheme, as they probably may, they will find themselves exposed not only to the Derision but to the highest Resentment of the People; therefore for their Sakes, if I had no other Reason, I must be against the Hon. Gentleman's Motion.

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Before I have done, Sir, I must say a Word or two in relation to the great Number of Troops to be kept at home. I was really surpris'd to hear the Hon. Gentleman say, his Majesty desired no more than were allowed him the first Year of his Reign, and not so many as were allowed in the Year 1735. When the Hon. Gentleman said so, he certainly forgot the Marines, which being all regimented are as regular Troops, and very near as expensive, as any marching Regiment in our Service; and tho' it would be proper, if they are ever to serve as Marines, to have them on board our Men of War, and sometimes sent to Sea, in order to season and breed them up to the Service, I believe, all or most of them now lie a Burden upon the Country People. I must therefore look upon these Marines as Land Forces, including them, as will appear by the Estimates, we are to keep at home above 35,000 Men, and that at a Time when we are to take Foreign Troops into our Pay at a monstrous Price. Sir, if our Schemes made it necessary to form such a great Army in *Flanders* what Occasion had we for 16,000 *Hanoverians*? Might not we out of 35,000 have spared to send 16,000 more of our own Troops to *Flanders*? Will it be said, that in Time of War we must always keep 35,000 Land Forces in this Island to protect us against sudden Invasions? Are we to suppose our People so much disaffected in any Part of the Island, that most of them would join an invading Enemy, if not immediately prevented by the Arrival of a large Body of regular Troops? God forbid, Sir, I should make a Supposition so injurious to his Majesty and our present Royal Family. The Danger of a sudden Invasion and the Disaffection of the People have always, I know, been made a Pretence for keeping up within the Island a greater Number of regular Troops than

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than we had any Occasion for, but it was never carried to such an extravagant Height as now ; and I am sorry this should happen under the Administration of some Gentlemen, who have for so many Years been exclaiming against numerous standing Armies.

But we are told, now it is Time of War, and a standing Army in Time of War is not inconsistent with our Constitution. Sir, War or Peace, a numerous standing Army kept within the Island, when we are not at War amongst ourselves, I say, is inconsistent with our Constitution. If we are to send an Army abroad, let it be raised, but let it be sent abroad as soon as possible ; and when the War is over, and the Army called home, let it be disbanded as soon as possible. This was our antient Method : This, and this alone is agreeable to our Constitution. If it were otherwise, it would be easy for an ambitious King to keep the Nation always at War, in order to have an Excuse for keeping up a numerous standing Army at home, not for subduing his Foreign Enemies, but for subduing his People : Therefore more of our Land Forces ought to have been sent abroad, or not so many of them raised ; and if any more Troops are designed for *Flanders*, they should have been put in an Estimate by themselves, in order to avoid a Precedent for keeping above 35,000 Men in the Island at a Time when there is no Rebellion, nor so much as the Appearance of an Insurrection in any Part of it ; therefore when the Question comes to be put upon the Number of Troops for Guards and Garrisons, I shall, I believe, be against it, as heartily as I am against the Question now under your Consideration.

Farther Arguments for and against continuing the British Forces in *Flanders*, viz.

Engaging the Nation in a second War.

Against Sir *William Yonge's* Motion for continuing the *British* Forces in *Flanders*, it was urg'd, ' That by this Step we should, with one War upon our Hands, draw ourselves into another.' — To this it was answered by the Ministry, ' That we entered into the second War, because we were bound by the strongest Ties of Treaty and publick Faith to do it ; because the first War could never have been brought to a happy Conclusion without it ; because the second Enemy supported the first ; because the second Power, without entering avowedly into that War, supplied, encouraged, and fomented the Difference between us and the first ; and because there is more Safety in an open Enemy, than in a false Friend : because the Views of the first and second Enemy co-incided with each other ; and because we were certain, that the second Enemy would have joined the first, with her whole and an irresistible Force, when she had finished her Work

Work in *Germany*, and that then we should have had to deal with both these Powers, without any one Ally in the World; whereas, by joining against the second, at the Time we did it, we were able to act in Conjunction with some of the greatest Powers in *Europe*, and a reasonable Expectation of the Aid of more; because the rash Attempts of the first Power, partly to gratify her own wild Ambition, and partly to assist the Plan of the second, had afforded us the Means, if we engaged against the second, of ruining the Armies of the first, of confining her Fleets from any Possibility of doing us any Harm, and in fine, of disappointing her most favourite Views, of exhausting her Revenues, and of throwing her Government into Confusion in one Campaign, more than by any other Way of waging War with her to the End of the World.—And that all this could be Only done, when we had the one War upon our Hands, by engaging in the other.

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A second Objection was, 'That hereby we should make ourselves Principals in a War, wherein we ought to be only Auxiliaries.' To this it was replied, 'That the Assertion is absolutely and notoriously false in Fact, for we have hitherto not been Principals in this War in any Sense whatever; we have acted only as Auxiliaries to the House of *Austria*. And that we ought to be Auxiliaries was agreed on all Hands.'

Making our-
selves Principals.

It was also ask'd, 'Why do we run ourselves into Expences we can't bear, into Difficulties we shall find it so hard, if not impossible to get out of, into Inconveniencies we see no End of, Pursuits where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles in which we have so much to lose?'—To this Question the Answer was, 'That the great Supplies of the last Year had been rais'd upon Terms as low as they ever were in Times of the most profound Peace; while the Enemy, we were engaged with, could not raise the Sums he wanted, at twice the Rate of Interest we pay. That as to the Inconveniencies being endless, it is undoubtedly true that no human Reason can prescribe an exact Period to any War, the Inconveniencies of which must last till such War is determined; but if this be an Objection, it is such a one, as must make against engaging in any War, however just or necessary, in any Country or Conjunction whatsoever: That it could not be said we had nothing to gain, when we had a Prospect of restoring that faithful Ally, which is alone able to stem the Ambition of the *French* Monarch, the implacable and ever dangerous Enemy of this Country; and that those Men must be destitute both of Common Sense and

Running into
endless Expen-
ces, and vain
Pursuits.

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Assisting the
Queen of Hunga-
ry with Troops
instead of Money.

and Honestly, who contend, that we should lie by in Time of Danger : For when are Men to struggle, but when they have so much to lose, as the Trade, the Independency, the Religion, and the Freedom of their Country ?

A Fourth Question was, ' Why, if the Queen of *Hungary* is to be farther assisted, do we, instead of sending her Money, which might assist her, expend treble the Money she would be thankful for, in raising Forces that can't assist her ? — And to this the Answer was, ' That though she might have been thankful for a third Part of the Money, which our Troops cost us, as any Power in her late deplorable Circumstances would have been, it was not her Thanks, but her Preservation from immediate Ruin ; it was not her Gratitude, but the Recovery of her Power to ballance France, which it was our Business to procure ; it must have been an Aid that would be effectual, or we should have left her worse than we found her. That this Insinuation, that a pecuniary Aid would have been alone effectual, was far from being true, though the whole Money, which our Armies cost us, had been remitted to *Vienna* : Because such immense Sums, exported out of this Country thither, would have distressed us greatly, and would have none of it return'd ; it would have therefore been impracticable to have continued this Expence for any Time : Whereas, by Experience of the last War, it was manifest, that very near two-thirds of the Charge of the Armies we maintained within a nearer Distance of this Country, returned to us again ; and we had had a Proof that we could support a War in this Method without any vast Diminution of our Specie : Because such immense Sums must, from the Nature of that Court, have been much wasted or consumed ; but, however applied, could not so conveniently have answered our Ends, because we should have lost the Advantage of a Diversion to the Forces of *France*, which is a Measure of the greatest Benefit in War. Because we should have lost the Advantage that resulted from the Security of the Barrier, from the Encouragement of the *Dutch*, from the Protection of the States and Circles lying upon the Confines of *France*, and the Influence we have since manifestly gained upon the Diet of the Empire. Because no other Measure could have put it in our Power to attack and penetrate into *France* itself, if God should prosper our Arms with any remarkable Success, and because by this Apprehension the Flower of her Armies have been consequently retained at home, and the more likely to be brought to Terms of reasonable Accommodation, That by this Means we availed ourselves of two great Points ;

of

of the Cavalry of the Allies, which is the best in *Europe*, An. 16. Geo. II.
 and must have been for the greatest Part unemployed in this
 Quarrel, if the War had not been carried on in this Man-
 ner; and of the natural Superiority which Confederated
 Powers have over a single Nation, and what was our mani-
 fest Advantage in the last War, *viz.* that the Loss of Men
 on our Part will fall more equally, and will be less felt;
 while the whole Loss of *France* falls upon her own Nation,
 from whence alone she is able to recruit; which Circum-
 stance, all other Things supposed to be equal, must enable
 the Queen of *Hungary* to sustain the War longer, and with
 less Inconvenience than the *French*. That the *Austrian* Do-
 minions are by no Means inexhaustible of Men; tho' the
French have suffered more, yet the *Austrians* have lost a
 great Number, and it is a certain Fact, that *France* alone
 contains more Inhabitants than all the Countries of the
 Queen of *Hungary* put together.

It was demanded, * Why the Ministry dissuaded the Queen
 of *Hungary* from listening to all Offers of Accommodation
 last Summer, and particularly at the Siege of *Prague*? Why
 did they endeavour to prevent her accepting the Terms pro-
 posed of reciprocal Evacuations of *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*,
 leaving other Claims and Pretensions to future Negotiations
 and civil Decision; which is the End they must come to, un-
 less these Squabbles last for ever? To this it was replied,
 ' That if it was done, it was done wisely: For that these
 Offers of Accommodation were in Effect no more than a Ces-
 sation of Arms, the only View of which was to prevent the
 Ruin of 30,000 Regular Troops of *France*. That the City
 of *Prague*, which was then every Day expected to fall into
 the *Austrian* Hands, was all that the Queen of *Hungary* could
 have gained by this Cessation; that therefore 'tis not to be
 wonder'd at, that she was not inclin'd to trust to a new Capi-
 tulation with that very Body of Troops, who, had they not,
 contrary to all Military Faith and Rules of War broke a
 Capitulation, by which they saved their Lives at *Lintz* a
 few Months before, could not have been at *Prague* in that
 Conjunction to have demanded a second Opportunity to abuse
 her Mercy. That she could nowise be blam'd for refusing to
 trust to the insidious Offers, to the Faith of that perfidious
 Power; Offers, that gave no Assurance of any Accommoda-
 tion; Offers plainly calculated to enable her Enemies to fall
 upon her immediately after, with redoubled Force, tending
 only to deprive her of the happy Opportunity of giving the
 greatest Blow to *France*, that was ever given to her in one
 Campaign; Offers to bribe her by an Advantage, which
 was,

Dissuading her
 from an Accom-
 modation with
 the Emperor.

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was, in fact, already in her Hands, to be guaranty'd to her by the Honour and Honesty of *France*, confirmed by the additional Power of their released Army, and secured by the Reservation of the Emperor's Title to all her Dominions, which the Emperor has, by his Memorials, since actually avowed as his Intention never to have departed from ! That if this Step had not been taken, by this Time indeed we should not have had an Army in *Flanders* ; nor would there have been a single Army in *Europe*, that could have ventured to have opposed the Views of *France* ; the Queen of *Hungary*, attacked by the collected Force of *France*, would have clearly understood what was meant by the future Negotiations, and the civil Decision then proposed to her ; she must have submitted long e'er now to the Will of that relentless Power ; and we should have had all our Thoughts vainly turn'd to the entrenching our selves in our own Island against the united Powers of *France* and *Spain*.

Engaging with-
out the Dutch ;

It was ask'd, ' Why we embark'd in this Measure, without the Junction, Consent, Approbation, or even Participation of *Holland* ? — And to this the Answer was, ' That it was absolutely false that they refused to join at all, or that they gave us Reason to believe that they never would consent, and that they had given us to understand that they had condemned our Undertaking ; whereas the Fact was only this, That they would not join in the Instant that we first desir'd ; that they would not consent till they found that they might depend upon the Vigour and Stability of our Administration ; that they would not publicly approve of a Measure, in which it was not safe for them to engage, till they saw a Force sufficient to protect them.

And taking upon
ourselves the
whole Burden of
the War.

Further it was urg'd, ' That we alone have taken upon us the Hazards, Burdens, and Expences of a Scheme, which all the Powers of *Europe* combined would not perhaps be able to execute, and which no Power in *Europe* will assist us in ? — To this the Ministry replied, ' That *England* had not alone taken upon itself the Hazards, Burthens and Expences of this War : For the House of *Austria* has now in different Parts, and in different Armies, no less than 180,000 Men : Under Prince *Charles* 63,000 ; under other Generals in *Germany*, employed in the Sieges or Blockades of *Egra*, *Ingoldstadt*, &c. 30,000 : With the King of *Sardinia* and Count *Traun* 27,000 ; in *Flanders*, and upon the *Rhine*, 20,000 ; in the *Trentine*, and the *Tirol*, and adjacent Parts of *Bavaria*, 15,000 ; upon the *Adriatick*, ready to succour, either the *Italian* Armies, or to be carried into the *Neapolitan* Dominions by our Fleets, 12,000 ; and at least 13,000 Men in the
Garrisons

Garrisons of *Austria*, the different Parts of *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, *Moravia*, *Servia*, *Croatia*, *Sclavonia*, *Carinthia*, *Carniola*, *Stiria*, and other Provinces which, bordering upon the *Turk*, can never be totally left unfurnished: That the King of *Sardinia* has above 40,000, and with his Militia above 60000, which amounts at least to Two Hundred and Forty Thousand Men, towards which we contributed no more than the Vote of 500,000 *l*.

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These, with what has been exhibited in the foregoing Speeches, were the main Arguments alledged for and against the Motion, which we have endeavoured to state in the strongest Light on each Side; ever mindful of that Caution which every Historian ought to bear eternally in his Mind, *Ne quid falsi audeat, ne quid veri non audeat*.

The Question being put upon Sir *William Yonge's* Motion, Sir W. Yonge's Motion for employing 16359 Men in Flanders agreed to.
 * That 534,763 *l*. 5 *s*. be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the Charge of 16,359 effective Men, (Commission and Non-Commission Officers included) to be employed in *Flanders* for the Year 1743, the same was agreed to, on a Division, Ayes 280, Noes 160.

A Motion being made to adjourn, it passed in the Negative, Ayes 153, Noes 267.

Then it was farther Resolv'd, That a Number of Land Forces for Guards, Garrisons, and other Services, (including 2322 Invalids) amounting to 23,610 effective Men, (Commission and Non-Commission Officers included) be employed for the Service of the Year 1743.

That 647,862 *l*. 5 *s*. 10 *d*. be granted unto his Majesty for defraying the Charge thereof.

That 266,616 *l*. 6 *s*. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d*. be granted to his Majesty for maintaining his Majesty's Forces and Garrisons in the *Plantations*, *Minorca*, and *Gibraltar*; and for Provisions for the Garrisons of *Annapolis-Royal*, *Canso*, *Placentia*, *Providence*, *Gibraltar*, and *Georgia*, for the Year 1743.

That 11,550 Marines (Commission and Non-Commission Officers included) employed for the Year 1742, be continued for the Service of the Year 1743.

That 206,253 *l*. 15 *s*. be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the Charge of the said Marines.

Dec. 7. The Land Tax Bill was read the third Time, Land-Tax Bill pass'd, and sent by Mr *Francis Fane* to the Lords. pass'd.

A Petition of the Prisoners for Debt, in the Castle of *York*, complaining of their Distress, and praying Relief, was order'd to lie upon the Table.

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Committee appointed to review the Vagabond Act.

Then a Committee was appointed to consider the Act made in the Thirteenth Year of his present Majesty's Reign, *For amending and enforcing the Laws relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, and other idle and disorderly Persons, and for reducing the same into one Act of Parliament*: And also, *for amending the Laws for erecting, providing, and regulating Houses of Correction*; and to report their Opinion, as to what Amendment may be proper to be made thereunto. And it was ordered, That the said Committee do consider the Laws relating to the Poor, so far as the same concern the Removal and Relief of poor Persons; and report their Opinion as to what Amendments may be proper to be made thereto.

Then Mr *Francis Fane* reported the foregoing Resolutions of the Committee of Supply, and the House divided on the Second, which pass'd in the Affirmative, Ayes 190, Noes 113. Then the rest were agreed to.

Duty on Malt, &c. continued.

Dec. 9. Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply the following Resolution, which was agreed to by the House, *viz.* That towards raising the Supply granted to his Majesty, the Duties on Malt, Mum, Cyder and Perry, be further continued from the 23d of June, 1743, to the 24th Day of June, 1744: And a Bill was order'd in, pursuant to the said Resolution, by Mr *Francis Fane*, Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr *Compton*, Sir *John Russell*, Mr *Gibbon*, Mr Attorney General, Mr Solicitor General, Mr *Scrope*, and Mr * *Jeffreys*.

Bill for recovering small Debts.

Ordered also a Bill to be brought in, for the more easy and speedy Recovery of small Debts, by Mr *Hungerford*, Mr *Wilkinson*, Mr *Vere*, and Mr *Hay*.

Dec. 10. General *Wade* presented to the House, pursuant to their Address to his Majesty, an Estimate of the Charge of the Office of Ordnance for the Year 1743 -- Land Service; which was ordered to lye upon the Table, to be perused by the Members.

Mr *Francis Fane* presented to the House a Bill for the continuing the Duties upon Malt, &c. which was read the first Time, and ordered a second Reading.

Petition for Wotton-Basset withdrawn.

The same Day *Nicholas Robinson*, Esq; withdrew his Petition for *Wotton-Basset*. [See p. 32.]

Then Mr Secretary at War presented to the House (by his Majesty's Command) a List of the Troops of *Hanover* now in *Flanders*, including the General Officers and Train of Artillery, together with their Pay; which was ordered to be referred

* Lately made one of the Chief Clerks of the Treasury, in the Room of Mr *Henry Furness*, who was so appointed on the Change in the Treasury, on the Resignation of Sir *Robert Walpole*.

referred to the Committee of Supply : As was likewise the Account of the Charge of the Troops of *Hanover*, in the Pay of *Great Britain*, from the 31st of *August* to the 25th of *December* 1742 ; and the Estimate of the Charge of the said Troops from the 26th of *December* 1742, to the 25th of *December* 1743. Also the Estimate of the Charge of the *Hessian* Troops, paid by *Great Britain*, from the 26th of *December* 1742, to the 25th of *December* 1743, both inclusive.

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Debate on the
Hanover Forces
in British Pay.

The House having resolv'd itself into the said Committee, Sir W. Yonge. Sir *William Yonge* stood up, and spoke as follows :

Sir,

* The Knowledge which his Majesty was most graciously pleased to communicate to us in his Speech from the Throne, and the apparent Danger to which the Liberties of *Europe* are now expos'd, would render it very unnecessary for me to say any Thing in favour of the Motion I am to make, if great Pains had not lately been taken, to represent the most wise and necessary Measure that was ever thought on, as a chimerical Project, concerted for no other End but that of enriching the Electorate of *Hanover* at the Expence and Hazard of this Kingdom. Upon this Occasion, Things have been said, nay Things have been printed and published, which, in my Opinion, ought to be deemed High Treason by every Man who has a Regard for the Protestant Succession ; for they have first represented it as a Condition in the Act of Settlement, that we should never be put to any Expence, or brought into any Danger, on account of the Electorate of *Hanover* ; and then they have endeavour'd to shew, that all our Foreign Measures ever since the Accession of the present Royal Family, have been calculated for the Interest or Aggrandisement of that Electorate. If this were true, the Inference would be natural, that the Condition of the Act of Settlement being broke, the Settlement itself is become void. This, Sir, is an Argument, that, if there were any Truth in it, I should tremble to mention ; but every one knows, that there is no such Condition in the Act of Settlement, nor has this Nation ever been put to any Expence, or brought into any Danger, on account of that Electorate.

* From what has lately happened, Sir : From the Method of arguing now made use of by some People, which is so very different from that they formerly made use of, it is very plain, that unless they are themselves employed, and employ'd too in such Stations as they may be pleas'd to prescribe to his Majesty, they will never approve, they will always oppose and find fault with the Measures pursu'd by the Administration.

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tion. As long as our Ministers wisely endeavoured to prevent a War, by taking every peaceable Method for obtaining Satisfaction for ourselves, and Security for our Allies, those Gentlemen exclaimed against our pusillanimous Measures, and endeavoured to ridicule our Negotiations: War and Bloodshed was then their favourite Cry, and nothing would satisfy them but an immediate Declaration of War, let the Consequence be what it would. Our Negotiations at last proved ineffectual: Our Ministers were forced into a War, and one of our principal Allies has been attacked, and is now in Danger of being swallowed up: The most effectual Measures have been concerted by our Administration, and are now pursuing in the most vigorous Manner, both for distressing our Enemies and supporting our Allies. Upon this, those Gentlemen have quite altered their Tone: The distressed Condition of our Country is set in its strongest Light, the Situation of our Ally is said to be desperate, and the Power of our Enemies irresistible; from whence they conclude, that our present Measures are romantick and chimerical. Thus, if our Ministers endeavour to avoid a War by Negotiation, which every wise Administration will, they are said to be Poltrons; and if they prosecute it with Vigour and Resolution, when they are forced into it, which they must and ought, they are said to be Don Quixots.

These, Sir, are the different Methods of arguing made use of by those who happen not to have at present any Share in our Administration, and from this Difference they really, in my Opinion, give Room to suppose, that their Opposition proceeds not from any Conviction of the Badness of our Measures, but from their having no Share in advising or carrying them on. But to come to the Point in Question, and to examine whether or no it will be right in us to take the *Hanover* Troops into our Pay, and to keep them in Pay till the Affairs of *Germany* are settled, and the Balance of Power restored, let us consider the present Circumstances of *Europe*, and the Consequences that may ensue from our taking no Share in the War now carrying on against the Queen of *Hungary*. If we do not assist her, if we do not resolve to assist her *totis viribus*, it is evident, that none of the other Powers of *Europe* will; and if she receives no Assistance, it is as evident, that she must at last submit to such Terms of Peace as *France* shall please to prescribe; for it is impossible for her, by herself alone, to withstand the united Force of *France*, *Spain*, and the present Emperor of *Germany*, the latter of whom would probably, in such a Case, be supported by the joint Power of the Empire; for if the Princes

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and States of the Empire should see her forsaken by all her Allies, a Majority of them would in all Probability be induced to put her to the Ban of the Empire, for defending her own Dominions against a Prince whom they have chosen for their Head.

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* Suppose then the present Emperor established in his Imperial Dignity, and in the Possession of a great Part of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*, by the Favour and Power of *France*: Suppose the *Spaniards*, or *Don Philip* of *Spain*, by the same Means, established in the Possession of all or most of the *Austrian* Dominions in *Italy*, what fatal Consequences might not this Nation expect, even as to our own particular Concerns? We know the Circumstances we are now in with Regard to *Spain*: We know how much it is the Interest of *France* to destroy our Trade, and to divest us of our valuable Possessions in the *Mediterranean*, as well as of many of our Plantations in *America*: We know how ready *France* was, but very lately, to join with *Spain* against us. What could we expect, if the Emperor of *Germany*, and all the Princes and States of *Italy*, were thus brought under a Sort of Dependence upon *France*? Could we expect any Assistance from the *Dutch*? They would not dare to send a single Ship to help us. Could we expect any Assistance from the *Portuguese*, or from any of the States in *Italy*? They would not dare to assist us: They would probably be induced, or compelled, even to forbid us their Ports. These were the fatal Consequences we had great Reason to apprehend at the Beginning of last Summer; and were we to do nothing, to attempt nothing, for preventing them? By the wise and vigorous Measures we have since taken, we have brought off the King of *Prussia* * from his Alliance with *France*: * We have prevail'd on the King of *Sardinia* to declare openly in our Favour; and if we continue the same Measures, we may probably soon persuade some other Powers to take the same Course.

* It is not yet, Sir, a Twelvemonth since it was the Opinion of some Gentlemen, that the unfortunate State of Affairs Abroad, and the Inactivity of the *Dutch*, as well as of several Princes of the Empire, were entirely owing to the pusillanimous Measures we had pursued, and to a Supposition, that we would no Way concern ourselves with any of the Affairs upon the Continent. This, it was said, had render'd it impossible for the other Powers of *Europe* to form any Confederacy against the ambitious Schemes of *France*,

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* See the Proceedings of the House of Lords in this Session, P. 228.

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and had even made some of them join with *France*, who would otherwise have been ready to have joined with us against her. If there was any Truth in this Argument, surely it was necessary for us to give, as soon as possible, a convincing Proof that we had not deserted the Cause of *Europe*, but on the contrary were as ready as ever to spend our Blood and our Treasure in Defence of the Liberties thereof. This we did by sending a powerful Squadron into the *Mediterranean*, for the Support of the King of *Sardinia*, and by sending an Army of our own Troops into *Flanders*; but neither of these Measures will signify any Thing, unless we proceed further; and for this Reason it became absolutely necessary for us to take a large Body of Foreign Troops into our Pay, in order to form such an Army as might give effectual Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*, in case *France* should persist in the Prosecution of her ambitious Views.

For this Reason, the *Hessian* Troops were ordered to march to *Flanders*, and his Majesty most graciously agreed to lend us a large Body of his own Troops, which were likewise ordered to march to *Flanders*, in order to join our Troops there; and these Troops, together with the *Austrian* Troops now in *Flanders*, will form such an Army as will, I hope, encourage some other Powers to declare openly in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary*. It has already had so good an Effect, that both the Emperor and *France* have begun to confine their Views, and have very much lessened their Demands; for they have already offered Terms, which they would have disdained to give Ear to, at the Beginning of last Campaign. So far therefore ought we to be from appearing in the least unwilling to take this Body of *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay, that, I think, we ought to thank his Majesty for being so ready to assist us with a Body of his Electoral Troops, at a Time, perhaps, when it would not have been easy for us to have got any other Troops to hire.

To every one therefore who considers the fatal Consequences which must ensue to this Nation in particular, from *France's* bringing almost all the Powers of *Europe* under a Sort of Dependence upon her, the taking of this Body of *Hanoverian* Forces into our Pay, and their March to join our Army in *Flanders*, must appear to be a Step absolutely necessary for the Preservation of *Great Britain*, and consequently not in the least owing to a Design of enriching the Electorate of *Hanover* at the Expence of *Great Britain*.

I shall indeed grant, that the Support of those Troops, whilst they are in our Pay, will be a very great Expence to
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this Nation ; but their March into *Flanders* is a manifest Proof that this Measure was not calculated for the enriching of *Hanover*, because the Money we pay to them will not be spent in *Hanover*, but in *Flanders*, or some other Part of *Europe*, where they shall happen to be employ'd, which can never be suppos'd to be in *Hanover*. On the contrary, as many of the Officers are Gentlemen of Fortune, they will, and always do spend more than their Pay, and consequently their living in *Flanders*, or in some Foreign Country, will draw Money out of the Electorate of *Hanover*, as well as out of the Island of *Great Britain*. In short, to suppose, that the sending of 16000 Men out of a Country, is done with a Design to enrich that Country, is, in my Opinion, one of the most extraordinary Notions that could ever enter into any Man's Head, and must vanish as soon as we begin to think seriously and coolly upon the Subject.

* The sending of those Men into *Flanders* can be of no manner of Service to the Electorate of *Hanover*, any further than as it may contribute to the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe* ; and to say, that we ought not to pay those Troops, because they will contribute towards the Advantage of *Hanover* as well as of this Kingdom, is an Argument that will hold equally good against our taking any other foreign Troops into our Pay. As the Loss of our own Liberties must necessarily follow that of the Liberties of *Europe*, we ought not to consider, what other States may do, or what Advantage they may reap by our doing ; but when the Liberties of *Europe* come to be in Danger, we ought to do all we can for extricating them out of that Danger ; for if other Nations should seem willing to submit to the Yoke, it is no Reason for our doing the same ; and therefore, I shall never think it romantick in us, to endeavour to prevent our being led into Captivity, were the odds against us much greater than they are ; for Success has often arisen from Despair, and Nations have been saved, after having lost all hopes of Safety. It is not Loss of Hopes, Sir, but Loss of Courage that enslaves a Nation : And I hope the Event of this Day will shew that we are *Britons*.

* But why, Sir, should we talk of Despair, or of losing all Hopes of Success in any Design for setting Bounds to the ambitious Projects of *France* ? The late and present Condition of the Queen of *Hungary* is a strong Argument against it. About a Year ago, who would have said, that she could now have been at *Vienna*, or in Possession of any Part of her Dominions, except such as she might have obtained

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from the Courtesy of *France*? yet, by the Courage of her own Troops, and a little Assistance from us, we now find her not only resisting but triumphing in *Germany*, and in Possession of all her Dominions except such as she has yielded to *Prussia*, and * two single Towns in *Bohemia*, both of which are block'd up by her Troops, and the Garrisons of both in the utmost Distress. How then can we think it to be either romantick or chimerical in us, to propose giving her such Assistance as may compel her Enemies to submit to reasonable Terms of Peace, and such as may restore the Balance of Power in *Europe*, and establish it upon a solid and lasting Foundation.

' This, Sir, we may do: We have now, I think, a very great Probability of being able to do it; but we never could, nor can we now propose being able to do it, without taking Foreign Troops into our Pay; and as a small Assistance now will be much more effectual than a much greater would be, after our Ally the Queen of *Hungary* is reduced to the last Extremity, therefore, I must think it was right in us, to take the first Troops we could get, which happened to be those of the Electorate of *Hanover*. At our Request they have already marched and joined our Troops in *Flanders*. His Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, has already, upon our Account, put himself to a very great Charge. He put such a Confidence in the Parliament of *Great Britain*, and in the Zeal we have hitherto shewn for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*, that without any express Parliamentary Engagement, he ordered his Troops to march; and therefore, I think, we are in Honour obliged to make good the Expence he has been at. Nay, I think, we are under a Sort of legal Obligation to make good this Expence; for by our Address of the 23d of *March* last, we expressly promised to support his Majesty in all such Measures as should be necessary for restoring the Balance of Power and re-establishing the Tranquility of *Europe*; † so that we are not only in Honour, but by our own express Promise obliged to make good the Expence his Majesty has put himself to, or may be at, by the March of his Troops into *Flanders*.

' For this Reason, Sir, I cannot suppose, that I shall meet with any Opposition as to the first Motion I am to make, which is, to resolve, ' That the Sum of 265,191*l.* 6*s.* 2*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the Charge of 5513 Horse, and 10,755 Foot, of the Troops of *Hanover*, (together with the General Officers and the Train

* Prague and Egra.

† See Vol. XIII. p. 216.

‘ Train of Artillery) in the Pay of *Great Britain*, from the An. 16. Geo. II. 31st Day of *August*, to the 25th Day of *December* 1742, ^{1742.} both inclusive.’

‘ This Resolution, I say, Sir, cannot well be opposed, because we are both in Honour, and by a Sort of Parliamentary Promise engaged to comply with it; and after this Resolution is agreed to, I shall then take the Liberty to move for such a Sum as, by the Estimate before you, appears to be necessary for keeping those Troops in our Pay during the ensuing Year, which, I hope, will be as readily complied with; for tho’ the Army we have now formed in *Flanders*, in Conjunction with the Queen of *Hungary*’s Troops there, may have a very good Effect towards procuring good Terms of Peace, yet as that Effect cannot be immediately expected, every Gentleman must see, that it would be absolutely disappointed, and all the Expence we have already put ourselves to rendered vain and useless, if *France* and the *Emperor* should find that the Parliament of *Great Britain* refused to keep those foreign Troops in its Pay for one Year longer.

‘ We have already, Sir, shewn a laudable Zeal for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*: We have already put ourselves to a considerable Expence; and no longer ago than in *March* last, we gave it as our Opinion, in our Address to his Majesty, which I have already mentioned, that we thought we had reasonable Grounds to hope, that the Balance of Power might be again restored, and the Tranquility of *Europe* re-established. I am sure, nothing has happened since that Time, which can afford us the least Shadow of Reason for altering our Opinion; so that if we now begin, thro’ Despair, or any other Motive, to draw back, and to refuse putting ourselves to the Expence necessary for obtaining that which we then thought we had so good Reason to hope for, it can proceed from nothing but an Unsteadiness of Temper, which we are, I fear, but too justly accused of by Foreigners, and therefore we ought, upon this Occasion, to be the more cautious of doing any Thing that may confirm them in such an Opinion.

The Hon. Mr *Powlett* seconded the Motion:

Sir,

‘ The Honourable Gentleman has with so much Clearness and Elegance displayed the State of *Europe*, explained the Necessity of hiring foreign Troops, and shewed the Reasons for which the Troops of *Hanover* were preferred to those of any other Nation, that I believe it not to be of
any

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any Use to urge other Arguments than those which he has produced.

‘ As therefore it is indisputably necessary to hire Troops, and none can be hired which can be so safely trusted as those of *Hanover*, I cannot but agree with the Right Hon. Gentleman, that this Measure of his Majesty ought to be supported.’

Sir John St Aubyn.

Sir *John St Aubyn* then spoke as follows :

Sir,

‘ It is with the greatest Difficulties that I rise up to give you this Trouble, and particularly after the Hon. Gentleman with whom I am so very unequal to contend : But when my Assent is required to a Proposition, so big with Mischiefs, of so alarming a Nature to this Country, and which I think, notwithstanding what the Hon. Gentleman has most ingeniously said, must determine from this very Day, who deserves the Character and Appellation of a *Briton*, I hope you will forgive me, if I take this last Opportunity which perhaps I may ever have of speaking with the Freedom of a *Briton* in this House.

‘ I am not able to follow the Hon. Gentleman in any Refinements of Reasoning upon our foreign Affairs, I have not Subtily enough to do it, nor is it in my Way as a private Country Gentleman : But tho’ Country Gentlemen have not that Sagacity in Business, and, for Want of proper Lights being afforded us, the Penetration of Ministers into publick Affairs ; yet give me Leave to say, they have one Kind of Sense which Ministers of State seldom have, and at this Time it is of so acute a Nature, that it must overthrow the Arguments of the most refined Administration. This is the Sense of feeling the universal Distresses of their Country, the utter Incapacity it now lies under of sustaining the heavy Burdens that are imposing upon it.

‘ This I take to be the first, the great Object of this Day’s Debate : Consider well your Strength at home, before you entangle yourselves abroad ; for if you proceed without a sufficient Degree of that, your Retreat will be certain and shameful, and may in the End prove dangerous. Without this first, this necessary Principle, whatever may be the Machinations, the visionary Schemes of Ministers, whatever Colourings they may heighten them with, to mislead our Imaginations, they will prove in the End for no other Purpose, but to precipitate this Nation, by empty captivating Sounds, into the private Views and Intrigues of some Men, so low perhaps in Reputation and Authority, as

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to be abandoned to the desperate Necessity of founding their ill possess'd precarious Power upon the Ruins of this Country.

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* Next to the Consideration of our inward domestick Strength, what foreign Assistances have we to justify this Measure? Are we sure of one positive active Ally in the World? Nay, are not we morally certain that our nearest most natural Ally disavows this Proceeding, and refuses to co-operate with us? One need not be deep read in Politicks to understand, that when one State separates itself from another, to which it is naturally allied, it must be for this plain Reason, that the Interest is deserted which is in common to them both: And it is an invariable Rule in this Country, a Rule never to be departed from, that there can no Cause exist in which we ought to engage on the Continent, without the Aid and Assistance of that neighbouring State. This is the Test, the certain Mark, by which I shall judge, that the Interest of this Country is not at present the Object in Pursuit.

* Is any Man then wild enough to imagine, that the Accession of Sixteen Thousand *Hanoverian* Mercenaries will compensate for the Loss of this natural Ally? No, but it is said that this indicates such a Firmness and Resolution within ourselves, that it will induce them to come in. Sir, if they had any real Proofs of our Firmness and Resolution, that the Interest of this Country was to be pursued, I dare say they would not long hesitate. But they look with a jealous Eye upon this Measure, they consider it as an Argument of your Weakness, because it is contrary to the Genius and Spirit of this Country, and may therefore lessen his Majesty in the Affections of his People.

* They have for some Years past looked upon a *British* Parliament as the corrupt Engine of Administration, to exhaust the Riches and impair the Strength of this Country. They have heard it talk loudly indeed of the House of *Austria*, when it was in your Power to have rais'd her to that State, in which she was properly to be considered as the Support of the Balance of *Europe*, if timid Neutralities had not intervened, and our Naval Strength had properly interpos'd to her Assistance.

* They have lately look'd upon this Parliament, and with the Joy of a natural Ally they have done it, resenting your Injuries, bravely withstanding the Power, that you might restore the Authority of your Government, demanding Constitutional Securities, appointing a Parliamentary Committee for Inquiry and Justice. Sir, they now see that Inquiry sup-
pressed

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pressed * and Justice disappointed. In this Situation what Expectations can we form of their Accession to us; talking bigly indeed of vindicating Foreign Rights, but so weak and impotent at Home, as not to be able to recover our own Privileges?

But this Measure is said to be undertaken in Consequence of the Advice of Parliament. — There has been great Strefs laid upon this — It has been loudly proclaim'd from the Throne, echoed back again from hence, and the whole Nation is to be amused with an Opinion, that upon this Measure, the Fate of the House of *Austria*, the Balance and Liberties of *Europe*, the Salvation of this Country, depend.

But was this fatal Measure the Recommendation of Parliament, or was it the Offspring of some bold enterprizing Minister, hatch'd in the Interval of Parliament, under the Wings of Prerogative; daring to presume upon the Corruption of this House as the necessary Means of his Administration? The Object indeed might be recommended, but if any wrong Measure is undertaken to attain it, that Measure surely should be dropt; for it is equally culpable to pursue a good End by bad Measures, as it is a bad End by those that are honest.

But as to the Address, I wish Gentlemen would a little consider the Occasion which produced it. Sir, it proceeded from the Warmth of Expectation, the Exultation of our Hearts, immediately after and with the same Breath that you established your Committee of Inquiry, and it is no forc'd Construction to say, that it carries this Testimony along with it, that National Securities and granting Supplies were reciprocal Terms.

But, Sir, I must own for my Part, was the Occasion never so cogent, *Hanoverian* Auxiliaries are the last that I would vote into *British* Pay; not upon the Consideration only, that we ought otherwise to expect their Assistance, and that we should rather make sure of others that might be engaged against us; but from this melancholy Apprehension, that Administrations will for ever have Sagacity enough to find out such Pretences, that it may be difficult to get rid of them again.

Besides, the Elector of *Hanover*, as Elector of *Hanover*, is an arbitrary Prince, his Electoral Army is the Instrument of that Power; as King of *Great Britain*, he is a restrain'd Monarch: And tho' I don't suspect his Majesty, and I dare say the Hearts of the *British* Soldiery are as yet free and untainted, yet I fear, that too long an Intercourse may

* See before, P. 32.

may beget a dangerous Familiarity, and they may here- An. 16. Geo. II.
after become a joint Instrument, under a less gracious Prince, 1742.
to invade our Liberties.

‘ His Majesty, if he was rightly inform’d, I dare say, would soon perceive the Danger of the Proposition which is now before you : But as he has every other Virtue, he has undoubtedly a most passionate Love for his native Country, a Passion, which a Man of any Sensation can hardly divest himself of ; and, Sir, it is a Passion the more easily to be flatter’d because it arises from Virtue. I wish that those who have the Honour to be of his Councils, would imitate his Royal Example, and show a Passion for their native Country too ; that they would faithfully stand forth and say, that as King of this Country, whatever Interests may interfere with it, this Country is to be his first, his principal Care ; that in the Act of Settlement this is an express Condition. But what sluggish Sensations, what foul Hearts must those Men have, who instead of conducting his Majesty’s right Principles, address themselves to his Passions, and misguide his Prejudices ? making a voluntary Overture of the Rights and Privileges of their Country, to obtain Favour and secure themselves in Power ; misconstruing that as a secondary Consideration, which in their own Hearts they know to be the first.

‘ Sir, we have already lost many of those Benefits and Restrictions, which were obtained for us by the Revolution and the Act of Settlement. For God’s Sake, let us proceed no farther. But if we are thus to go on, and if, to procure the Grace and Favour of the Crown, this is to become the flattering Measure of every successive Administration, — This Country is undone !

Then Colonel *Bladen* stood up and spoke as follows :

Col. *Bladen*.

Sir,

‘ If Zeal were any Security against Error, I should not willingly oppose the Hon. Gentleman who has now declared his Sentiments, and declared them with such Ardour as can hardly be produced but by Sincerity, and of whom therefore it cannot be doubted, that he has deliver’d his real Opinion ; that he fears, from the Measures which he censures, very great Calamities, that he thinks the public Tranquility in Danger, and believes, that his Duty to his Country obliged him to speak on this Occasion with unusual Vehemence.

‘ But I am too well acquainted with his Candor to imagine, that he expects his Assertions to be any farther regarded than they convince ; or that he desires to debar others from the same Freedom of Reason which he has himself used. I shall there-

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therefore proceed to examine his Opinion, and to show the Reasons by which I am induced to differ from him.

‘ The Arguments upon which he has chiefly insisted are the Danger of hiring the Troops of *Hanover* in any Circumstances, and the Impropriety of hiring them now without the previous Approbation of the Parliament.

‘ The Danger of taking into our Pay the Forces of *Hanover*, the Contrariety of this Conduct to the Act of Settlement, and the Infraction of our natural Privileges, and Violation of our Liberties which is threaten’d by it, have been asserted in very strong Terms; but I think not proved with proportionate Force; for we have heard no regular Deduction of Consequences by which this Danger might be shown, nor have been informed, how the Engagement of 16,000 *Hanoverians* to serve us against *France* for the ensuing Year, can be considered as more destructive to our Liberties than of any other Forces.

‘ It is indeed insinuated, that this Conduct will furnish a dangerous Precedent of Preference granted to *Hanover* above other Nations, and that this Preference may gradually be advanced, till in time *Hanover* may by a servile Ministry be preferred to *Great Britain* itself, and that therefore all such Partiality ought to be crushed in the Beginning, and its Authors pursued with Indignation and Abhorrence.

‘ That to prefer the Interest of *Hanover* to that of *Great Britain* would be in a very high Degree criminal in a *British* Ministry, I believe, no Man in this House will go about to deny; but if no better Proof can be produced, that such Preference is intended than the Contract which we are now desired to ratify, it may be with Reason hop’d, that such atrocious Treachery is yet at a great Distance; for how does the Hire of *Hanoverian* Troops shew any Preference of *Hanover* to *Great Britain*?

‘ The Troops of *Hanover* are not hired by the Ministry as braver or more skilful than those of our own Country, they are not hired to command, or instruct, but to assist us; nor can I discover, supposing it possible to have raised with equal Expedition the same Number of Forces in our own Country, how the Ministry can be charged with preferring the *Hanoverians* by exposing them to Danger and Fatigue.

‘ But if it be confessed, that such Numbers would not possibly be raised, or, at least, not possibly disciplined with the Expedition that the Queen of *Hungary* required, it will be found, that the *Hanoverians* were at most not preferred to our own Nation but to other Foreigners, and for such

Prefe-

Preference Reasons have been already given which I shall esteem conclusive, till I hear them confuted. An. 16. Geo. II.

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‘ The other Objection on which the Hon. Gentleman thought it proper to insist, was the Neglect of demanding from the Parliament a previous Approbation of the Contract which is now before us, a Neglect, in his Opinion, so criminal that the Ministry cannot be acquitted of arbitrary Government, of squandering the publick Money by their own Caprice, and of assuming to themselves the whole Legislative Power.

‘ But the Proof of this enormous Usurpation has not yet been produced ; for it does not yet appear, that there was Time to communicate their Designs to the Parliament, or that they would not have been defeated by Communication ; and therefore it is yet not evident, but that when they are censured for not having laid their Scheme before the Parliament, they are condemned for omitting what was not possibly to be done, or what could not have been done, without betraying their Trust, and injuring their Country.

‘ It is allowed that the Parliament had resolved to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, and therefore nothing remained for the Ministers but to execute with their utmost Address the Resolution that had been formed ; if for the Prosecution of this Design they should be found to have erred in their Choice of Means, their Mistakes, unless some ill Designs may justly be suspected, are to be imputed to the Frailty of human Nature, and rather to be pitied, and relieved as Misfortunes, than punished as Crimes.

‘ But I doubt not, that in the Course of our Deliberations, we shall find Reason for concluding, that they have acted not only with Fidelity but Prudence, that they have chosen the Means by which the great End which the Parliament proposed, the Succour of the Queen of *Hungary*, and consequently the Re-establishment of the Balance of Power, will be most easily attained, and that they have taken into the Pay of this Nation those Troops which may be trusted with the greatest Security, as they have the same Prince and the same Interest.

‘ But the Hon. Gentleman appears inclined to advance a new Doctrine, and to insinuate, that when any Vote is passed by the Parliament, the Ministers are to suppose some Conditions which are to be observed, though they were never mentioned, and without which the Voice of the Parliament is an empty Sound. In Pursuance of this Supposition, he calls upon us to recollect the Time and Circumstances in which this Vote was passed ; he reminds us, that the Con-

cession

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cession was made in a sudden Exultation of our Hearts, in the Raptures of Triumph, and amidst the Shouts of Conquest, when every Man was forming Expectations which have never been gratified, and planning Schemes which could never be perfected.

‘ He seems therefore to think, that our Ministers insidiously took Advantage of our Intoxication, and betrayed us, in a Fit of thoughtless Jollity, to a Promise which, when made, we hardly understood, and which we may therefore now retract. He concludes, that the Concession which might then escape us ought not to have been snatched by our Ministers, and made the Foundation of their Conduct, because they knew it was made upon false Suppositions, and in Prospect of a Recompense that never would be granted.

‘ I hope there is no Necessity for declaring, that this Reasoning cannot safely be admitted, since if the Vote of the Parliament be not a sufficient Warrant for any Measure, no Man can undertake the Administration of our Affairs, and that Government which no Man will venture to serve must be quickly at an End.

‘ For my Part I know not how the Nation, or the Parliament, has been disappointed of any just Expectations, nor can I conceive that any such Disappointments vacate their Votes or annul their Resolutions, and therefore I cannot but think the Ministry sufficiently justified, if they can show, that they have not deviated from them.

Mr E. Waller.

Mr Edmund Waller then spoke as follows :

Sir,

‘ Whatever Opinion we may have of what has been printed and published upon the Subject now under our Consideration, we must allow, that it has been of some Service to us, if it were nothing else but that of having given Occasion to the Hon. Gentleman, who made the Motion, to display his Eloquence ; for otherwise, it seems, he was not to have indulged us any such Pleasure. We should have heard nothing from him, but two bare Motions for granting his Majesty near 700,000 l. in order to enable him to maintain, with the more Ease, his own *Hanoverian* Troops. But tho’ I was pleased with the Hon. Gentleman’s Eloquence, I must confess, his Argument gave me some Pain. He seems to think, that our Constitution was quite altered by the Revolution and the Act of Settlement which was the Consequence of it, and that we had thereby departed from our antient Maxim, *That the King can do no Wrong*. Whereas according to my Notion of both, our Constitution was not altered but restored ; and consequently

frequently this fundamental Maxim of our Government must remain as firm and as inviolable, as ever it was under any former Race of *British* Kings. If this be so, and that it is no Man who has a Regard for our present Royal Family will deny, then no Breach of Condition or Limitation can impeach the King's Title, but may be a good Reason for impeaching and punishing his Ministers and Advisers, as well as every one who acts by their Orders against the Laws of their Country. Upon this Maxim the Freedom and Stability of our Government depends: Upon this alone, not only the Freedom of the Press, but the Freedom of Speech in Parliament, can be founded; for if the Person or Title of the King were to be any Way affected by the wrong Measures advised or pursued by his Ministers, no Man could find Fault with their Measures, without being guilty of a Breach of his Allegiance to his Sovereign. But the Constitution of our Government is known to be otherwise; and therefore none of the Limitations which are supposed by the common Law, or expressed in any of our Statutes, particularly *Magna Charta*, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement, are to be look'd on as Conditions upon which the King holds his Crown, but as Directions to the Ministers and others employed by him in the executive Part of our Government, which they are not to transgress, even tho' they should have his express Order for so doing.

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' In this Light, Sir, every Man may find Fault with the Measures pursued by an Administration, without incurring in the least upon that Allegiance which is due to his Sovereign: Nay, if he thinks the Measures wicked or wrong, he is in Duty to his Sovereign, as well as his Country, obliged to find Fault with them, and to expose the Motives upon which they were founded, or the evil Consequences with which they may be attended. It is by this our Constitution is secured, and the People guarded against being imposed on by the false Glosses usually put by Ministers upon the Measures they have resolved to pursue; and it is by this our Kings are secured against the fatal Effects of a general Discontent, by which absolute Monarchs are often tumbled headlong from their Throne, before they can be sensible of the evil Tendency of the Measures they have been advised to pursue. Therefore, if it has been of late insinuated, or if it should now be insisted on, that the Interest of *Great Britain* has been, or is now to be sacrificed to the Interest of *Hanover*, the Hon. Gentleman is not to impose Silence upon those that say so, by telling them they are guilty of High-Treason, but by setting the Argument in such a Light as will admit of

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no Reply, which he, with all his Eloquence, will, I fear, find to be a Task not easily accomplished. Nay, I believe, he will not attempt it; because in so doing he would find himself obliged to argue against those who for some Years have been his principal Friends; and who formerly suffered for not joining so cordially in the Measures against * *Sweden*, as was then expected by the Court.

‘ Will any Gentleman say, that the Interest of *Hanover* had no Share in the Measures we took, and the War we at last declared against *Sweden*, soon after the Accession of his late Majesty to our Throne? Every impartial Man who knows any Thing of the History of those Times must grant, that the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden* was the true Cause of the Rupture between *Sweden* and us; and the securing of that Purchase was afterwards the Cause of the Rupture between us and the *Czar*. The same Cause likewise gave Rise to the defensive Alliance between the Emperor and us in the Year 1716, and was originally the Cause of those Disputes between *Spain* and us, which have now produced two Wars and a Half (if I may so express myself) between the two Kingdoms; for that in the Year 1727, I can call but Half a War, because it was carried on upon one Side only. Whilst the Imperial Court but seemed to favour the Pretensions of *Hanover* in *Germany*, we did every Thing that Court could desire; but when we found that Court a little remiss with regard to those Pretensions, we, all of a sudden, in the Year 1721, altered our Conduct, concluded a separate Peace with *Spain* upon Terms not very honourable, and from being a generous became a jealous Friend of the Emperor’s, which united us in a close Correspondence with the Court of *France*, and at last produced the Treaty of *Hanover*, the Consequences whereof have been fatal to *Europe* as well as this Nation.

‘ These Facts could, I believe, Sir, be sufficiently proved, were we Masters of all the secret Negotiations that have been carried on for thirty Years past; and if they are true, surely it is not Treason to say so. But suppose them all to be true, and clearly demonstrated, no Man that understands our Constitution will say, they could any Way operate against his Majesty, or against our present happy Establishment. Such a Proof would indeed fall heavy upon the Ministers that advised or pursued such Measures, and the very Suspicion ought to be a prevailing Argument for our establishing such Regulations, as may prevent the Prosecution of such Measures in any future Time.

‘ As

* See the Debate on this Affair, in CHANDLER’s History of the Commons, Anno 1717, p. 120

‘ As to the Measure which is the Subject of our present Debate, I am vastly surpris’d to hear any Gentleman pretend, that it will be no Advantage to the Electorate of *Hanover*. Is not the sending of near 700,000 l. *English* Money to that Electorate an Advantage to it? Will not the maintaining of 16,000 Men, which must otherwise have been maintained by the Electorate itself, be an Advantage to it? But the Hon. Gentleman says, the paying of those Troops, can carry no Riches into the Electorate of *Hanover*, because the Troops are march’d out of it, and their whole Pay to be spent in a Foreign Country. Nay, he goes farther and says, that our taking those Troops into our Pay, and obliging them to live in Foreign Parts, will be a Loss to the Electorate, because many of the Officers have Fortunes of their own, and will spend more than the Pay received from us, which Supra-expende must be drawn from, and consequently will be a Loss to that Electorate. Sir, if there are any Officers among the *Hanover* Troops who spend more than their Pay, there are some who will not spend so much, and as those Savings must remain in, or be laid out in the Electorate, it is highly probable that what it gets by the latter, will more than atone for what it loses by the former. But suppose it were otherwise, will not the Cloathing, Levying, and Recruiting these Troops at our Expence, be an Advantage to that Electorate? For the whole Money upon every one of these Articles will be laid out or laid up in *Hanover*; and the Advantage it must reap this Way, will, I am sure, do a great deal more than compensate any Loss it may sustain by the Extravagance of some of its Officers.

‘ We must therefore suppose, that tho’ this Body of *Hanoverian* Troops be to serve in a Foreign Country, yet a great Part of what we pay for them, or to them, will be laid out in *Hanover*, and consequently that this Measure will tend to the Enriching of that Electorate. But now suppose, that not one Shilling of this Money were to remain in, or ever to return to *Hanover*, would it not be an Advantage to have 16,000 of its Troops maintained at our Charge? For no Augmentation has been made upon this Account to the Army in *Hanover*. The Hon. Gentleman seems to lay it down as a Maxim, that it can never be an Advantage to any Nation, to send 16,000 of its Subjects out of the Country: If he had added the Word, *idle*, his Maxim would then have stood in its proper Light; and, I believe, no Man will say, that it would not be an Advantage to a Nation to have 16,000 of its *idle* Subjects maintained, either at home or abroad, at the Expence of some neighbouring Nation. I should have been

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An. 15. Geo. II.

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very far from finding fault with our sending 16,000 of our Soldiers to *Flanders*, if they had been to be maintained by the Queen of *Hungary*, the *Dutch*, or any other neighbouring Nation, that would not afterwards have made use of them against ourselves. Therefore, the sending of our Troops to *Flanders*, as it is at our own Expence, must be a Loss to us, but *Hanover's* sending 16,000 of its Troops to *Flanders* must be an Advantage to it, because they are to be maintained there, at our Expence.

‘ I shall grant, indeed, Sir, that if the *Hanover* Troops were to have been kept in *Hanover*, and there maintain'd at our Expence, it would have been a greater Advantage to that Electorate; and therefore our keeping, and always maintaining such a Body of Troops in the Electorate of *Hanover*, may perhaps be design'd to be introduced by this Precedent. Our Parliaments may not be as yet well enough disciplined, for approving of such a Measure; but we do not know what may be brought about, by Time and bad Precedents. We lately maintained, for several Years, 12,000 * *Hessians* for the Defence of *Hanover*; and now we have got into the Method of taking *Hanoverians* into our Pay, I can see no Reason why we should not always be, from the same Motives, induced to keep a Body of Troops in that Electorate for the same Purpose. To a Parliament willing to be convinced, I could suggest a great many plausible Reasons for our agreeing to such a Measure; and such Reasons as, I am sure, would in all future Reigns make me a Favourite at Court; for I never yet read of a Prince that was willing to give up the smallest Territory that belonged to him. I could shew, and I think, with some Reason too, that as the Elector of *Hanover* is King of *Great Britain*, it would be inconsistent with our Honour to allow it to be taken from him: That it is almost surrounded with Princes who keep great Armies on foot: That without keeping always a very numerous standing Army in that Electorate, it is liable to be suddenly invaded and swallowed up by some of its neighbouring Princes: That the Electorate is not of itself able to keep such an Army on foot as may be necessary for guarding against this Danger; and that therefore we, for the Preservation of our own Honour, ought always to maintain a great Army in that Electorate. I could farther urge, that this Army would give great Weight to our Negotiations at all the Courts upon the Continent: That it would tend to encourage our Friends
and

* See the Debate upon that Measure, in CHANDLER's History, Vol. VII.

and terrify our Enemies, fully as much as an Army sent to, An. 16. Geo. II.
 or kept in *Flanders*; and that it would be always ready and
 more at our Command than the Troops of any Ally, in or-
 der to be brought over, to prevent or repel any Invasion or
 Insurrection, especially as our King has now the Possession of
Bremen and *Verden*, which shews the Consequence that Pur-
 chase may be of to the Quiet of *Great Britain*, and the
 Security of the Protestant Succession.

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* These, and a great many other such Arguments, I could make use of, for our maintaining a great Body of Troops in *Hanover*: I am far from saying they would appear conclusive to any Man of an honest Heart and a clear Understanding; but, I am sure, they would be as conclusive as those Arguments were, that were made use of for our taking or keeping the *Hessian* Troops in our Pay, in consequence of the Treaty of *Hanover*; therefore it may be supposed, that some future Parliament may agree to such a Measure. What we are now about will be a Precedent for it; and if ever we have such a Parliament, I am convinced, our Ministers, who generally think of nothing so much as of acquiring an Interest in the Closet, will not be backward in proposing it. Nay, I do not know but that in the very next Session we may hear some such Proposition made: Before our next Meeting I may prophesy, that a Suspension of Arms will be agreed on, and a Congress appointed: It will then be urged, that we ought not to disband any of our own Troops, or dismiss any of the Foreign Troops we have in our Pay, till Peace be fully restored; and if we do keep them in Pay, it will, even with Reason, I think, be said, that *Hanover* is as proper a Place for keeping them in as any other Part of *Europe*.

* Thus, I hope, Sir, I have shewn, that the Measure now under our Consideration, must immediately contribute to the enriching of *Hanover* at the Expence of this Kingdom, and may probably, in its Consequences, contribute a great deal more.

* The next Thing I am to inquire into is, how, or what way, or if at all, this Measure can be supposed to contribute to the Honour, Advantage, or Security of this Kingdom. As to Honour, I hope, we are not become such *Don Quixots* as to expose ourselves to an infinite Expence and infinite Danger merely for assisting a fine Lady in Distress. Such a Behaviour might be great and heroick in a private Man, but can be neither in a Minister, because he neither exposes his Person nor his Estate in the Adventure. As to Advantage, I cannot say what the Electorate of *Hanover* may have in its View, over and above the Advantages I have already ex-

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plain'd, but I am sure, this Kingdom cannot so much as aim at any Advantage by assisting the Queen of *Hungary*. Our future Security must therefore be the only Thing we can have in View, and if this Measure should appear to have a Tendency towards making our future Security more precarious, surely it is mad in us to put ourselves to any such Expence.

For making this appear, Sir, I must examine what is meant by the Balance of Power, how it stood by the former Systems of Affairs in *Europe*, and how it must stand, if it can stand at all, by any future System. From the Accession of *Charles* the Fifth, to the *Spanish* and *Imperial* Thrones, the Balance of Power leaned towards the House of *Austria*, and therefore it was the Business of this Nation to side now and then with *France*, in order to pull down the overgrown Power of the House of *Austria*, or at least to prevent its growing to any greater Height. In *Henry* the Eighth's Reign, and his two next Successors, our true Interest was neglected and sometimes sacrificed; but Queen *Elizabeth* wisely and steadily pursued it, and thereby established the Balance of Power; and what is most surprising, without putting the Nation to any great Expence, or involving it in any Debt. By the Emperor's being often involved in Wars either with the *Turks* or the Princes of *Germany*, and by the Stupidity of the *Spanish* Court, the *French* at last, in our *Charles* the First's Reign, and during the Usurpation of *Cromwell*, began to get the Ascendant, and from that Time so increased in Power, that before the Revolution it was become formidable to *Europe*, and therefore it was our Business to join with the House of *Austria* in pulling down the Power of *France*, or in raising the Power of that House, so as to make it near an equal Match for *France*. This we did, and did it effectually, tho' we must say at a monstrous Expence, from the Revolution 'till the Year 1721, when the Balance was so equal, that but a small Assistance from the Maritime Powers might have turned it to which Side they pleased.

But how, Sir, was this Equality established? Wherein did it consist? Not singly in the Dominions possessed by the House of *Austria*, but jointly in that House's being possessed of those Dominions, and at the same Time in Possession of the Imperial Throne, with a prevailing Influence upon the Diet of the Empire, by which she was almost sure of engaging the Empire in her Quarrel. This, Sir, was the System upon which the Balance of Power stood in the Year 1721; and if we had not then begun to shake it as well as desert it, it might have stood firm upon this Basis to this very Day. The Electoral Princes of *Germany* were, 'tis true, jealous of the Power

Power of the House of *Austria* ; but if we had stood firm, no one or more of them would have ventured to have joined with *France* against that House ; because as long as she made no open Attack upon the Liberties of the Empire, nor upon the Properties of any of the Princes thereof, she would always have had a Majority of the Diet in her Favour. But our Coolness towards that House, and our deserting her in the Year 1733, gave the first Blow to her Power, and has now at last overturn'd that System, upon which the Balance of *Europe* was established, at the Expence of Hundreds of Millions, and many Thousand Lives, to this unfortunate and infatuated Nation.

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‘ Is it now, Sir, in our Power to restore the same System ? Is it in our Power to restore the House of *Austria* to her lost Dominions ? Is it in our Power to restore her to the Imperial Throne, or to that Influence she formerly had upon the Diet of the Empire ? Sir, if it were in our Power, I do not believe it is in the Will of our Ministers to do so. To humour an infatuated and ill judging People, and to accomplish some of their own private Ends, they may pretend to assist the Queen of *Hungary* ; but if they could, I do not believe they would restore the Power of that House, so as to make it near equal to what it was, or in any Degree a Match for the Kingdom of *France*. If they had any such View, I am sure it would be chimerical, because none will assist us, most of the Princes of *Germany* would unite against us ; nay, I do not know, if the Foreign Troops we have now in our Pay, or the *Hanoverians* we are to take into our Pay, would assist in carrying on any such Scheme ; for surely those Troops would not assist in dethroning an Emperor chosen and acknowledged by their own Master.

‘ From hence, Sir, it is evident, that the Balance of Power cannot be established upon its antient Basis ; and therefore the Preserving or Diminishing the Power of the House of *Austria* can be of no great Concern to this Nation, nor could be of any, ever since the Elector of *Bavaria*’s being chosen Emperor. The only Basis upon which the Balance of Power can now be established, is to restore a firm Union and good Correspondence among the several Princes of *Germany*, and to detach every one of them, as much as possible, from any slavish Dependence upon *France*. If this had been our Scheme, and it is the only wise Scheme we could propose, after the Emperor was chosen, instead of sending Troops, we ought to have sent Ministers (not such as we have of late Years sent abroad) into *Germany* ; in order to have had an End put as speedily as possible to the War in that Country. In this

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Scheme, I believe, both the *Dutch*, the King of *Prussia* and the several Circles of the Empire, would have joined with us more heartily than they will do in any other, because it is their, as well as our Interest, to have an End put to that War; whereas it is the Interest of *France*, to have the War continued as long as possible; because the longer it is continued, the more the Princes engaged will weaken one another, the more difficult it will be to restore a good Harmony between them, and consequently the more difficult it will be to restore Activity or Force to the *Germanick* Body. That these are the Politicks of *France*, we may see by her whole Conduct in the present War, by her sending at first no very great Force to the Assistance of the Elector of *Bavaria*, by her leaving the King of *Prussia* to fight his own Battles, and by her now having in *Bavaria* only such an Army as may enable the Emperor to continue the War.

‘ If Peace had been restored to *Germany* soon after the Emperor’s being chosen, he would never have been under any slavish Dependence upon *France*, much less would he have contributed to any Increase of Power in such a dangerous Rival: He soon became sensible of his being made a Tool by *France*, for disuniting and weakening the *Germanick* Body: If he had been established in his Throne by our Mediation, he might probably, in a short Time, have been become as great an Enemy to *France* as ever the House of *Austria* was; and if we had applied our whole Strength to a vigorous Prosecution of the War with *Spain* and towards defeating her Schemes in *Italy*, we might by this Time have forced her to submit to reasonable Terms. But suppose we had not: Suppose the War had continued between *Spain* and us, and that *France* had joined with *Spain* against us, both together could not fit out a Naval Force equal to ours, so that we might have carried on the War with Success against both, and to the utter Destruction both of the Trade and Plantations of *France*; for without a superior Fleet she could have defended neither. If the Peace of *Germany* had been restored, and the Emperor established upon the Imperial Throne by our Mediation, *France* would have had no great Influence upon him, and much less upon the *Germanick* Body; and consequently neither could nor durst have pretended to give Laws to the rest of *Europe*; because it would probably have drawn that great Body unanimously into a Confederacy against her; but if that Body should be ruined by a tedious and consumptive War, supported at the sole Charge of this Nation, we shall not only exhaust ourselves, so as not to be able to maintain our Naval Force, but

but weaken the *Germanick* Body, and attach the Emperor An. 16. Geo. II. more strongly to *France*; and if the Queen of *Hungary* should at last be obliged to submit, thus exhausted and distressed, we shall be left exposed to the Vengeance of *France* and *Spain*, supported by an enraged and dependent Emperor of *Germany*. In this Case, indeed, it would be in the Power of *France* to give Laws to the rest of *Europe*, and to oblige all the Powers thereof to interdict us their Ports, if not join with her and *Spain* against us.

* From all which I must conclude, Sir, that if our Ministers mean any Thing by sending our Troops to *Flanders*, and taking such a numerous Body of *Hanoverians* into our Pay: I say, if they mean any Thing, besides that of imposing upon the Nation, and making a Present to his Majesty of 6 or 700,000 l. their Measures will render our future Security more precarious than it would, or could have been, had they put the Nation to no such Expence, nor engaged it in any such romantick Measures; because, by continuing the War we weaken, perhaps may destroy that Basis upon which alone the Balance can now be established, and which can no Way suffer by taking from one and giving to another of the *German* Princes, as long as *France* gets no Part of the Spoil, nor *Spain* any Success without first coming to an Accommodation with this Nation; for as to any Accession of Power *Spain*, or the Princes of *Spain*, may acquire in *Italy*, it signifies nothing to the general Balance, because the Connection now subsisting between *France* and *Spain*, can last no longer than the present King of *Spain's* Life, which cannot be of any long Duration; and upon his Death the antient Jealousy, between those two Kingdoms, will very probably revive, which would of course throw the Power and Influence of *Spain* into the Balance against the overgrown Power of *France*, and would be a new and a very great additional Security for preserving the Liberties of *Europe*.

* I know, Sir, I am arguing against the general Cry of the ignorant and unthinking Part of this Nation; but, I hope, our Ministers are not to be reckoned amongst that Set of Men. I shall grant that the Basis upon which the Balance of Power stood established in the Year 1721, was more firm and certain than that I am now recommending. Whilst it remained fixt upon that Basis, we could with more Certainty depend upon the *Germanick* Body's acting with Vigour and Unanimity against *France*, than we can do, when the Power of the House of *Austria* is divided, and the Head of the Empire without any great Influence upon the Body; and therefore we have the more Reason to resent the fatal Change

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Change that has been brought about, chiefly by the weak or wicked Measures of our Ministers here at home. To preserve or increase the Power of the House of *Austria* has been the Cry our People have been used to for threescore Years past : Whilst that Power could be set up as a Match for the Power of *France*, it was a right Maxim : If it were now possible to do so, it would still be a right Maxim ; and therefore I am not at all surpris'd, that this should still continue to be the Cry amongst those who do not consider or perceive the Impossibility of the Thing : But every Man who considers the present State of *Europe*, must be sensible of its being now impossible to restore the Power and Influence of the House of *Austria*, so as to set it up as a Match for the Power of *France* ; because all the Princes of *Germany* would declare openly against it : Even the Elector of *Hanover* might, perhaps, as Elector, declare openly against it ; and if he should declare against it, I believe, the Ministers of the King of *Great Britain* neither would nor could act vigorously in the Prosecution of such a Scheme.

I must therefore necessarily conclude, that this cannot be the Scheme upon which our Troops were sent abroad, or the *Hanoverians* taken into our Pay ; and as I can think of none other, I must suppose, that our Troops were sent abroad in order to amuse the Queen of *Hungary*, and persuade her to reject the Propositions of Peace made to her last Summer, which were as good, I believe, as any we can procure for her, in order that our Ministers might, from the Continuance of the War in *Germany*, have a Pretence, or some Shadow of an Argument for persuading this Nation to take 16,000 *Hanoverians* into its Pay. The Hon. Gentleman says, we were obliged to send our Troops abroad, in order to convince our Allies of our being resolved to act with Vigour, and to remove that Opinion which our former Conduct had instilled into them. Sir, if our new Ministers had sincerely and heartily join'd in punishing those who had brought such a Reproach upon their Country, and in getting such Laws passed as the People think necessary for securing their Liberties at home, it would have been a much more effectual, and a much cheaper Method of removing that Opinion which our late Conduct has instilled into the Minds of foreign Courts ; for they all know, from Experience, that this Nation both will and can act with Vigour, when it happens to be under a popular Administration ; but that our Government is of such a Nature, that it never did, nor ever can act with Vigour, when it is administered by Men who have rendered themselves hated or despised by the People

People. This we may be convinced of by the vigorous Resolution taken by the *Dutch*, as soon as they heard of a Change in our Administration; and the Slackness that ensued in their Counsels, as soon as they found that that Change was not like to be agreeable to the People.

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* It is this, Sir, that has confounded the Counsels of all those who ought to be our Allies. It is the Unpopularity of our Government, and the Discontents still reigning among the People of this Nation, that has convinced all the Courts of *Europe*, that there is no Dependence to be had upon, nor much to be apprehended from any Thing we can do; and this, perhaps, has defeated the best Scheme I ever heard mentioned for restoring the Balance of Power, and settling it upon the most solid and lasting Foundation. I mean that of drawing off the Emperor, as well as the King of *Prussia*, from their Alliance with *France*, and getting the whole *Germanick* Body to unite with the *Dutch* and us in a Confederacy for aggrandizing the House of *Bavaria* at the Expence of *France*. If this could have been done, it would have been a pulling down the Power of *France*, which is what we ought principally to aim at, and adding to the Power of the *Germanick* Body, so that both Ways it would have operated for securing the Liberties of *Europe*; but for this Purpose all the Parties concerned must have acted with the utmost Vigour, which was not to be expected from this Nation, whilst the Discontents of the People are not only general, but too ready, I am afraid, to break out into a Flame. From hence, I am convinced, that our Ministers had not the least View of procuring such a Confederacy, when our Troops were first sent into *Flanders*, and much less can they have any such View at present. Nay, I believe, the *Dutch* have expressly declared against attacking *France*, and whatever may be pretended, however far the Pretence may be pushed, I believe, none of our Troops, at least none of our Auxiliaries, will actually attack the Emperor; therefore I must suppose, and next Summer may probably justify my Supposition, that after having made a Parade, and stript this poor Nation of four or five Millions, we shall end where we ought to have begun, in negotiating a Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, and such a Peace too, as was offered to her last Summer, and would probably have been accepted by her, if we had no way interposed.

* For this Reason, Sir, I hope, it will not be said, I am opposing the Measures of our Ministers, when I declare against our entering into the War in *Germany* upon the present Footing. Tho' I argue against their pretended, I am convinced,

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I do not argue against their real Sentiments. Whatever Opinion I may have of their Integrity, I have a better Opinion of their Understanding than to suppose, that they would undertake such a romantick Scheme, as that of restoring the House of *Austria* to its former Power and Influence ; and therefore, I hope the Hon. Gentleman will not say, that I alter my Sentiments merely because our Ministers have altered their Measures. I never was for War or Peace, merely because I saw the Ministers resolved to pursue the contrary Measure, nor is this, I hope, ever a Motive with any Gentleman of this House ; but I pardon the Hon. Gentleman for supposing that it is, because it is very natural for Gentlemen (who have laid it down as a Maxim, to be for every Measure they find the Ministers resolved to pursue,) to suppose, that others oppose the Ministers Measures merely for the Sake of Opposition. Has any Gentleman, who declared for a War with *Spain*, as yet altered his Sentiments ? Are not we still for a vigorous Prosecution of that War ? But this too may, perhaps, be said to proceed from a Spirit of Opposition ; for it cannot be said, that our Ministers have ever yet prosecuted that War with Vigour, and of late they really seem to have quite forgot it.

‘ Has any Gentleman ever said, that we were by ourselves alone to undertake the Cause of the Queen of *Hungary* ; and that without the Assistance of the *Dutch*, or even of the Elector of *Hanover*, we are to restore her to the Possession of all her former Dominions, to dethrone the Emperor, and to place the Duke of *Lorraine* in his stead, not only in spite of *France* and *Spain*, but in spite of the Empire itself ? This, Sir, is the Fallacy of the Hon. Gentleman’s Argument, when he tells us, we shall be guilty of Unsteadiness in our Opinions and Behaviour, if we do not come into such a Scheme. All that has been said, in Parliament, all the Declarations or Addresses of Parliament, for assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, have been upon this Condition, that the other Powers, who are engaged by Treaties, and bound by Interest to support her, should join with us in assisting her. This Condition the Hon. Gentleman has, it seems, forgot, I shall not say willfully, and now he charges us with having been formerly of Opinion, that without her being assisted by any, but ourselves, there were reasonable Grounds to hope, that the Balance of Power might be again restored, and the Tranquility of *Europe* re-established. Is not this, Sir, a downright Misrepresentation of the Fact ? And since we now find, that none of the Powers of *Europe* will join with us in assisting her, that even the Electorate of *Hanover* will not
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send her the 4000 Men stipulated by the Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, is it not a good Reason for our refusing to concur in a Scheme, which it is impossible to execute, and which, by our joining in it, may render the Emperor more dependent upon *France* than he otherwise would be, and consequently destroy, or very much weaken that Basis, upon which alone the Balance of Power can now be established ?

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‘ The very Reason given for our taking the *Hanover* Troops into our Pay, is a Proof of its being ridiculous in us to think of re-establishing the Balance of Power upon its former Foundation, and was certainly the strongest Argument that could be urged against this Measure. The Hon. Gentleman was so free as to tell us, that we took the *Hanoverians* into our Pay, because we could not get any other. If this be true, I am sure, we ought not to have taken them, because it was from thence apparent, we could make no use of them ; and if we could at that Time have got any other, we ought to have taken any rather than those of *Hanover* ; because by that means we might have engaged the Prince whose Troops we hired, to join with us in espousing the Cause of the Queen of *Hungary* ; and we might certainly have got the Troops of any other Potentate in *Europe*, at a cheaper Rate than we are now to pay for those of *Hanover* ; for I could shew, that we never paid so dear for any Troops taken into our Service, as we are to pay for these *Hanoverians*. But as I think, and I hope have demonstrated, that we ought not to take those Troops into our Pay at any Rate, I have therefore no Occasion to point out the several extraordinary Articles that are in the Estimates now lying upon our Table. And as to their being already marched into *Flanders*, I do not think, we can be supposed to be thereby laid under any Obligation, either to make good the Charge of marching them thither, or to pay for marching them back ; because it is evident, from our Address of last Session, that we neither desired nor designed that his Majesty should put the Nation to any Charge in supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, unless he was to be joined by the other Powers equally concerned with us, and some practicable Scheme formed for giving her such a Support as might restore the Balance of Power and establish it upon a solid Foundation. Therefore, as it is not so much as pretended, that we ever had, or have now the least Hopes of such a Conjunction, if we do not comply with this Demand, his Majesty cannot blame his Parliament : He can blame only those Ministers that were so rash as to advise the marching of those Troops ; and, I am sure, our Constituents would have great Reason

An. 16. Geo. II. 1742. to blame us, if we should lavish away their Money, for no other Reason but to prevent his Majesty's having Cause to blame his Ministers.

Mr H. Walpole, spoke next to the following Effect.

Sir,

Mr H. Walpole

' I Confess, I should have been no way surpris'd, had the Hon. Gentleman who made you this Motion, saved himself the Trouble of explaining his Reason for making it, or for our agreeing to it; for they are so clearly deducible from Facts so publickly known, that when I first heard of the March of the *Hanover* Troops, and of their being taken into the Pay of *Great Britain*, I was so far from thinking the Measure would be oppos'd, that I imagin'd it would be highly applauded and readily provided for. I even then began to think, that after we had agreed to the proper Resolutions for granting the Supplies necessary for the Subsistence of those Troops, I should have the Pleasure to see this House unanimously resolving upon an Address of Thanks to his Majesty, for shewing such a Mark of his Affection for these Kingdoms, as to lend us a large Body of his Troops, when he thereby expos'd his own native Dominions to the Danger of being involved in the War, and to the highest Resentment not only of *France*, but of the Prince then chosen Emperor of *Germany*, and Head of the Empire.

' Sir, If we but consider the Turn which the Affairs of *Europe* took upon the Death of the late Emperor, there can be no Occasion to persuade us to agree to this Motion; and the least Reflection must convince us, that that Turn was not owing to any Misconduct in our Ministers, but merely to the unforeseen Accident of the late Emperor's dying, before any proper Measures had been taken for giving him a Successor in the Imperial Throne: I say unforeseen Accident; because the late Emperor was of a healthful robust Body, and not very far advanced in Years, no one could foresee, no one could reasonably suppose, that his Death was so near approaching. By this Event's happening at such an unseasonable Time for the rest of *Europe*, the *French* were encouraged to form a Scheme, not only for giving an Emperor to *Germany*, but for reducing still further the Power of the House of *Austria*, their antient Rival, by parcelling out a great Part of her Dominions, amongst those Princes of *Europe* who should appear most attached to the Interest of *France*; and in both Parts of this Scheme the found but too certain Hopes of Success, from the ill tim'd Ambition of some of the Princes of *Europe*, and a Sort of panick Fear in most of the rest.

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‘ In these Circumstances, Sir, what was his Majesty to do ? What was this Nation to do ? If his Majesty had been guided by his Ambition as others were, and had shewn no Regard to any Thing but the Extension of his *German* Dominions, he might certainly have purchased some Addition, by joining with the Measures of *France*, for as he was King of *Great Britain*, as well as Elector of *Hanover*, they would certainly have thought it well worth their while, to have purchased his Friendship, and hearty Concurrence almost at any Rate. On the other Hand, if he had been aw’d by Fear, as some others seem to have been, he would have remained quite inactive, without putting himself or this Nation to any Expence, which would have deprived some Gentlemen, both within Doors and without, of the Pleasure they seem to take in opposing what is now under our Consideration. But his Majesty was too wise to be guided by either of these Motives : He resolv’d to oppose the Measures of *France* as much, and as soon as it was in his Power ; for which purpose he immediately ordered an Augmentation of his Armies in *Hanover*, as well as in *Great Britain*, to be ready to act as soon as a fit Opportunity should offer. But as *France* had been enabled, by the Ambition of some Powers in *Europe*, to form a most powerful Alliance ; as Fear in others made it at first impossible for his Majesty to form a sufficient Counter-Alliance ; and as his own Dominions were in Danger of being immediately attack’d, he was oblig’d to conclude a Treaty of Neutrality ; which Neutrality, however, he wisely confin’d to his *German* Dominions, and to the Space of one Twelvemonth from the Date.

‘ As to that Part of the *French* Scheme relating to the Election of an Emperor, his Majesty found it impossible to oppose it, because a great Majority of the Electors had positively resolv’d to concur in the Choice of the Elector of *Bavaria*, which Resolution they had taken, not out of Love to the *French*, or from any Fear of their Arms, but for two other Reasons that were both very prevalent. First, to preserve their Right of Election, and prevent the House of *Austria*’s acquiring any Pretence from Prescription to say, that the Imperial Diadem ought always to be continued in that House ; and secondly, because there was no Male Representative of the House of *Austria*, and it was not proper to chuse the Duke of *Lorrain*, left by the Queen of *Hungary*’s dying without Children, the Empire should come to have a Head who had not Dominions sufficient for supporting the Lustre and Dignity of the Imperial Diadem. These

Reasons

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An. 16. Geo. II. Reasons prevailed with a great Majority of the Electors to fix upon the Elector of *Bavaria*, and his Majesty finding it needful to oppose, concurred in the Election.

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To these Reasons, I may add, Sir, that most of the Princes of the Empire had found the Inconvenience of continuing the Imperial Dignity so long in the House of *Austria*, and had by Turns felt the Weight of the Power that House had thereby acquired, which was certainly grown so great as to be a little inconsistent with the Liberties of *Germany*, however much it might tend to the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe*. This was a third Reason for uniting the Electors in the Interest of the House of *Bavaria*, with regard to the Election; and was, perhaps, a Reason that prevailed with many of them to fall in with the Views of *France*, even with regard to the lessening the Power of that House; especially as *France* has all along taken care to persuade the World, that she had no Design to add any Thing to her own Power or Dominions.

If his Majesty had shewn a Regard only to the Interest of his *German* Dominions: If he had been governed by the Maxim that has long prevailed in *Germany*, of pulling down the overgrown Power of the House of *Austria*; he would certainly have joined in the Scheme for dividing the Dominions of that House, and might, perhaps, have come in for a Share, or, at least, some Equivalent; but his Majesty, in this, as well as all his former Measures, has been intirely governed by the sole Interest of *England*. He considered that, as the House of *Austria* is the present and rightful Possessor of those Territories which are now called the *Austrian Netherlands*, we might always depend upon that House as our faithful Ally, for that Reason, which chiefly prevails among Princes, because it is her Interest to be so. If ever *France* attempts to extend her Dominions, that Attempt will certainly fall first upon the *Austrian Netherlands*; but as she cannot propose to succeed in any such Attempt, till she has first brought this Nation so low as not to be able to prevent it, or established a Government here that will not endeavour to prevent it, therefore her first Attempt will undoubtedly be against us, or, at least, against our present happy Establishment; but as the Conquest of the *Austrian Netherlands* will be the certain and immediate Consequence of *France's* succeeding in any such Attempt against us, therefore we may depend upon the Assistance of the House of *Austria*, if ever *France* should make any Attempt against us.

For this Reason, Sir, even supposing that the Balance of Power must now depend upon the Harmony and Unanimity of

of the *Germanick* Body, which, in my Opinion, it always did in Time past, as well as it must do in Time to come, yet it is the Interest of this Nation to preserve the Dominions and Power of the House of *Austria* as entire as possible. This made his Majesty resolve to defeat the second Part of the *French* Scheme ; but as this was not to be done without drawing off some of those Princes that were at first engaged in the *French* Alliance, and as he found it impossible to do this without giving up some Part of the *Austrian* Dominions, therefore his first Attempt was, to prevail upon the Court of *Vienna* to give Satisfaction to the King of *Prussia*, and upon that Prince to accept of what the Court of *Vienna* was willing to give. In this his Majesty has succeeded better, or at least sooner, than could be expected ; and the Consequence of this has been, a Reconciliation between the Courts of *Saxony* and *Vienna*, with little or no Loss to the latter.

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* His Majesty's next Care was, to provide for the Safety of the *Austrian* Dominions in *Italy*, and to defeat the Designs of our declared Enemies the *Spaniards*. For this Purpose it was necessary to prevail with the Court of *Vienna* to make some Cession to the King of *Sardinia*, who may be said to keep the Keys of *Italy*, and to prevail with that Prince to declare openly against the *Spaniards*. In this too his Majesty has succeeded beyond any Hopes which the most sanguine could entertain a Twelvemonth ago ; and in order to weaken and distress the *Spaniards* still more in *Italy*, he has, by his superior Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, not only lock'd up their Fleets in Port, but compelled the King of the two *Sicilies* to declare for a Neutrality. *

* These Things were all done, Sir, or resolved on, before our Troops were sent to *Flanders*, or the Auxiliary Troops, either of *Hanover* or *Hesse Cassel*, were ordered to march ; but two Things still remained to be done, and that was, to secure the King of *Sardinia* from being attacked by the *French*, in Conjunction with the *Spaniards*, and to draw the *Dutch* out of that Inactivity, which Despair of being able to oppose the Views of *France*, had frightened them into. For both these Purposes it became necessary to form a numerous Army in *Flanders*, and therefore his Majesty, early last Summer, ordered a large Body of his *British* Troops to be transported to that Country ; but as it was not possible for us to spare such a Body of our own Troops, as was necessary to form such an Army as might give Apprehensions to the

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French

* See the Proceedings of the House of Lords, Anno 1742, P. 215.

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French, or *Courage* to the *Dutch*, his Majesty was obliged, not only to order the *Hessians* in our Pay to march, but to take another large Body of Foreign Troops into our Pay, and as his own *Hanoverian* Troops were not only the readiest at Command, but the nearest to the Place of Rendezvous, 16000 of them were accordingly ordered to march to join our Army in *Flanders*.

* This, Sir, has already had a very great and good Effect. The *French* not knowing what we might undertake, and being jealous of the *Dutch*, were obliged to march such a Body of their Troops towards *Flanders*, that they could spare not so much as a Regiment to join with the *Spaniards* in oppressing the King of *Sardinia*, and compelling him to desert the Engagements he had entered into with his Majesty and the Queen of *Hungary*; and the *Dutch* being by this Army secured against any sudden Attack from the *French*, have begun to entertain Thoughts of joining with us in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, which, I am persuaded, they will resolve on as soon as the Forms of their Government will permit; because when they judge impartially, and without being influenced by any Apprehensions of being immediately swallowed up by *France*, they must conclude, that it is their Interest as well as ours, and upon the same Account too, to preserve, as entire as possible, the Power of the House of *Austria*.

* Thus, Sir, in one Twelvemonth's Time, the Queen of *Hungary*, by the Assistance we have given her in Money, by our Mediation with the Courts of *Berlin*, *Dresden*, and *Turin*, by the Influence of our Army in *Flanders*, and Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, and by the Fidelity and Bravery of her own Subjects, has been raised from the most forlorn, the most desperate Condition that ever any Princess, not absolutely conquered, was in, to a State of triumphing over her present and most inveterate Enemies in every Part of *Germany*, and of rejecting with Scorn those Terms of Peace, which her Enemies would, with Derision, have heard proposed by her but a Twelvemonth ago.

* From this Change in the Face of Affairs, Sir, we have good Reason to hope, not only that the Tranquility of *Europe* may be speedily restored, and the Balance of Power re-established, but also that we may be able, very soon, to force *Spain* to submit to reasonable Terms of Peace with this Nation. Whereas, if we had sat still, and allowed *France* to parcel out the *Austrian* Dominions as she pleased, what fatal Consequences might we not have expected? As *France* would then have had no Occasion for keeping up a very great Land

Land Army, she would have disbanded a great Part of it, and applied all that Saving towards repairing and augmenting her Naval Force. A great Number of Ships might have been built in a Year or two, and her Land Soldiers, as fast as disbanded, would have been converted into Marines, and sent on board her Ships, with a few Seamen in each, to instruct them in their Trade. By this Means she might soon have provided herself with a most formidable Navy, and in the mean Time she would have encouraged *Spain* to continue the War against us.

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* I have, Sir, as good, and perhaps as just an Opinion of our naval Force, and of the Bravery of our Seamen, as any Gentleman whatever; but let us recollect, what a Figure *France* made at Sea towards the End of the last Century, and even in the last War in *Queen Anne's* Time. If we had then had no Assistance from the *Dutch*, we should not perhaps have found ourselves such an Overmatch for the *French* at Sea, as some People imagine we now are; and yet, during all that Time, she kept up most numerous Armies at Land. What then have we to expect, should the whole Treasure and Strength of *France*, or the greatest Part of both, be turned towards gaining a Superiority, or at least an Equality at Sea? In the last two Wars, we gained, 'tis true, by the Help of the *Dutch*, several great Naval Victories over the *French*, but it was not altogether by those Victories we beat them out of that Element. If I may be allowed the Expression, by Land we beat them out of the Sea. We obtained so great and so many Victories at Land, that they were forced to neglect their Sea Affairs, in order to apply their whole Strength, both in Money and Men, to defend their Country, I may say, their Capital, at Land. Therefore, if both *France* and *Spain* should join in a War against us, and we should have no one to assist us, nor they any Enemy to fear at Land, I would not have Gentlemen vainly imagine, that we should be in no Danger of losing our Superiority, even upon our own Element; and if we did, what dreadful Consequences should we not have to apprehend?

* Thank God! Sir, by the wise Measures his Majesty has taken, and is now about, we seem at present to be out of this Danger; and in all those Measures, I hope, I have made it evident, that his Majesty has solely pursued the Interest of *Great Britain*, even at the Risk of his *German* Dominions. I am therefore surprised, how any one can suppose, that the Interest of *Great Britain* has, in any of our late Measures, been sacrificed to the Interest of *Hanover*; but as this scandalous Reflection (I beg Pardon for the Ex-

pression,

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pression, my Concern for our present happy Establishment forces it from me) has been carried much farther back than any of our late Measures, I must beg your Indulgence for removing that Asperision.

‘ It is impossible, Sir, to mistake the Spirit by which the Authors and Propagators of this Misrepresentation are actuated, when we consider that they begin it with the very first Transaction of a Foreign Nature, in which his late Majesty was engag’d after his Accession, and carry it down from that Time to this very Day, pretending, that not only our Dispute with *Sweden* in the Year 1715, but all our Foreign Transactions since that Time, have been govern’d by that Influence which the Interest of *Hanover* has had upon the Counsels of *Great Britain*. A Misrepresentation thus begun and continued can proceed from nothing but a Spirit of *Jacobitism*, and a fix’d Design to render the People of this Kingdom dissatisfied as well as discontented; and therefore it is the Duty of every Man who is a Friend to our present happy Establishment to set the Affair of *Sweden*, and all our other Foreign Affairs, in their just and true Light, which may easily be done by any one that considers the Dates of our Negotiations and Treaties, and the Circumstances our Affairs were in at each respective Time.

‘ As to our Dispute with *Sweden* in the Year 1715, it was so far from proceeding from his late Majesty’s Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, that it took its Rise from what had happened before his Accession to our Throne. For several Years before that Time, our Trade had been interrupted in the *Baltick*, and several of our Merchant Ships plunder’d by *Swedish* Privateers or Cruizers. This we had complain’d of at the Court of *Sweden*, often before his late Majesty’s Accession; and as the *Dutch* had met with the same Treatment, they joined with us in those Complaints. We had jointly presented several Memorials to the King or Senate of *Sweden*, before as well as after his late Majesty’s Accession; and when his late Majesty found, that these Memorials had no Effect, he at last resolv’d, in Conjunction with the *Dutch*, to send a strong Squadron into the *Baltick* for protecting the Trade of both Nations. Accordingly in *May* 1715, the *British* and *Dutch* Squadrons sail’d to the *Baltick*, whereas the Treaty between his late Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, and the King of *Denmark*, about the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, was not concluded till the 26th of *July* following. Therefore, it is evident, that our sending a Squadron into the *Baltick* proceeded from his late Majesty’s Care of our Trade, and not from any Engagements he was under by

by a Treaty which was not concluded till some Months after. An. 16. Geo. II.

‘ The same Cause made it necessary for us, and for the *Dutch* as well as us, to send a Squadron into the *Baltick* in the Year 1716; and the Behaviour of the King of *Sweden* towards this Nation, made it at last necessary for us to come to an open Rupture, and to provide against the Designs of that violent and obstinate Prince. Thus it is apparent, that in this whole Affair between *Sweden* and us, the Interest of *Hanover* could have no Manner of Concern; and as little in the defensive Alliance concluded in 1716, between his late Majesty and the Emperor. Before and at the Time of concluding this Alliance, the Court of *France*, even after the Regent’s getting the Government solely into his Hands, had given evident Indications of their being inclined to prosecute a Scheme concerted in their late King’s Life-time, for setting the Pretender upon the Throne of these Kingdoms. This made it necessary for his late Majesty to provide for his Defence, which he did, first by procuring an Accommodation of all Differences between the Emperor and the States General in the Year 1715, and afterwards by this Defensive Alliance with the Emperor in the Year 1716. By these two Treaties he laid a Foundation for another grand Confederacy against *France*, in case that Court had persisted in her Design of establishing Popery and arbitrary Power in this Kingdom, by placing a Popish Pretender upon our Throne; and the Fear of this had such an Effect upon the late Regent of *France*, that it produced a thorough Change in his Measures, and made him court the Friendship instead of provoking the Resentment of the late King.

‘ His Majesty having thus secured himself and his Kingdoms against those who were contriving the Destruction of both, his next Care was to secure the Tranquility of *Europe*, which had been left upon a very precarious, or rather upon no Foundation at all. By the Conduct of those who had negotiated that infamous Treaty, all Faith and Confidence had been destroyed among those who were the Members of that formidable Confederacy, which had brought *France* so low, and would have kept her so, if it had been preserved; and the Dispute about the Succession to the *Spanish* Monarchy was left subsisting without any Sort of Agreement between the two Parties pretending to that Succession. By the two Treaties I have mentioned, his late Majesty had entirely restored that Confidence, which formerly subsisted between the three chief Members of the grand Alliance; but the Dispute, or rather an open War still subsisted between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, and the latter was actually making Preparations for

1742.

An. 16. Geo. II.
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its Prosecution, so that something still remain'd to be done for restoring and preserving the Tranquility of *Europe*; and as the Regent of *France* was then willing to join with his late Majesty in his pacifick Measures, this produced first the Treaty of Alliance and Guaranty between *France*, *Great Britain*, and *Holland*, in the Year 1717, by which we obtained the Demolition of *Mardyke*, and the Banishment of the Pretender from *Avignon*; and the Quadruple Alliance between the Emperor, *France*, *Great Britain*, and *Holland*, by which the Dispute about the Succession to the *Spanish* Monarchy was fully determined, and a Method settled for compelling the King of *Spain* to agree to it, in case it should be found, that no fair Means would prevail.

But, Sir, the King of *Spain*, after having adjusted all his Differences with us by the Treaty in 1721, agreed to submit all his Differences with the Emperor to be determined at the Congress of *Cambray*, and in the mean Time to suspend all Manner of Hostilities. Thus the Affairs of *Europe* stood when the Court of *France* sent back the *Infanta* of *Spain*, and the Emperor set up the *East India* Company at *Ostend*, which quite changed the Face of Affairs in *Europe*. The Establishment of that Company produced a Difference between the Emperor and the Maritime Powers, the sending back the *Infanta* produced a Breach between the Courts of *France* and *Spain*, and the latter's insisting upon the Restitution of *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*, created an Uneasiness between them and us; and all these joined together united the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, and produced the famous Treaty between them, concluded at *Vienna* in 1725. By the very Terms of this Treaty it was evident, that the Emperor was resolved to compel the *Dutch* and us to submit to the Continuance of his *Ostend* Company, and that *Spain* was resolved to force *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon* from us, and perhaps to attack *France*, in order to revenge the Affront put upon them by sending back their *Infanta*. These Designs, I say, appeared upon the very Face of the Treaty, and from the most undoubted Authority his late Majesty had Intelligence, that Engagements were entered into by secret Articles between those two Powers, which were of much more dangerous Consequence to *Europe* in general, as well as to this Nation in particular.

By these open and secret Engagements between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, the Tranquility of *Europe* became exposed, and the Trade of this Nation was in Danger of suffering from the Privileges granted by the King of *Spain* to the Subjects of his Imperial Majesty. Here again his late
Majesty

Majesty's Care for the Trade of this Nation and the Peace of *Europe*, were manifested, by his so speedily and seasonably concluding the Treaty of *Hanover*, and by the prudent Measures he afterwards took in drawing other Powers into that Defensive Alliance, and in preventing the Return of the *Spanish* Gallions from *America*, without which neither the Emperor nor *Spain* could come at the Sinews of War.

An. 16. Geo. I.
1742.

By these Measures, Sir, the Emperor and the King of *Spain* were defeated in all their ambitious Schemes: The Tranquility of *Europe* was secured; and the Trade of this Nation restored to its former flourishing Condition. Can it be said, that the Interest of *Hanover* had the least Concern in any of these Measures? Did it receive the least Benefit or Advantage from any of these Treaties? On the contrary, by his late and present Majesty's declaring so openly, and acting so vigorously against the *Ostend* Company, and the other Projects of the Court of *Vienna*, was not the Electorate of *Hanover* exposed to an immediate Attack? So that it may be justly said, that her Interest and even Safety has more than once been sacrificed to the Preservation of the Tranquility and Trade of this Nation; for that it is again liable to an Attack by the Measures now pursuing, and particularly by those now under our Consideration, I believe, no Gentleman will question.

I hope, Sir, I have now fully removed that wicked Aspersions which has been cast upon his late and present Majesty's Conduct: I hope, I have demonstrated, that the Interest of this Nation neither is now, nor ever has been so much as once sacrificed to the Interest of the Electorate of *Hanover*; and, that all our Treaties and Negotiations, and in short all our Foreign Measures, ever since the Accession of our present Royal Family, have been either defensive or preventive; and the respective Events have shewn, that they were wisely calculated for the Ends for which they were intended. I hope, therefore, the Motion now before you will be unanimously agreed to; for tho' it has been insinuated, that the Price we are to pay for these Troops is extravagant, it will appear at first View to every one who reads over the Estimate, that all the Articles of Expence are necessary, and no one of them charged higher than what is usual upon such Occasions. Our ready Compliance with this Motion will convince the Powers of *Europe*, that the Parliament of *Great Britain* is resolved to concur with their Sovereign in the most vigorous Measures for supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, let the Expence or Risk be what it will; and this alone

An. 16. Geo. II.

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lone may suffice to re-establish the Peace of *Europe*, for both the Emperor and *France* will from thence conclude, that they cannot pretend to prescribe Terms to a magnanimous Prince, supported by such brave Subjects, and by so powerful an Ally. This of course will incline them to submit to reasonable Terms of Peace, and will prevent the *French* King's aiming at any new Addition to his own Dominions, which he may very probably accomplish, if we allow him to reduce the Queen of *Hungary* to any greater Distress; for late Experience may convince us, that we are not to trust to his most solemn Protestations; and if this should be the Consequence of our refusing to comply with this Motion, I believe, the Gentlemen who were the Authors of that Refusal, would find it very difficult to answer to their Constituents for their ill-timed Parsimony at such a dangerous Conjunction.

Lord *Quarendon* * spoke next to the following Effect.

Sir,

Ld. *Quarendon*,

' As the present unlucky Situation of the Affairs of *Europe* must be acknowledged, even by those whose late Conduct has been the chief Occasion of it, they have certainly good Reason to endeavour to assign an accidental Cause; but no Man who knows any Thing of the late History of *Europe* will allow, that the Cause they themselves assign, was such a one as could not be foreseen. The Pretensions which some of the Princes of *Germany* had to a Part of the *Austrian* Dominions were well known, and considering the Circumstances of the late Emperor's Family, it was highly probable, that he might die, before any proper Measures could be taken for giving him a Successor to the Empire. It might likewise have been foreseen, that upon this Event's happening, the *Bourbon* Family would endeavour to make their Advantage of it, by raising, if possible, a Civil War in *Germany*, and appropriating some Part of the *Austrian* Dominions to themselves. All these Things were known, or might have been foreseen, long before we guarantied the *Pragmatick Sanction*; and the fatal Consequences that have ensued might have been in a great measure prevented, if we had pursued proper and vigorous Measures twenty Years ago.

' For this Purpose, Sir, we should have been extremely watchful to prevent, if possible, any Accession of Power to the House of *Bourbon*, or any Diminution of Power in the House of *Austria*; and we should have made use of all our Influence at the Court of *Vienna* to procure some Sort of Satisfaction for those Princes of the Empire, who had Claims upon the Dominions, or Pretensions to the Succession, of that House

* Now Earl of Lichfield.

House in Case of the Emperor's Death without Male Heirs. We should even have insisted upon this as a Condition previous to our guarantying the *Pragmatick Sanction*; and if we had, we might at least have obtained such a Satisfaction for the King of *Prussia*, as would have prevented his entering into any Engagements against the House of *Austria*. Both these Measures it was the Interest of *England* to pursue, but both became inconsistent with the Interest, the Claims, or the Resentments of the Electorate of *Hanover*; and every one who knows any Thing of our Foreign Transactions for twenty Years past may easily judge, by which of these two jarring Interests the Counsels of this Nation have been governed.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

‘ I am extremely sorry, Sir, to see any Thing like this become the Subject of our Debate; but when it does, and as often as it may hereafter do, it neither is, nor ever will be the Fault of those, who, from the Duty they owe to their Country, endeavour to expose this untoward and unlucky Bias in our Counsels: It is, and always will be the Fault of those Ministers who sacrifice their Sincerity to their Complaisance, and, for the Sake of gaining an Interest in the Cabinet, betray the Interest of their Country and of their Sovereign. It was natural, it was even laudable in his late Majesty to shew an Affection to his native Country, and the Case is the same with his present Majesty; but the very Reason that makes it laudable in him to indulge it, renders it criminal in a *British* Minister to flatter it, or even not to oppose it, when he sees that it is like to be prejudicial to the Interest of *Great Britain*. This a *British* Minister may often perceive, when it is impossible for his Master to perceive it; for such is the Weakness of Mankind, that our Judgment is often blinded and misled by our natural Affections. I am persuaded, his late Majesty would never have pursued any Measure, however much for the Interest of *Hanover*, if he had perceived it to be contrary to, or inconsistent with the Interest of *Great Britain*; but the Misfortune was, his Affection for his native Country, prevented his perceiving this Inconsistency, and his *British* Ministers, upon whose Advice he mostly relied, had not the Honesty to oppose what they found their Master naturally inclined to.

‘ This, Sir, has been, and may again be the Case: I am convinced, it is the Case with regard to this very Measure now under our Consideration; but it can never be a Reason with any Man of common Sense or common Justice, for having the least Resentment against the Person of his Sovereign, and much less against the illustrious Family now upon our Throne.

An. 16. Geo. II. Throne. It is a very good Reason for Resentment against such Ministers; and upon them, and them alone, the National Vengeance ought to fall.

1742.

* From hence, Sir, it must appear, that there can be nothing Treasonable in any *British* Subject, either within Doors or without, to trace our publick Measures to their original and genuine Motives, and to shew that they were founded upon such as were inconsistent with the true Interest of *Great Britain*. If there be any Treason in this Case, it must be in those Ministers and in them only, who allow themselves to be directed by such Motives; for surely, the Man who discovers the Treason is not to be deemed the Traitor.

* After what I have thus premised, Sir, I hope, I may take the Liberty to examine into the Grounds of the Measure now before us; and if it appears to me to proceed from a greater Regard for the Interest of *Hanover*, than for the Interest of *Great Britain*, I hope, I may say so, without being guilty of High Treason: If I did not, I am sure, I should not perform that Duty which I owe to my Country, especially as a Member of this House, and consequently obliged to declare my Sentiments openly and freely upon every Subject that comes to be debated here.

* Now, Sir, if our publick Affairs upon any former Occasion, have been directed by such a Motive, it is natural to suspect they may be so again; therefore I shall first take the Liberty to examine some of our Foreign Measures since the Accession of the present Royal Family; and this Liberty I am the more intitled to, because an Hon. Gentleman has in this Debate endeavoured to vindicate all our Foreign Measures from any such Aspersions, as he called it. If I can shew, that he has failed in his Attempt, and that every Foreign Measure he mentioned, proceeded from a greater Regard for the Interest of *Hanover* than for the Interest of *Great Britain*, it will be an Argument for our suspecting at least, that the Measure now under our Consideration proceeds from a Motive of the same Kind, which will of course add Weight to every Argument for shewing that it does.

To begin with the Affairs of *Sweden*, in the Year 1715, I shall grant that the *Swedish* Cruisers had given some Interruption to our Navigation in the *Baltick* for some Years before, but this they were necessarily obliged to do, because they were then at War both with *Muscovy* and *Denmark*, and consequently had a Right to visit all Ships sailing in that Sea, in order to prevent their carrying any contraband Goods to the Enemy. This we now do, on account of our being at War with *Spain*: This all Nations do, when they are at

War

War with any other Nation. Perhaps the *Swedish* Privateers An. 16. Geo. II.
or Cruisers were, in the Exercise of this Right, sometimes 1742.
guilty of Acts of Injustice or Oppression: Perhaps some Ships
or Goods were seized and condemned without just Cause;
but I am confident, we had very little of this Sort to com-
plain of: I am confident, that upon a strict Examination
many of the Complaints made by our Merchants, from which
Mr *Jackson* formed the Demand he made in *January*
1714-15, were found to be groundless; and my Reason for
being so is, because his late Majesty did not insist upon a
Compliance with that Demand, or any Reparation in lieu of
it.

* Therefore as it is a Maxim with all Nations, not to go
to War, or to have Recourse to hostile Measures, for
Trifles, I am convinced, we neither ought, nor would, upon
this Account alone, have menaced and insulted *Sweden* with
a hostile Squadron, as we did in *May* following.

* Surely, Sir, those Gentlemen who a few Years since
argued so strenuously for not coming to a Rupture with
Spain, and for accepting of such a mere * Trifle, in lieu of
the many Hundred Thousand Pounds they had robb'd our
Merchants of, will not say, that we ought to have gone to War
with *Sweden*, or to have done any Thing that might cause
a Rupture for the Sake of 65,000*l.* even supposing that
whole Sum had been justly due to us?

* Thus it must appear, that the Protection of our Trade,
or the Reparation of the Damage that had been done to
it, was not the true Motive for our sending that Squa-
dron into the *Baltick*; we must therefore seek for another,
and we need not go far for it. I hope the Hon. Gentleman will
not pretend, that the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden* was
a Bargain never thought of till the very Day the Treaty
was concluded. There must have been a Negotiation pre-
vious to the Treaty, and considering the Difficulties with
which it was attended, that Negotiation must have lasted for
several Months. As the Treaty was concluded in *July*
1715, that is, in less than twelve Months after his late Ma-
jesty's Accession, I am convinced, the Purchase was thought
of, and the Negotiation begun, before his late Majesty set
Foot upon *English* Ground. The Considerations publickly
avowed were, that his late Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*,
should declare War against *Sweden*, pay 600,000 *Rix-Dol-*
lars to the King of *Denmark*, and guaranty to him the Pos-
session

* See the Debate upon the CONVENTION with SPAIN, in
CHANDLER'S History Anno 1739, Vol. XI.

An. 16. Geo. II.
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session of the Dutchy of *Sleswick*. These, I say, Sir, were the Considerations publickly avowed; but it is highly probable that there was a private Consideration previously promised, which was the sending of a strong *British* Squadron into the *Baltick*, without which the King of *Denmark* could not proceed in his Design of making a Descent upon *Schonen*; and that the King of *Denmark* refused to conclude the Treaty for the Purchase, till this Squadron was actually arrived in the *Baltick*. And further it is probable that, as another private Consideration for this Purchase, his *Danish* Majesty likewise insisted upon the Elector of *Hanover's* engaging the King of *Great Britain* to guaranty his Possession of the Dutchy of *Sleswick*; for it is impossible to assign any other Reason for our burdening ourselves with that Guaranty.

‘ These publick and private Considerations being agreed on long before the Treaty was signed, it became absolutely necessary to find out some Pretence for sending a *British* Squadron into the *Baltick*, and for this Purpose a long Account of Damages sustained by our Merchants was made out from their Complaints, and probably was made as high as those Complaints could possibly afford Room for; which is another Reason for supposing, that the Demand made by Mr. *Jackson* in *January* 1714-15 was, upon a strict Examination, found to be without any just Ground, at least as to the greatest Part of it; for Merchants often complain of Seizures which, upon Inquiry, appear to have been just and agreeable to the Law of Nations.

‘ As the Interruption of our Trade was thus to be made the Pretence for sending this Squadron into the *Baltick*, and as the *Dutch* had been interrupted in their Trade as much as we, in order to give an Air of Truth to this Pretence, it became absolutely necessary to prevail with them to join us with a few of their Ships; and if we consider what they were then soliciting at the *British* Court, we cannot wonder at their being a little complaisant to us in this Particular; for they soon after got a large Sum of Money allowed them by Parliament, for a Debt they pretended to be due to them; and in *November* 1715, the famous Treaty was concluded between the Emperor, the *States General*, and his late Majesty, for securing to them their Barrier, and for the yearly Payment to them of several great Sums of Money, as well for maintaining that Barrier, as for the Reimbursement of those which were then due to them.

‘ If we had meant only the Protection of our Trade, a few Convoys would have been better than a great Squadron;

or

or if to procure immediate Reparation and Satisfaction from *Sweden*, our Squadron should have insisted upon it, and have bombarded their Towns in case of Refusal. Whether our Squadron made any such Demand I know not, but I am sure, it returned without obtaining it, or shewing any Resentment at its being refused; so that with regard to the End for which this Squadron was pretended to be sent, it had a quite contrary Effect, for it at last produced an open War between *Sweden* and us, which put an entire Stop to our Trade with that Kingdom, and during that King's Life was a great Obstruction to it in every other Part of the *Baltick*.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

* Thus, I think it is evident, or at least highly suspicious, that our War with *Sweden* proceeded from our having a greater Regard to the Interest of *Hanover* than to the Interest of *Great Britain*; and this Suspicion will be greatly strengthened, when we consider the Manner in which that War was put an End to. As the late King of *Sweden* was violent in all his Passions, and obstinate in all his Resolutions, while he lived his late Majesty could never obtain from *Sweden* a Surrender of their Right to the Duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, upon any Consideration whatever; tho' it was strongly solicited and an Offer made, that *Great Britain* should upon that Condition join with him against *Russia*; as appears from a Memorial presented to this Court by the *Russian* Minister in *March* 1716-17. But upon the Death of that King the *Swedes* resolved to give up for a valuable Consideration, a Right which, they knew, they could not recover, and therefore by a preliminary Treaty concluded in *July*, and a definitive one in *November* 1719, between the Queen of *Sweden* and his late Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, they yielded up to his Majesty the said two Duchies, in Consideration of a Million of *Rix-Dollars*, which was the only Consideration mention'd in the Treaty; but from what followed very soon after, we may easily perceive, it was not the only one in the Negotiation; for so soon, as in the Month of *January* following, a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was concluded between his late Majesty, as King of *Great Britain*, and the Queen of *Sweden*, by which his Majesty gave up not only all the pretended Demands we had upon *Sweden*, on Account of Damages done to our Trade before the War; but also all the real and just Demands we had upon that Crown during the War: And farther his Majesty promised to assist her *Swedish* Majesty, as soon as possible, with Subsidies and Soldiers, in her War against the *Czar of Muscovy*, and to continue that Assistance till a Peace should be restored.

* Sir,

An. 16. Geo. II.

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‘ Sir, can any Motive of a true *British* Growth be assigned for such a Treaty? Considering the distressed Condition *Sweden* was then in, Generosity and Compassion might have induced us to release or suspend a Demand, which that unfortunate Nation was not at that Time able to satisfy; but no such Motive, nor any Advantage *Britain* could reap from an Alliance with *Sweden*, could induce us to put ourselves to such an Expence, or expose ourselves to the Danger of a War with *Muscovy*; nor had this Nation the least Reason to find Fault with the Conduct of the *Czar*; for he did not so much as seem to aim at a Conquest of *Sweden*: He aimed only at getting his conquer’d Provinces upon the *Baltick* secured to him, and this we should have supported him in, because they opened a direct Trade between us and *Moscovy*, which has been of great Advantage to us, and may hereafter be of much greater. Yet in Consequence of this Treaty, we gave a large Subsidy to *Sweden**, and sent a powerful Squadron into the *Baltick*, which produced a Sort of War between us and *Muscovy*: I say, a sort of War; for the *Czar* was so conscious of the Influence we were under, that in his Manifesto upon that Occasion, he said, he declared War against the King, but not against the People of *England*, which was a Precedent, I wish, we had followed in our present War with *Spain*.

‘ I must therefore conclude, Sir, that in the Negotiation between his late Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, and the Queen of *Sweden*, it was stipulated that the Elector of *Hanover* should prevail upon the King of *Great Britain* to conclude this Treaty; and that tho’ it was signed two Months after, it was agreed on before the Treaty for the Cession of *Bremen* and *Verden* was definitively concluded. Consequently I must suppose, that our Peace with *Sweden*, as well as our War, proceeded from a greater Regard for the Interest of *Hanover* than for that of *Great Britain*.

‘ I shall, indeed, grant, Sir, that tho’ *Britain* had no Fault to find with the Conduct of the *Czar*, yet the Elector of *Hanover* had on account of the Affairs of *Mecklenburgh*, which the *Czar* had intermeddled in, because of the near Relation between him and the unfortunate Duke of that Name; and as this Affair will contribute towards discovering the true Motives of some of our other publick Measures, I shall beg Leave to explain it.

‘ With regard to this Duchy, there had been a very old Family Compact between the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, now King

* 250,000*l*. See Vol. VI. p. 121.

King of *Prussia*, and the Duke of *Mecklenburgh*, by which, An. 16. Geo. II.
 in Failure of Heirs Male of either House, the other was to
 succeed ; which Contract had been approved and confirmed
 by several Emperors : This gave the Family of *Prussia* an
 Interest in the Affairs of *Mecklenburgh*, and a View of mak-
 ing it one Day their own. On the other hand, as this Duchy
 lay contiguous to the Dominions of the *Brunswick* Family,
 and would be of great Advantage to them, by giving them
 a Communication with the *Baltick*, as *Bremen* and *Verden*
 does with the *German* Ocean, we may suppose, they have
 long been contriving Schemes for getting hold of it. In
 1664, a Dispute began between the Dukes of *Mecklenburgh*
 and the noble Families of that Duchy, which continues to
 this Day : In this Dispute the Family of *Prussia* has always
 taken the Part of the Duke, and the Family of *Brunswick*
 that of the Nobles ; and in 1708, or a little before, the lat-
 ter obtained from the Imperial Court a Protectorial Com-
 mission, directed to the King of *Sweden* and Duke of *Wol-
 fenbuttle*, as Directors of the Circle of *Lower Saxony*, to take
 into their Hands the Administration of the Government of
 that Duchy.

* In these Circumstances that Duchy stood when the *Czar*
 marched his Troops into it, in Favour of the Duke and
 against the Nobles. This could not but give Offence to the
 Family of *Hanover*, not only on Account of their having al-
 ways taken the Part of the Nobles, but because Baron *Be-
 rensdorf*, at that Time one of his late Majesty's principal *Ha-
 nover* Ministers residing here, was descended of a noble Fa-
 mily in *Mecklenburgh*, and had made considerable Purchases
 there. Accordingly his late Majesty left no Stone unturn'd
 for getting the *Muscovite* Troops removed out of that Du-
 chy ; and here likewise this Nation was made to interfere by
 its Ministers at several Courts in *Germany*, of which the
Czar complained heavily in the Memorial I have mention-
 ed, which was presented to this Court in *March* 1716-17.
 At last, by the Interposition and Weight of this Nation, the
Muscovite Troops were removed ; and by the same Influence
 a new Protectorial Commission was granted in 1717, by the
 Imperial Court, to the Elector of *Hanover* and Duke of
Wolfenbuttle, who, without any apparent Cause, marched
 in such a large Body of Troops, as not only consumed the
 whole Revenues of the Duchy, but run it vastly in Debt
 every Year, which Debt, by the Laws of the Empire, was
 to be discharg'd before those Troops could be removed ;
 and consequently a Foundation was laid for the perpetual
 Possession of that Duchy ; because the Mortgage would in
 a short Time have exceeded the Purchase.

An. 16. Geo. II.

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* I shall by and by have Occasion, Sir, to take farther Notice of this Affair of *Mecklenburgh*, and therefore shall now conclude it with observing, that from every Circumstance it must appear, that our War both with *Sweden* and *Muscovy* was entirely owing to a peculiar and partial Regard for the Electorate of *Hanover*, and especially to the Purchase made by his late Majesty of the Duchies of *Bremen* or *Verden*. Whether this Nation paid any Part of the Purchase Money either to *Denmark* or *Sweden*, I don't say; but it is certain that these two Wars cost us an infinite Sum of Money, besides the Interruption given to our Trade; and I must observe, that in the Beginning of the Year 1717, 250,000 *l.* was granted to his late Majesty for providing for our Defence against the Designs of the then distressed and oppressed King of *Sweden*, which Sum was never to this Day accounted for, nor could it ever be discover'd to what Use* it was applied; and I must farther observe, that in the Year 1720, the very Year after the Million of Rixdollars was to be paid to *Sweden* for the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, a Provision computed at 600,000 *l.* was made by Parliament, for paying off the Debts of the Civil List; and because this Provision did not bring in above 300,000 *l.* therefore the very next Year, a further Sum of † 500,000 *l.* was granted by Parliament for the same Purpose; so that in these two Years, we paid no less than 800,000 *l.* for making good the Debts of the Civil List, notwithstanding his late Majesty's having then been but six Years upon our Throne, and his being provided with a much greater Civil List Revenue than had ever been enjoyed by any Sovereign of these Kingdoms. Whether any Part of this 250,000 *l.* or of our Civil List Revenue, had been applied towards paying the Purchase Money of these two Duchies, I shall leave to some future impartial Inquiry, if ever this Nation should be so happy as to see such a one set on Foot.

* My Subject hitherto, Sir, may appear unaccountable, but what I am now to enter upon must astonish. The Measures we were by a *Hanoverian* Influence led into, with regard to *Sweden* and *Muscovy*, were attended with no bad Consequences, save that of leading the Nation into a needless Expence, and an unnecessary Interruption of a small Branch of its Commerce; but what we have by the same Influence been led into, with regard to the House of *Austria*, have not only put us to a much larger Expence, but have interrupted

our

* In the Year 1726, a Motion was made by Mr SHIPPEN, to address the King for an Account of the Disposal of that Sum: But it pass'd in the Negative.

† See the Debate upon the said Grant, in CHANDLER's History of the Commons, Anno 1721, P. 260.

our Trade in all its most valuable Branches, and have at last *de fond en comble*, overturned the Balance of Power in *Europe*. In order to shew this, I must consider how the Affairs of *Europe* were left by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and how they stood at his late Majesty's Accession to the Throne. The Treaty of *Utrecht*, Sir, which has been the buffeting Stock of all our little Politicians since that Time, and which has been incessantly exclaim'd against, even by those who have since shewn themselves to be arrant Bunglers in Treaty-making : The Treaty of *Utrecht*, I say, Sir, if the Parties chiefly concern'd in the Grand Confederacy would but have satisfied themselves with what was reasonable, had established the Balance of Power upon a solid Basis, and had laid a Foundation for a Contest between *France* and *Spain*, which could hardly miss of taking Place upon the Death of *Lewis XIV.* who by the Course of Nature could live but a very few Years.

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' It was not, Sir, the Treaty of *Utrecht*, but the insatiable Ambition of the Emperor and the *Dutch*, joined with an Error in the first Concoction of the Grand Confederacy, which broke the Confidence that ought to have been preserved among its chief and original constituent Members. That Error had made it impossible for the Allies to conclude a Treaty of Peace with mutual Consent ; for surely no Man of common Sense will say, that it was our Interest, or that we ought to have united the whole *Spanish* Monarchy with the Imperial Diadem and the Dominions of the House of *Austria* in the Person of the late Emperor *Charles*. This would have been ridiculous : It would have destroyed the very End for which the Grand Confederacy was form'd ; and as no Provision had been made by the Terms of that Confederacy, or by any future Treaty, for the Case of *Charles's* succeeding to his Brother *Joseph*, there was no Possibility of prevailing with *Charles* to join in any Treaty or Negotiation, by which the *Spanish* Monarchy was to be given to any other Person.

' On the other Hand, Sir, the *Dutch* became so flushed with the Success of the Confederate Arms, that they began to think of making themselves entirely Masters of the *Spanish Netherlands*, as appears evident, I think, from the Barrier Treaty they brought us into in the Year 1709. It was this Treaty, Sir, that gave the first Shock to that Confidence which subsisted till then between the Confederates ; for it was concluded without any Communication with the Court of *Vienna*, and the Emperor, as soon as he heard of it, protested in the strongest Terms against it. Surely no

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Man will say, it could ever be for the Interest of this Nation, to have the *Dutch* made Masters of the Whole or the greatest Part of the *Spanish Netherlands*; and yet this would have been the Case, if they had got a Liberty to put as many Troops as they pleased, and when they should think necessary, not only into the Towns expressly mentioned, but into all the Towns, Places and Forts in the *Spanish Low Countries*, which was what they stipulated, and we agreed to, by the 6th and 7th Articles of that Treaty.

These Circumstances, Sir, and these ambitious Views in our two chief Allies, made it apparent to us, that it would be impossible to begin and carry on any Treaty of Peace, with mutual Consent and Satisfaction; and as it was not our Interest, nor, indeed, in our Power, to carry on the War much longer, it became absolutely necessary for us to begin a Treaty by ourselves. I shall not pretend to justify the Treaty of *Utrecht* in every Particular; but if we impartially examine, and candidly judge of all Circumstances at that Time, we shall not find Reason to join in all the Reproaches thrown out daily against that Treaty, by those who have since made several more destructive, more dishonourable, and more ridiculous Treaties than were ever made by this Nation. By that Treaty we obtained even for those Allies that would not join with us in it, all that had been stipulated by the Grand Alliance: We raised considerably the Power of the House of *Austria*: We reduced the Power of *France* low enough, if proper Measures had since been taken to keep it so; and we laid a Foundation for a Contest between *France* and *Spain*, which actually took Place within one Year after his late Majesty's Accession to the Throne of these Kingdoms. But as the Imperial Court would not agree to what had been stipulated with regard to *Spain*, tho' there was a Cessation of Hostilities, the War continued between the Emperor and *Spain* at the Time of that Accession, and for several Years afterwards. And as the *Dutch* were unwilling to depart from the Barrier Treaty I have mentioned, and the Emperor resolved not to agree to it, the Regulation of that Barrier remained unsettled between them and the Emperor, at the Time of his late Majesty's Accession.

These, Sir, were the Circumstances of Affairs at the Time, or soon after the Time of his late Majesty's Accession. We had no Interest, we were under no Engagement to interfere, any other Way than by our good Offices, in the Disputes either between the Emperor and *Spain*, or between him and the *Dutch*; and we had nothing to fear from

from *France*, especially after the Regent got the Govern-
ment solely into his Hands; for *Spain* began immediately
to intrigue against him, and this it was, and not our de-
fensive Alliance with the Emperor, which made the Regent
of *France* court our Friendship and Alliance.

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* In these Circumstances, Sir, what had we to do but to live in Peace with all our Neighbours: To avoid carefully entering into any new Engagements; and to think of nothing but the utmost OEconomy with regard to our Domestick Affairs, in order to pay off that great Load of Debt, and clear away that monstrous Heap of Taxes, under which the People of this Nation then groaned, and are groaning to this very Day. This was the Interest of *England*: — But the Interest of *Hanover* was to make use of the Power and Riches of *England* for increasing its Territories, and this our *British* Ministers ought to have opposed with all their Might, if they had faithfully served either their King or their Country. Did they do so: No, Sir, I have already shewn, how they allowed their Country to be involved in two Wars upon that single Account. But this was not all: By the Treaty with *Denmark* the Electorate got Possession of *Bremen* and *Verden*: The next Thing to be thought on was, how to secure it, and to obtain the Investiture from the Emperor and Empire: For this Purpose *England* was to enter into new Engagements with the Emperor, and to guaranty all the Possessions he had, at the very Time that *Spain* was preparing to attack his Island of *Sardinia*; and this without stipulating any one Thing for ourselves, or any one Concession for putting an amicable End to the Disputes between him and *Spain*: Yet this was agreed to by the Treaty in May 1716.

* It was impossible, Sir, not to foresee, that a War with *Spain* would be the Consequence of this Engagement. Was it then the Interest of *England* to enter into it? We knew the Emperor was able enough, notwithstanding his War with the *Turks*, to defend himself against the *Spaniards* in *Italy*; and surely neither the Interest of *England*, nor the Balance of Power, could suffer by their taking the Island of *Sardinia* from him. But the Emperor on his Part promised to guaranty all his late Majesty then enjoyed and possessed, in which *Bremen* and *Verden* was included; and farther it is to be supposed, that the Emperor promised, at least verbally, to grant his late Majesty a Protectorial Commission for the Duchy of *Mecklenburgh*, and to grant him the Investiture of *Bremen* and *Verden*, as soon as *Sweden* could be prevailed on to yield up her Right. These two Promises, I say, are to be supposed, because the Protectorial Commission for *Mecklenburgh* was

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actually granted the Year following, and because our Court-Writers have since asserted the other, and reproached † the Imperial Court with Breach of Faith in that Respect.

‘ These Favours for *Hanover*, Sir, were by our Ministers allowed to be a sufficient Consideration for *England*’s entering into an Engagement, which would certainly involve her in a War with *Spain*. But before I leave this famous Treaty, I must observe, that the two contracting Parties engaged to defend and preserve, not only all they then actually possessed, but all they should afterwards by mutual Consent acquire in *Europe*. It is evident, that this additional Engagement had no Relation to *England*, because it is against our Interest to acquire any Thing in *Europe*; but both the Elector of *Hanover* and the Emperor had each a View in this Engagement. The former was, if possible, to acquire *Mecklenburgh*, and the latter the fruitful Island of *Sicily* in Exchange for the barren one of *Sardinia*. This the Emperor had insisted on from the Time of his late Majesty’s Accession; and probably it was brought into Negotiation at the Time this Defensive Treaty was negotiated. I say probably, because if the Duke of *Savoy*, then King of *Sicily*, had not known that this unequal Bargain was to be forced upon him, he would have made a much better Defence against the *Spaniards* when they attack’d that Island than he actually did; for he in a Manner surrendered it up to them as soon as they landed. And probably the King of *Spain* would never have attack’d that Island, if he had not known, that a Scheme was formed for compelling him to renounce the Right of Reversion as to that Island, which he had reserved to himself by the Treaty of *Utrecht*; for the Court of *Spain* had certainly heard of this Scheme, before they attack’d *Sicily*, because it was finally settled and made a Part of the Quadruple Alliance, which was concluded in *July* 1718.

* Having now done with the Motives, I shall next, Sir, consider the Consequences of this Defensive Treaty with the Emperor. As he absolutely refused to come to any Terms of Accommodation with the *Spaniards*, they attacked and took Possession of *Sardinia* in the Year 1717. Upon this Event, he called upon us to perform the Guaranty we had entered into the Year before; and as he had then granted his late Majesty the Protectorial Commission for *Mecklenburgh*, and seemed still willing to grant the Investiture of *Bremen* and *Verden*, as soon as *Sweden* could be brought to consent to it, we engaged in his Quarrel with a most extraordinary Zeal,
 attacked

† The Rt. Rev. Author of a famous Pamphlet, intituled, *An Inquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain*, publish’d Anno 1726.

attacked and destroyed † the *Spanish Fleet* in 1718, and put An. 16. Geo. II.
him in Possession of *Sicily*, and the Duke of *Savoy* in Possession
of *Sardinia*, before the Year 1720. 1742.

‘ Tho’ it was not the Interest of this Kingdom to engage with the Emperor in this War with *Spain*; yet having once engaged, it was certainly both our Interest and our Duty to continue and push the War till we could bring our Ally, as well as ourselves, off with Honour and a reasonable Satisfaction; but the Interest of *Hanover*, unlucky for us, took this Year a new Turn, which prevented our performing our Duty either to ourselves or our Ally. For explaining this, I must observe, that in *November* 1719, the definitive Treaty between his late Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, and the Queen of *Sweden*, was concluded, by which she yielded up her Right to the Duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*; and upon this it is to be supposed, an Application was made to the Court of *Vienna*, for having the Investiture forthwith granted; but a new Obstacle presented itself, which was the Claim of the Duke of *Holstein* to those two Duchies. As that Prince was the Son of the King of *Sweden*’s eldest Sister, he was, by the Laws of the Empire, which could not be altered by any Regulation made in *Sweden*, the Lineal Successor to those two Duchies, and as such he put in his Claim, which the Emperor could not but allow, and therefore refused granting the Investiture without a Surrender from that Prince. I must likewise observe, Sir, that the Duke of *Mecklenburgh*, supported by the Czar and King of *Prussia*, applied to the Court of *Vienna* for an Order to the Elector of *Hanover* and Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*, the Protectorial Commissioners, to bring in an Account of his Revenues, and their Demands upon his Duchy; and the Emperor was so uncomplaisant, tho’ I cannot say unjust, as to issue such an Order, or *Rescribatur*, as it is called in *Germany*, dated *April* 23d, 1720.

‘ These, Sir, were two Strokes which could never be forgiven by the Electorate of *Hanover*; and the first Method it took to shew its Repentment, was to persuade us to make up at any Rate a separate Peace with *Spain*, which we did the very next Year, upon Terms not very honourable, to say no worse; for we acknowledged ourselves in the wrong, by promising to restore the Men of War we had taken from them in 1718, and his late Majesty was induced to make a Sort of Promise, by a Letter under his own Hand, to restore *Gibraltar* to *Spain*. * So little was the Interest, or even the

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Prefer-

† See the Account of that Transaction, in the Debates of the House of Lords. Vol. III. p. 95.

* This Letter at Large is to be found in the APPENDIX to the Eighth Volume.

An. 16. Geo. II. Possessions of *England* minded by our Ministers, when their Preservation became inconsistent with the Resentment of the Electorate of *Hanover* against the Emperor.

1742.

Thus, Sir, the Electoral Resentment began to shew itself against the House of *Austria*; and this has been the true Cause of the many wrong Steps we have made since that Time, by which that House has been reduced to the lamentable State it is now in; for the late Emperor was so far from endeavouring to mollify this Resentment, that he rather sharpened it by his subsequent Behaviour. From the Year 1720, he continued to send such *Rescribatur*s as I have mentioned, yearly or half yearly. In 1722 he reduced the Elector of *Hanover*'s Claim upon *Mecklenburgh*, which amounted to some Millions of Dollars, to between 6 and 700,000; and upon his late Majesty's Death, he refused to continue his Protectorial Commission to his present Majesty, but instead thereof, granted the Administration of the Duchy to Duke *Christian Louis*, Brother and presumptive Heir to the present Duke; which Administration he positively refused to revoke, notwithstanding all that could be done, by the Mediation of *France*, at the Congress of *Saïssons* in 1729. This continued the Resentment of the Electoral House against the Imperial, and it is this Resentment that was the true Cause of our Treaty of *Hanover* in 1725; of our being so ready to join in an Alliance with *France* and *Spain* in 1729, for compelling the Emperor to admit the *Spanish* Troops into *Italy*; and of our leaving him to shift for himself in 1733, when he was attack'd by *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia*. Our abandoning him at that Time was but too clear a Proof of our not being sincere in the Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, which, through Necessity, we had granted him but two Years before; and this gave Encouragement to that Attack which is now carrying on against the Queen of *Hungary*.

It is easy, Sir, to find some other specious Pretences for all these Measures; but those have already been so often, and so fully refuted, that I shall not take up your Time with a Repetition, and therefore, I shall now examine our Conduct, since the late Emperor's Death. Upon that unlucky Event, (I say unlucky, Sir, for it had been made so by our Conduct for above twenty Years towards the House of *Austria*) every one might have foreseen, that the Queen of *Hungary* would be attack'd by the Elector of *Bavaria*, supported by *France*, if they found any Reason to hope, that she was not to be assisted, in the most sincere and vigorous Manner, by the Maritime Powers and the united Force of all or most of the other Princes of *Germany*. This it was the Interest of *England* to do: This it was the Interest of *Holland* to do:

This

This it was the true Interest of all the other Princes of *Germany* to do ; but the chief and most potent of them, the King of *Prussia*, had some old Claims upon the House of *Austria*, which were certainly to be satisfied, before it could be expected, that he would act with Sincerity in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary*. Nay, it was very much to be apprehended, that he would join against her, if immediate Satisfaction should be refused. If the *British* Court had been actuated by a true *British* Spirit, they would have stipulated Satisfaction for him before they had guaranty'd the *Pragmatic Sanction* ; but in this too a *Hanoverian* Spirit prevailed over our Counsels ; for there had been long an Emulation and a Jealousy between the Family of *Brandenburgh* and the Family of *Brunswick*, and to this the late King of *Prussia* had added particular Disobligations, by his not seconding our Views in the Treaty of *Hanover*, by his supporting the Duke of *Mecklenburgh* against us, by renewing the old Family Compact with that Duke in the Year 1726, and by another Incident of a more Domestick Nature. For this Reason, we could not bear to think of stipulating any Addition to the *Prussian* Dominions on the Side of *Silesia*, without which we could not expect his Assistance in our Guaranty of the *Pragmatic Sanction* ; and yet, if our Ministers were sincere in that Guaranty, which there is great Ground to question, it was ridiculous to think of it, without securing the Assistance of *Prussia*, by procuring him at least a stipulated Satisfaction, to take place upon the Emperor's Death, with regard to his Claims upon *Silesia*.

* But, Sir, tho' our Ministers did not, perhaps, act with Sincerity at that Time towards the Emperor, yet surely the Dangers that threatened *Europe* by his Death, should have made them act with Sincerity towards their Sovereign. Whether they did so or not we shall presently see. The Emperor died, I think, on the 20th of *October*, without any Satisfaction so much as promised to the King of *Prussia*, who therefore resolved to take by Force what had hitherto been refused him by fair Means, which Resolution he executed with such Expedition, that on the 17th of *December* he entered *Silesia* at the Head of a considerable Army ; protesting however, at the same Time, that he was ready to enter into a strict Alliance with the Courts of *Vienna*, *Russia*, and the Maritime Powers, for guarantying the *Pragmatic Sanction*, and for procuring the Imperial Dignity for the Duke of *Lorraine*, upon Condition of his receiving immediate Satisfaction as to his Claims upon *Silesia*, which had nothing to do with the *Pragmatic Sanction*, nor could be construed as a Breach

of

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of that Settlement ; and intimating that he was willing to accept of a Part of what he had a Right to, and that he would assist in procuring her an Amends for the Loss she might sustain upon that Occasion. In short, Sir, it appeared from every Part of his Conduct, that he was extremely willing to come to any reasonable Accommodation with the House of *Austria*, and as unwilling to join with those who were meditating the Ruin of that House, and soliciting, and even tempting him with great Offers, to join with them in that Project.

‘ Upon this important Emergency, Sir, what was the Interest of *England* ? How were our Ministers, or our Court, to behave in this Dispute between the Queen of *Hungary* and the King of *Prussia* ? Surely, to solicit, to insist upon it, to make it the absolute Condition of our doing, or promising to do any Thing, in favour of the former, that she should at any Rate give Satisfaction to the latter, and bring him into a strict Alliance with us. It was not enough to bring him into a Neutrality. We stood in need of his powerful Assistance. We could not do without it. If we had done this, she would have comply’d, she must have comply’d ; and she might then have purchased his Assistance for less than she has now purchased his Neutrality ; in which Case, *Bavaria* might have protested, but he would not have dared to attack, and *France* would have continued to profess what she never had, a sincere Regard for her Engagements. Did our Ministers do this, Sir ? Does it not appear from the Papers upon our Table, they did not ? What is the Reason ? Sir, the Reason is manifest. The Ministers of *Hanover*, for the Causes I have already assigned, were averse to any Extension of the Dominions of *Prussia*. Nay, there is some Reason to suspect, that they, foolishly imagining that *France* would not intermeddle in the Affairs of *Germany*, began to form a Scheme for joining with the Queen of *Hungary*, and dividing the *Prussian* Dominions between them ; for, beside the Paper we have heard of, sent hither from *Vienna*, we know, that as soon as his *Prussian* Majesty attack’d *Silesia*, and before the Elector of *Bavaria* marched a Man into *Austria*, or the *French* a Man into *Germany*, there were Orders given for adding 6000 Men to the Troops of *Hanover*. With this View therefore it was not the Interest of *Hanover* to insist upon the Queen of *Hungary*’s giving Satisfaction to *Prussia*, and this, as in other Cases, became the Rudder of *British* Politicks.

‘ Whether our *British* Ministers gave any Countenance to this Scheme of attacking *Prussia*, I don’t affirm ; but there

there are some Circumstances which render it highly suspicious ; for before the *French* marched a Man into *Germany*, there were Orders given to the foreign Troops in *British* Pay to march towards *Hanover*, and some Preparations made for embarking a large Body of *British* Troops, to be sent somewhere, and against some Body : Where or against whom, I shall not pretend to say ; but, I am sure, it was not against our Enemies the *Spaniards*. And whatever was the Design of these Preparations, they had a most fatal Effect : They confirmed the Queen of *Hungary* in her Obstinacy towards *Prussia*, forced that Prince into an Alliance with *France* and *Bavaria*, and thereby produced the War now carrying on in *Germany* ; for till that Time, neither the *French* nor *Bavarians* would venture to attack, or to march a Man against the Queen of *Hungary*.

* The March of the *French* Troops, and their Entrance into *Germany*, especially those that marched into *Westphalia*, awakened the *Hanover* Ministers out of their golden Dream : They thought no more of attacking *Prussia*, or of coming in for a Snack of his Dominions : They thought of nothing but a Neutrality ; and this too must have an Effect upon our Counsels ; for at the same Time that we were sending Money to support the Queen of *Hungary*, we allowed the *Spaniards* to pass quietly by our Fleet to attack her. Like an Aider at a Boxing Match, we help to raise her up, and then stand quietly by to see her knock'd down.

* Soon after this, Sir, there happened some little Change in our Counsellors, tho', I am afraid, none at all in our Counsels ; and contrary to all Expectation, the Queen of *Hungary* supports herself to a Miracle. The King of *Prussia* too, by the ill Usage he met with from the *French*, is drawn off from the Alliance against her, which brought the present Emperor, and the *French* Army in *Bohemia*, into such Distress, that they offer her very reasonable Terms of Peace. Upon this unlook'd, unhop'd for Event, what was *England* to do ? As in the present Circumstances of *Europe*, we can hardly expect to procure better Terms for her, it was certainly the Interest of *England* to advise her to accept of them. But the *Hanover* Ministers observing how zealously the People of *England* had declared for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*, they had, before this happened, formed a Scheme, to make use of this our Zeal as a Handle for touching a pretty round Sum of our Money, under the Pretence of lending us a Body of their Troops for the Support of our Favourite the Queen of *Hungary*. It was therefore contrary to the Interest of *Hanover* to advise the Queen of
Hungary

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Hungary to accept of the Terms offered her; and, I believe, it will appear, that they had such an Influence upon our *British* Ministers as to get them to encourage her not to accept of them. Accordingly she rejects them, and to encourage her to do so, as well as to form a Pretence for taking those *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay, this Nation was put to the Expence of transporting a large Body of its Troops to *Flanders*, and of keeping in Pay a much more numerous Army than we should otherwise have had Occasion for.

* Thus, Sir, I think it is evident, that our taking those Troops into our Pay proceeded from *Hanoverian* Counsels; and as we followed the Advice of *Hanoverian* Ministers, in taking those Troops into our Pay, I believe, we shall follow the same Advice in the Use we make of them, or even of our own that are joined with them. How the Counsels of *Hanover* may alter, I shall not pretend to foretel; but at present, it is plain to me, that they do not intend to give any real Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*; for if they did, they would at least send her the 4000 Men, which they are engaged to send her by their Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction. As they have not done this, I must suppose, they do not intend to assist her; and as we neither can nor ought to assist her, without their Concurrence, I am against putting the Nation to an Expence, which can no Way redound to our own Benefit, or to the Advantage of our Ally the Queen of *Hungary*, however it may to *Hanover*.

Mr W. Pitt.

Then Mr *William Pitt* rose up and spoke as follows:

Sir,

* If the Gentlemen, who have spoke in Support of this Motion, are, as they pretend, determin'd to abandon their present Sentiments as soon as any better Methods are proposed, the Ministry will very quickly be deprived of their ablest Defenders; for I think the Measures which have hitherto been pursued so weak and pernicious, that scarcely an Alteration can be proposed, that will not be for the Advantage of the Nation.

* They have already been informed there was no Necessity of hiring Auxiliary Troops, since it does not yet appear, that either Justice or Policy required us to engage in the Quarrels of the Continent, that there was any Need of forming an Army in the Low Countries, or that, in order to form an Army, Auxiliaries were necessary.

* But not to dwell upon disputable Questions, I think it may be justly concluded, that the Measures of our Ministry have been ill concerted, because it is undoubtedly wrong to squander

squander the publick Money without Effect, and to pay An. 16. Geo. II.
Armies only to be a Show to our Friends, and a Jest to our
Enemies. 1742.

* The Troops of *Hanover*, whom we are now expected to pay, marched into the Low Countries, indeed, and still remain in the same Place ; they marched to the Place most distant from Enemies, least in Danger of an Attack, and most strongly fortified, if any Attack had been design'd ; nor have any Claim to be paid, but that they left their own Country for a Place of greater Security.

* It is always reasonable to judge of the future by the past, and therefore it is probable, that the Services of these Troops will not, next Year, be of equal Importance, with that for which they are now to be paid : And I shall not be surpris'd, tho' the Opponents of the Ministry should be challenged, after such another glorious Campaign, to propose better Men, and should be told, that the Money of this Nation cannot be more properly employed than in hiring *Hanoverians* to eat and sleep.

* But to prove yet more particularly, that better Measures may be taken, and that more useful Troops may be retained, and that therefore the Honourable Gentlemen may be expected to quit those to whom they now adhere, I shall show, that in hiring the Forces of *Hanover*, we have obstructed our own Designs ; that we have, instead of assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, withdrawn Part of her Allies from her, and that we have burthened the Nation with Troops, from whom no Service can be reasonably expected.

* The Advocates for the Ministry have on this Occasion affected to speak of the Balance of Power, the Pragmatic Sanction, and the Preservation of the Queen of *Hungary*, not only as if they were to be the chief Care of *Great Britain*, which, though easily controvertible, might, perhaps in Compliance with long Prejudices, be admitted, but as if they were to be the Care of *Great Britain* alone ; as if the Power of *France* were formidable to no other People ; as if no other Part of the World would be injured by becoming a Province to an universal Monarchy, and being subjected to an arbitrary Government of a *French* Deputy, by being drained of its Inhabitants, only to extend the Conquests of its Masters, and to make other Nations equally miserable, and by being oppressed with exorbitant Taxes levied by military Executions, and employed only in supporting the State of its Oppressors. They dwell upon the Importance of publick Faith, and the Necessity of an exact Observation of Treaties,

An. 16. Geo. II. Treaties, as if the Pragmatick Sanction had been signed by
 1742. no other Potentate than the King of *Great Britain*, or as if the publick Faith were to be obligatory to us only.

‘ That we should inviolably observe our Treaties, and observe them, tho’ every other Nation should disregard them ; that we should show an Example of Fidelity to Mankind, and stand firm, though we should stand alone, in the Practice of Virtue, I shall readily allow ; and therefore I am far from advising, that we should recede from our Stipulations, whatever we may suffer by performing them, or neglect the Support of the Pragmatick Sanction, however we may be at present embarrassed, or however inconvenient it may be to assert it.

‘ But surely for the same Reason that we observe our own Stipulations, we ought to incite other Powers likewise to the Observation of theirs ; at least not contribute to hinder it. But how is our present Conduct agreeable to these Principles ? The Pragmatick Sanction was confirmed not only by the King of *Great Britain*, but by the Elector likewise of *Hanover*, who is therefore equally obliged, if Treaties constitute Obligation, to defend the House of *Austria* against the Attacks of any foreign Power, and to send in his Proportion of Troops to the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*.

‘ Whether these Troops have been sent, those whose Provinces oblige them to some Knowledge of foreign Affairs can inform the House with more Certainty than I ; but since we have not heard them mentioned in this Debate, and have found by Experience that none of the Merits of that Electorate are passed over in Silence, it may, I think, fairly be concluded, that the Distresses of the illustrious Queen of *Hungary* have yet received no Alleviation from her Alliance with *Hanover*, that her Complaints have moved no Compassion at that Court, nor the Justice of her Cause obtain’d any Regard.

‘ To what can we impute this Negligence of Treaties, this Disregard of Justice, this Defect of Compassion, but to the pernicious Counsels of those Men who have advised his Majesty to hire to *Great Britain* those Troops which he should have employed in the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary* ; for ’tis not to be imagined that his Majesty has more or less Regard to Justice as King of *Great Britain* than as Elector of *Hanover*, or that he would not have sent his Proportion of Troops to the *Austrian* Army, had not the Temptations of greater Profit been industriously laid before him.

‘ But this is not all that may be urged against this Conduct : For can we imagine, that the Power of *France* is less,

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or that her Designs are less formidable to *Hanover* than to *Great Britain*; nor is it less necessary for the Security of *Hanover*, that the House of *Austria* should be re-established in its former Grandeur, and enabled to support the Liberties of *Europe* against the bold Attempts for universal Monarchy?

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* If therefore our Assistance be an Act of Honesty, and granted in Consequence of Treaties, why may it not equally be required of *Hanover*? and if it be an Act of Generosity, why should this Nation alone be obliged to sacrifice her own Interest to that of others? Or why should the Elector of *Hanover* exert his Liberality at the Expence of *Great Britain*?

* It is now too apparent, that this great, this powerful, this formidable Kingdom, is considered only as a Province to a despicable Electorate; and that in Consequence of a Scheme formed long ago, and invariably pursued, these Troops are hired only to drain this unhappy Nation of its Money. That they have hitherto been of no Use to *Great Britain*, or to *Austria*, is evident beyond Controversy; and therefore it is plain, that they are retained only for the Purposes of *Hanover*.

* How much Reason the Transactions of almost every Year have given for suspecting this ridiculous, ungrateful, and perfidious Partiality, it is not necessary to mention. I doubt not but most of those who sit in this House can recollect a great Number of Instances, from the Purchase of Part of the *Swedish* Dominions to the Contract which we are now called upon to ratify. I hope few have forgotten the memorable Stipulation for the *Hessian* Troops; for the Forces of the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*, which we were scarcely to march beyond the Verge of their own Country; or the ever memorable Treaty of which the Tendency is discovered in the Name. * The Treaty by which we disunited ourselves from *Austria*, destroyed that Building which we may perhaps now endeavour, without Success, to raise again, and weakened the only Power which it was our Interest to strengthen.

* To dwell upon all the Instances of Partiality which have been shewn; to remark the yearly Visits that have been made to that delightful Country; to reckon up all the Sums that have been spent to aggrandise and enrich it, would be at once invidious and tiresome; tiresome to those who are afraid to hear the Truth, and to those who are unwilling to mention Facts dishonourable or injurious to their Country. Nor shall

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* In the Debate upon the *Hanover* Treaty, [Anno 1725 p. 360.] It was alludg'd by Mr Horatio Walpole, ' That the Treaty between the Emperor and the King of Spain, might probably be Cemented by a Match between the eldest Daughter of the former (Now Queen of Hungary) and the Infant Don Carlos,

An. 16. Geo. II. I dwell any longer on this unpleasing Subject, than to express my Hopes, that we shall no more suffer ourselves to be deceived and oppressed; that we shall at length perform the Duty of the Representatives of the People; and by refusing to ratify this Contract, show, that, however the Interest of *Hanover* has been preferred by the Ministers, the Parliament pays no Regard but to that of *Great Britain*.

Mr H. Walpole. Hereupon Mr *Horatio Walpole* rose up, and spoke to the following Effect:

Sir,

‘ Though I have long considered the mercenary Scriblers of Dissaffection as the Disgrace of the Kingdom and the Pest of Society, yet I was never before so fully sensible of their pernicious Influence.

‘ I have hitherto imagined, that the Weekly Journalists and the Occasional Pamphleteers were the Oracles only of the lowest of the People, and that all those whom their Birth or Fortune has exalted above the Crowd, and introduc’d to a more extensive Conversation, had considered them as Wretches compelled to write by Want, and obliged therefore to write what will most engage Attention by flattering the Envy or the Malignity of Mankind; and who therefore propagate Falshoods themselves, not because they believe them, and who spread Faction, not because they are of any Party, but to gratify those that employ them, or to amuse the Publick with Novelties, or disturb it with Alarms, that their Works may not pass unregarded, and their Labour be spent in vain.

‘ This is my Opinion of the Party-Writers, and this I imagined the Opinion of the rest of Mankind, who had the same Opportunities of Information with myself; nor should I readily have believed, that any of their Performances could have produced greater Effects than those of inflaming the lowest Classes of the People, had I not perceived, that the Hon. Gentleman who spoke last, owed his Opinions of the Partiality shewn to the Dominions of *Hanover*, to some late Pamphlets which have, on Occasion of this Contract, been very industriously dispersed among the People.

‘ I know not the Authors, nor think they deserve that any Inquiry should be made after them, except by a Proclamation that may set a Price upon their Heads, and offer the same Reward for discovering them as is given for the Conviction of Wretches less criminal; nor can I think the Lenity of the Government easily to be distinguished from Supineness and Negligence, while Libels like these are dispersed openly in the Streets, and sold in Shops without Fear and without

Danger

Danger ; while Sedition is professedly promoted, and Treason, or Sentiments very nearly bordering upon Treason, propagated without Disguise.

An. 16: Geo. II.

1742.

These Scriblers have endeavoured to corrupt the Principles of his Majesty's faithful Subjects, not only by vilifying the Memory of the late Emperor, whose Justice, Humanity, and Integrity are generally revered, but by insinuating * likewise that our present most gracious Sovereign has adopted the same Schemes, and endeavours to aggrandise *Hanover* at the Expence of *Great Britain* ; that all the Measures that have been taken with Regard to the Affairs of the Continent, have been contrived with no other View than that of advancing the Interest, enlarging the Bounds, and encreasing the Riches of the *Hanoverian* Territories : They declare that

* *The Case of the Hanover Forces. — The Vindication of the Case of the Hanover Forces. — The Interest of Hanover steadily pursued since the Accession, and Others, in which the Authors asserted, ' That the Interests of Great Britain had been steered, ever since the Accession of the late King, by the Rudder of Hanover. — That the Interests of Great Britain had been constantly and manifestly sacrificed, for many Years, to that of the Electorate. — That the Interests of Hanover had been the Touchstone of all our Measures since the Accession. — That Great Britain had been hitherto strong and vigorous enough to bear up Hanover on its Shoulders, and though now wasted and wearied out with the continued Fatigue, she was still goaded on, as if already sold to Vassallage, and by Compulsion obliged to persist in the ungrateful Drudgery, without Hope of, or Title to, Redemption ; and forced to submit to the Ignominy of becoming only a Money-Province to that Electorate. — That nobody could, or did indeed wonder at the Affection his late Majesty expressed for his native Country, and nobody blames the Tenderness of his present Majesty which he preserves for it : Both of them had their Beings and their first Impressions in it. That it is not surprising, that the Successor should have some Predilection for the Meridian in which he was born and educated, but it is a terrible Doctrine, that of being a pecuniary Province to a little State upon the Continent, destined only to bolster up its Pride, supply its Indigence, and gratify its frivolous Ambition ; to lavish away, upon a puny hope- less stunted Child, the Nourishment necessary to support the healthy and thriving one. — That being exhausted and beggared, as we are already, a servile Submission, and the breaking and taming of the true English Spirit, may possibly be thought the next Thing necessary ; in order to which, the Interest and Influence of Hanover are no longer now to be disguised or concealed, but openly avowed as the Rule of our Conduct, and the Spring of our Actions. — That being Lured by an insatiable Thirst of Gain, in whatever Shape ; in Love with Military Spectacles, and to make a Soldier-like Figure in the Field, Hanover may proceed as far as a March, or a Counter-march ; more would be too much. — That the King would lose the Affections, and exhaust the Strength of his Kingdoms, for the Addition of a Bailiarge to the Electorate. — That we have too much good Sense to be so imposed upon, too much Spirit not to resent the very Attempt, and too much Discretion to beggar ourselves for the Sake of an Infant, which has been a Snare and a Curse to us from the Beginning.*

An. 16. Geo. II. that *Great Britain* has been steered by the Rudder of *Hanover*, and that the Nation will soon be divided into two more opposite and irreconcilable Parties, than ever yet disturbed the publick Peace, *Britons* and *Hanoverians*.
 1742.

* That they themselves, whoever they be, long for those Times of Division and Confusion, may be easily believed, and the Number of those who have the same Withes with themselves is, I fear, too great : But I believe their Hopes will not be encouraged, nor their Designs promoted in this House, and that none of those who are intrusted to represent their Country, will suffer themselves to be misled by such wicked Insinuations.

Mr Nugent.

Mr *Nugent*, Member for *St Marw's*, answer'd to the following Effect :

Sir,

* I know not for what Reason the honourable Gentleman has thought it convenient to retard the Deliberations of this House, by expatiating upon the Falshood and Malignity of Pamphlets, of which the Authors are unknown, of which no Man has attempted the Vindication, and which, however diligently dispersed, or however generally credited, appear to have had no great Influence upon the Nation; nor to have produced any Effects that might give just Occasion to so tragical an Outcry, to Censures as vehement and bitter, as if the Trumpet of Rebellion had been sounded, as if half the People had taken Arms against their Governors, as if the Commonwealth was on the Brink of Dissolution, and Armies were in full March against the Metropolis.

* These Pamphlets I have read as well as other People ; and though I am far from thinking, that the Censure of that honourable Gentleman can make a Defence necessary, since indeed he has contented himself with Investive instead of Argument, and, whatever he may disapprove, has confuted nothing : And though I have no particular Reason for exposing myself as a Champion for those Authors, whoever they may be, yet I cannot forbear to affirm, that I have read some Passages with Conviction ; and that, in my Opinion, they require a different Answer from those which have been yet offered, and that the Impressions which have been made upon the People will not be effaced by Clamour and Rage, and Turbulence and Menaces, which can affect only the Persons of the Writers, but must leave their Reasons in their full Force ; and, even with Regard to their Persons, will have very little Effect ; for tho' some Men in Power may be offended, it will not be easy to quote any Law that has been broken by them.

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* On this Occasion I cannot but animadvert, I hope with the same Pardon from the House as has been obtained by the Hon. Gentleman whom I am now following, upon an Expression in frequent Use among the Followers of a Court, whenever their Measures are censured with Spirit and with Justice. The Papers which they cannot confute, and which they have not yet been able to obtain the Power of suppressing, are asserted to border upon Treason; and the Authors are threatned with Punishments, when they have nothing to fear from a Reply.

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1742.

* Treason is happily defined by our Laws, and therefore every Man may know when he is about to commit it, and avoid the Danger of Punishment by avoiding the Act which will expose him to it; but, with regard to the Borders of Treason, I believe no Man will yet pretend to say how far they extend, or how soon, or with how little Intention he may tread upon them. Unhappy would be the Man who should be punished for bordering upon Guilt, of which those fatal Borders are to be dilated at Pleasure by his Judges. The Law has hitherto supposed every Man, who is not guilty, to be innocent, but now we find that there is a Kind of Medium in which a Man may be in Danger without Guilt, and that in order to Security a new Degree of Caution is become necessary; for not only Crimes but the Borders of Crimes are to be avoided.

* What Improvements may be made upon this new System, how far the Borders of Treason may reach, or what Pains and Penalties are designed for the Borderers, no Degree of human Sagacity can enable us to foresee: Perhaps the Borders of Royalty may become sacred, as well as the Borders of Treason criminal; and as every Placeman, Pensioner, and Minister may be said to border upon the Court, a Kind of Sanctity may be communicated to his Character, and he that lampoons or opposes him may border upon Treason.

* To dismiss this Expression with the Contempt which it deserves, yet not without the Reflections which it naturally excites, I shall only observe, that all Extension of the Power of the Crown must be dangerous to us, and that whoever endeavours to find out new Modes of Guilt is to be looked on, not as a good Subject, but a bad Citizen.

* Having thus shewn, that the Censure produced against these Pamphlets is unintelligible and indeterminate, I shall venture to mention some of the Assertions which have heated the Gentleman into so much Fury. Assertions, which I cannot be supposed to favour since I wish they might be false, and which I only produce in this Place to give some, whom

An. 16. Gen. II. their Stations make acquainted with publick Affairs, an Opportunity of confuting them.

1743.

It is asserted, that the *French* appear to have treated all our Armaments with Contempt, and to have pursued all their Schemes with the same Confidence as if they had no other Enemy to fear than the Forces of *Austria*; this is indeed no pleasing Observation, nor can it be supposed to give Satisfaction to any *Briton* to find the Reputation of our Councils and of our Arms so much diminished, to find the Nation which lately gave Laws to *Europe*, scarcely admitted to Friendship, or thought worthy of Opposition in Enmity; to hear that those Troops, which, in the Days of our former Monarchs, shook the Thrones of the Continent, are passed by, without Fear and without Regard, by Armies marching against their Allies, these Allies in whose Cause they formerly fought in the Field of *Hochstedt*. But the Truth of the Assertion is too plain to all the Nations of the World, and those, whose Interest it may be to conceal from their Countrymen what is known to all the Continent, may rage, indeed, and threaten, but they cannot deny it; for what Enterprize have we hitherto either prevented or retarded? what could we have done on one Side, or suffered on the other, if we had been struck out from Existence, which has not been suffered, or not done, though our Armies have been reviewed on the Continent, and, to make yet a better Show, lengthened out by a Line of Sixteen Thousand of the Troops of *Hanover*.

It is asserted in the same Treatises, that the Troops of *Hanover* cannot act against the Emperor, and that therefore they are an useless Burthen to the State; that they compose an Army of which no other Effect will be found but that they eat,—and eat at the Expence of *Great Britain*. This Assertion is indeed somewhat more contestible than the former, but is at least credible, since if we may be permitted on this, as on other Occasions, to judge of the future from the past, we may conclude, that those who have let pass such Opportunities as their Enemies have in the Height of their Contempt and Security presented to them, will hardly ever repair the Effects of their Conduct by their Bravery or Activity in another Campaign; but that they will take the Pay of *Great Britain*, and, while they fatten in Plenty and unaccustomed Affluence, look with great Tranquility upon the Distresses of *Austria*, and, in their Indolence of Gluttony, stand idle Spectators of that Deluge, by which, if it be suffer'd to roll on without Opposition, their own Halcyon Territories must at last be swallowed up.

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* The last Assertion which I shall extract from these formidable Pamphlets is more worthy of Attention than the former, but perhaps may be suspected to border more nearly upon Treason : I shall however venture to quote, and, what is still more dangerous, to defend it.

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1742.

* It is propos'd that, instead of squandering in this Time of Danger the Expences of the Publick upon Troops, of which it is at best doubtful whether they will be of any Use to the Queen of *Hungary*, whether they can legally engage against the Emperor, and whether they would be of any great Use, though they were set free from any other Restraints than Regard to their own Safety : Instead of amusing our Ally with an empty Show of Assistance, of mocking her Calamities with unefficacious Friendship, and of exposing ourselves to the Ridicule of our Enemies by idle Armaments without Hostility, by Armies only to be reviewed, and Fleets only to be victuall'd, we should remit the Sums required for the Payment of the *Hanoverians*, to the Queen of *Hungary*, by whom we know that it will be applied to the great Purposes for which the Parliament granted it, the Establishment of the Liberties of *Europe*, and the lowering the House of *Bourbon*.

* This Proposal, however contrary to the Opinion of the Ministers, I take the Liberty of recommending to the Consideration of the House as, in my Opinion, the most effectual Method of preserving the Remains of the Greatness of the House of *Austria*. It is well known, that these Troops are hired at a Rate which they never expected before, that Levy-Money is paid for Forces levied before the Commencement of the Bargain, that they are paid for acting a long Time before they began to march, and that, since they appeared to consider themselves as engaged in the Quarrel, their March has been their whole Performance ; a March not against the Enemy but from him ; a March in which there was nothing to fear, nor any Thing to encounter ; and therefore I think it cannot be denied, that the publick Treasure might have been better employ'd.

* The same Sum remitted to the Queen of *Hungary* will enable her to hire a much greater Number of Troops out of her own Dominions ; Troops of whose Courage she can have no doubt, and whose Fidelity will be strengthened by common Interest and natural Affection ; Troops that will fight like Men defending their Wives and their Children, and who will therefore bear Fatigue with Patience, and face Danger with Resolution ; who will oppose the *French* as their natural Enemies, and think Death more eligible than Defeat.

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Thus

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

‘ Thus shall we assert the Rights of Mankind, and support the Faith of Treaties, oppose the Oppressors of the World, and restore our antient Allies to their former Greatness, without exhausting our own Country ; for it is not impossible, that by the proper Use of this Sum the Queen may obtain such Advantages in one Campaign as may incline the *French* to desert the Emperor, and content themselves with the peaceable Possession of their own Territories ; for it is to be remembered, that they are now fighting only for a remote Interest, and that they will not hazard much ; a firm Resistance will easily incline them to wait for some more favourable Opportunity, and there will then be Leisure for forming our Measures, in such a Manner, that another Opportunity may never be offered them.

‘ But of the present Scheme what Effect can be expected but Ignominy and Shame, Disgrace Abroad and Beggary at Home ? To this Expence what Limits can be set ? When is there to be an End of paying Troops who are not to march against our Enemies ? As they will at all Times be of equal Use, there will be at all Times the same Reason for employing them, nor can there ever be imagined less Need of idle Troops than in a Time of War.

‘ I am therefore afraid, that in a short Time the *Hanoverians* may consider *Great Britain* as a Tributary Province, upon which they have a Right to impose the Maintenance of Sixteen Thousand Men, who are to be employed only for the Defence of their own Country, though supported at the Expence of this. I am afraid, that we shall be taught to imagine, that the Appearance of the *Hanoverians* is necessary in our own Country, perhaps to check the Insolence of the Sons of Freedom, who without Fear border upon Treason. I am afraid, that his Majesty or his Successor may be advised by Sycophants and Slaves to trust the Guard of his Person to the trusty *Hanoverians*, and advised to place no Confidence in the Natives of *Great Britain*.

‘ For my Part, I think it a very wise Precept by which we are directed to obviate Evils in the Beginning ; and therefore since, in my Opinion, the Influence of *Hanover* must be destructive to the Royal Family, and detrimental to these Kingdoms, I shall endeavour to obviate it, by voting against any Provision for these useless Mercenaries, and declaring that I shall more willingly grant the publick Money to any Troops than to those of *Hanover*.

Lord Perceval.

Lord *Perceval* then spoke to the following Effect :

Sir,

‘ I look upon the Question now under your Consideration,

to vary very little in Reality from that which was debated here the first Day of this Session. The principal Point in the Debate of that Day was the same with that which is more regularly the Debate of this, Whether the *Hanoverian* Forces should be taken into *British* Pay?

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1742.

* Sir, I should then have offered my Sentiments upon this Question, if so many other Gentlemen had not delivered my Sense in so much better Manner than I thought myself able to do, that it would have appeared a great Presumption in me, and would have given the House an unnecessary Trouble. — The same Reason had induced me to have been silent also upon this Occasion,—if the Temper of the Times, the little Indulgence shewn by Gentlemen to one another, when they happen to differ in political Opinions, and the popular Circumstance * in which I stand, did not in some Sort oblige me to protect the Vote I then gave, and that which I now intend to give by the Reasons that induce me to give it.

* Sir, there are three principal Considerations in this Question ; first, Whether we are to assist the House of *Austria*, and Balance of Power at all, Ay or No ? Then whether we ought to do it with our whole Force ? And lastly, whether the *Hanoverian* Troops should be made a Part of that Force.

* As to the first Consideration, a new Doctrine has been taught and inculcated for some Months past, that it is of no Importance to this Nation what may happen on the Continent ; that this Country being an Island intrenched within its own natural Boundaries, it may stand secure and unconcerned in all the Storms of the rest of the World. This Doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all Sense and Reason, contrary as it is to the universal Principles of Policy by which this Nation hath been governed from the Conquest to this Hour, is yet openly professed and avowed by many without these Walls ; and tho' no Man has yet ventured to own this Opinion publicly and directly in this House, yet some Gentlemen even here, in Effect, maintain it, when they argue, that in no Case this Nation ought to assist to support the Balance of Power without the Concurrence of the *Dutch*. This tends inevitably to produce the same fatal Effect ; it reduces this Country to depend upon *Holland*, to be a Province to *Holland* ; and *France* would then have no more to do to become Mistress of all *Europe*, than to gain over one single Town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few Members of the States : It is therefore a Doctrine of the greatest Danger. The only solid Maxim is, that whoever becomes

* See before P. 30.

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

Master of the Continent, must in the End obtain the Dominion of the Sea. To confirm this, I may venture to cite an old Example, nor can I be accused of Pedantry in doing of it, since it is an Instance drawn from the last universal Monarchy to which the World submitted. The *Romans* had no sooner divided, broken, and subdued those Powers upon the Continent of *Europe*, who had given a Diversion in the great Attempt they had long intended, than they attacked the *Carthaginians*, a Maritime Power, potent in Arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the Trade of the whole World, and unrivall'd Mistress of the Sea. Yet these People, who enjoyed no Wealth, pursued no Commerce, and at the Commencement of their Quarrel were not Masters of a single Ship, at length prevailed against this Enemy upon their proper Element, beat and destroyed their Fleets, invaded their Dominions and subdued their Empire. From whence, Sir, I must conclude that we cannot wholly rely upon our Situation, or depend solely on our Naval Power; and I may venture to Reason upon this Axiom, that this Nation must contribute to support the House of *Austria*, and the Balance of Power in some Degree.

‘ The next Question that occurs is, in what Degree we ought to do it? and whether we should do it with our whole Force? Taking, therefore, our Footing here upon this Axiom, that we must contribute to it in some Degree, and taking farther to our Aid the Reasoning of those Gentlemen who think it a Work of such extreme Danger and almost desperate, the natural and evident Conclusion can be only this, that if we do it, so we must do it, with the utmost Vigour, and with our whole Force.

‘ We come now to consider, whether the *Hanoverian* Troops should be made Part of that Force? There are several Considerations previous to the Decision of this Question. First, whether they are as cheap as any other Forces we can hire? Then whether they are as Good? Next whether they are as properly situated? And whether they are as much to be depended upon? If as to every one of these Particulars the Answer must be made in the Affirmative, I think it will go very far to determine the Question now before you.

‘ As to the first, that they are as cheap, nay, upon the whole much cheaper, the Estimates now upon your Table, notwithstanding any Cavil, do sufficiently demonstrate.

‘ That they are as good, what Man can doubt, who knows the Character of the *German* Nation? What Man can doubt, who knows the Attention of his Majesty to Military Discipline? Those Gentlemen can least pretend to doubt

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it, who sometimes do not spare Reflections upon that Attention which they insinuate to be too great.

An. 16. Dec. 11.
1742.

That these Troops are not properly situated, will be hardly asserted at this Time, when they are actually now in *Flanders*, and now acting in Conjunction with our Troops. Let any Man consider the Map of *Europe*, let him observe the Seat of the War, and he must evidently see, that whether their Service may be required in *Flanders*, whether upon the *Rhine*, or in the Heart of *Germany*, in every one of these Cases, the *Hanoverian* Forces are as properly circumstanced and situated as any Troops in *Europe*.

It remains in the last Place to examine, Whether any other Troops can be better depended upon? And sure nothing can be more obvious than that we may rely with more Security on these than any other. They are Subjects of the same Prince, and of a Prince indulgent to all his Subjects, and accused by those who differ in other Points from me, of being partial against the Interest of his *German* Dominions. Unless, therefore, we arraign the first Principle upon which a free Government can be supported; and without which every Exercise of Arbitrary Power would be warranted, we must allow that such a People will be faithful to such a Prince; will defend him with a strict Fidelity, and support his Quarrel with the utmost Zeal; with a Zeal which can never be expected from the mercenary Troops of any other Foreign Power.

This naturally leads us to inquire what other Troops we can depend upon; the Answer to this Inquiry is short and positive; that as Affairs now stand Abroad, we can depend upon none but these; let us carry this Consideration with us in a Survey of all *Europe*. — Shall we take into our Pay 16,000 of the *Dutch*? Would this be the Means of bringing *Holland* into Alliance with us? Would they act at their own Expence, would they exert their own proper Force? Would they pay their own Troops in Aid of the Common Cause, when they found this Nation ready to do it for them? They would act like Madmen if they did. Shall we hire *Danes*? Is there a Gentleman in this House, who is not convinced that this Power has been warped, for sometime past, towards the Interest of *France*? When we hired these Troops in the last Instance, did they not deceive us? Did they not even refuse to march? Nay farther, are they not in all Appearance now upon the Point of being employed in a Quarrel of their own? a Quarrel in which they will have need of all their Force. Shall we then hire *Saxons*? An Honourable Gentleman seemed to think that there may be some Possibility of this,

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this, and perhaps there may hereafter, when the King of *Prussia's* Views are known and the Part he shall resolve to act; but *Saxony* is certainly now too much exposed to, and cannot fail to be alarmed at, his growing Power, at the great Augmentation of his Armies, and the secret and vast Designs which he seems to meditate. This Measure, therefore, is not practicable in the present Conjuncture; that Electorate cannot hazard its own Security in these precarious Circumstances, by lending out so great a Body of its Troops. Would Gentlemen advise the Hire of *Prussian* Troops to serve us in this Conjuncture? They who do advise it must forget strangely the Part so lately acted by that Prince, and the Variety of his Conduct with regard to his different Allies within the Space of the two last Years. I shall guard myself in my Expressions, and maintain a proper Respect in discoursing of so great a Character; but I must say thus much, that the Ministry would act with great Imprudence, to put the Safety of the *British* Troops, and to risk the Fate of this Army, upon the Event of such a Measure. I need not say more; for it is not yet proved to us, that this Prince would (I wish there was no Reason to believe he would not) lend us this Body of his Men, though we should be disposed to take them into Pay. The *Swiss* Cantons, therefore, now alone remain; and indeed from them we probably might procure a greater Number; but I leave it to the Judgment of any Man of Sense and Candour, whether any Minister of this Nation could warrant the Employment of 16,000 *Swiss* in this Service? For when we reflect upon the Situation of these Provinces, and compare it with that of our *British* Troops who are now in *Flanders*, it is visible that they must pass 400 Miles upon the Borders of the *Rhine*, flanked by the strong Places of *France*, during their whole March, exposed to the Garrisons and Armies upon that Frontier by whom it can never be supposed that they would be suffered to pass unmolested, when *France* must so well know the Intention of their March to be for no other End, but to make a Conjunction with other Troops in the *British* Pay, in order afterwards to invade, or at least to interrupt the Views of that Kingdom with their united Force.

These Reasons, Sir, prove invincibly to me, that if we are to assist the House of *Austria* by an Army, we must of Prudence, nay of Necessity, in Part, compose that Army of the *Hanoverian* Troops.

But yet there is another State of this Question; an Alternative of which some Gentlemen seem very fond; Whether it would not be better to assist the Queen of *Hungary* with Money only? This

This Opinion at first Sight is extremely plausible; if the Queen of *Hungary* has been able to do so much with an Aid of 500,000 *l.* what might she not be able to do with a Million more? Sir, a Million more would by no Means answer in the same Proportion. When a Sum is given her which with the best Oeconomy can suffice barely to put her Troops in Motion, when the Enemy is at her very Gates, her All at an immediate Stake, there can be no Room for a Misapplication of it: But a Sum so immense as that of a Million and a Half, would dazzle the Eyes of a Court so little used to see such Sums, and as an Hon. Gentleman long versed in Foreign Affairs*, and well acquainted with these Matters, told you in a former Debate, would be much of it squandered among the *Austrian* Ministers and Favourites. I make no Scruple to add to this, that some small Part might fall to the Share of Ministers elsewhere. But there is another Danger, which Gentlemen who contend for this Measure do not consider. Can they who profess a Distrust of all Ministers, and particularly those who are now employed at home; they who have ever argued against all Votes of Credit upon this Principle, that it affords an Opportunity to Ministers of defrauding the Service, and of putting large Sums into the Purse of the Crown, or into their private Pockets? Can they now argue for this Measure, which I may be bold to say, would be in Effect the most enormous Vote of Credit that was ever given in the World? Gentlemen insinuate, that the taking the *Hanoverian* Forces into *British* Pay, is a criminal Complaisance, calculated only to confirm an Infant and a tottering Administration. But how much greater Means for such a Purpose would an Alternative like this afford? Suppose a Minister unfirm in his new acquired Power, to ingratiate himself with his Prince, should propose a Scheme to replenish the Coffers of an exhausted Civil List squandered in such vile Purposes, that no Man could have the Hardiness to come to Parliament, or dare to hope a Supply for it by any regular Application to this House? What Method could be devised by such a Minister himself, to do the Jobb more effectually than this? for who can doubt that (guard it how you will) the Queen of *Hungary* might be induced, in the Condition in which she now stands, to accept a Million, and to give a Receipt in full for the whole Sum? How could you prevent an Understanding of this Kind between two Courts? And how easy, therefore, might it be to sink 500,000 *l.* out of so vast a Grant? Sir, I will suspect no Minister; but I will trust none in this Degree; and I wonder

* Mr Horatio Walpole, sen.

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der other Gentlemen do not suspect, if I do not. From hence therefore, I consider this as a Proposition both fallacious and unsafe; for though it be a Fact, that the same Sum of Money might maintain in *Austria* double the Number of Troops; yet, if no more than half that Money should be apply'd (as I have shewn great Reason to believe that it would not) to the Uses of the War, it is evident, that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal Number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse Troops for it.

But, Sir, there is yet a stronger Argument against the Supply in Money only. What are our Views in supporting the Queen of *Hungary*? Our Views are general and particular; General, to save the House of *Austria*, and to preserve a Balance of Power: Particular, to prevent the *French* from making any farther Acquisitions on this Side of *Flanders*. The first might possibly be answered in a good Degree, by giving that Princess an Equivalent in Money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an Army on this Side of *Europe* in the *British* Pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital Parts, rather than our more remote Members? Would not the Queen of *Hungary* (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest Part of these Subsidies in Defence of her Dominions in the Heart of *Germany*? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her Views, and to think of Conquests, and Equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in? Would she not leave *Flanders* to shift for itself, or still to be taken Care of by *Great Britain* and the *Dutch*? In such a Case, if *France* should find it no longer possible to make any Impression on her Territories, on the *German* Side, what must we expect to be the Consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive Projects on that Quarter, and there only carry on a defensive War, while she fell with the greater Part of her Force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this Measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one Campaign, before any Possibility of making Head against her, (which the *Dutch* would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect) all that she has been endeavouring for the last Century to obtain, and what no Union of Powers could be ever capable of regaining from her. All this will be effectually prevented by an Army paid by us on this Side of *Europe*; an Army, ready to march to the Borders of her Country, and to intercept her Succours

Succours and Supplies for the *German War* ; an Army, ready to protect the petty States, whose Interest and Inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their Forces with us, when they no longer fear the Power of *France* ; an Army, which may possibly give Courage and Spirit to greater Powers, who may still doubt, without these vigorous Measures, (after what they have formerly experienced) whether they could even yet depend upon us ; an Army (if the Posture of Affairs should make it necessary) able to cause a powerful Diversion to the *French Forces*, by an Attack upon *Lorrain* and *Champaign*, and still within Distance to return upon its Stops in Time, to prevent the *French* from carrying any Point of Consequence in *Flanders*, should they then attempt it.

* One Argument more, I beg Leave to mention, and it is of great Weight. Admit that the Sums raised upon the Subject, might be greater in the one Case than the other ; the Sums remitted out of the Kingdom would be infinitely less. Whatever is remitted to the *Queen of Hungary*, is bury'd in the remotest Parts of *Germany*, and can never return to us ; whereas in a War carry'd on by Troops in our own Pay on this Side, by much the greater Part of the Expence returns to us again ; in Part by the Pay of Officers, by the Supply of Provisions and Necessaries in a Country exhausted by Armies, Ammunition, Ordnance, Horses, Cloathing, Accoutrements, and a Multitude of other Articles, which I need not enumerate, because Experience, which is the soundest Reasoner, fully proved it in the Example of the last War ; at the Conclusion of which, notwithstanding the prodigious Sums expended in it, this Nation felt no sensible Effect from a Diminution of its Current Specie.

* Sir, I was prepared to have spoken much more largely to this Subject, but my Discourse has already been drawn to a greater Length than I imagined, in treating upon the Argument thus far. I shall therefore avoid troubling you any farther upon it at this Time ; I shall only observe, that in my humble Opinion, it is sufficiently proved, first, that we must assist the House of *Austria*, and that we must do it with all our Force ; next, that we cannot do it with Money only, but in Part with a Land Army, and that this Land Army cannot be conveniently (I may say possibly) composed at this Time, without the *Hanoverian Troops*. This Question therefore, can, I think, be no longer debated, but upon the Foot of popular Prejudices, and Insinuations of an improper Connexion of *Hanoverian* and *British* Interests ; but as I could not enter into this Subject, without Concern and

An. 16. Geo. II. and Indignation, and as it is a very delicate Point for me in particular to debate upon, I shall leave this Part of the Question to other Gentlemen, who can engage in it both with less Inconvenience and with more Ability than it is possible for me to do.

Lord Strange.

Then Lord *Strange* stood up and spoke as follows :

Sir,

* In all Affairs of a political Nature, the Vulgar without Doors are very much swayed in their Opinion by those Sounds they have been long accustomed to, or those Maxims they have long adopted. Without considering the Difference of Times, or the Difference of Circumstances, they are governed by a favourite Sound, even after it becomes nothing but a Sound ; or by a Maxim which when first adopted was right, but by a Change of Circumstances has become useless or perhaps pernicious. This is at present the Case as to the People without Doors, and from the Course of the Argument in this Debate, it seems to be the Case with too many even in this House. Whilst the House of *Austria* was possessed, and likely to remain possessed of the Imperial Diadem, the Balance of Power in *Europe*, and the Power of the House of *Austria*, were synonymous Terms, and for almost a Century past they have been rightly considered as such. But from the Moment the Elector of *Bavaria* was chosen Emperor, those two Terms became distinct, and the Balance of Power in *Europe* had no more to do with the Power of the House of *Austria*, than it had with the Power of any other Sovereign House in *Germany*.

* As *France* is still the most formidable Power in *Europe*, it is still the Business of our Politicians to find out such a Balance for the Power of *France*, as will at all Times be ready to oppose the ambitious Views of that Nation ; and I shall readily grant, that the House of *Austria* would be the most proper Power in *Europe* for us to fix our Eyes upon for this Purpose, if it were possible for us to restore that House to the Possession of the Imperial Diadem, and of all those Dominions which it has lost within this last Dozen of Years. But is this possible, Sir ? From the present Appearance of Things it is evident, that it is not. What then are we going to do ? We are going to put ourselves to a vast Expence, and to engage perhaps in a War, in which neither the Interest of this Nation, nor the Preservation of the Balance of Power in *Europe*, has the least Concern ; for as long as the House of *Austria* cannot be set up as a Balance for the Power of *France*, and as long as the latter acquires

N. B. In some few Copies of the foregoing Page, Line 12, read Steps ; and in Line 25, after Armies, add, by Arms,

quires no Addition of Power, what signifies it to this Nation, whether the House of *Austria* or the House of *Bavaria* becomes the most powerful House in *Germany*? The latter has already got Possession of the Imperial Dignity, by the Assistance of *France*, and the late bad Conduct of this Nation: Suppose it should by the same Assistance get Possession of some of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*, are we to suppose, that the House of *Bavaria* will therefore consent to be the humble Slave of *France*, or that it will co-operate with the *French* King in establishing his arbitrary Power over *Germany*, as well as the rest of *Europe*? No, Sir: If the House of *Bavaria* were once established in the peaceable Possession of the Imperial Dignity, and of some Part of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*, the Princes or Emperors of the House of *Bavaria* would be as ready to oppose the ambitious Schemes of *France* as ever the House of *Austria* was; and the sooner that House is established in the peaceable Possession of the Imperial Dignity, the greater Part it acquires of the *Austrian* Dominions, the more ready, and the more able will it be to oppose any of the future ambitious Schemes of *France*; so that as Affairs now stand, I do not know but that by supporting, or even assisting the House of *Austria*, we may be destroying the Balance of Power instead of restoring it, unless we could propose to divest the present Emperor of the Imperial Dignity to restore it to the House of *Austria*, and to take from *France*, and give to that House, an Equivalent for what it has yielded to *Prussia*.

* Can we propose to do this, Sir, without any Assistance either from the *Dutch*, or from any of the Princes of *Germany*? Surely, no such Thought can enter into the Head of the boldest Minister we have amongst us; and therefore the first Question stated by a noble Lord in this Debate, is not quite so clear as he imagines it is. But the noble Lord, in this Question, as well as the next, confounds himself by connecting the House of *Austria* with the Balance of Power, whereas there is really now no more Connection between the House of *Austria* and the Balance of Power, than there is between the House of *Bavaria* and the Balance of Power. Nay, if the latter were once fully established, and likely to continue in the peaceable Possession of the Imperial Diadem, there would then be a greater Connection between the Balance of Power and the Power of the House of *Bavaria*, than between the Balance of Power and the Power of the House of *Austria*, or any other Sovereign House in *Germany*. The other Princes of *Germany* may sometimes be induced

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induced from particular Views of their own, to favour the ambitious Views of *France*, but whatever Prince is at the Head of the Empire, he will always look upon himself as the Rival of *France*, and will consequently be ready to join in defeating any ambitious Design that may hereafter be formed by that powerful Nation.

‘ From what I have said, Sir, I hope it will not be thought, that I was at first against assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, or that I should now be against assisting her *totis Viribus*, if the *Dutch*, and some of the most powerful Princes of *Germany* would resolve to do the same. In such a Case we might propose to re-establish the Balance of Power upon its ancient Foundation, by restoring the Imperial Dignity to the House of *Austria*, and by giving to that House an Equivalent for the Dominions it has lately been oblig’d to part with. This, I shall grant, would be extremely desirable, and therefore, I wish, we could prevail with the *Dutch* and some of the Princes of *Germany* to join with us in this Scheme. I have so good an Opinion of our Ministers, that I am persuaded, they have attempted it; but the very Demand now under our Consideration is a convincing Proof, that they have not succeeded, and will, I am afraid, be an Obstruction to their future Success. This Demand must shew to us, Sir, and what is much worse, to all *Europe*, that we have not so much as prevailed with the Electorate of *Hanover* to join with us in this Scheme; for if that Electorate had agreed to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis Viribus*, it could not have desired of us to take the greatest Part of its Army into our Pay; and when the Electorate of *Hanover* thus openly refuses to join with us in such a Scheme, can we suppose, that any other Power in *Europe* will? I must therefore conclude, that as Affairs stand at this present Conjunction, it is impossible for us to give the Queen of *Hungary* such an Assistance as will be effectual for re-establishing the Balance of Power upon its former Basis, and for this Reason I am against our giving her any farther Assistance that what we are oblig’d to by Treaty; this Assistance I am indeed for giving, not because I think it will any way contribute towards the Preservation or Re-establishment of the Balance of Power, but merely because we are obliged by Treaty to give it; for I shall always be for a most religious Observance of Treaties, however contrary it may be to the Practice of the present Times.

‘ There is another Assistance which, I think, Sir, we ought to give, not because it will be an Assistance to her, but because it will bring Distress upon our own declar’d Enemies the *Spaniards*. You will readily suppose, Sir, I mean an Assistance

Assistance against the *Spaniards* in *Italy*. I am really surpris-
 ed how we came to permit them to send any Troops to
Italy: I think it is an Affair which demands a Parliamen-
 tary Inquiry as much as any Affair that ever happened to us :
 But whatever we may do in this respect, I hope, Care will
 be taken not to permit any such Thing for the future. We
 may by our Squadron prevent their sending any more Troops
 thither by Sea ; and I hope that, by means of the Alliance
 we have with the King of *Sardinia*, we shall be able to pre-
 vent their sending any thither by Land. As the Queen of
Spain is, we know, very intent upon having her Son *Don*
Philip settled in *Italy*, and her native Country freed from the
 Dominion of the *Germans*, this may perhaps be a better, and
 a shorter Method of obtaining Satisfaction from the *Spaniards*,
 than any Attack we can make upon them either in *Europe*
 or *America* ; therefore we are not only in Honour but in In-
 terest bound to prevent their making any Conquests in *Italy*
 as long as they are at War with us ; and for this Reason I
 must think, that our allowing their Fleet and Land Forces
 to pass undisturbed to *Italy*, was one of the greatest Indigni-
 ties, as well as one of the greatest Prejudices, this Nation
 ever suffered.

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Having thus, Sir, explained what Sort of Assistance we
 ought to give to the Queen of *Hungary*, and for what Rea-
 son ; I may, I think, conclude, that we ought not to assist
 her *totis Viribus*, unless the *Dutch* and some of the most po-
 tent Princes in *Germany* will agree to do the same, and, con-
 sequently, the second Question stated by the noble Lord can
 admit of no absolute, but a conditional Answer. If the o-
 ther Powers, who are equally concerned with us, will join
 with us, his Lordship's Question ought to be answered in the
 Affirmative : If they will not, it ought certainly to be an-
 swered in the Negative ; and unfortunately for his Lordship,
 his third Question must, in either of these Cases, have a Ne-
 gative put upon it ; for if none of the other Powers of *Europe*
 will join with us in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, and con-
 sequently we are to give her no Assistance, but what we are
 obliged to by Treaty, we have no Occasion for taking either
Hanoverians or any other Troops into our Pay, because it
 will be more convenient for us, and better, I believe, for her,
 to advance our Quota in Money ; and if she should insist up-
 on our Quota in Troops, we can spare enough, and more
 than enough of our own Troops, and may, I hope, have
 Liberty to march them through *Hanover* for that Service.

On the other Hand, Sir, if any of the Powers of *Europe*
 are to join with us in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis*
Viribus,

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Viribus, the Electorate of *Hanover* will certainly be the first ; for as his Majesty is absolute in his Electorate, if the Balance of Power were really in Danger, he would certainly order his Electorate to join with us *totis Viribus*, in which Case we could have no Occasion for taking 16,000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay, because the Electorate could, and certainly would send us 16,000 of those Troops it maintains in Time of Peace, at its own Expence. If, indeed, upon this Occasion, the Electorate were to send, at its own Expence, all the Troops it has now on Foot to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*, and to raise 16,000 more for the same Purpose, there might be some Reason for our taking that additional 16,000 into our Pay ; but even in this Case it would be more prudent to take 16,000 of the Troops of any other Potentate in *Europe* into our Pay, than to desire the Electorate of *Hanover* to raise 16,000 fresh Troops for our Service. This, I say, Sir, would be more prudent for several very substantial Reasons : Our hiring 16,000 Troops from any other Prince in *Europe*, might be an Inducement for him to join with us in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, or, at least, it might prevent his joining with *France* against us ; whereas, without any such Consideration, I hope, we are sure, that the Electorate of *Hanover* will never do so : And lastly, Sir, it must be allowed that 16,000 Veteran Troops of any other Potentate in *Europe*, would be more fit for immediate Service than 16,000 Troops newly raised in *Hanover*.

Therefore, Sir, if we were to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis Viribus*, and were to take 16,000 Foreign Troops into our Pay, the Troops of *Hanover* are, in my Opinion, the last we should think of ; but as the noble Lord was pleased, upon this his third Question, to state three or four previous Questions, I shall beg Leave to give every one of them a proper Answer, beginning with the second and the last connected together, because they are in Effect the very same : Whether the Troops of *Hanover* are as good, and as much to be depended on, as the Troops of any other Potentate whatsoever ? As to this Question, I shall grant, Sir, that the Veteran Troops of *Hanover* may be as good, and are as much to be depended on as the Troops of any other Potentate whatsoever ; but if *Hanover* is to join *totis Viribus* in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, all its Veteran Troops must be employed at its own Expence ; consequently if we take 16,000 into our Pay, fresh Troops must be raised for that Purpose, and, I hope, I may say, without any Derogation, that 16,000 *Hanoverians* newly raised, are not so good as 16,000 of the Veteran Troops of any other Potentate in *Europe* ; for in the last War, even
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the Veteran Troops of *Hanover* were far from being reckoned the best of any we had in our Service.

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* The next of his Lordship's previous Questions was, Whether the Troops of *Hanover* are not as well situated as any other ; and this, if we are to give any real Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*, I absolutely deny ; for either *Prussian*, or *Saxon*, or *Swiss* Troops, are better situated for marching to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*, than those of *Hanover*. The *Prussians* and *Saxons* are upon the Confines of *Bohemia*, and might have joined the Queen of *Hungary*'s Army in two or three Days ; and as to the *Swiss*, I was surprised to hear his Lordship talk of marching them down the *Rhine* to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*, when every one knows, that they lie upon the Borders of her Province of *Trent*, and might easily march to join her Army, either in *Italy* or *Germany*, without coming near any of the strong Places of *France* ; so that to march them down the *Rhine*, would really be to march them away from, instead of marching them to her Assistance. But our Army in *Flanders* was, it seems, to be the Loadstone which was to draw whatever Troops we hired to that Corner, where neither could be of any Use to the Queen of *Hungary*, without a previous Concert with the *Dutch* to attack *France* upon that Quarter. And as the *Dutch* were so far from being in a Concert with us for this Purpose, that they positively declared against it, and even threatened to declare War against us if we began the Attack there, I cannot yet comprehend, what was our real Motive for sending our Troops to *Flanders* ; for if we were resolved to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, surely the best and most ready Way would have been to have sent them to *Hanover*, in order to join with the Troops of that Electorate, and drive M. *Maillebois* out of *Germany*, or at least prevent his marching to the Relief of *Prague*. In this Case indeed, the *Hanover* Troops would have been the best situated of any in *Europe* for our Purpose ; but then they ought to have marched at the Expence of the Electorate, and not at the Expence of this Nation ; for the Electorate of *Hanover* is as much obliged, both in Honour and Interest, to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis Viribus*, as this Nation can be supposed to be.

* Upon this Subject his Lordship endeavoured to shew, either that we could get no other Troops to hire, beside the *Hanoverian*, or that no other Troops were so proper for us. The *Dutch* we ought not to take into our Pay, he says, because we cannot suppose the *Dutch* will pay their own Troops in Aid of the common Cause, when they find this Nation ready to do it for them. Sir, does not every one see,

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that this Objection lies equally strong against our taking *Hanoverians* into our Pay ; and I will say in general, that for Half a Century past we have given ourselves too much Concern about preserving the Balance of Power, and have shewn ourselves too ready to take Troops into our Pay for that Purpose ; for the Powers upon the Continent would be more careful of themselves, and more ready to pay their own Troops in Aid of the common Cause, if they did not expect us to be such generous Fools as to do it for them. By this Means we have already almost ruined ourselves, and now we must, it seems, compleat that Ruin, by undertaking alone the Support of what some Gentlemen are pleased to call the Balance of Power, tho' it is evident, that it is not so, and still more evident that, if it were, it would not be in our Power to support it by ourselves alone.

As for the *Danes*, *Prussians*, and *Saxons*, his Lordship thinks, we can have none of them, even for our Money, because they are either jealous of one another, or warp'd towards the Interest of *France*. I do not know, Sir, but it may be so ; and if it is, I am sure, we ought not to take any Foreign Troops into our Pay, because if no Power in *Europe* will assist us, we cannot propose to re-establish the Balance of Power upon its former Foundation. But if the Case be as his Lordship represents, we have ourselves only to blame for it ; for if we had persuaded the Court of *Vienna* to have accepted of the Terms at first offered by the King of *Prussia*, and had thereby got him to join with us in supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, and in getting her Consort, the Grand Duke, raised to the Imperial Throne, I am persuaded, neither the *Bavarians* nor *French* would have attack'd her, nor would the *Swedes* have attack'd the *Muscovites* ; but we encouraged the Queen of *Hungary* in her Obstinacy towards *Prussia*, and by the Treatment the latter met with, at the Court of *Vienna*, and especially in this House, we at last, sore against his Will, drove him into the Arms of *France*, which encouraged the *French* to send their Troops into *Germany* ; and then, in order to prevent any *Muscovite* Troops being sent to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*, they prevailed with *Sweden* to declare War against *Muscovy*, the Fate of which has given them a Handle to get the King of *Denmark* warp'd over to their Interest. Thus it may justly be said, that all the present Confusions in *Europe* are owing to the Treatment the King of *Prussia* met with upon his invading *Silesia* ; and as he may still have a great Hand in bringing those Confusions to a happy or very unhappy Issue for this Nation, I was glad to hear the noble Lord maintain a proper Respect in discour-

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ing of so great a Character: I wish the same Respect had been maintained, when the Conduct of that Prince came first under Consideration of this * House; for I know of no Variety in his Conduct, except what he has been provoked to by the Conduct of those he has had to deal with; and his Invasion of *Silesia* we had no Right to find Fault with, nor any Authority to condemn.

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* I come now to his Lordship's first previous Question, which was, Whether these *Hanoverian* Troops are as cheap to us as any other Forces we can hire? This, his Lordship says, the Estimates now upon our Table do sufficiently demonstrate. I wish his Lordship had examined the Estimate of the *Hanover* Troops taken into our Pay in the Year 1702, before he had determined this Question in such a Magisterial Manner. If he had compared that Estimate with the Estimate now upon our Table, he would have seen it sufficiently demonstrated by Figures, that these *Hanover* Troops now taken into our Pay will cost as a much larger Sum, in Proportion to their Number, than the *Hanover* Troops did in the Year 1702, or than any Foreign Troops taken into the Pay of *Great Britain* ever did. It would be too tedious to run over all the Articles of the present Estimate, but I must beg Leave to mention the most extraordinary. In 1702 the *Hanover* Troops then stipulated, began to be in our Pay only the 1st of *June*, and before the 21st of that Month, when the Convention for them was signed, some of them were arrived at the appointed Place of Action, as is declared in the Convention itself; and they were to continue no longer in our Pay, than till the first of *January* following. From hence we may see, that they were in actual Service, as well as actual Pay, for the chief Part of one whole Campaign, and that we were to give them but seven Months Pay for this whole Campaign, which was much more glorious for this Nation, and contributed more to the Relief of *Europe*, than the next Campaign is likely to do; and yet by the Estimate for the *Hanoverians* now on our Table, we are to give them no less than 16 Months Pay for the ensuing Campaign; for it is evident that during the last Campaign they neither were, nor could be of any Service to this Nation, to *Europe*, or to the Queen of *Hungary*.

* Another Article of the present Estimate is not only of an excessive but a new Kind: In 1702, we paid no Levy Money for the *Hanover* Troops then taken into our Pay; but by the present Estimate we are to pay no less a Sum

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* See the Debate on Sir R. Walpole's Motion for granting 200,000 l. to the Queen of Hungary, in Vol. xii. P. 325.

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than 139,313 *l.* *Sterling* for Levy Money, tho' the Troops were all raised long before we desir'd to take them into our Pay, and tho' no new Troops are to be raised in *Hanover*, instead of those now taken into our Pay. A second Article of the same Kind is the recruiting Money, amounting to near 20,000 *l.* which is an Article never before heard of in the hiring of any Troops, and an Article of Expence which was never allowed even to our own Army, because this Service is always provided for out of the Savings that necessarily happen every Year by Mens dying, deserting, or being killed. A third Article of the same Kind is the Pay of the Officers and Men belonging to the *Hanoverian* Train, amounting to near 13,000 *l.* which is not only new, but is an Article of Expence we might have saved to the Nation by sending a sufficient Train of our own to *Flanders*; for surely, a Train might have been sent to *Flanders*, at a less Expence from *England* than from *Hanover*; and considering the vast Sums raised yearly upon this Nation for the Service of our Ordnance, it cannot be supposed, that we had not in our Stores sufficient to spare for this Service. And the fourth Article of a new as well as excessive Nature, is the great Number of *Hanoverian* General Officers now pinn'd upon us. In the Year 1702, with the 10,000 Men then taken into our Service, we had but one Lieutenant General and one Major General; whereas with the 16,000 now taken into our Service, we have, and are to pay, one General, two Lieutenant Generals, and three Major Generals, besides a most extraordinary Number of Brigadier Generals, Aid de Camps, Majors of Brigade, and other Sorts of Superior Officers.

' Before I leave this Subject, Sir, I must take Notice of one other Article which really seems to be a downright Imposition upon this Nation. In 1702, a certain fixed Number of Guilders was to be paid, at stated Times at *Rotterdam*, for the *Hanover* Forces then taken into our Pay, so that the Nation could lose nothing by the Exchange; but by the present Contract, or rather the present Estimate, for I do not know how any Contract could be made between the King of *Great Britain* and the Elector of *Hanover*, the Levy-Money, Recruiting-Money, and Pay of those Troops, is to be in Pounds *Sterling*, at ten Guilders ten Stivers for a Pound, when every one knows the present Exchange is ten Guilders eighteen Stivers, so that this Nation loses eight Stivers upon every Pound *Sterling*, which upon 657,883 *l.* the whole Sum we are to pay for the *Hanover* Troops, amounts to about 26,000 *l.* *Sterling* Loss to this Nation,

Nation, and Gain to the Electorate or Elector of *Hanover*. An. 16. Geo. I.

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‘ After these Observations upon the present Estimate, and the Convention in 1702 for the same Troops, I hope, no Man will say, that these *Hanover* Troops are now as cheap as those were which we took into our Pay in 1702; and upon comparing this Estimate with all the Treaties we ever made for Auxiliary Troops, it will appear, that these *Hanover* Troops we now take into our Pay are the dearest of any we ever did, or, I hope, will ever again take into our Pay. As these Observations, Sir, are all founded upon Figures, and upon very easy and obvious Calculations, I shall not say, it is an affected Ignorance, but I must say it is an inexcusable Neglect, that can induce any Gentleman to affirm, that these *Hanover* Troops are as cheap as any other Forces we can hire. The Contrary is so evident, that I could not imagine any of the Advocates for this Measure would be hardy enough to state the Question in such plain Terms; and supposing the Measure could in every other Respect be supported, this alone would be a sufficient Argument for my being against it. Our paying such an extravagant Price for these *Hanover* Troops will introduce a Precedent of a most pernicious Nature to this Kingdom; because every foreign Prince we may hereafter have Occasion to treat with for auxiliary Troops, will expect the same Terms we now allow to the Elector of *Hanover*, and will refuse his Troops if we refuse agreeing to his Terms. The Elector of *Hanover* may ask what he pleases for his Troops, and his *British* Ministers may have Complaisance enough to agree to all his Demands: They may even do so with an Expectation, that such extravagant Demands will not be refus’d by a *British* Parliament; but if they are there agreed to, they can be refused by no other Power or Authority; and therefore, it would be both a most criminal and a most inexcusable Complaisance in us to agree to such extravagant Demands.

‘ Having thus, Sir, answered all his Lordship’s previous Questions, and having answer’d them in a Manner, I believe, which he little expected, the Reply which from thence naturally flows to his third principal Question, is, that suppose we are to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, and suppose we are to assist her with our whole Force, the *Hanover* Troops ought not to be made a Part of that Force, nor ought the Electorate of *Hanover* to desire any such Thing of us, because it is equally with us obliged, both in Honour and Interest, to assist the Queen of *Hungary*, and consequently ought, at its own Expence, to assist her with all

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the Troops it has in actual Pay. We ought therefore to have look'd out for the Troops of some other Potentate ; and if we could find no such Troops to hire, it was, and is still an unanswerable Argument against our giving her any other Assistance than what we stand engag'd to by Treaty ; and this Assistance we might have given her in Money, which would have been more convenient for us, and better for her, than any proportionable Number of Troops we could have sent to her Assistance.

‘ But as the noble Lord was pleas'd to state us another Question upon this Head, and thereupon endeavour'd to shew that we ought to assist her with Troops rather than Money, I shall beg Leave to consider the Arguments he made use of for this Purpose. His Lordship was pleas'd to say, upon the Authority of an Hon. Gentleman, that if we gave the Queen of *Hungary* any large Sum of Money, a great Part of it would be squander'd among the *Austrian* Ministers and Favourites. Whatever Regard his Lordship may pay to the Authority he quoted, I can lay no great Strefs upon it ; because from the Consequences of that Hon. Gentleman's Negotiations we have no Reason to suppose, that his Knowledge of Foreign Affairs is very exact or extensive ; and if he knows any Thing of Publick Money's being squander'd among Ministers, I am persuaded, he got his Knowledge of these Matters at home, and not abroad. I shall grant, that such a Misapplication of Publick Money is but too frequent at most Courts, and we in this Country have from Experience great Reason to be jealous of it ; but the present Court of *Vienna* is as little to be suspected of such a Misapplication as any Court ever was ; for the Queen of *Hungary* could not have made such a glorious Stand as she has already done, against so many and such powerful Enemies, if any of her Money had been squandered among Ministers and Favourites ; and for this Reason, if we are to raise a Million and a Half for her Support, I should chuse to put it under her own Management, in order to enable her to support herself, rather than to put it under the Management of our own Ministers, in order to enable them to support her with Troops. This, I say, I should chuse, and I am directed to this Choice by the very Measure now under our Consideration ; for if she had been to contract for 16,000 veteran Troops, I am sure she might, and would have got them for much less than we are to pay for these 16,000 *Hanoverians*.

‘ Another Objection his Lordship made to our assisting the Queen of *Hungary* with any large Sum of Money was, that it would be a Sort of Vote of Credit, and might be converted by

by our Ministers here to very bad Purposes. Sir, we might easily prevent this by our Method of granting it; for if we order'd it to be paid directly to her Minister here, or to such Persons as she should appoint, I am persuaded, every Shilling of it would be faithfully and speedily remitted to her. Some of the little petty Princes of *Germany* may perhaps submit to give a Receipt for 30,000 *l.* when they receive but 20,000 *l.* but the Queen of *Hungary* has shewn too much Spirit to be suspected of any such mean Submission. If a Million and a Half were granted to her by the *British* Parliament, I am convinced she would insist upon every Shilling of it being paid: She would scorn to let any *British* Minister go shares with her in the Grant, or to give a Receipt for more than she actually received.

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But, Sir, when the noble Lord seems to be so suspicious of our Ministers, and of their purloining 500,000 *l.* out of a Million and a Half, in Case we should grant such a Sum to the Queen of *Hungary*, I wonder he does not see, that what we are now to grant is worse than a Vote of Credit, because it is an absolute Gift to the Crown of at least 600,000 *l.* For as no new Troops are to be raised in *Hanover*, and as these 16,000 Men must have been paid and maintain'd by his Majesty, tho' we had not taken them into our Pay, I am persuaded the Difference between the Expence of maintaining them at home, and the Expence of marching them to, and maintaining them in *Flanders*, or any Part of *Germany*, will not amount to the odd 57,000 *l.* and consequently, whatever we pay for those Troops above that Expence, ought to be look'd on as a Free-Gift to his Majesty, which his Ministers may apply, if he pleases, towards replenishing the Coffers of an exhausted Civil List; and I wish no Part of it may be applied to any worse Purpose: For tho' his Majesty is not to be so much as suspected of consenting to any wrong Application of publick Money, yet Experience has shewn, that the Civil List Money, or any publick Money, which is not to be strictly accounted for to Parliament, may by Ministers be applied to very vile Purposes without the Knowledge of their Master.

I now come, Sir, to the particular View, which the noble Lord says, we have in supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, and which, he says, cannot be answered by our supporting her with Money only. This View, his Lordship tells us, is to prevent the *French* from making any further Acquisitions in *Flanders*. How his Lordship's Imagination came to suggest any such View to him, I cannot tell, but I am convinced, no one of our Ministers ever had such a View:

They

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They know, that the Neutrality of the *Dutch* depends upon *France's* attempting no such Thing, and therefore, there never was the least Occasion for our sending any of our own Troops to *Flanders*, and much less for our sending any Auxiliaries there, unless the *Dutch* had desired it, in order to enable them to break the Neutrality they have hitherto so religiously observed: And if they had done this, we should have had no Occasion to send any of our Auxiliary Troops to *Flanders*; for with the Assistance of the *Dutch*, and by sending 10 or 12000 more of our own Troops thither, which we might easily have spared, we could have formed such an Army in *Flanders*, as would have been sufficient to oppose any of the Designs of *France* in that Part of the World, especially, if by sending our Auxiliaries to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary* in *Germany*, we had enabled her to drive the *French* out of that Country, because she might then, and certainly would have come down upon the *Rhine*, with such an Army as would have prevented the *French* from being able to push any Conquests in *Flanders*. For as *France* lies much more open upon the Side of *Germany* than upon that of *Flanders*, their own Prudence would have directed, and even Necessity would have drove them to have stood upon the Defensive in *Flanders*, in order to have sent their most powerful Armies towards the *Rhine*, because, in *Flanders*, they may defend themselves by their strong Garrisons, but towards *Germany* they must defend themselves by their numerous Armies.

Thus, Sir, in every Light this Measure can be considered, it must appear to be wrong. As the Balance of Power, in the present Situation of the Affairs of *Europe*, no more depends upon the Power of the House of *Austria*, than upon the Power of any other House in *Germany*, it was wrong in us to think of giving the House of *Austria* any farther Assistance than we were obliged to by Treaty, unless the other Powers of *Europe*, equally concerned, had joined with us in restoring that House to the Imperial Diadem, as well as in procuring it an Equivalent from *France* for the Dominions it has been lately dispossessed of. If it had been right to give the Queen of *Hungary* a greater Assistance than we were obliged to by Treaty, and to take Foreign Troops into our Pay for that Purpose, it was wrong to take *Hanoverians*. If it had been right to take *Hanoverians*, it was wrong to take them at such an extravagant Price; and if it had been right to take them at any Price, it was wrong to march them into *Flanders*, because they must march back again to *Germany*, before they can be of any Use to the Queen of *Hungary*.

But

* But really, in my Opinion, Sir, and according to the An. 16. Geo. II. 1742. present Appearance of Things, I cannot believe, that either the *Hanoverians* or *Hessians*, or even our own Troops, will march into *Germany*, or give the Queen of *Hungary* any real Assistance. Let us consider, Sir, that both the *Hanoverians* and *Hessians* are the Emperor's Subjects, and, consequently, their fighting even as Auxiliaries against him may expose their Masters to the Ban of the Empire. Nay, the Ban, I believe, would be the certain Consequence, if we should happen to be unsuccessful in the War; therefore, tho' the Elector of *Hanover* and the Prince of *Hesse* may allow their Troops to take our Money, I do not believe, they will allow their Troops to engage against the Emperor. This, Sir, is the Case of the *Hanoverian* and *Hessian* Troops, and as to our own Troops, I do not think it possible for them to march to the farther End of *Germany*. How shall we subsist them upon their March thither? How shall we subsist them after they are there? How shall we recruit them? How shall we preserve the Remains of our Army, in Case it should happen to meet with a Defeat? These, Sir, are Questions very material, and I protest, I do not see how any one of them can be answered. What Change may be produced in the present Face of Affairs by the good Conduct of the Court of *Vienna*, and the bad Conduct of the Court of *Versailles*, I do not know, nor is it possible for human Wisdom to foresee; for the Conduct of the one may be so good, and that of the other so bad, as may give Courage, and even a probable View of Success, to some of the Princes of *Germany*, to act against the Emperor they have chosen: And I am sure, the Electorate of *Hanover* in particular has great Reason to resent the scurrilous Treatment it has lately met with from the *French*, with regard to the Neutrality it was forced into, and especially the insulting Manner in which the *French* Ministers openly talk'd at all the Courts of *Europe* of that Neutrality's being solicited, and even begged, of the *French* Court by that Electorate.

* One cannot therefore determine what may hereafter happen, but in deciding the Question now before us, we must consider the present Posture of Affairs only, and from thence we must conclude, that the *Hanoverian* Troops neither can, nor will act against the Emperor. I am sure, no Man, who has any Regard for the Safety of his Majesty's Electoral Dominions, will at present advise him to expose himself to the Ban of the Empire, by allowing his Electoral Troops to act offensively against the Emperor; and if such a Change should hereafter happen in the Affairs of *Europe*, as to render such

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such a Step advisable, it will then be Time enough for us to take those *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay. We shall thereby save the Expence of maintaining them for seven or eight Months, when they neither will nor can be of any Service either to us or the Queen of *Hungary*; and considering the present distressed Condition of this Nation, the heavy War we are already engaged in, and the more heavy War we are like to be engaged in, this is a Saving which, I am sure, a true *British* House of Commons will not neglect.

Mr Grenville.

Mr *George Grenville* oppos'd the Motion to the following Effect :

Sir,

‘ Though I am far from thinking myself able to produce, without Premeditation, a complete Answer to the elaborate and artful Harangue which you have lately heard from a noble Member, yet as I cannot be convinced of the Reasonableness of the Measures which have been defended with so much Subtilty, I shall at least endeavour to shew, that my Disapprobation is not merely the Effect of Obstinacy, and that I have at least considered the Proposals of the Ministry, before I have ventured to condemn them.

‘ Whether we ought to think ourselves indispensably obliged to maintain, at all Events, the Balance of Power on the Continent; to maintain it without Allies, to maintain it against a Combination of almost all *Europe*, I shall not now enquire. I will suppose it for once our Duty to struggle with Impossibility, and not only to support the House of *Austria*, when it is attacked, but to raise it, when it is fallen; fallen by our own Negligence, and oppressed with the Weight of all the surrounding Powers; and shall therefore at present only endeavour to find out by what Means we may afford that Assistance with most Benefit to our Allies, and least Danger to ourselves.

‘ With Regard to our Ally, that Assistance will be apparently most advantageous to her by which her Strength will be most increased, and therefore it may perhaps be more useful to her to find her Money than Troops; but if we must supply her with Troops, I doubt not but it will readily appear, that we may easily find Troops which may be of more Use and less Expence than those of *Hanover*.

‘ It has been observed, with Regard to the convenient Situation of those Troops, that it cannot now be denied; since they are acting in *Flanders* in Conjunction with the *British* Forces. This is an Assertion to which, though it was uttered with an Air of victorious Confidence; though it was produced-

duc'd as an insuperable Argument, by which all those who intended Opposition were to be reduced to Silence and Despair, many Objections may be made which it will require another Harange equally elaborate to remove.

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* That the Troops of *Hanover* are now acting in Conjunction with the *British*, I know not how any Man can affirm; unless he has received Intelligence by some airy Messengers, or has some sympathetick Communication with them not indulged to the rest of Mankind. None of the Accounts which have been brought hither of the Affairs of the Continent have yet informed us of any Action, or Tendency to Action; the *Hanoverians* have indeed been reviewed in Conjunction with our Forces, but have hitherto not Acted; nor have the Armies yet cemented the Alliance by any common Danger; or shewn yet that they are Friends otherwise than by sleeping and eating together, at the Expence of the same Nation.

* Nor am I at present inclined to grant, that either Army is situated where it may be of most Use to the Queen of *Hungary*; for they now loiter in a Country which no Enemy threatens, and in which nothing therefore can be feared; a Country very remote from the Seat of War, and which will probably be last attacked. If the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary* had been designed, there appears no Reason why the *Hanoverians* should have marched thither, or why this important Conjunction should have been formed; since they might, in much less Time, and with less Expence, have joined the *Austrians*, and perhaps have enabled them to defeat the Designs of the *French*, and cut off the Retreat of the Army which was sent to the Relief of *Prague*. But this March, though it would have been less tedious, would have been more dangerous, and would not have been very consistent with the Designs of those who are more desirous of receiving Wages than of deserving them; nor is it likely, that those who required Levy-Money for Troops already levied, and who demanded, that they should be paid a long Time before they began to march, would hurry them to Action, or endeavour to put a Period to so gainful a Trade as that of hiring Troops which are not to be exposed.

* This Conduct, however visibly absurd, I am very far from imputing either to Cowardice or Ignorance; for there is Reason to suspect that they marched into *Flanders*, only because they could not appear in any other Place as the Allies of the Queen of *Hungary*, without exposing their Sovereign to the Imperial Interdict.

* It is therefore not only certain, that these Troops, these
boasted

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boasted and important Troops, have not yet been of any Use ; but probable that no Use is intended for them, and that the sole View of those who have introduced them into our Service is to pay their Court by enriching *Hanover* with the Spoils of *Great Britain*.

‘ That this is in Reality their Intention, appears from the Estimates to which an Appeal has been so confidently made, but which, if they are compared with a Contract made for the Troops of the same Nation in the last War, will shew how much their Price has risen since their Sovereign was exalted to this Throne ; though I cannot find any Proof, that their Reputation has encreased, nor can discover from their Actions in *Flanders* any Reason to believe, that their Services will be greater.

‘ It is certain, that, whatever may be the general Character, or the late Conduct of other Nations, it is the Interest of *Great Britain* to employ rather any Troops than these, as any Evil is rather to be chosen than Animosities between our Sovereign and our Fellow-Subjects ; and such Animosities must inevitably arise from this detestable Preference of the Troops of *Hanover*.

Mr Henry Fox then stood up and spoke as follows :

Sir,

Mr H. Fox.

‘ I Shall not attempt to confute every Assertion of the hon. Gentleman which I think false, or detect the Fallacy of every Argument which appears to me sophistical ; but leave to others the Province of shewing the Necessity of engaging in the War on the Continent, of employing a large Force for the Preservation of the House of *Austria*, and of forming that Army with the utmost Expedition, and of taking Auxiliaries into our Pay ; and confine myself to this single Question, whether, supposing Auxiliaries necessary, it was not prudent to hire the Troops of *Hanover* ?

‘ Nothing can be, in my Opinion, more apparent than that if the Necessity of hiring Troops be allowed, which surely cannot be questioned, the Troops of *Hanover* are to be chosen before any other, and that the Ministry consulted in their Resolutions the real Interest of their Country, as well as that of our Ally.

‘ The great Argument which has in all Ages been used against mercenary Troops, is the Suspicion which may justly be entertain’d of their Fidelity. Mercenaries, it is observ’d, fight only for Pay, without any Affection for the Master whom they serve, without any Zeal for the Cause which they espouse, and without any Prospect of Advantage from Success,


Success, more than empty Praises, or the Plunder of the Field, and therefore have no Motives to incite them against Danger, nor any Hopes to support them in Fatigues ; that they can lose nothing by Flight, but Plunder, nor by Treachery, but Honour ; and that therefore they have nothing to throw into the Balance against the Love of Life, or the Temptations of a Bribe, and will never be able to stand against Men that fight for their native Country under the Command of Generals whom they esteem and love, and whom they cannot desert or disobey without exposing themselves to perpetual Exile, or to capital Punishment.

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These Arguments have always been of great Force, and therefore that Nation whose Defence has been entrusted to Foreigners, has always been thought in Danger of Ruin. Yet there have been Conjunctions in which almost every State has been oblig'd to rely upon Mercenaries, and in Compliance with immediate Necessity to depend upon the Fidelity of those who had no particular Interest in supporting them. But with much greater Reason may we trust the Success of the present War, in some Degree to the Troops of *Hanover*, as they are perhaps the only Foreign Forces, against which the Arguments already recited are of no Force. They are Foreigners indeed, as they are born in another Country, and governed by Laws different from ours ; but they are the Subjects of the same Prince, and therefore naturally fight under the same Command ; they have the same Interest with ourselves in the present Contest ; they have the same Hopes and the same Fears ; they recommend themselves equally to their Sovereign by their Bravery ; and can neither discover Cowardice nor Treachery, without suffering all the Punishment that can be feared by our native Troops, since their Conduct must be censured by the same Prince, of whose Approbation they are equally ambitious, and of whose Displeasure they are equally afraid.

As to the Troops which any neutral Prince might furnish, there would be Reason to fear, that either for larger Pay, or upon any casual Dispute that might arise, they might be withdrawn from our Service, when they were most needed, or transferred to the Enemy at a Time when his Distress might compel him to offer high Terms, and when therefore there was a near Prospect of an advantageous Peace. But of the Troops of *Hanover* no such Suspicion can be formed, since they cannot engage against us without rebelling against their Prince ; for it cannot be imagined, that his Majesty will fight on one Side as Elector of *Hanover*, and on the other as King of *Great Britain*, or that he will ob-

struct

An. 16. Geo. II. 1742.  trust the Success of his own Arms, by furnishing the Troops of *Hanover* to the Enemies of this Kingdom.

• It therefore appears very evident, that we have more to hope and less to fear from the Troops of *Hanover*, than from any other, since they have the same Reason with ourselves to desire the Success of the Queen of *Hungary*, and to dread the encreasing Greatness of the *French*, and that they can be suspected neither of Treachery nor Desertion. It is not very consistent with the Candour, with which every Man ought to dispute on publick Affairs, to censure those Measures which have been proposed, without proposing others that are more eligible : for it is the Duty of every Man to promote the Business of the Publick, nor do I know, why he that employs his Sagacity only to obstruct it, should imagine, that he is of any Use in the National Council.

• I doubt not but I shall hear many Objections against the Use of these Troops, and that upon this Question, Virulence and Ridicule will be equally employ'd. But for my Part, I shall be little affected either with the Laughter that may be raised by some, or the Indignation that may be expressed by others, but shall vote for the Continuance of these Measures till better shall be proposed ; and I think that these Troops ought to be retained, unless it can be shewn, that any others may be had, less dangerous, or of greater Use.

Mr *Philips* spoke as follows :

Mr *Philips*.

Sir,

• The Question now before you is of the utmost Importance to this Nation : It is no less than whether you shall take 16,000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay, at a Time when you are at Peace with all the World except *Spain*, against whom it is impossible these Troops can be employed ; at a Time when you have a large Fleet, sufficient not only to defend your Coasts, but invade and annoy others ; at a Time when the Nation groans under the Load of heavy Taxes and a large Debt, and at a Time when all the Powers of *Europe* are so employed, that it is impossible for any of them to hurt *England* : To what End then are these Troops to be taken into our Pay ? Is it to assist the Queen of *Hungary* against the Emperor ? No. By the Treaty of *Munster*, by the Laws of the Empire, the Troops of none of the Imperial States can act against the Emperor ; much less can the Troops of *Hanover* against an Emperor that *Hanover* itself has acknowledged, and joined in the Election of. It was said by an Hon. Gentleman, that these Troops can, and will act in Conjunction with the *British* Troops, wherever it shall
be

be advis'd ; but I believe, it will never be thought advisable, that they should act againſt the Emperor, becauſe the Conſequence muſt be, that *Hanover* will be put to the Ban of the Empire. A Diſtinction was made by an Hon. Gentleman between acting againſt the Emperor, and acting againſt the Empire, but it was a Diſtinction without a Difference ; becauſe, as the Emperor was elected and acknowledged by a Majority of the Electors and the other Princes of the Empire, and had an actual Subſidy granted him of 50 *Roman Months* †, the acting againſt him cannot but be conſidered as acting againſt the Empire. All States muſt, in the Nature of Things, yield to a Majority, and a Majority (which I have often been ſorry to ſee) concludes this Houſe.

‘ There is no Power then, but *France*, that theſe Troops can be ſuppoſed to act againſt ; and ſhall *England*, unallied and unsupported, become Principals in a War againſt *France* ? Oh, but it is ſaid, the *Dutch* may ſtill come in : Has not that Experiment been tried, * and have they not declared,

† See the Proteſt on this Occaſion, in the Proceedings of the Houſe of Lords, P. 341.

* Amongſt the Letters and Negotiations of M. Van Heey, Embaſſador from the States General to the Court of France, publiſh'd in May, 1743, is the following Memoir of the Contents of a Relation of his Excellency, dated Nov. 5, 1742, wherein the Points of Lord Carteret's Negotiation with their High Mightineſſes are reduc'd to four Propoſitions, viz. ‘ I. To engage the Republick to join with England and her ‘ Allies in making War with France. II. To put Garrifons in all the ‘ ſtrong Places in Flanders belonging to the Queen of Hungary, that ſhe ‘ may be able to withdraw her Troops, and employ them in the ‘ Field. III. To lend 30,000 Men of the Troops of the Republick to ‘ the Queen of Hungary, which Troops are to be in the Pay of Great ‘ Britain. IV. A new Treaty of Commerce between England and the ‘ Republick, to the Advantage of the States. — To the firſt Propoſition ‘ the States-General answered, That the War having now ſpread itſelf ‘ all over Europe, they would not intermeddle therewith to lengthen it, ‘ and render it more bloody, but would preſerve their Characters as Me- ‘ diators for the Common Good. To the Second, That the Republick ‘ never keep Troops on Foot but for her juſt Defence, and for the Main- ‘ tenance of the general Tranquility. To the Third, That the Repub- ‘ lick, ſince ſhe was a Republick, had never made a Cuſtom of lending ‘ or letting out her Troops to foreign Powers, but, on the contrary, ‘ had taken Troops into her own Pay when Occaſion required it. As to ‘ the Fourth, That their High Mightineſſes would be very glad to receive ‘ ſo ſenſible a Mark of the Friendſhip of England, as this would be, of ‘ eſtabliſhing the Commerce of both Nations on a more equal Foot, ‘ and conſequently leſs prejudicial to Holland : That beſides ſhe ſincerely ‘ wiſhed to knit faſter the reciprocal Band of Amity between the two ‘ Nations, by all juſt and proper Methods ; but that it was the invio- ‘ lable Maxim of the Republick, not to make herſelf happy, but by ‘ making others happy ; that ſhe could not think of bettering her Situ- ‘ ation on Condition to promote the War, and at the Expence of the ‘ publick Welfare of Europe.

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clared, they will not ? And why will they not ? Sir, there must be a Uniformity of Opinions and Counsels, to engage Nations to act together. You lost the Confidence of your old Allies the *Dutch*, when you threw yourselves into the Arms of *France* ; and what Steps have you taken since to regain that Confidence ? Were they so much as consulted on any one Measure that you have taken ? Was not the new Emperor acknowledged without their Advice ? Was there not a Treaty of Neutrality made with *France* for *Hanover* without their Advice ? And now we want the *Dutch* to act against *France*, and to guaranty *Hanover*.

‘ Sir, it is *Hanover*, and *Hanover* only, that seems now to be our Care : That is to be guarantied by all our Treaties ; and poor *England* must maintain the Troops of *Hanover*, all her Troops, even the 4000 Men that she herself stipulated to provide for the Support of the Pragmatick Sanction ; and these Troops we are to maintain at treble the Expence they cost the Elector of *Hanover*. Is not this contrary to the Act of Settlement ? Is not this unhinging the very Frame of our Constitution ?

‘ Sir, I am as much for preserving the Balance of Power in *Europe*, and for assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, as any one Man in this House ; but I am for doing it in a practicable Way, which is by giving her Money. Last Year, when it was agreed to send over the Troops to *Flanders*, (which, by the Way, was no otherwise agreed to, than by voting the Staff and Hospital for that Service) every Man in this House was made to believe, the *Dutch* would come in ; and it was called a mad and unaccountable Scheme, to pretend to act on the Continent without them ; but what followed ? There were seven Embarkations, the first in *May*, the last in *September* ; still the *Dutch* lay quiet, the *Hanoverians* did not arrive till *October* ; but did this mighty Army prevent the *French* from marching to the Assistance of the Emperor ? No. Did not *Harcourt*, did not *Maillebois* march while we remained, and still remain inactive in *Flanders* ?

‘ The Charge of Troops there in our Pay comes to above 1,354,000 *l.* and would not Half that Sum remitted in Money to the Queen of *Hungary*, enable her to fight all her own Battles ? It was said by an Hon. Gentleman, the Money cannot be sent her Time enough ; but have we no Credit abroad ? I am sure, the Money can reach her much sooner than the Troops can march to her Assistance. I cannot help taking Notice of the large Sum the *Hanover* Troops amount to, no less than 657,888 *l.* out of which

14,886 *l.*

14,886 *l. per Annum*, is charged for recruiting Money, tho' An. 16. Geo. II.
 you pay none to the *Hessians*. But the most extraordinary, 1742.
 and, indeed, surprising Article, is the Levy-Money, which
 comes to near 140,000 *l.* and is at the Rate of 18 *l.* for every
 Horseman, and 6 *l.* 15 *s.* for every Footman that was raised
 ; and this to be paid for Forces that were not raised for
 our Service, but had been long on Foot. It was said, indeed,
 you are to pay no Subsidy for these Troops, which you are
 obliged to do for all other foreign Troops: I wish I could look
 on these Troops as really foreign ones; but I beg Leave to take
 Notice, that this Levy-Money amounts to near four Times as
 much as the Subsidy we pay for the *Hessians*; and I am credibly
 informed, that these Troops, which are charged to us at 392,697 *l. per Annum*,
 were maintained by the King, at *Hanover*, for 100,000 *l. per Annum*.

* Gentlemen blame others for being jealous: Sir, Jealousy
 in a Member of Parliament is as great a Virtue, as Over-Credulity
 is a Vice; but it is said, we should give Reasons for our Jealousy:
 What stronger Reason, Sir, can be given for it, than when we see
 so dangerous an Exertion of the Prerogative, as the taking of
 16,000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay, without the Advice or
 Consent of Parliament? But it was said by an Hon. Gentleman,
 that this is no Exertion of the Prerogative at all, because the
 Troops are not to be paid till the Parliament votes them; but
 will that Hon. Gentleman say, that the Parliament has had its
 free Option in this Case? Was not the Measure taken without
 the Parliament's Advice, and the Troops ordered to march? And,
 I believe in my Conscience, that many Gentlemen in this House
 (who in their Hearts condemn the Measure) will vote for the
 Troops, because they are actually taken into our Pay; and
 because we have begun, they think, we ought to go on.

* Sir, I have a Right to be jealous, that many of these
 Troops we are to pay for, are not in *Effé*; and I am justified
 in that Jealousy by what I know of our own Troops, many
 of which, especially the Marines, are very far from being
 compleat, tho' we pay for the Whole; and many Regiments
 have been Months, I believe I may say, Years, without
 Heads, without Colonels to command them, by which great
 Savings have been made, which ought to be accounted for;
 and if we are so liable to be deceived at home, much more
 may we be so abroad.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

* Sir, upon the Whole, the taking 16,000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay, without the Advice or Consent of Parliament, is enough to awaken and alarm every honest *Briton*; and a Minister that was bold enough to advise it, may likewise advise the sending for them over hither; but let them be where they will, they must suck the Blood and Vitals of this Kingdom, and as they drain us, they must necessarily tend to enslave us, and to deprive us of that Power of Resistance, which every *Englishman* is intitled to, whenever his Property shall happen to be invaded. The late Minister was too wise a Man, and too faithful a Subject to advise the King to employ *Hanoverians*, to render him odious to the *British* Subjects. An Hon. Gentleman was pleased to say, He would be for no Measure that should give Dissatisfaction to the King. Sir, I believe, it was impossible for any Measure to be invented, that could be more disagreeable to the People of *England* in general; and if the Ministers neglect the true Interest of their Sovereign, which is to advise him to take such Measures as may render him amiable to his People, it is high Time for the Parliament to interpose; and that, I hope, they will now do, by giving a Negative to this Question.

The Motion for maintaining the Hanoverian Forces agreed to.

But the Question being put, it was determined in Favour of the Proposal, for maintaining the *Hanoverian* Troops, by 260 against 193. The Names of the Members who voted *Pro* and *Con.* upon this memorable Question, will be seen in the APPENDIX.

And that for Deducting Levy-Money rejected.

Dec. 13. Mr *Fane* reported the said Resolutions; and it was mov'd to amend the first Resolution, relating to the Payment of 16268 *Hanoverian* Troops, by deducting 139,313 *l.* charg'd for Levy Money; but after Debate the Question being put, it pass'd in the Negative; on a Division, Ayes 177, Noes 230. Then the rest of the Resolutions were agreed to.

Malt-Bill pass'd.

Dec. 16. An ingrossed Bill for continuing the Duties upon Malt, Mum, &c. was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords.

A new Writ was ordered for *Westlow*, in the Room of Sir *Charles Wager* * Kt. made Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy.

A Petition of the Dean and Chapter of *St Peter's Westminster*, was presented to the House and read, setting forth, That the Monies already granted for the Repair of the said Church,

* He was removed from his Post of First Commissioner of the Admiralty upon the Change in the Ministry in the First Session, and was re-chosen for the above Borough.

Church, being near expended, the said Works will soon be An. 16. Geo. II. at a Stand; and submitting the same to the Consideration of the House, acknowledging the Favours already conferred on the said Collegiate Church, as well by the present as by former Parliaments, and praying the Continuance of them: Thereupon Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, by his Majesty's Command; acquainted the House, that his Majesty having been inform'd of the Contents of the said Petition, recommended it to the House. Hereupon it was referred to the Committee of Supply: On a Division, Ayes 44, Noes 11.

1742.

Petition for Westminster-Abbey.

Dec. 21. Ordered a new Writ for the Burghs of *St Andrews*, &c. in the Room of *John Drummond*, * Esq; and for the Burghs of *Annan*, &c. in the Room of Lord *John Johnston* †, both deceas'd.

The proper Officers were ordered to lay before the House an Account of the Produce of Twenty Shillings a Gallon on Spirituous Liquors, granted to his Majesty by an Act of the Ninth Year of his Reign; with an Account of the Produce arisen yearly, by granting Licences for the retailing of Spirituous Liquors; and the Number of Prosecutions carried on against Offenders, in retailing Spirituous Liquors contrary to the said Act, and what has been recovered, and paid into the Exchequer on such Prosecutions.

Accounts order'd relating to Spirituous Liquors.

A Petition of the Prisoners in the *Fleet* (to the Number of five hundred and upwards) was presented to the House, complaining of their Distress, and ordered to lie upon the Table.

Petition from the Fleet Prisoners.

Ordered, *Nem. Con.* That Leave be given to bring in a Bill to explain and amend the Laws touching the Elections of Members to serve for *Scotland*, and to restrain the Partiality and regulate the Conduct of Returning Officers at such Elections; and that Mr *Scot*, and the Lord Advocate of *Scotland* do prepare and bring in the same.

Three Bills order'd in for regulating Elections.

A Bill was also order'd in, to the same Purport in regard to the Elections of Knights of the Shire to serve in Parliament for *England*, and that Mr *Carew*, Sir *Watkin-Williams Wynne*, and Mr *Cornwall* do prepare and bring in the same.

Likewise a third relating to Members to serve in Parliament for Cities, Boroughs, Towns, Ports, and other Places in *England*; and that Mr *Carew*, Mr *Sydenham*, and Sir *Watkin-Williams Wynne* do prepare and bring in the same.

The same Day his Majesty came to the House of Peers, and

O 2

* Hon. Thomas Leslie, Esq;] were elected.
† Sir James Johnston, Bart.

An. 16. Geo. II. and gave the Royal Assent to the Land-Tax Bill, and the Malt-Bill, and made the following Speech to both Houses of Parliament :

1742.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

King's Speech of " I Am very glad of the Occasion, which my coming hither, at this Time, gives me, of expressing to you the Thanks for the " great Satisfaction I take, in seeing so good a Progress already made in the Business of this Session.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

" The Readiness, and Dispatch, with which you have thus early provided so considerable a Part of the Supplies, for the ensuing Year, deserve my particular Thanks : And I make no Doubt, but the same Zeal for the Common Cause, will induce you to enable me to concert proper Measures, and to enter into, or make good, such Alliances, and Engagements with other Powers, as may be necessary for the Support of the Queen of Hungary, and restoring the Balance of Power.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

" I look upon this Beginning as a sure Pledge of your Steadiness, in pursuing the true Interest of Great Britain, which is, and ever shall be, my only View.

Thereupon it was resolved, *Nem. Con.* that an Address of Thanks be presented to his Majesty for his most gracious Speech.

Petition for Westminster-Bridge.

January 10. A Petition of the Commissioners for building Westminster Bridge, was presented to the House, setting forth, That the Petitioners find themselves under a Necessity of applying to the House for such further Sums of Money as they shall judge proper, that a Work so useful and advantageous to the Publick may not be stop'd for want thereof, and therefore praying the House to take the Premises into Consideration

Also from the African-Company.

Then a Petition of the Royal African Company of England, setting forth, That 10,000 *l.* granted last Session towards the Maintenance of the British Forts and Settlements, had been accordingly apply'd ; but that they cannot be supported, and the Trade preserved, without the Aid of Parliament ; and Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer having acquainted the House, that his Majesty recommends the said Petitions to them, they were severally referred to the Committee of Supply : And it was order'd, that the said Company do lay before the House the Establishment for their Forts and Settlements.

Settlements on the Coast of *Africa*, with the Charge thereof, for the Year 1742, distinguishing how much of the same is on Account of Trade, and how much for the Maintenance of the said Forts and Settlements; and also an Account how the Money granted in the last Session hath been disposed of; likewise, an Estimate of the Charges for the Maintenance of the several *British* Forts and Settlements belonging to the said Company on the Coast of *Africa* for the Year 1743.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

The Lord *Baltimore*, from the Commissioners of the Admiralty, presented to the House, pursuant to Address, the ordinary Estimate of the Navy, for the Year 1743.

A Petition of the Trustees of *Georgia*, was read, setting forth the Resolutions of the 29th of *June*, 1742*, one whereof was, 'That it will be an Advantage to the said Colony to permit the Importation of Rum from any of the other *British* Colonies;' and that in Pursuance thereof, the Petitioners have prepared a Law agreeably to his Majesty's Charter, and presented the same, under their Common Seal, to his Majesty in Council, for repealing so much of an Act made in the 8th Year of his present Majesty, as prohibits the Importation of Rum into the said Colony from the other *British* Colonies; and that they have also petition'd, to release the Quit-Rents of Lands in *Georgia* reserv'd to his Majesty, in order that the same might be reduc'd in the respective Grants of Lands there; and that as a further Encouragement to the Inhabitants of the said Colony, the Petitioners have also prepar'd a Law for reducing the said Quit-Rents from 4 s. to 2 s. Proclamation-Money of *South Carolina*, for every hundred Acres, and for enlarging and establishing the Tenures of the Lands in Fee-simple, to all such Persons who have settled, or should hereafter settle in the said Colony at their own Expence; but that the Petitioners are utterly incapable of further settling and improving the said Colony, without the Assistance of the House.

And from the
Trustees of
Georgia, refer-
red to the Com-
mittee of Supply.

Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer having, by the King's Command, acquainted the House, that his Majesty recommended the said Petition to their Consideration, it was order'd to be referr'd to the Committee of Supply.

A Petition of *Thomas Stevens*, Agent for *Georgia* in *America*, was presented, setting forth, *inter alia*, that by the many Restrictions and Discouragements arising from the Laws, Constitution, and Government of the said Colony, the Substance of the greatest Part of the Inhabitants being exhausted, they have been oblig'd to desert the same, and

Petition from
the Agent for
Georgia.

O. 3

praying

* See the said Resolutions at large in Vol. 13, P. 271.

An. 16. Geo. II. praying Relief: But the Journal of the 29th of *June* last *,
 1742. being read, the said Petition was ordered to lye upon the
 Table.

Accounts relat-
 ing to the Navy
 order'd in.

Jan. 12. Ordered the State of the Debt of the Navy, as it stood at *Christmas* last, to be laid before the House, and an Account of the Number of Seamen employ'd from the 31st of *December*, 1741, to the 31st of *December*, 1742, distinguishing what Number were borne, and what muster'd in the Service. Also of what Money has been order'd by the Commissioners of the Treasury, and receiv'd by the Treasurers of the Navy, for any Services of the Navy, from the 31st of *December*, 1741, to the 31st of *December*, 1742, distinguishing the Times when receiv'd, and the Services to which apply'd.

Also from West-
 minster Abbey.

Ordered an Account of what Part of the Revenue of *Westminster-Abbey* has been given for Repair thereof, and how dispos'd of, for seven Years last past.

Bill for Relief of
 Insolvent Debt-
 ors.

Jan. 13. Upon a Motion of Mr *Cornwall*, seconded by Mr *Hay* and Mr *Foley*, a Bill was order'd in for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors.

Grants for the
 Office of Ord-
 nance.

Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply, the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House, That 146,637 *l.* 7 *s.* 2 *d.* be granted for the Charge of the Office of Ordnance for Land Service, for the Year 1743. And 98,048 *l.* 13 *s.* 5 *d.* for the extraordinary Expence of the said Office, not provided for by Parliament.

Bill relating to
 Lace.

Jan. 14. Upon a Motion of Lord *Strange*, seconded by Mr *Gibbon* and Mr *Sydenham*, a Bill was order'd in, For prohibiting the wearing of Gold and Silver Lace, Thread or Wire, in Apparel.

Accounts and
 Resolutions re-
 lating to Spiri-
 tuous Liquors.

Jan. 17. Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply the following Resolutions. I. That the Duty of 20 *s.* per Gallon, granted in the 9th of his Majesty's Reign, upon all Spirituous Liquors, which any Retailers thereof should be possess'd of, after the 29th of *September*, 1736, shall, after the 25th of *March*, 1743, be no longer paid. II. That there shall be paid, for every Gallon of Low Wines, made from any Foreign or imported Materials, or any Mixture therewith, Sixpence. III. That for every Gallon of Low Wines, drawn only from any Sort of Drink or Wash, brew'd or made from any Sort of Malt or Corn, other than and except Brewer's Wash and Tilts, one Penny. IV. That for every Gallon of Low Wines, drawn from Brewer's Wash or Tilts, or any Mixture therewith, one Penny.

Penny. V. For every Gallon of Low Wines, drawn from any other Sort or Kind of *English* Materials, or any Mixture therewith, Three Half-pence. VI. For every Gallon of Spirits made in *Great Britain*, of any Kind of Wine or Cyder imported, Sixpence. VII. For every Gallon of strong Waters, or Aqua Vitæ, made for Sale, of any other Materials, Three-pence. All the said Sums, besides all other Duties chargeable thereon, to be paid by the Makers. VIII. That a Drawback be made of the respective Duties aforesaid, on the Exportation thereof. IX. That the Sum of Fifty Pounds yearly, by the said Act granted for a Licence for vending Spirituous Liquors, shall, from the 25th of *March*, 1743, cease. X. That after the 25th of *March*, 1743, Twenty Shillings yearly shall be paid for a Licence, to be taken out yearly by every Person keeping a publick Brandy-Shop, Victualling-House, Coffee-House, Ale-House, or Inn, who shall vend any Spirituous Liquors.

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

The first Resolution was agreed to by the House, but a Motion being made and the Question put, that the second Resolution be re-committed, it pass'd in the Negative; and the same, together with the other Resolutions, were agreed to, and a Bill order'd in accordingly.

Jan. 18. Ordered that the Commissioners of the Excise do lay before the House, an Account of the Quantities and net Produce of the Duties on Foreign Brandy and Spirits; also of the net Produce of the Duties upon Strong Waters, Low Wines, and Spirits; likewise of the gross and net Produce of the Duties on Beer and Ale: All from *Midsummer*, 1735, to *Midsummer*, 1742, distinguishing each Year. And that the proper Officer do lay before the House, an Account of the Monies paid into the Exchequer for the Duties on Foreign Brandy and Spirits, and for the Duties on strong Waters, Low Wines, and Spirits, during the same Time, from *Scotland*, distinguishing each Year.

Mr *Scot* presented to the House, according to Order, a Bill, To explain and amend the Laws touching the Elections of Members to serve for *Scotland*: As did also Mr *Carew* a Bill, To explain and amend the Laws touching the Elections of Knights of the Shire for *England*; both which were read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading, and the last to be printed.

Jan. 19. Mr *Cornwall* presented to the House a Bill, for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, which was read a first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Upon a Motion of Mr *Philips*, the House resolv'd to address

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

dress his Majesty, that he will be pleas'd to concert Measures for the furnishing all Forces in the Pay of *Great Britain*, (as far as it is possible) with the Product and Manufactures of this Kingdom, and that it be presented by such Members as are of his Majesty's Privy Council.

Address for
clothing with
British Cloth the
Forces in Bri-
tish Pay.

Then a Motion being made, and the Question being put, that an Address be presented to his Majesty, to give Directions to be laid before the House, Copies of all Conventions or Engagements enter'd into, between his Majesty, and the Queen of *Hungary*, or the King of *Sardinia*, for paying 300,000 *l.* to her, and 200,000 *l.* to him, out of the Supplies for last Year. It passed in the Negative.

Motions for se-
veral Papers re-
lating to the
Queen of Hun-
gary and King of
Sardinia, &c.

But it was ordered that the proper Officers do lay before the House, an Account of the several Sums of Money paid to the Queen of *Hungary*, by virtue of an Act of Parliament, that granted 300,000 *l.* to his Majesty, to enable him to support the said Queen; distinguishing to whom paid, the Times when paid; and of what Sums were remitted to *Amsterdam*, in Pursuance of the Treaty concluded between his Majesty and the Queen of *Hungary*, the 13th of *June*, 1741; and at what Rate of Exchange the same were remitted from hence.

A Motion being made, and the Question being proposed, that the proper Officer do lay before this House an Account of the several Sums of Money issued to the Queen of *Hungary*, and the King of *Sardinia*, in Pursuance of an Act of the last Session of Parliament, distinguishing to whom paid, the Times when paid, and what Sums were remitted by the Contractors for remitting the same, and to what Places the same were remitted, and at what Rate of Exchange; the same was ordered accordingly.

It was also ordered, that the proper Officer do lay before the House, Copies of all Warrants from the Crown to the Pay-Master General, or his Deputy, for receiving any Sums of Money on Account of any Subsidies paid to foreign Princes, or for the Hire of foreign Troops; and of all Sums of Money that have been deducted or repaid out of, or upon Account of any Subsidies paid to foreign Princes, or for the Hire of foreign Troops, since the 25th of *March*, 1726.

500,000 *l.* voted
on Account, for
Support of the
said Forces.

Then the House resolv'd itself into a Grand Committee on the Supply, and it being propos'd to resolve, That 500,000 *l.* be granted upon Account, towards enabling his Majesty to concert proper Measures, and form such Alliances,

ances, or enter into such Engagements with other Powers, as An. 16. Geo. II. his Majesty shall judge necessary for the Support of the House of *Austria*, and restoring the Balance of Power in *Europe*; it was mov'd, That the Chairman do leave the Chair; after Debate it pass'd in the Negative, Ayes 159, Noes 212. Then the said Resolution was agreed to by the Committee: As it was also the next Day upon the Report to the House; On a Division, Ayes 245, Noes 156.

Jan. 21. Order'd out a new Writ for *Whitchurch*, in the room of *William Sloper*, * Esq; deceased.

Jan. 24. Mr Comptroller reported to the House, his Majesty's Answer to their Address of the 19th Inst. * That ' his Majesty is always desirous to give Encouragement to ' the Manufactures of this Kingdom, so far as it is possible, ' and may be consistent with the Public Service.'

Mr *Carew* presented to the House a Bill to explain and amend the Laws, touching the Elections of Members for Cities, Boroughs, Towns, Ports, and other Places in *England*; and to restrain the Partiality, and regulate the Conduct of Returning Officers at such Elections, which was read the first Time, order'd a second Reading; and to be printed.

The Lord *Strange* presented a Bill to prohibit the wearing of Gold and Silver Lace, Thread, or Wire, in Apparel, which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

The next Day Dr *Lee* made a Report from the Committee of Privileges and Elections, relating to a Breach of Privilege on Sir *Watkin Williams Wynne*, and two Persons were taken into Custody. On a Division, Ayes 260, Noes 80.

Jan. 26. A Petition of several Merchants, Maltsters, and Brewers, in *Great Yarmouth*, was read, reciting a Resolution from the Committee of Supply, (See P. 198.) representing to the House, that several Laws were heretofore made for obliging all Distillers to draw their Low Wines from Drink made of Malted Corn entirely; and that Spirits drawn from Malt only, are more wholesome than such as are drawn from unmalted Corn, mix'd with Malt; and that by the Distiller's Use of unmalted Corn, much less Corn as well as Malt is consumed; and therefore praying, that the Distillers may be restrain'd from using unmalted Corn, &c. was order'd to lie on the Table.

Mr *Francis Fane* presented to the House a Bill, For repealing certain Duties on Spirituous Liquors, which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Upon

* Charles Clarke, Esq; was elected.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

Mutiny-Bill.

Upon a Motion of Mr Secretary at War, seconded by Mr *Boone* and Mr *Mansfon*, order'd a Bill in, For punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters.

A Complaint being made to the House, that the Hand-Writing of a Member had been counterfeited, to prevent the Payment of Postage, it was resolv'd, *Nem. Con.* to address his Majesty, to give Directions to the Attorney-General, to prosecute such Persons.

Bill relating to
Convicts trans-
ported.

Jan. 27. Upon a Motion of Mr *Carew*, seconded by the Lord *Baltimore*, Mr Alderman *Heathcote*, and Mr Alderman *Calvert*, order'd in a Bill, For the more easy and effectual Conviction of Offenders found at large in *Great Britain*, after they have been order'd for Transportation.

Accounts relat-
ing to Lace.

Order'd an Account of the Quantity of Gold and Silver Lace, Thread and Wire, exported for seven Years last past: And an Account of the Amount of the gross and net Produce of the Duty upon Gilt and Silver Wire, for seven Years past, with the Amount of the Drawback upon the Exportation of Gold, Gilt, and Silver Lace, Thread and Wire, for the same Time.

Grants in the
Committee of
Supply.

Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply, the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House. I. That 188,558 *l.* 13 *s.* 5 *d.* be granted to his Majesty for the Ordinary of the Navy, (including Half Pay to Sea Officers) for the Year 1743. II. 10,000 *l.* towards the Support of *Greenwich Hospital*. III. 58,869 *l.* 15 *s.* 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* for making good the Deficiency of the general Fund ended at *Michaelmas*, 1742. IV. 3,819 *l.* 2 *d.* to re-place to the Sinking Fund the like Sum paid out of the same, to make good the Deficiency of the additional Stamp Duties, at *Christmas*, 1741. V. 42,000 *l.* to re-place to the Sinking Fund the like Sum paid out of the same, for one Year's Interest, due the 5th of *November*, 1742, on the principal Sum of 1,200,000 *l.* lent on Credit of the Salt-Duty, to-towards the Supply of 1741. VI. 13,786 *l.* 10 *s.* 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* to re-place to the Sinking Fund the like Sum paid out of the the same, to make good the Deficiency of the Duty of 12 *s.* a Barrel on Sweets, or Wines made from *British* or Foreign Fruit or Sugar, at *Michaelmas*, 1742. VII. 4,333 *l.* 10 *s.* 1 *d.* to re-place to the Sinking Fund, the like Sum paid out of the same to make good the Deficiency of the Duty upon all Victuallers in *London*, *Westminster*, and the Bills of Mortality, at *Michaelmas*, 1742. VIII. 10,000 *l.* to the Royal *African*

African Company of England. IX. 4000 *l.* to *Westminster* Abbey. X. 25000 *l.* towards finishing *Westminster* Bridge. An. 16. Geo. II. 1742.

Jan. 28. Mr *Bennet* presented a Bill, For the better Preservation of Fish and Game, by encouraging the Destruction of Vermin; which was read a first Time and ordered a second Reading. Bill for Destruction of Vermine.

Order'd an Account of the Quantities and Produce of Low Wines and Spirits extracted from Malt or Corn; and of the Quantities and Produce of Low Wines and Spirits extracted from Foreign Materials; both from *Midsummer*, 1732, to *Midsummer*, 1742, distinguishing each Year.

February 1. An ingross'd Bill, For the further Punishment of Persons who shall assist or encourage Prisoners to escape, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent by Mr *Carew* to the Lords. Bill pass'd relating to Prisoners Escapes.

The Lord *Baltimore*, from the Commissioners of the Admiralty, presented to the House, pursuant to their Order, an Account of the Number of Seamen employ'd in the Service of the Royal Navy, from the 31st of *December*, 1741, to the 31st of *December*, 1742, upon a Medium of each Month; distinguishing what Number were borne and what muster'd in the said Service.

February 2. A Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater* was presented to the House, representing, that the Petitioners at this Time labour under a very great Burthen from the high Price of *Olive-Oil*, occasion'd by the Prohibition thereof since the War with *Spain*, the Price being advanc'd from 26 *l.* to 60 *l.* a Tun, to the great Prejudice of the Woollen Manufactory; which was refer'd to a Committee of the whole House. Petition relating to Olive-Oil.

A Bill, For the better Preservation of Fish and Game, by encouraging the Destruction of Vermin, was read a second Time.

On this Occasion a Member jocosely propos'd, to insert a Clause in the Bill, whereby Mice should be deemed Vermin, because he had been inform'd, that they had nibbled away great Part of the Corn laid up in *Flanders*, which prevented our Troops there from marching to the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary*. A Motion being made, that the said Bill be committed, it pass'd in the Negative.

Feb. 3. The Order of the Day being read for taking into further Consideration the Report from the Committee appointed to consider the Act for amending and enforcing the Laws relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, &c. The Serjeant at Arms summon'd the Members as usual, and the Resolutions

An. 16. Geo. III.
1742.

Resolutions re-
lating to the Va-
gahond Act.

tions of the said Committee were read, viz. I. That the said Act is in many Parts insufficient to answer the Purposes for which the same was design'd. II. That the Omission of the Correction of Vagrants by whipping, is one great Cause of the Defects and Insufficiency thereof. III. That the Method of passing Vagrants appointed by the said Act, is burthensome to the Publick, and has not any Way answered the Intent of the said Act. IV. That the Punishment of incorrigible Rogues and Persons giving a false Account of themselves, upon their Examinations prescribed by the said Act, is not sufficient to answer the Intent thereof. V. That so much of the said Act as relates to the Nomination and Removal of the Master of the Houses of Correction, is insufficient. VI. That two Justices of the Peace, whereof one to be of the Quorum of the Division, where any Person is likely to become chargeable to the Parish, shall come to inhabit, by their Warrant may be enabled to remove and convey such Person to such Parish where he was last legally settled by any Laws now in being, notwithstanding such two Justices, whereof one to be of the Quorum, or either of them shall be resident in, or chargeable to, the Poor's Rates of such Parish. VII. That no Person ought to gain any Settlement in any Parish, by renting a Tenement of ten Pounds *per Annum*, unless wholly situate within the Parish where such Person resides, and for which such Person hath duly paid one Year's Rent. VIII. That no poor Person ought to gain any Settlement in any Parish, by serving as a Servant or Apprentice, unless the Master or Mistress with whom such Service is perform'd, pays the Parish Taxes of such Parish where such Service is perform'd. IX. That no Person ought to gain a Settlement, by serving the Offices of Constable or Tything-Man, within any Parish. X. That every unmarried Person not having Children, who shall serve any Person in any Parish for the Space of one whole Year, ought to be adjudg'd to have gain'd a legal Settlement by such Service in such Parish, although it should not appear that such Person was hired to serve for a Year. XI. That it is the Opinion of the Committee, a Bill ought to be brought in, To explain, amend, and make more effectual, an Act made in the 13th Year of his present Majesty, intituled, *An Act for amending and enforcing the Laws relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, &c. And also to explain and amend the Laws in being relating to the Settlement and Removal of poor Persons.*

The first Resolution of the Committee was agreed to by the House, *Nem. Con.* The 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th, were agreed

agreed to on a Division. The 6th, *Nem. Con.* The 7th*, An. 16. Geo. II. 8th, and 10th Resolutions agreed to by the House, with an Alteration. The 9th pass'd in the Negative. 1742.

And Leave was given to bring in a Bill or Bills accordingly; and that Mr *Carew*, Sir *Hugh Smithson*, Sir *Roger Newdigate*, Sir *Nathaniel Curzon*, Sir *Robert Long*, Mr *Noel*, Mr *Proby*, Mr *Southwell*, Mr *Robert Williams*, Mr *Hay*, and Mr *Phillips*, do prepare the same.

Griffith Phillips, Esq; withdrew his Petition for the Borough of *Caermarthen*; [See Vol. 13. P. 54.] as did also Mr *Phillips*, late Mayor and others, for the Borough of *Pembroke*; *Rawleigh Mansel*, Esq; for *Caermarthen*; *Hugh Barlow*, Esq; for *Haverford-West*; and *Jobu Simmons*, Esq; for the County of *Pembroke*. Petitions for undue Elections withdrawn.

Order'd a new Writ for *St Albans*, in the Room of *Thomas Alsby*, Esq; deceas'd †.

A Motion being made by Mr *Waller*, and the Question put, that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, to give Directions, that there may be laid before this House Copies of all Memorials, Representations, and Declarations, which have been sent either to his Majesty or his Ministers, by the Queen of *Hungary* or her Ministers, or by his Majesty or his Ministers, to the Queen of *Hungary* or her Ministers, and of all Letters which have been sent to his Majesty's Ministers by the Ministers of the Queen of *Hungary*, or by his Majesty's Ministers to the Ministers of the Queen of *Hungary*, with Copies of the respective Answers to such Memorials, Representations, Declarations, and Letters, relating to the State of the War in the Empire, and the Support and Interests of the House of *Austria*, since the 1st of September, 1741, to the 16th of November, 1742; it pass'd in the Negative, Ayes 154. Noes 212 †.

Feb. 7. A Petition of several Merchants, Masters, and Brewers, in *New Sarum*, was presented to the House, reciting a Resolution of the Committee of Supply, to the same Pur-

* The Alteration made by the House to the 7th Resolution of the Committee was thus, viz. After per Annum, ' Unless the Tenement, or so much thereof as is of the Value of ten Pounds per Ann. be situate, &c.' In the 8th Resolution, after the Word *Servant* leave out, or *Apprentice*. In the 10th for, Ought to be adjudg'd, read, Shall be adjudg'd.

† Hans Stanley, Esq; was elected.

‡ A Motion to the same Effect was made in the first Session, and overrul'd, but afterwards carried. See Vol. XIII. p. 62, and 104.

An. 16. Geo. II. obliged to provide great Quantities of *Italian Oil* in Readiness, as Foundations for reloading them homewards; and considerable Quantities of such Oil are already arriv'd; not less than a Thousand Tuns more are now on the Way, and Orders are gone for greater Quantities which the Petitioners have engaged in, under the Security of the Law, that *Spanish Oil* could not, during the War, be imported; and that the *Spanish Court*, since the War, had rigorously prohibited the Introduction of *British Manufactures*, even by the way of Neutral Ports; and that, tho' Olive Oil was at a Price higher than usual, the same did not arise from the Cause assigned by the Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater*, but from a Shortness in the Growth thereof, in the Year 1740 and 1741. Neither was the Excess of Price so great as represented, and that the Quantity used by the Clothiers is so small, that the high Price would not prove such a very great Burthen on the Woollen Manufacture; but that the introducing *Spanish Oil* during the War, which must be paid for in Money, and exported from thence in Neutral Ships, will be of the highest Prejudice to those who have already invested their Properties under a Reliance on the Law; that it may divert a considerable Part of the Trade to *Italy*, by the *Italians* taking, in Payment for their Oil, the like Goods from our Competitors in the Woollen Manufactures, as they now take from *Great Britain*; was refer'd to the Committee of the whole House, on the Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater*.

Bill for Recovery
of Small Debts.

Mr *Hungerford* presented to the House a Bill for the more easy and speedy Recovery of small Debts, which was read the first Time, and ordered a second Reading.

Feb. 10. Mr *Philips* presented to the House a Bill for amending the Laws relating to the Settlement of poor Persons, which was read the first Time, and ordered a second Reading.

A Petition of the Clothiers of *Bradford*, in the County of *Wilt*, setting forth, That the excessive high Price of Olive Oil, since the Prohibition of that from *Spain* is apparently prejudicial to the Woollen Manufactures, was referred to the Committee on the Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater*.

Resolutions of
the Committee
of Supply.

Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House: I. That towards raising the Supply, one Million be raised by Annuities, at 3 *l. per Cent. per Annum*, and 800,000 *l.* by way of Lottery, to be attended with Annuities
after

after the Rate of 3 *l. per Cent. per Annum*, transferable at An. 16. Geo. II. the Bank, and charg'd on the several Duties on Spirituous Liquors, granted this Session. II. That the several Duties granted by an Act of the Twelfth Year of King George I. by laying a Duty upon all Victuallers and Retailers of Beer and Ale in *London and Westminster*, and within the Bills of Mortality, shall, after the 24th of *June* 1743, be no longer paid. III. That in Lieu of the said Duties now charged with the Payment of 481,400 *l.* in Exchequer Bills, the said Sum remaining unsatisfied in Exchequer Bills, with the Interest thereon, and Charges of circulating the same, shall after the 25th Day of *March*, 1743, (together with the Sum hereafter granted to his Majesty) be charged on the Duties granted this Session for Licences to sell Spirituous Liquors, or Strong Waters by Retail, subject to the same Rules and Methods as were prescribed concerning the circulating and paying off the same Exchequer Bills by the Victuallers Act. IV. That towards raising the Supply, his Majesty be enabled to borrow by Loans, or Exchequer Bills, any Sum of Money not exceeding 518,600 *l.* which said Sum, together with the said Sum of 481,400 *l.* remaining unpaid of Exchequer Bills, issued pursuant to the said Act, shall be charged upon the said Duties granted to his Majesty this Session of Parliament for Licences to sell Spirituous Liquors, or Strong Waters by Retail. V. That 12,492 *l.* 2 *s.* 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* now remaining in the Exchequer, being the Overplus of the Grants for the Year 1742, be applied towards making good the Supply granted to his Majesty in this Session. And ordered, That a Bill be brought in, pursuant to the said Resolutions.

Ordered an Account of the Charge of Transport Service for the Year 1742, to be laid before the House; and that the Commissioners of the Victualling do lay before the House an Account of the Expences in that Office, in victualling his Majesty's Land-Forces between the first of *January* 1741, and the 31st of *December* 1742.

Then a Motion being made, and the Question put, that an Address be presented to his Majesty, to communicate to this House, Copies of all Declarations, Memorials or Representations, Letters or Precises of Letters, and an Account of all verbal Communications from the King of *Prussia* or his Ministers, to his Majesty or his Ministers, or to the States General or their Ministers, and by them communicated to his Majesty or his Ministers, relating to any Auxiliary or foreign Forces entering into *Germany*, in Support of the Queen of *Hungary*; It pass'd in the Negative, Ayes 130, Noes 164.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

Also from the
King of Sweden.

A Motion was made for an Address to his Majesty, to communicate to the House, Copies of all Declarations, Memorials or Representations, Letters or Precis of Letters, from the King of *Sweden* or his Ministers, to his Majesty or his Ministers, concerning the *Hessian* Forces, (now in the *Low Countries*) marching or not marching into *Germany*, together with the Answers given by his Majesty or his Ministers, relating thereunto, which also pass'd in the Negative. Ayes 130, Noes 148.

Feb. 11. Mr *Henry Archer* reported from the Committee, appointed to enquire what Laws are expired or near expiring. That the Committee had come to the following Resolutions.

Report relating
to expiring Laws.

I. That an Act in the 4th Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, *An Act for granting an Allowance upon the Exportation of British made Gunpowder.*

II. That an Act made in the fifth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, *An Act to prevent the committing of Frauds by Bankrupts.*

III. That so much of an Act made in the eighth Year of the Reign of his late Majesty King *George the First*, intituled, *An Act for giving further Encouragement for the Importation of Naval Stores, and for other Purposes therein mentioned*, as relates to the Importation of Wood and Timber, &c. from his Majesty's Plantations.

IV. That so much of an Act made in the twelfth Year of the Reign of his late Majesty King *George the First*, intituled, *An Act for granting an Aid to his Majesty, by laying a Duty upon all Victuallers, &c.* as relates to the additional Number of 100 Hackney Chairs.

V. That several Clauses in an Act made in the ninth Year of Queen *Anne*, in the tenth Year, and in the twelfth Year of the said Queen; and also in an Act made in the first Year of the Reign of his late Majesty King *George the First*, relating to the Jurisdiction, Powers, and Authorities of the Commissioners for licensing and regulating Hackney Coaches, and of Justices of the Peace; and to the Rules, Penalties, Forfeitures, and Directions therein mentioned, are all near expiring, and fit to be continued.

The second Resolution of the Committee, being read a second Time, was agreed to by the House.

The first, third, fourth and fifth subsequent Resolutions of the Committee, being read a second Time, were postponed; but a Bill was order'd to be brought in upon the second Resolution, by Mr *Henry Archer* and Mr *Philips*.

And

And it was order'd that several Acts and Clauses mentioned An. 16. Geo. II. in the other Resolutions of the said Committee, which were 1742. postpon'd, be referr'd to the Committee of Supply.

Then Lord *Baltimore*, from the Commissioners of the Admiralty, presented to the House, pursuant to Address, an Estimate of the Debt of his Majesty's Navy, as it stood on the 31st of *December*, 1742.

Ordered a new Writ for *Whitchurch*, in the room of *Charles Clarke*, Esq; * now one of the Barons of the Exchequer.

Feb. 14. A Petition of the Clothiers of *Melsham*; and of the Borough of *Devizes* in *Wilts*; and of the Master-Combers of *Norwich*, the Woollen-Manufacturers at *Chippenham*, and the Clothiers and Manufacturers of *Dursley*, *Wotton*, and *Uley* in the County of *Gloucester*, to the same Purport as that from *Stroudwater*, was referr'd to the same Committee, as was also a Counter-Petition from the Merchants of *Bristol*. Petitions relating to Olive-Oil.

Ordered a new Writ for *Penryn*, † and also for *Rochester*, in the room of Admiral *Vernon*, who made his Election for *Ipswich*.

Resolved, That an Address be presented to his Majesty, Estimate for Re- to give Direction to the proper Officers to lay before the pairs of Shipping, House, an Estimate of what may be necessary for the Buildings, Rebuildings and Repairs of his Majesty's Ships, for the Year 1743.

Mr *Francis Fane* presented to the House a Bill for repealing the several Duties upon Victuallers, for transferring the Exchequer Bills, unsatisfy'd thereupon, to the Duties for Licences to sell Spirituous Liquors, and also for enabling his Majesty to raise a certain Sum of Money for the Service of the Year 1743, to be farther charged on the said Duties for Licences, which was read a first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

An ingrossed Bill for repealing certain Duties on Spirituous Liquors, &c. was read the third Time, pass'd, and Spirituous Li- sent by Mr *Francis Fane* to the Lords; where it occasio- quors pass'd. ned great Debates ‡.

P 2

Feb.

* Major General *Wentworth*, who commanded at the Siege of *Carthage*, was elected in his Place.

† The Hon. *John Boscawen*, Esq; was elected for *Penryn*, without Opposition; and *David Polhill*, Esq; [See Vol. xiii. P. 9.] for *Rochester* against Vice-Admiral *Matthews*.

‡ See the Debate at Large in the Eighth Volume of *TIMBERLAND'S* History of the House of Lords. Part II.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

Feb. 15. A Petition of the Clothiers of *Froome*, and of the Woollen Manufacturers residing at *Bristol*, to the same Purport, as the Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater*, were refer'd to the same Committee.

Mr *Carew* presented a Bill for the more easy and effectual Conviction of Offenders, found at large in *Great Britain*, after they have been order'd for Transportation; which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Bill pass'd relating to the Scotch Elections.

An ingrossed Bill to explain and amend the Laws, touching the Elections of Members to serve for *Scotland*, and to restrain the Partiality and regulate the Conduct of Returning Officers at such Elections, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr *Scot*.

Sir *Hugh Smithson* presented a Bill, to impower Justices of the Peace to act in certain Cases relating to Parishes and Places, to the Rates and Taxes of which they are rated or chargeable; which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading: And to be printed.

The Petitions relating to Olive Oil drop'd.

The Order of the Day being read, for the House to resolve into a Committee of the whole House, on the Petition of the Clothiers of *Stroudwater*, &c. The Consideration thereof was put off for two Months.

Feb. 17. Order'd an Account of what Cambricks and Lawns have been imported into this Kingdom for seven Years last past, distinguishing each Year, with the Places from whence they came, and the respective Duties charg'd thereon.

Mr *Francis Fane* presented to the House a Bill for raising a certain Sum of Money by Annuities, and a Lottery for the Service of the Year 1743, which was read the first Time, and ordered a second Reading.

Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer presented to the House, pursuant to Order, Copies of the Minutes of the Treasury, since the first of *March*, 1741-2, for remitting abroad any Public Money, which was order'd to lie on the Table to be perus'd by the Members.

Motion relating to the Foreign Troops in British Pay.

A Motion being made by Lord *Guernsey*, and the Question being put, that an Address be presented to his Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased, if it be necessary to march an Army, and act in *Germany*, to order all the Mercenaries in Pay of *Great Britain* to that Service, in Consideration of the great Distance, Charge and Inconveniency it will be to the *British* Troops, and that Part of the said *British* Troops be left in the Low Countries, if any of the Forces we now pay abroad are to remain there; and
humbly

humbly to beseech his Majesty, that he will, in Compassion An. 16. Geo. II.
to the Distresses and Poverty of this Nation, ease us of the 1742.
Burthen and Expence of the 6000 *Hessians*, if they do not
march, or cannot act in the Empire; and that, if 6000 And for discharging 6000 Hessians.
Men are wanting in the Low Countries, they may be
supplied from our own numerous (otherwise useless and bur-
then some) Army at home. It pass'd in the Negative, Ayes
135, Noes 182.

Feb. 18. Mr *Carew* presented to the House a Bill for Bill relating to Vagabonds,
amending and making more effectual the Laws relating to
Rogues, Vagabonds, &c. which was read a first Time, and
order'd a second Reading: And to be printed.

Mr *Henry Archer* presented a Bill to continue an Act
made in the fifth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty,
To prevent the committing Frauds by Bankrupts, which was Bankrupts,
read a first Time, and order'd to be read a second Time.

The same Day it was order'd, That the Committee
of the whole House on the Mutiny-Bill, have Power to re-
ceive a Clause, to oblige Soldiers, having Wives or Chil- And Soldiers,
dren, to discover, and give an Account upon Oath, before
some Justice of Peace, where quarter'd, of their last legal
Settlement.

Feb. 21. The Lord *Baltimore*, from the Commissioners
of the Admiralty, presented to the House, pursuant to Ad-
dress, an Estimate of the Buildings, Rebuildings, and Re-
pairs of Ships of War, for the Year 1743.

A Motion being made, and the Question put, that the Motion relating to the Remittance of publick Money.
proper Officer do lay before this House, Copies of the Let-
ters or Memorials of Mr *Wilkinson* and Mr *Muilman*, to
the Treasury, (relating to the remitting of the Publick
Money abroad) in the Months of *June* and *October* last,
and on the 11th of *January* last. It pass'd in the Nega-
tive, Ayes 77, Noes 119.

Feb. 22. The Order of the Day being read, for the The Bill relating to small Debts drop'd.
House to resolve into a Grand Committee, upon the Bill for
the more easy and speedy Recovery of small Debts; the
same was postpon'd for two Months; by a Majority of 63
against 42.

Feb. 23. Ordered an Account of what Cambricks have New Writ for Oxfordshire.
been imported into this Kingdom since the first of *August* last,
with the Places from whence they came and the Duties charg-
ed thereon.

Feb. 24. A new Writ was order'd for a Knight of the
Shire for *Oxford*, in the Room of Lord Viscount *Quarendon*,
now Earl of *Litchfield*.

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

Bill pass'd to re-
peal the Victua-
ling Act.

An ingross'd Bill, For repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Victuallers and Retailers of Beer and Ale, &c. was read a third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr *Francis Faue*.

Motion for dis-
charging the
Mercenary
Troops.

A Motion being made and the Question put, that an Address be presented to his Majesty, That in Consideration of the great and increasing Load of Debts and Taxes with which this Nation is burthen'd, and of the just and necessary War in which it has for some time been engag'd with *Spain*, he will be graciously pleas'd, in Compassion to his Subjects of these Kingdoms, to lessen the publick Expence, by dismissing the mercenary Troops now in the Pay of *Great Britain*, in case none of the other Powers of *Europe* (particularly the States General of the United Provinces) engag'd by Treaties and bound by Interest to support the Queen of *Hungary*, should think proper to act offensively in *Germany* in Concert with his Majesty, in Pursuance of those Engagements, conformable to the humble Address and Advice of this House, and of his Majesty's most gracious Approbation of it, in the last Session of Parliament, in which the timely Concurrence of other Powers was laid down, as the only Means of supporting the House of *Austria*, and restoring the Balance of Power in *Europe*: It pass'd in the Negative. Ayes 132. Noes 195.

Bill relating to
transported Con-
victs ;

Feb. 25. An ingross'd Bill, For the more easy and effectual Conviction of Offenders found at large in *Great Britain*, after they have been order'd for Transportation, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr *Carew*.

And for Insol-
vent Debtors
pass'd.

March 1. An ingross'd Bill, For the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, was read a third Time, and pass'd. On a Division, Ayes 87. Noes 56. And sent to the Lords by Mr *Cornwall*.

Bill against the
Importation of
Foreign Lace.

Upon a Motion of Lord *Dupplin*, seconded by Mr Secretary at War, and Mr Alderman *Heathcote*, it was order'd, *Nem. Con.* that a Bill be brought in, For the more effectually preventing the Importation and Wear of Gold and Silver Thread, Lace, Fringe, or other Work, made of Gold and Silver Wire manufactur'd in Foreign Parts, which was the next Day presented by Lord *Dupplin*, and read the first Time and order'd a second Reading.

Mutiny-Bill
pass'd.

An ingross'd Bill, For punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr Secretary at War.

March

March 3. Ordered a new Writ for *Suffolk*, in the Room An. 16. Geo. II. of Sir *Fermyn Davers*, * Bart. deceas'd.

1742.

A Petition of several Gentlemen, Manufacturers, Freeholders, &c. in the Soak of *Grantham*, praying, *inter alia*, that a Bill may pass, For registering, from the Grower and Feltmonger, the whole Crop of Wool in *Great Britain*, or in *England* and *Wales* only, for one Year, was order'd to lie on the Table.

Order'd Copies of the Minutes of the Treasury, contain- Orders relating ing all Contracts or Agreements made with Sir *Henry Furness*, from the first of *January*, 1703, for the remitting of Money. Money Abroad, during the War, to be laid before the House.

Mr *Francis Fane* reported from the Committee of Supply, the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House, *viz.* I. That 26,137 *l.* 10 *d.* be granted for the reduc'd Officers of the Land Forces and Marines for 1743. Resolutions of the Committee of Supply. II. That 3918 *l.* for paying off Pensions to the Widows of such reduc'd Officers as died upon the Establishment of Half Pay in *Great Britain*, for the Year 1743. III. That 41,435 *l.* 18 *s.* 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* for defraying extraordinary Expences and Services of his Majesty's Land Forces, incur'd *Ann.* 1742, and not provided for by Parliament. IV. That 133,871 *l.* 8 *s.* 11 *d.* for the Freight of Transports, between the first of *Jan.* 1741, and 31st of *December*, 1742. V. That 35,075 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.* for the Expence of Victuals provided for his Majesty's Land Forces, between the first of *January*, 1741, and the 31st of *December*, 1742. VI. That 12000 *l.* for the Colony of *Georgia*. On this last Resolution the House divided. Ayes 135. Noes 60.

On Occasion of the Motion for the foregoing Grant for Freight of Transports, Mr *Phillipps* spoke to the following Effect.

Sir,

* I have perus'd the Account of Transport Service now Mr *Phillipps*. under your Consideration, as I have most of the other Estimates and Accounts that have been laid before the House, and I am sorry to say, that few, if any, of them are satisfactory to an inquisitive Mind; and an inquisitive Mind, I think, every Member of Parliament ought to have: I mean no more than this, That an honest Man, who has the Service of his Country at Heart, and is resolv'd not to be led blindfold to vote for Things that he does not understand, but to inquire and satisfy himself how the several Sums ask'd for do arise, is not warrant'd by these Accounts to grant the Money contained in them. But of all others the Transport

* John Aspleck, Esq; was elected.

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

Transport Account is the most extraordinary : That Service comes to 133,871 *l.* 8 *s.* and 11 *d.* and one Article in the Account, which consists of three Words only, *Freight of Transports*, comes to 117,707 *l.* 8 *s.* 3 *d.* This may be called a Parliamentary Account, for what I know, but I am sure, it is not a satisfactory one. The Sum demanded seems to be too large, but if it was 200,000 *l.* instead of 100,000 *l.* I am sure, I could not contradict it ; neither can any Person that is not acquainted with the Particulars ; but this Account is so very lame, that there is not so much as a Distinction made between the Transports sent to *Flanders*, and those sent to the *West-Indies*, but they are all lump'd together, and make a handsome round Sum of 117,000 *l.*

' Suppose any Gentleman's Steward or Agent was to bring him in an Account of 50 or 100,000 *l.* laid out for building a House, or any other Service, without producing the Particulars or Vouchers, would he allow of that Account ? If he would, Sir, I am sure he must have greater Confidence in his Agent, than I can or ought to have in the Commissioners of the Navy who produce you this Account, or, indeed, in any Ministerial Persons whatsoever. It is the Duty of Members of Parliament to be jealous of Ministers, to examine strictly all Accounts that are attended with a Burden to the People, and to be thoroughly satisfied, that the Money is rightly applied before they allow it. We are but Stewards, or Agents for the People, and we are accountable to them for every Penny we raise on them. An Account composed of gross Sums is no Account at all, and therefore, I think, ought to be rejected.

' We are kept so in the Dark, Sir, in every Thing that relates to the Navy, that, I fear, there is a great Mystery of Iniquity at the Bottom of it, and it is high Time there should be a Parliamentary Inquiry into it. Last Year there was granted in the Navy Account, including Transports, 2,437,402 *l.* 12 *s.* 8 *d.* and this Year, exclusive of Transports, 2,268,558 *l.* 13 *s.* 5 *d.* Yet there is now a Debt on the Navy of 2,182,895 *l.* 14 *s.* And tho' such great Sums have been granted, this Debt has increased since last Year 526,888 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$. How this Debt can rise is most surprising, when we consider, that the Article of Wear and Tear only, for the 40,000 Men which have been granted for two Years past, at 1 *l.* 7 *s.* *per* Man, *per* Month, comes to 702,000 *l.* *per* Annum, which is vastly more than the Charge of fitting out our Men of War with new Rigging comes to ; and surely they cannot want every Year to be

new

new rigged. I speak from Information, which I have had from Persons of great Credit, who have been concerned in the Navy, and shall beg Leave to explain what I have said by giving an Instance or two. The whole Charge of fitting out a Ship of a hundred Guns, with Masts, Yards, Rigging, Cables, Anchors, Sails, Boatswains and Carpenters Stores, and every Thing except her Hull, (which comes to above 27,000 *l.*) is computed to be 8350 *l.* The Wear and Tear allowed to such a Ship, supposing her to have her Complement of 850 Men, is 14,917 *l.* 10 *s.* so that there is 6567 *l.* 10 *s.* granted for this Service more than it comes to. The Charge of fitting out a forty Gun Ship is computed to be 2239 *l.* The Wear and Tear allowed to such a Ship, supposing her to have her Complement of 250 Men, is 4387 *l.* 10 *s.* which is 2148 *l.* 10 *s.* more than the whole Charge of Rigging comes to. It is the same in Proportion with every other Ship, so that there must be prodigious Savings on this Head only, but how they are applied is kept secret from us; which convinces me, that there are some Articles that will not bear the Light.

* You have a farther Charge on your Table of 135,025 *l.* for Navy Buildings, the Account of which was called for by one of the Gentlemen of the Admiralty; but, I think the Gentlemen have been so modest not to refer it, at least this Year, to the Committee of Supply; but sure I am, there is more saved every Year on the Head of Wear and Tear, than is sufficient to answer the Expence of our Navy Buildings and Transport Service; therefore I must give my Negative to this Question, until a fair Account is laid before us of all our Navy Expences.

March 4. An ingross'd Bill, For raising by Annuities and a Lottery 1,800,000 *l.* at 3 *l.* per Cent. per Annum, for the Year 1743, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr Francis Fane. Lottery Bill pass'd.

The same Day several Persons concern'd in remitting Abroad of publick Money were order'd to attend the Committee of the whole House, to whom it was referr'd to consider of the Papers presented this Session, relating to such Remittances.

Mr Francis Fane reported from the Committee of Supply, the following Resolutions, which were read and agreed to by the House, viz. 1. That towards raising the Supply, there be issued one Million out of the Sinking Fund. 2. That an Act of the 4th of Geo. II. For granting an Allowance

Farther Resolutions of the Committee of Supply.

An. 16. Geo. II. ^{1742.} an. upon the Exportation of *British* made Gun-Powder, is near expiring and fit to be continued. 3. That so much of an Act of 8th Geo. I. giving further Encouragement for the Importation of Naval Stores, as relates to the Importation of Wood and Timber from any of his Majesty's Plantations or Colonies in *America*. 4. That so much of an Act of the 12th Geo. I. For granting an Aid to his Majesty, by laying a Duty upon all Victuallers, &c. as relates to the additional Number of 100 Hackney Chairs. 5. That several Clauses in one Act of the 9th, and two others of the 10th and 12th of *Anne*. Also an Act of 1st George I. relating to the Jurisdiction, Powers and Authorities, of the Commissioners for licensing and regulating Hackney-Coaches, and of Justices of the Peace, and to the Rules, Penalties, Forfeitures, and Directions therein mentioned, are all near expiring, and fit to be continued. And a Bill was order'd in Pursuance of the said Resolutions.

Bill pass'd relating to Elections for Counties in England.

An ingress'd Bill, To explain and amend the Laws touching the Election of Knights of the Shire to serve for *England*, and to restrain the Partiality and regulate the Conduct of Returning Officers at such Elections, was read the third Time and pass'd. On a Division, Ayes 99. Noes 77. And sent to the Lords by Mr *Carew*, where it was Lost.

March 8. A Petition of the Corporation, &c. of *Grantham*, to the same Purpose as the former, had the same Success.

An ingress'd Bill, To empower Justices of the Peace to act in certain Cases relating to Parishes and Places, to the Rates and Taxes of which they are rated or chargeable, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Sir *Hugh Smithson*.

The same Day the Committee appointed to consider further of the Importation and Wearing of Foreign Cambricks, was put off for two Months.

Motion for better Manning the Fleet.

March 9. Admiral *Vernon* took Notice to the House, of the Hardships suffer'd by the *British* Sailors, in being forc'd from their Families by the violent Method of pressing, and being afterwards oblig'd to take up their Pay, if necessitated, at a very large Discount; adding, that he had a Scheme to propose for remedying that Evil. Hereupon it was resolv'd, to appoint a Day to consider of more effectual Means for the easy and speedy Manning of his Majesty's Fleet.

Debate relating to the Remittance of Publick Money.

March 10. The Commons in a Grand Committee, took into Consideration, the Papers concerning the Remitting Abroad of publick Money, and after Examination of a great Number

Number of Persons relating thereto, Mr *Edmond Waller*, An. 16. Geo. II.
spoke to the following Effect :

1742.


Sir,

‘ From the Papers laid before you by Order of the House, from those produced by the Witnesses you have examined, particularly Messieurs *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, and from the Information those Witnesses have given you, I shall state as methodically, as fairly, and as impartially as I can, the Matters of Fact relating to those Contracts for remitting our Money abroad, and the Manner in which they were entered into, in order that you may judge, whether the Affair now under your Consideration deserves your Censure, or your Approbation. But because the Business of Exchange may not, perhaps, be thoroughly understood by many Gentlemen in this House, I shall first explain that Mystery as briefly and clearly as I am able.

Mr Waller.

Exchange, Sir, is, properly speaking, the Price or Premium that is paid or received for carrying Gold or Silver from one Country to another. For Example, If a Man were going to *Holland*, and wanted to carry 1000 *l.* or 250 Ounces of Gold thither, (which I shall suppose to be of that Value) he must either carry it himself, or pay some Person for taking the Trouble, and running the Risk to carry it for him ; and if in a Month’s Time he were to come back again, and to bring the same Quantity of Gold along with him, he must do the same. Again, if a Man wanted to carry 250 Ounces of Gold to *Holland*, and another Man, at the same Time wanted to bring 250 Ounces of Gold from *Holland*, if there were no Dealers in Bills of Exchange, nor they known to each other, they must both either be their own Carriers, or pay a Premium for carrying it. To prevent this double Trouble and Expence, Numbers of Merchants have, in every Country, set up to be Dealers in Bills of Exchange, who are a Sort of Brokers or middle Dealers between those who want to carry out Money, who are called Remitters, and those who want to bring it in, who are called Drawers ; and if between any two Countries the Quantity of Money to be drawn for, and the Quantity to be remitted, were at all Times exactly equal, neither Drawer nor Remitter would ever have Occasion to pay any Thing but a Trifle, perhaps a Half, or a Quarter *per Cent.* to the Dealer in Bills of Exchange for his Trouble, and the Risk he runs of sometimes taking a bad Bill.

‘ But, Sir, as these two Quantities are never equal : As the Proportion between them is in a continual State of Variation,

An. 16. Geo. II. 1742. ation, therefore the Course of Exchange between any two Countries must be the same ; for Bills of Exchange, like all other Commodities, rise and fall in their Price, according to the Proportion between the Demand, and the Quantity brought to Market ; and when the Quantity to be remitted, that is to say, carried out of any Country to another, is always greater than the Quantity to be drawn for, that is to say, brought from that other, the Exchange will always be against the former, and its Gold and Silver will be continually carried out to that Country. For Example, there is always a greater Quantity of Money to be carried out from this Country to *Holland*, than there is to be brought from thence hither ; consequently, the Course of Exchange is continually against us, that is to say, every Man who has Money to remit or carry out from hence to *Holland*, must pay a Premium for it, which is called the Exchange ; and no Man will bring Gold or Silver from thence hither, because when he wants to bring Money hither, he can, by Means of a Dealer in Exchange, find out several Men who want to carry Gold or Silver to *Holland*, and will, therefore, give him a Premium to save them the Trouble, by giving them the Gold or Silver he has in *Holland*, in lieu of an equal Quantity of theirs here. From hence it is plain, that no Man who pays in to a Dealer in Exchange here, 1000 *l. Sterling*, or 250 Ounces of Gold, can expect to get a Bill upon *Holland* for as much *Dutch* Money as will purchase 250 Ounces of Gold of equal Fineness there ; but must expect to be a Loser, equal to the Amount of this Premium or Exchange, which is generally between Five and Six *per Cent.*

‘ I shall next observe, Sir, and I desire Gentlemen will take particular Notice of what I say, because it is of great Importance in this Debate ; I say, I shall next observe, that the Exchange between no one Country and another can ever rise much above the Value of the Risk and Trouble of carrying Gold and Silver from one of these Countries to the other ; because when it does, the Dealers in Exchange will carry out, or pay for carrying out Gold and Silver, in order to have the Advantage of Drawing. Suppose the Value of the Trouble and Risk of carrying Gold and Silver from hence to *Holland* to be equal to 3 *per Cent.* in that Case the Exchange between *Holland* and this can never rise to above 6 *per Cent.* or perhaps $6\frac{1}{2}$, upon some very extraordinary Occasion. If it should rise to 6 *per Cent.* the Dealers in Exchange would immediately begin to send over our Gold and Silver,

Silver, or at least to pay for sending it over, by purchasing it there from those that do ; and the Reason is plain, because they pay 3 *per Cent.* for sending it over, and after they have it there, they get 6 *per Cent.* by taking People's Money here and giving them Bills for it upon *Holland*, so that they have three *per Cent.* clear Profit. This Practice, therefore, of sending over Gold and Silver will not only prevent the Exchange from rising much above six *per Cent.* but will reduce it, and generally keep it lower, perhaps never for any Time above five and an half *per Cent.* to our Disadvantage. Thus, Sir, if we were to speak properly, the Exchange between *Holland* and this ought to be called high when 'tis most to our Disadvantage, and low when it is least ; but as the Merchants denominate the Exchange high or low according to the Number of Guilders or Stivers they receive in *Holland* for a Pound Sterling paid in here, they call it high when it is least to our Disadvantage, and low when it is most to our Disadvantage. That is, when they receive in *Holland* ten Guilders nineteen Stivers for a Pound Sterling paid here, they call the Exchange high, and when they receive but ten Guilders sixteen Stivers in *Holland* for a Pound Sterling paid here, they call the Exchange low ; and as this is the Language of the Merchants, I shall conform myself thereto in what I am to say upon the Subject. But before I begin to say any Thing about the Contracts now under our Consideration, I must observe farther, that from Sir *Isaac Newton's* Table of foreign Coins it has been calculated, that when we receive but a little more than ten Guilders seventeen Stivers, Current Money in *Holland*, for a Pound Sterling paid here, the Exchange is then above Five and an half *per Cent.* to our Disadvantage ; consequently, if we were to receive but ten Guilders sixteen Stivers Current Money in *Holland* for a Pound Sterling paid here, it would be about six *per Cent.* to our Disadvantage ; and therefore, from what I have before observed, it is apparent, that the Exchange can never fall much below ten Guilders sixteen Stivers for a Pound Sterling, at least as long as we have any such Thing as Gold or Silver in the Kingdom ; for when it falls lower than that, the Dealers in Bills of Exchange will certainly begin to export our Gold and Silver, or to pay for exporting it, to the End they may draw Bills for it, because of the great Profit to be got by that Traffick ; and this will necessarily raise the Exchange again to ten Guilders seventeen, perhaps eighteen or nineteen Stivers, Current Money of *Holland*, for a Pound Sterling paid in here.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1732.

An. 16. Geo. II. here. This Observation is confirmed by Experience; for notwithstanding the great and extraordinary Remittances to *Holland* this last Year, we find the Exchange has sunk but a very little, and has never continued long under ten Guilders sixteen Stivers, Current Money, or thirty-four Shillings four Groots *Flemish*, Bank Money, (which is the same Value) for the Pound Sterling.

1742.

‘ Having thus explained the Nature of Exchange, Sir, and particularly that between *Holland* and this, I shall proceed to examine the Contracts under our Consideration, and I must begin with taking Notice, that in *March* or *April* last, when it was resolved to send a large Body of our Troops to *Flanders*, the Exchange between *Holland* and this was at 34 *Shillings* 8 *Groats Flemish*, Bank Money, for the Pound *Sterling*, which is about 10 *Guilders* 18 *Stivers Dutch Money* per Pound *Sterling*. When this Measure was resolved on, the Lords of the Treasury could not but know or foresee, that they would soon have Occasion for remitting large Sums of Money to *Holland*; therefore they should have carefully examined the current Rate of Exchange, and the Probabilities of its rising or falling; and likewise they should have examined into the Practice of the Treasury upon such Occasions, in former Times, especially during the late War in the Queen’s Time. If they had done this, they would have found, that there was no Probability of the Exchange falling above 2 or 3 *Stivers* in a Pound *Sterling* below the then current Rate, and they would have seen, that in former Times, upon every such Occasion, the Custom of the Treasury was, as soon as it was proper to let the Thing be known, to signify to the chief Dealers in Bills of Exchange, that the Publick would soon have Occasion to remit large Sums to such a Country, to *Holland* for Example, and that the Treasury were ready to receive Proposals sealed up for that Purpose: They would likewise have seen, that when such Proposals were deliver’d in, the Treasury had always, without any Respect to Persons of equal Character and Credit, given the Jobb to the highest Bidder, and that if any two or three Bidders were equal, it was equally divided among them.

‘ Did they do any such Thing, Sir, upon this Occasion? I am sure, it does not appear from their Minutes, that they did; and as no Bidder appeared but one, I mean Mr *Gore*, it is highly probable, he had a private Hint given him by somebody, and accordingly, *April* 29th, 1742, he presents his Proposal to the Lords of the Treasury in these Words: ‘ Being informed, that his Majesty has commanded a Body
‘ of

' of Troops upon foreign Service, I humbly propose to give An. 16. Geo. II.
 ' my Bills on *Amsterdam* for such Sums as shall be wanting 1742.
 ' for the Service of the said Troops, upon my receiving the
 ' Value thereof, after the Rate of 10 *Guilders* 11 *Stivers*
 ' and a half Current Money of *Amsterdam*, for each Pound
 ' *Sterling*, which shall be payable as follows, *viz.* two
 ' Thirds at eight Days Sight, and one Third at one Month
 ' after Date.'

' This extraordinary Proposal, Sir, should have shewn
 them, how necessary it was to give Notice to other Dealers
 to give in their Proposals, especially as there was sufficient
 Time for that Purpose; for this Proposal was no less than
 six *Stivers* and a half *per* Pound *Sterling* below the then cur-
 rent Rate of Exchange, and consequently was an Advantage
 of above three *per Cent.* to the Drawer, beside the Profit
 which every Drawer in the common Way has for his Trou-
 ble in remitting other People's Money; for even at 10 *Guil-*
ders 18 *Stivers per* Pound *Sterling*, the Drawer must have a
 Profit, otherwise he would not take the Trouble of receiv-
 ing other People's Money, and giving his Bills for it, nor
 would he run the Risk of keeping his Money in *Holland* for
 that Purpose, or of taking bad Bills in order to have it back
 again. Nay, Sir, this Proposal was four *Stivers* and a half
 below what the Exchange could in any Probability fall to,
 and, consequently, was above two *per Cent.* almost certain
 to the Advantage of the Drawer, beside his usual Profit up-
 on Drawing.

' There was, therefore, the highest Reason to reject this
 Proposal with Contempt, and to recur to the antient Custom
 of the Treasury; but what did these Lords Commissioners of
 the Treasury do? Why, Sir, they instantly, and without
 the least Objection or Consideration, agreed to it; and this
 Success, or, perhaps, another private Hint, encouraged the
 same Mr *Gore*, together with his Friend Mr *Gulson*, to of-
 fer another Proposal of the same squeezing Nature to the
 Treasury on the 13th of *May* following, in these Words,
 ' That they are willing to furnish their Bills of Exchange on
 ' *Amsterdam* in equal Proportions, for all such Sums as shall
 ' be wanting from Time to Time, to be remitted on Ac-
 ' count of what remains due to the *Danish* and *Hessian*
 ' Troops to the 25th of *December* 1741; and for the Pay,
 ' and the Extraordinaries of the said Troops for the Year
 ' 1742, at the Rate of 10 *Guilders*, 11 *Stivers* and a Half,
 ' Current Money of *Amsterdam*, *per* Pound *Sterling*, paya-
 ' ble as follows, *viz.* two Thirds in Bills at eight Days
 ' Sight,

An. 16, Geo. II.

1742.

' fight, and one Third in Bills at one Month after Date.' Which Proposal was likewise instantly agreed to; as if it had been predetermined, that this Gentleman and his Friends should have the Remitting of the publick Money, let their Proposals be never so disadvantageous to the Publick.

' This Conduct, Sir, was the more extraordinary, because the Secret Committee, of which some of the Lords of the Treasury were Members, was, at that very Time, examining into, and preparing a severe Censure upon the Conduct of the former Lords Commissioners of that Board, for a Contract of the same Kind, for furnishing Bills on *Jamaica*, to pay our Troops in the *West Indies*. And I cannot help observing, that in the Report of that Committee *, there is a severe Censure upon the Treasury's entering into any such Contract upon the good Faith of the Proposers only, with an Ignorance, real or affected, of the Value of the Exchange, and not endeavouring to supply the Defect of Knowledge, by admitting Proposals from any other Merchant; and yet the very Men concerned in drawing up this Censure, were, at that very Time, committing the same very Faults, and, if possible, in a more flagrant Manner; for as there is more Traffick, and many more Dealers in Exchange, between *Holland* and *London*, than between *Jamaica* and *London*, the Lords of the Treasury had more Reason to invite Bidders, and might more easily have known the Current Value of Exchange. Nay, it is hardly possible they could be ignorant of it, because it is printed and published twice every Week at *London*, in a Paper called *Castaigh's Course* of Exchange, and those Papers regularly and carefully filled up in the Treasury-Office.

' I shall grant, indeed, Sir, that the publick Fraud, for I can call it by no other Name, was not upon every Hundred Pound so great in this last Case as in the former; but if it had been carry'd on as at first intended, and if it be true as is supposed, that the Troops we are to maintain, and the Subsidies we are to pay abroad, during the War, will cost us 1,800,000 *l.* a Year, the Fraud upon the Whole would have been much greater; for it would have amounted to very near 45,000 *l.* or, at least, to very near 27,000 *l.* a Year; because the remitting of the Money would have cost

* See the Farther Report of the Secret Committee, P. 22. in Vol. XIII. ' That it seem'd a determin'd Point to shut out Information, even when it seem'd to obtrude it self upon him, from the very Offices
' Subject to his [the Earl of Orford's] Inspection.

cost us near two and a half *per Cent.* more than it cost us An. 16. Geo. II.
 in the War during the late Queen's Reign; and the Ex- 1742.
 ample of the Lord *Godolphin*, at that Time, renders the
 Conduct of our present Lords of the Treasury, upon this
 Occasion, the less excusable. That noble Lord knew the
 Disadvantage of the Publick's contracting with a Merchant
 to remit the publick Money for any Term; because, when
 the Exchange is low, it is a Disadvantage to the Publick to
 make any such Contract; and when the Exchange is high,
 no Merchant will contract with the Publick for any Term,
 at the then Current Rate of Exchange. For this Reason,
 with regard to the Money sent to *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*,
 and to the Duke of *Savoy*, now King of *Sardinia*, that noble
 Lord took Care that fresh Proposals should be given in, and
 a new Contract made, for every particular Remittance; and
 with regard to the Remittances to *Holland*, he made a Con-
 tract in the Year 1704, with Sir *Henry Furnese*, to furnish
 his Bills of Exchange for all such Sums of Money as the
 Publick should have Occasion to remit to *Holland*, at such
 Rate of Exchange as should, at each respective Time, be
 the Current, for a Premium of Eleven Shillings *per Cent.*
 only; so that the Publick was, in some Measure, its own
 Merchant, and was to be a Gainer by the Rise of the Ex-
 change.

But our present Lords of the Treasury were so far from
 following this Example, that they agreed to such a Contract
 as no Man would have had the Assurance to offer, if proper
 Notice had been given to the Dealers in Exchange to come
 in with their Proposals. Nay, Sir, so far was the Treasury
 from giving any such Notice, that they seem to have in-
 dustriously concealed their having Occasion for remitting
 Money abroad, lest some Dealer should come in, and, by
 his Proposals, render inexcusable, or rather criminal, their
 giving such a lucrative Jobb to Mr *Gore*. However, the
 Secret at last came out: The Embarkation of our Troops
 divulged it, whether they would or no; and the Dealers in
 Exchange being then assured, that the Publick would have
 Occasion for remitting Money to *Holland* for maintaining
 those Troops, Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, who have
 a House of as great Credit as any in *London*, and who cor-
 respond with Houses of as good Credit as any in *Amsterdam*,
 presented to the Treasury a Memorial, by which they ac-
 quainted their Lordships, that they were ready, and desirous
 to make Proposals for remitting what Money might be ne-
 cessary for the Payment of his Majesty's Troops in *Flanders*,
 Vol. XIV. Q on

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

on Terms very advantageous for his Majesty's Service, and would give good Security, if it should be thought necessary ; and, at the same Time, intimated, that their Proposals would be to remit the Money at the Rate of 10 *Guilders* 16 *Stivers* for a Pound *Sterling*.

' This being, Sir, a Proposal more beneficial for the Publick, by two and a half *per Cent.* than that offer'd by Mr *Gore*, one would have thought, that their Lordships should have taken some Notice of it, at least so far as to make use of it for inducing Mr *Gore* not to take such a monstrous Advantage of the Publick as they had agreed to give him ; but so far otherwise, that upon the 10th of *June*, when this Memorial was read at the Board, they answer directly, ' That they cannot take these Proposals into Consideration, ' having already agreed with Mr *John Gore* for making the ' said Remittances for that Campaign.' This was something very extraordinary ; but when we consider the Agreement they had made with Mr *Gore*, it will appear amazing : They had made no other Contract with him, other than simply agreeing to his Proposal of the 29th of *April*, as I have before mentioned. What was that Proposal ? It was to give his Bills for such Sums as should be wanting for the Service for the Troops to be sent abroad, without specifying any Time. Therefore it could be meant only to extend to the first Remittance ; and if Mr *Gore* had by the first Remittance found it to be a hard Bargain, which it was indeed impossible he should, he would have insisted upon it, that he meant no more, and would have had a Right to have declared off. After the first Remittance, therefore, both Parties were at Liberty to withdraw from the Agreement ; and this their Lordships should have declared to Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, and should have invited them to make their Proposals for the next Remittance. This, I say, their Lordships should have done, if they had resolved to say what was true, or to do what was right.

' But suppose, that this Proposal of Mr *Gore's* could have been understood to mean for any certain Time to come. It must be understood to mean for that Campaign, or for a Year certain, as Mr *Gore* afterwards pretended he understood it, and as Mess. *Gore* and *Gulston* express'd themselves in their Proposal of the 13th of *May*, relating to the *Danes* and *Hessians* ; or it must be understood to mean as long as those Troops should remain abroad. If the last, it was such a Contract as the Lords of the Treasury had no Power to make ; and if they had, to make a Contract for such a long Time at
such

such a low Price, would have been a most criminal Breach of An. 16. Geo. II. their Trust. On the other Hand, if they understood it so as to mean for that Campaign only, which they at first certainly did, as appears from their Answers to Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, or for a Year certain, they should have explained themselves fully to Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, and encourag'd them to return at the proper Time with Proposals for the next Campaign, or the ensuing Year: They should not, certainly, have dismiss'd them with such a short and blunt Answer, as might have discouraged them, or any other Person that had heard of their Treatment, from ever coming to make any new Proposal; so that they seem'd resolv'd, that nothing should induce them to lessen or discontinue the beneficial Bargain they had given to their Favourite; for, as I have said, they did not, at least as a Board, so much as try to make use of this Proposal for getting more beneficial Terms from Mr *Gore*.

‘ However, Sir, some of them in their private Capacity, or, I believe, somebody else, for in this whole Affair they seem to have been under the Direction of one of their Servants, I say, that I believe somebody spoke to Mr *Gore* upon the Subject, and advis'd him to offer better Terms. Accordingly, on the 27th of *July*, Mr *Gore*, as it were of his own Head, and out of pure Generosity to his Country, attended the Treasury with a Memorial, which they very improperly call a Proposal, in these Terms: ‘ Whereas he is under an Agreement with your Lordships to furnish his Bills on *Amsterdam* for the Payment of the *British* Troops in *Flanders*, at ten Guilders eleven Stivers and a half per Pound Sterling; and now judging the Exchange is likely to keep up, and may probably be supported, he is now willing to allow ten Guilders thirteen Stivers per Pound Sterling, not doubting, in case the Rate of Exchange should decline, that your Lordships upon Application will give him Relief.’

‘ Mighty generous, Sir, to serve the Publick at two and a half per Cent. extraordinary Profit, when another equally capable offer'd to serve it at one per Cent. However, this Act of Generosity, small as it is, I believe, we should never have heard of, if the Lords of the Treasury, or their Director, had not been, by the Proposal of Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, made to apprehend, that their Conduct in this Affair might be brought under the Consideration of this House. By this Act of Generosity they thought they had secured themselves against our Censure, and by the short An-

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

swer given to Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, they thought they had prevented their disturbing them in their Career of Jobb-Work with any more troublesome Proposals ; but so desirous were those Gentlemen of serving their Country, or so sensible of the Profits to be made by the Bargain, even upon the advanc'd Terms they had offer'd, that their Lordships were disappointed in the latter Part of their Expectations, for, Oct. 26, those two Gentlemen presented a new Memorial to their Lordships in these Words : ' My Lords, ' about four Months ago we had the Honour to acquaint ' your Lordships, that we were ready and desirous to make ' Proposals for remitting what Money might be necessary ' for the Payment of his Majesty's Troops in *Flanders*, and ' were then told, your Lordships would have readily received them, but that those Remittances were already agreed ' for, for that Campaign ; whence, we hope, we may conclude, it will not be disagreeable, that we now take the ' Liberty to offer to supply your Lordships, with whatever ' Sum may be wanted for the publick Service, for a Year ' to come, or to the End of 1743, either at a certain Course ' of Exchange, or at a certain Rate, for Commission, Brokeridge, Postage of Letters, and Risk of Bills, on Terms ' much more advantageous to the Publick, than it has ever ' been serv'd upon, at least for many Years past. We are ' likewise ready to furnish your Lordships with whatever ' Money may be required at any other Place, on Terms equally advantageous ; and we flatter ourselves, that from ' the Nature of our Correspondence, none are more capable ' of serving your Lordships and the Publick, in a Business of ' this Kind, than your Lordships humble Servants.'

These, Sir, are the Words of their second Memorial : If any Gentleman thinks I have not read or repeated them faithfully, he may have the Memorial read at the Table, from the Copy deliver'd in by the said Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* upon their Examination.—This Memorial, I say, was deliver'd into the Treasury upon the 26th of *October*, but no Notice was ever taken of it at that Board, nor of any Proposal Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* had ever made, except in the improper and preposterous Manner I shall now beg Leave to take Notice of.

By the Constitution of our Government, Sir, the Paymaster-General is but a Clerk or Officer under the Board of Treasury, and bound to obey such Orders and Directions as he receives from them ; therefore, all Petitions, Memorials, and Proposals, relating to the publick Money-Affairs, are presented

presented to that Board, and after considering them, they issue their Orders to their inferior Officers, of whom, as I have said, the Paymaster is one. But Things have lately, it seems, changed their Course, and the Paymaster directs instead of being directed. This, it seems, even Mr Gore and his Friends had not found out 'till after the Dissolution of the Secret Committee; for their Memorials or Proposals of *April* the 29th, *May* the 13th, and *July* the 27th, were all presented to the Board of Treasury; but as they are Adepts in State Affairs, and know better than most others who are the chief Directors, they soon found out the Secret, and instead of applying to the Board of the Treasury for Contracts to remit the publick Money abroad, they applied first to the Paymaster-General of the Forces. This Secret, as appears from the Minutes of the Treasury, was, it seems, first discover'd by Mess. *Burrel* and *Brislow*, whose Names are often mentioned in the Report of the Secret Committee, on Account of the famous *Jamaica* Contract; and their Example was follow'd by Mr Gore and his Friends; for in the Beginning of *January* last, they presented several Memorials or Proposals to the Paymaster-General, for making Remittances for the Service of our own Forces in *Flanders*, the *Hessian* Forces, and the *Hanoverians* in our Pay; every one of which was for giving Bills at ten Guilders thirteen Stivers Current Money of *Amsterdam* for a Pound Sterling. But as the Paymaster could do nothing in this Affair by himself alone, as he was by our Forms oblig'd to make use at least of the Names of the Lords of the Treasury, he presented a Memorial to that Board on the 4th of *January*, with these Proposals annex'd; and next Day they refer'd them back to his Consideration, together with the Memorial presented *June* the 10th, by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*; but they took Care not so much as to refer that presented by the same Gentlemen on the 26th of *October*; for if they had, it would have made it very difficult for the Paymaster to report in Favour of Mr Gore and his Friends.

‘ However, tho’ this Memorial of the 26th of *October* was not refer’d, yet Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* were so just to themselves as to attend the Paymaster on the 7th, and presented to him a Proposal in these Terms, ‘ That
 * they are ready to furnish, at *Amsterdam*, all the Money
 * that may be necessary for his Majesty’s Service, at the
 * Rate of ten Guilders sixteen Stivers Current Money for the
 * Pound Sterling, for such a Term of Time as Contracts of
 * that Nature are generally made, the Value of their Bills

‘ being

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‘ being paid them, in the same Manner as it has been paid to the present Contractors, or is customary in the like Case; and that if any other Person makes Proposals for a fixed Time, they are ready to do so too.’

‘ But, Sir, as these two Gentlemen were by Experience convinc’d, that they had the private Inclinations, I shall not say the private Interest, of the Treasury Board as well as Paymaster to combat in this Affair, they knew, that nothing could procure them Success in their Application for this Jobb of remitting the publick Money, but their preventing, by their Proposals, so much as an Excuse for giving a partial Preference to their Competitors. For this Purpose, therefore, upon the 11th of the same Month, (of *January*) they presented to the Lords of the Treasury the following Memorial.

May it please your Lordships,

‘ On *Friday* last we deliver’d to the Paymaster-General a Proposal for remitting to *Amsterdam* all the Money that may be necessary for his Majesty’s Service, in the same Manner, as we are inform’d, the former Remitters have lately done, *without saying for what precise Time*. But it being intimated to us Yesterday, that one of those Gentlemen had said, That he understood it *for a Year*, if that is the Time your Lordships desire to receive Proposals for, *we have one ready to deliver*, or else desire to abide by that deliver’d to the Paymaster-General.

It has been proved at your Bar, Sir, that this Memorial was presented to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, before the Paymaster came there that Day, and consequently before his Report, which is dated that Day, was deliver’d to them, or could be taken into Consideration. Nay, the Commissioners themselves have not taken upon them to say, that this Memorial was not read to them before the Paymaster’s Report. Was it not then their Duty to call for the Memorialists Proposals for a Year certain, which they said *they had ready to deliver*, before they took the Report into Consideration, or at least before they came to any Resolution upon it? Was not this the more necessary, because the chief Reason given in the Report for preferring Mr *Gore’s* Proposal was in these Words, ‘ But as they (the Memorialists) propose to make Trial for only two or three Remittances, at the Rate of ten Guilders sixteen Stivers per Pound Sterling, without fixing any Continuance of Time, or Certainty of the Sum, they will remit at that Rate.’ Surely this made it absolutely necessary for the Lords of the Treasury to call for

for the Proposal which the Memorialists said they were ready to deliver upon that very Day ; because by that Proposal the Memorialists would certainly have obviated this Objection ; and as their Proposal was the highest and most profitable for the publick Service, it was the Duty of the Lords of the Treasury to give them an Opportunity to obviate every Objection that could be made against them, especially as they then appear'd to be ready to answer every avow'd Objection that could be made against employing them in the Affair of Remittances ; for by what they were then to offer, they were to fix the Time, and ascertain the Sums they were to engage for ; and the Security they had before offered was a full Answer to every Objection that could be made against their Ability, or the Ability of their Correspondents at *Amsterdam*.

* But so far were these Lords of the Treasury from calling for the Proposals which Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* said they were ready to deliver, that they do not appear to have taken the least Notice of their Memorial : Their receiving of such a Memorial is not so much as mention'd in the Minutes of their Proceedings ; and upon that very Day we find the following Minute entered in their Journals :

January 11, 1742-3.

* The Lords having taken into their Consideration a Report dated this Day, and made to them by the Right Hon. *Henry Pelham*, Esq; Paymaster of his Majesty's Guards, *Garrisons*, and Land Forces, concerning Remittances, their Lordships, on mature Deliberation, as well for the Reasons stated in the same Report, as from the allow'd Ability of the Remitters Correspondents in *Holland*, and the Contract for the Remittances being for a Time certain, and the Experience they have had of the punctual and effectual Manner in which they have hitherto been carried on, and from the great and irretrievable Detriment it would be to the publick Service, if any Interruption should happen in the Payment of the Forces, by making any Alteration in the Contract at this Time, are of Opinion, it will be for the Interest of the Publick to accept the Proposals therein mention'd of Mess. *Gore*, *Gulston*, and *Poyntz*.

* Thus their Lordships, whatever they may say of their mature Deliberation, determine, in a Manner instantaneously, upon receiving the Paymaster's Report, as if they had been oblig'd to yield a blind Obedience to the Report of their Servant : But why should I say a blind Obedience, Sir ? For as the most material Fact upon which the Report was founded

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founded was contradicted, I may say falsify'd, by the Memorial then before them, it must be allow'd, that with their Eyes open they determin'd against the Interest of their Country and the Duty of their Office. Nor can it be said that they were under any Necessity to determine in this precipitate Manner: If a great Remittance had been to be made that Day, or the next, it might have afforded them some Excuse; but so far otherwise, that Mess. *Gore, Gulton,* and *Poyntz*, were not inform'd of their Lordships having agreed to their Proposal, till the 13th of *January*, which shews, that upon the 11th there was no Necessity for their coming to an immediate Resolution.

Having now, Sir, impartially stated the Facts, with such Observations as I thought necessary for setting the Affair in its true and genuine Light, I shall next take Notice, that if the publick Loss, occasioned by this Preference given to Mr *Gore*, had been inconsiderable, it might have been excused by the Experience the Publick had of his Punctuality, or it might have left Room for a little Partiality towards a Friend; but this Conduct becomes quite inexcusable, when we consider the Loss thereby sustained; and as many Gentlemen may not have considered this Loss, I shall beg Leave to explain it, and to state it in a clear Light. I have already shewn, that there is hardly a Possibility of the Exchange between *Holland* and this falling below ten Guilders sixteen Stivers, because if it should, the Remitters or the *Jews* will certainly send over our foreign Gold and Silver, or melt down and send over our coined Gold and Silver, in order to bring the Exchange up again to that Standard; and if we had neither foreign nor coined Gold or Silver to send over, which, I fear, may be the Case if the War continues but a few Years, it will be allowed, I believe, that we must then instantly put an End to maintaining any Armies or Princes upon the Continent. It was therefore ridiculous to agree with any Remitter for less than ten Guilders sixteen Stivers per Pound Sterling, even tho' it had been resolv'd on to take this Method, and not to follow the Method taken by the Lord *Godolphin* in the late War, for supplying our Troops and subsidiary Princes upon the Continent; but as the Exchange, at the Time these Contracts were made, was but at ten Guilders eighteen Stivers, or as the Paymaster himself states it in his Report, upwards of ten Guilders seventeen Stivers per Pound Sterling, we ought certainly to have followed the Lord *Godolphin's* Method, which was to agree with the Remitters to remit at the Current

rent Course of Exchange, for such a Premium *per Cent.* as An. 16. Geo. II. we could agree for. This Method, I say, we ought to have followed, because we knew, that as long as we could have Occasion for any Remittances, the Exchange could not fall above one or two Stivers in a Pound Sterling below what it was then at, and by sending now and then a Man of War over to *Holland* or *Flanders*, with a large Quantity of foreign Gold or Silver upon the publick Account, we might have kept the Exchange always at ten Guilders eighteen Stivers, or perhaps raised it to eleven Guilders per Pound Sterling.

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* If this Method had been resolved on, and proper Notice given to the Merchants, I am persuaded, Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, according to their Proposal of October 26, or some other Remitter, would have undertaken the Service, at the Rate of one half *per Cent.* for Commission, Brokeridge, Postage of Letters, and Risk of Bills. This, I say, Sir, I am persuaded of, because in the Year 1704, Sir *Henry Furness* undertook the Service for 11 *s. per Cent.* and as the Business of Exchange is now better understood, and followed by a greater Number of Merchants, than it was at that Time, the Remitters must content themselves with a less Profit; for when a Remitter remits for a private Person at the Current Rate of Exchange, we are not to suppose, he has no Profit, nor any Thing for Commission, Brokeridge, Postage of Letters, and Risk of Bills: Even at the Current Rate of Exchange, and without any Premium, he has certainly an Allowance for his Risk and Expence, and some Profit for his Trouble; consequently the Premium he gets from the Publick, for remitting the publick Money, ought to be considered as a nett additional Profit, and tho' much less than an Half *per Cent.* must certainly be a very great and desirable Profit, when such large Sums are to be remitted. Therefore, I think, I have Reason to conclude, that if our present Lords of the Treasury had followed the Method chalked out to them by the Lord *Godolphin*, they might have found Remitters of the best Credit, that would have engaged to have remitted all the publick Money at the Current Price of Exchange for a Half *per Cent.* And as we must necessarily have a Number of Guard Ships in the Channel, they might have taken Care to keep the current Price of Exchange always at or above 10 Guilders 18 Stivers for the Pound *Sterl.* by sending over, when Occasion required, in one of our Men of War, such a Quantity of our Gold and Silver as might appear necessary for keeping up or raising

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raising the Price of Exchange. This, I say, they might have done, as long as we had any Gold or Silver left; and no Man will suppose we can any longer support either Troops or Princes upon the Continent.

Taking it then, Sir, for granted, that all the publick Money might have been remitted at Ten Guilders Eighteen Stivers for the Pound *Sterl.* with a Half *per Cent.* to the Remitter as a Premium, let us compute what the publick Loss would have amounted to during the last Year, and the ensuing, if the Treasury had proceeded upon the first Contract they made with Mr *Gore*, at Ten Guilders eleven and a Half Stivers for the Pound *Sterl.* which is six and half Stivers Loss upon every Pound *Sterl.* Every Gentleman that will be at the Pains to calculate, may see, that this is at the Rate of above 3 *per Cent.* Loss to the Publick, from which we may deduct the Half *per Cent.* Premium that in the other Method was to have been paid to the Remitter; so that the nett Loss to the Publick would have been above 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* This, 'tis true, may to some Gentlemen appear so trifling, as not to be worth their Notice; but if we consider the vast Sums that were remitted last Year, and are to be remitted in the ensuing, the Loss upon the whole will amount to such a Sum, as even a Lord of the Treasury may think it worth his while to take Notice of: And as, in this Case, the Loss of the Publick is the Gain of the Remitter, I am persuaded, we never had a Lord of the Treasury, that would not have thought it worth his while to have a Share of such a Gain.

To compute, Sir, what this Loss to the Publick and Gain to the Remitter would have amounted to upon the whole, we must consider, that the Expence of our 16,000 National Troops in *Flanders*, for the ensuing Year, is estimated at about 535,000 *l.* to which I shall add one Third, or 178,333 *l.* as the Expence of maintaining them there for some Part of last Year, being in the whole 713,333 *l.* The Expence of the *Hanoverians* for last Year and the ensuing is estimated at 657,888 *l.* The Expence of the *Hessians* for the ensuing Year is estimated at 161,607 *l.* and for the last Year their Expence was estimated at 194,916 *l.* being in the whole 356,523 *l.* And the Expence of the *Danes* for last Year was 98,345 *l.* These four Articles amount in the whole to 1,826,089 *l.* to which I must add the 500,000 *l.* advanced last Year to the Queen of *Hungary* and King of *Sardinia*, and the same for the Year ensuing; because it has been whispered, that Methods have been

been taken for recommending to them the same Remitter, An. 16. Geo. II.
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 who will probably insist upon having Terms from them equally advantageous with those he has from his native Country; and the Loss of our Allies in the War may in some Measure be called the Loss of this Nation, or at least it is a Gain to the Remitter, let him have it from whom he will. These two Sums added to the former make 2,826,089 *l.* and if to these I add the casual Expence of Waggon-Money, Forage-Money, *Douceurs*, and the like, which must be remitted abroad, I must reckon that all the Sums remitted, or to be remitted, for last Year and this, amount to a round Sum of 3,000,000 *l.* And $2\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. Loss upon this Sum amounts to 75,000 *l.* which is, in my Opinion, a Loss by much too considerable to be neglected or despised by this Nation in its present Circumstances; and as this whole Sum, and a great deal more, is all clear Gain to the Remitter, it is a Gain which any Subject in *Britain* may think it worth his while to have a Share of.

* I shall not say, Sir, that the Paymaster, or any present Lords of the Treasury, would accept of any Share; but the Report of the Secret Committee must convince us, that when such a profitable Contract is to be given, there are Methods of letting some Friends of theirs into a Share of the Profits, without their advancing any Money, running any Risk, or being at any Trouble; and the unaccountable Neglect of all the Memorials offered by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* afford some Suspicion, that what appears from that Report to have been practised under the former Administration, has already been practised under this; for if any such underhand Bargains were in View, I do not wonder at their giving no Notice to the Remitters in the City to send in Proposals; nor do I wonder at their neglecting and contriving Reasons for refusing the advantageous Proposals made by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, who certainly deserv'd more than Mr *Gore* the Favour of the Publick, because by their interfering and making Proposals, the Publick got a Stiver and a Half per *Pound Sterl.* more from Mr *Gore* than its Servants, the Lords of the Treasury, had stipulated for it, and more, I am convinced, that Mr *Gore* would ever have given, had it not been for these Proposals of *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*: The Publick was therefore very much obliged to them, because by their interfering it saved about two Thirds per Cent. and consequently lost but about 70,000*l.* instead of 75,000*l.* as I have before computed.

* If there were any such underhand Dealings, or Lettings
 in

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as are mentioned in the Report with regard to the *Jamaica* Remittances, it was a most audacious as well as criminal Transaction, because it was carryed on at the very Time the Secret Committee of this House was inquiring into and censuring such Transactions: But suppose, Sir, there was no underhand Bargains: Suppose Mr *Gore* and his Friends had no secret or concealed Partners in the profitable Jobb given to them, yet the Conduct of the Lords of the Treasury in not giving Notice to the Remitters, and in refusing the highest Bidder, occasioned then such a Loss to the Publick, as deserves at least the Censure of this House; and if it should escape Censure, I may prophesy, that it will in future Times be of infinite Disadvantage to the Publick, because it will be a Precedent for all our other Boards to follow the same clandestine Method of making publick Contracts, and it will prevent any Merchant or Tradesman's attempting to offer any Proposals to the Publick, or to outbid the Person to whom the Board seems inclined to give the Jobb; so that for the future, every publick Contract will be made a Piece of mere Jobbwork, and all publick Services will not only be charged at an extravagant Rate, but also most negligently or weakly performed; for when the Commissioners, or their Friends, become *Socii Criminis* with the Performer or Undertaker, by going Sharers with him in the Profits, it cannot be expected, that they will look narrowly into, much less find Fault with the Manner in which he performs his Contract.

' This, Sir, would be a most fatal Effect: An Effect which every Man that has the least Regard for his Country or Posterity, will certainly endeavour to prevent; and therefore I shall wave moving for any further or more particular Inquiry into this Transaction, however necessary it may be, in order to discover whether this Mr *Gore* has any concealed and criminal Sharers in this lucrative Jobb: This, I say, I shall wave, notwithstanding the great Appearance of Guilt, lest by aiming at more than is necessary, I should miss of what I think absolutely necessary for preventing the Ruin of my Country. I shall aim at no Discovery or Punishment: I desire only a saving Censure, and therefore I shall content myself with moving, ' That the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury contracting at first with Mr *Gore* for remitting abroad
' the publick Money, without having previously given Notice
' to other Merchants to bring in Proposals for that Purpose,
' was a Neglect of their Duty, and contrary to the right
' and ancient Practice of that Office; and that their afterwards

wards rejecting the Proposals of Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muil-* An. 16. Geo. II.
man, who offered to remit all the publick Money at the 1742.
 Rate of 10 Guilders 16 Stivers per Pound *Sterl.* and accept-
 ing the Proposals of Mess. *Gore*, *Gulston*, and *Poyntz*, who
 offered but 10 Guilders 13 Stivers per Pound *Sterl.* was a
 Breach of the Duty of their Office, a considerable Loss to
 the Publick, and a great Detriment to the Publick Ser-
 vice.

To this it was answered by Mr *Winnington* to the follow-
 ing Purpose :

Sir,

When the Affair now before us was first mentioned, it Mr *Winnington*,
 was introduced with so much Solemnity, and so many Pa-
 pers called for, that I expected some extraordinary Discov-
 eries. I expected nothing less, than to hear, that the
 Publick had been robb'd of a large Sum of Money, and that
 some of our Chief Officers had been concerned in that Rob-
 bery ; but now, after the Affair has been thoroughly sifted,
 after we have examined all the Witnesses, and had all the
 Papers laid before us, that can give us any Light into this
 Transaction, and after we have spent two Days in the In-
 quiry, which, in my Opinion, might have been otherwise
 much better employed, what have we discovered ? Why,
 we have discovered, that in a most necessary, important,
 and difficult Piece of Publick Service, the Lords of the
 Treasury chose to employ a Man whose Abilities and Con-
 duct they had Experience of, rather than a new Undertaker,
 who offered to perform the Service at a trifling less Expence.
 If this is not *Parturiunt Montes*, I never knew any Thing
 that deserved the Name.

I shall readily agree with the Hon. Gentleman, that
 when any publick Service is to be performed by casual Un-
 dertakers, it is usual and proper for those that are intrusted
 by the Publick to make such Contracts ; I say it is both u-
 sual and proper for them to receive Proposals from all those
 who are willing to undertake the Jobb ; and when the Ser-
 vice is not publickly foreseen, I believe, it is customary to
 give some sort of previous Intimation to those from whom
 any Proposal for that Service may be expected ; but it is
 neither customary nor necessary to give such a previous Inti-
 mation in every Case whatever, nor are the Trustees for the
 Publick obliged in all Cases to prefer that Proposal which at
 first View may appear to be most advantageous to the Pub-
 lick. When the Service is publickly foreseen, when every
 one

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one that looks into a News Paper knows that the Publick will soon want such a Service to be performed, it is not necessary to give any Sort of previous Intimation, which was the Case with regard to the Affair now before us. There was not, I believe, a Merchant upon 'Change who had not heard of our designing to send some of our Troops to *Flanders*; and no one could be so stupid as not to foresee, that if Troops were to be sent thither, they must be paid there; and, consequently, that the Publick would want to remit Money for that Purpose. In this Case, therefore, it was needless for the Treasury to give Notice to any Person, that such a Service would be wanted; and if no Proposal for that Service was offered beside that of Mr *Gore's*, it was because there were very few Merchants in *London*, who thought themselves equal to the Undertaking.

* We cannot therefore, Sir, find Fault with, much less pass a solemn Censure upon the Conduct of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, for not advertising in the Gazette, or sending one of their Officers to proclaim upon 'Change, that the Government would soon have Occasion to remit large Sums to *Holland* or *Flanders*. On the contrary, if they had done so, their Conduct would, in my Opinion, have deserved to be censured; because it would, very probably, have produced a Combination among the Dealers in Bills of Exchange both at *London* and in *Holland*, to run it down as low as possible, in order that they might have no Opportunity of making the more advantageous Bargain with our Government, for supplying them with Money in *Holland*, to pay the Army that was to be sent to *Flanders*; and the Danger of such a Combination, after it came to be publicly and certainly known, that we were to send Troops to *Flanders*, must shew, that it was prudent and right in the Lords of the Treasury to make a Contract for supplying those Troops as soon as possible, and to make that Contract at a certain Rate of Exchange, and not as it was made by the Lord *Godolphin* in the Year 1704, at an uncertain Rate of Exchange, but at a certain Premium *per Cent.* for all the Money to be remitted. Such a Contract may hereafter be made, when the Course of Exchange becomes a little settled, after the Shock it must receive by our beginning to take a Share in the War; but to have made such a Contract at the very Beginning, or rather before the Commencement of the War, would not have been prudent, nor would it have been pursuant to the Example of the Lord *Godolphin*; for he took Care not to make any such Contract at the Beginning :

ning: The War had been carried on for two Years before An. 16. Geo. II. he thought of making such a one, and then the Course of Exchange had returned to its proper Equilibrium, after the Shock it had received by our first sending our Troops to *Holland*, which was in 1701, and in the Beginning of 1702.

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‘ To comprehend this Matter clearly, Sir, we must consider, that the Business of Exchange is a Sort of Trade, and, consequently, must vary according to the Demand and the Quantity brought to Market to be sold at any particular Place. It is a Sort of Price for Money at a certain Place, and like the Price of Corn, may be high at one Market, at the same Time that it happens to be very low at another. This Difference may be occasioned by many Accidents, and may upon some Emergencies become very considerable, but cannot long continue; because as the intrinsic Value is the the same in all Places, Merchants will soon find out where the Price is high, and will bring such Quantities to that Market, as will soon reduce the Price to the usual Standard. With Respect to all Sorts of Commodities, and in every Market, the Quantity necessary for supplying the Market, and the Demand necessary for buying or taking off that Quantity, are in ordinary Cases pretty well known, and generally keep pretty near equal. But when, by any unforeseen Accident, the former is greatly increased, the Price must fall at that Market, and for that Market-Day at least; and if, by any unforeseen Accident, the latter should be greatly increased, the Price must rise, and must continue high till the Demand be lessened, or the Quantity usually brought to that Market increased.

‘ Upon this Principle, Sir, which is infallible, let us consider the Consequences of our sending our Troops to *Flanders*: It necessarily increases our Demand for ready Money in *Holland*, and as it is a new, an extraordinary, and an unforeseen Demand at that Market, it must raise the Price of that Commodity, and that Price must continue ‘till Merchants have found out Methods for encreasing the Quantity of that Commodity at that Market; consequently the Price of Exchange must fall considerably at first, below what it usually was when we had no such Demand; and therefore it was a prudent Step in the Lords of our Treasury to enter into a Contract before sending our Troops abroad, and to settle, by that Contract, a certain Rate of Exchange, in order to prevent the Publick’s suffering by the Increase of the Demand, and consequently of the Price of ready Money in *Holland*. If they had not done so I am convinced, the Course

of

AN. 16. Geo. II. of Exchange would have fallen much below what it has been at for many Years past ; but this they prevented by their prudent Conduct, because the Merchants they contracted with, had thereby timely Notice, and they took Care to encrease the Quantity for supplying the Market, even before the Demand began to encrease ; whereas had the Lords of the Treasury not previously made such a Contract, or had they made such a Contract as Lord Godolphin did in 1704, no Merchant would have taken Care to encrease the Quantity for supplying the Market in *Holland*, and consequently the Publick might have lost very considerably by the raising the Price of ready Money there and the sinking of the Course of Exchange.

But besides the Course of Exchange, Sir, the *Agio* of the Bank in *Holland* will certainly be affected by our sending our Troops to *Flanders*. To explain what is meant by the *Agio* of the Bank, I must observe, that in *Holland* there is a Difference between what is call'd Bank Money and Current Money. The Value of the former is fix'd and certain, and remains always at the Standard it was at when the Bank was first established, whereas the Value of Current Money rises and falls in *Holland*, as in other Countries, according to the Fineness or Coarseness of their Coin ; and for this Reason most of the Bills drawn upon *Holland*, are drawn payable in Bank Money. As the Coin now Current in *Holland* is coarser than it was when the Bank was established, therefore Bank Money is better, or of greater Value than Current Money, that is to say, one hundred Guilders Bank Money is better, or of greater Value, than one hundred Guilders Current Money, and the Difference between them is call'd the *Agio*, which intrinsically is exactly five *per Cent.* One hundred Guilders Bank Money being intrinsically worth one hundred and five Guilders Current Money ; but this *Agio* does not remain always fix'd at its intrinsic Value, because it rises above or falls below five *per Cent.* according to the Demand for ready Money. In Time of Peace the *Agio* is often above five *per Cent.* because the great Merchants in *Holland*, in the Way of Trade, deal mostly with one another in Bank Money, or Credit in Bank ; but in Time of War, when large Bills are drawn upon them for subsisting Armies, which must be paid in ready Money, then the *Agio* falls below five *per Cent.* and the great Draughts made by *France* upon *Holland*, for paying her Armies in *Germany*, and her Subsidies to the Emperor and *Sweden*, has lately reduc'd this *Agio* to four and a half *per Cent.* from whence it

is reasonable to suppose, that the great Draughts now to be made by us, for paying our Army in *Flanders*, will reduce the *Agio* still lower, which will be an additional Loss to the Remitter; for 34 s. 8 d. Bank Money for a Pound Sterling is not so much now that the *Agio* is but four and a half *per Cent.* as it would be if the *Agio* were five *per Cent.*

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* Another Thing I must mention, which will likewise, I believe, turn out to the Disadvantage of the Remitter, is the Price or Premium paid to those who employ themselves in carrying Foreign Gold or Silver from this Country to *Holland*; for besides the Freight and Insurance, they must have a Profit as a Reward for their Trouble; and as the Wages of the Workman always rise when there is a great deal of Work to be done, especially if the Number of the Workmen be diminished, so these Exporters will probably insist upon a greater Profit, because the Exports will become much larger, and such great Sums must sometimes be exported, as can be trusted with but very few of the common Exporters. To this I must add, the Chance of a War with *France*, in which *Holland* will probably be likewise involv'd; and if this should happen, both the Freight and Insurance between *Holland* and this will rise very considerably, both which will turn out to the Disadvantage of the Remitter, because large Quantities of Gold and Silver must be sent over to answer our Draughts upon *Holland*: When all these Chances and Disadvantages are consider'd, I believe Mr *Gore's* Contract will be deemed no such extraordinary Bargain as it has been represented; especially if we consider the Expence he must be at in Commission, Brokerage, Postage of Letters, and other Charges, which I reckon, will amount to near one and a half *per Cent.* and his Profit is not above two *per Cent.* even at the then Current Rate of Exchange; so that he has but a half *per Cent.* nett Profit, which is the least that can be allow'd for his Trouble, for his Risk of Bills, and for the great Risk he ran of the Exchange sinking even below what he had agreed to give his Bills at; for if the Exchange has not fallen by the great additional Demand for ready Money in *Holland*, being contrary to the natural Course of Things, it can be ascrib'd to nothing but his Care and Conduct in supplying the Market before the Demand began to be felt.

* But the great Outcry, I find, is, another offered to perform the Service at a much less Expence to the Publick. Sir, I shall be far from saying, that Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Mulman* were not as capable to perform the Service as Mr *Gore* and his Friends; but the Lords of the Treasury had no Ex-

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perience of their Performance, and it is certainly their Duty, as well as it is the Duty of every other Officer or Board, to take Care rather to have the publick Service well perform'd than cheaply perform'd, especially those Services upon which the very Being, I may say, of the Commonwealth depends. When the Difference in the Expence is very great, or when one Man offers to serve the Publick at a remarkable less Expence, or cheaper Rate, than another, it is then the Duty of a Board to inquire minutely into the Nature of the Service to be undertaken, for in that Case there must be Extortion on one Side, or Fraud on the other intended; and if the Price or Profit requir'd by the former appears, upon the strictest Inquiry, to be but a moderate one, I think, they ought to be vastly cautious of engaging with the latter; for it is not to be presum'd, that any one would serve even the Publick for nothing, and much less to his own Loss; and as it is almost impossible to foresee all the Frauds which an Undertaker of any publick Service may be guilty of, I should be shy of employing a Man whose Proposals shew'd that he must either cheat himself or the Publick.

' In all such Cases, therefore, Sir, there must be a discretionary Power left in the Commissioners or Officers who are to contract for the Publick, and they may sometimes have very good Reasons for rejecting the highest Proposal or Bidder, even when the Difference is very considerable; but when the Difference is trifling, as it was in the Case now under Consideration, their having Experience of one Man's Capacity and Conduct, and none of the others, is of itself a sufficient Reason for preferring the Man they know, even when the other offers to serve at a cheaper Rate; and as the least Failure or Disappointment in this Service, would have been of the most fatal Consequence, I think, the Lords of the Treasury were in the right not to allow the Dealers in Exchange, by bidding upon one another, to beat the Price down too low, which they might have done from a too great Avidity of Gain, or from the Hopes that the Publick would give them some Relief, if it should afterwards appear, that they had undertaken the Service at a cheaper Rate than it could be faithfully perform'd: This would probably have been the Case, if the Proposals of Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Mulman* had been accepted; for as by these Proposals they were to have but two Stivers in a Pound Sterling Profit, which is not one *per Cent.* and as the Charges of Commission, Brokeridge, and Postage of Letters, is always computed at near one and a half, they could not have continued for any Time

to

to furnish the Publick with Bills at that Rate, unless the An. 16. Geo. II. Course of Exchange had risen very much in our Favour, which was not to be expected at such a Juncture. They must therefore have soon come to a new Agreement with the Publick, or they must have given over the Business; and we know by Experience how dangerous it is to change Hands, or to employ many Hands in such a Transaction; for by so doing our Affairs were brought into very great Confusion towards the latter End of the last War.

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‘ Besides these, Sir, and many other publick Reasons, which I could mention, if it were worth while, the Lords of the Treasury may have had private Reasons for preferring the Proposals of Mr *Gore* and his Friends, tho’ lower than those offered by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*: I mean not such private Reasons as have been insinuated in this Debate, as if they or some of their Friends were to have a Share in the Contract, and that therefore they were willing to make it as profitable as they thought they might safely do, I mean such private Reasons only as relate to the Safety and Service of the Publick; for in all such Cases they are obliged to enquire strictly into the Character and Conduct of those they are to contract with, and may find such Reasons for preferring one Man to another, as ought not to be mentioned or communicated to the Publick. I do not, however, affirm, that in this Case, they had any such Reasons: I mention it only to shew, how cautious we ought to be of censuring the Conduct of great Officers in every Case, where there is not a very apparent Neglect or Misbehaviour, and a remarkable Injury done to the Publick.

‘ I hope, I have now given such Reasons as will appear sufficient against our resolving to pass any Censure upon the Conduct of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, either for their not giving Notice to the Merchants to bring in their Proposals for remitting abroad the publick Money, or for their preferring the Proposals of Mess. *Gore*, *Gulston*, and *Poyntz*, to the higher Proposals of Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*; and next I shall observe, that it is really, in my Opinion, surprising, to hear Gentlemen, who certainly attend to, and understand the publick Business; I say, it is surprising to hear such Gentlemen talk of the Loss the Publick has sustained upon this Occasion; for, I think, it is demonstrable, that had the Contract of Mess. *Gore*, *Gulston*, and *Poyntz*, been much lower than it is; had they agreed to give their Bills upon *Holland* at no more than ten Guilders ten Stivers per Pound Sterling, the Publick could

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have sustained no Loss. Sir, Gentlemen may shake their Heads and seem amazed, but I shall make good what I say from the Estimates upon your Table, and from what is known to be the common Practice in paying the Army abroad. To begin with the last : It is well known, that as soon as our Army set Foot upon foreign Ground, they are not paid in *English* Money, but from that Moment begin to be paid in the Current Money of the Country, according to the Rate of Exchange at which the Government has contracted to have the Money remitted. Therefore, if the Government should make a bad Bargain, with regard to the Remittance, it may be a Loss to the Officers and Soldiers of the Army, but it can be no Loss to the Publick. If Mr Gore had given but ten Guilders ten Stivers for the Pound Sterling, it would have been a Loss to the Officers and Soldiers of our Army, because their Pay abroad would have been less by near one and a Half *per Cent.* but the Publick could neither have got nor lost by the Bargain.

‘ I shall next, Sir, consider the Case of the Money remitted for paying the *Hanoverians* ; and here, if Gentlemen will but look upon the Estimate, they will see, that the Money granted for paying the *Hanoverians* is calculated at ten Guilders ten Stivers per Pound Sterling, and must certainly be paid to them at that Rate ; for they will insist upon having a Pound Sterling, or the Produce of a Pound Sterling in *Dutch* Money, for every ten Guilders ten Stivers we are obliged to pay them ; and, consequently, our remitting their Money at a higher Rate than ten Guilders ten Stivers *per* Pound Sterling, can be no Advantage to this Nation, nor can our remitting it at a lower Rate than ten Guilders sixteen or eighteen Stivers, be any Loss.

‘ This, Sir, is the Case with regard to the Money remitted or to be remitted for the *Hanoverians* ; and with regard to the Money that has been remitted, or that may be remitted for the *Danish* or *Hessian* Troops, the Case is the very same. But what surprises me most is, that the Money remitted, or to be remitted, for paying the Subsidies granted by Parliament to the Queen of *Hungary*, or King of *Sardinia*, should be brought in over Head and Ears, to swell the imaginary Loss, which the Nation is to sustain by this wicked Contract. This, I say, is the most surprising, because by Accounts upon our Table it appears, that a great Part of the Subsidies payable to the Queen of *Hungary*, and King of *Sardinia*, were paid in ready Money to their Ministers here, and the rest in such Bills as they
approved

approved of ; and it is not to be supposed, that their Ministers here would allow themselves to be directed by any of our Ministers to go to a particular Remitter, unless he was ready to give them his Bills at as high a Rate of Exchange as any other Remitter would agree to.

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‘ From hence, Sir, I think it is evident, that the Publick could have sustained no Loss, even tho’ the Contract made with Mr *Gore* had stood at the Rate of Exchange at which it was first settled ; and as to the Argument, or rather Piece of Wit, made use of, with respect to the Treasury Board’s being under the Direction of one of their own Servants, it will appear to be without any Foundation, when we consider, that it is the daily Practice of every Board in *England*, when Facts and Circumstances are to be enquired into, to refer that Inquiry to be made and reported by one or more of their chief Clerks or Servants, and that Report is always made the Foundation of the Board’s Resolution, unless a farther Inquiry or Consideration appear to be necessary, which, in this Case, there was certainly no Occasion for, because the Paymaster, in his Report, shewed so clearly the Reasonableness of the Proposals made by Mess. *Gore, Gulton, and Poyntz*, and the Danger of changing Hands, that it became quite unnecessary to take into their Consideration the new Proposals that Day delivered in by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*. From all which, I must be of Opinion, that we have not the least Reason to find Fault with any Part of the Conduct of the Lords of the Treasury in this Transaction, and, consequently, I must be against the Motion.’

Then *John Bance*, Esq; spoke to the following Effect : Mr Bance.

Sir,

‘ Whatever the Gentlemen of the other Side of the Question may say ; they must be sensible, that, in this Debate, we have a very great Advantage, because, it depends upon Figures, which cannot, like Words, be wrested to disguise the Truth or support a Falshood, and if they think we have made no material Discovery, it must proceed from their being accustomed, for some Years, to deal in Millions, and to see the Publick defrauded daily of Thousands ; but such Gentlemen as I am, who have never touched publick Money, nor any Money but our own, or such as a Court of Justice might compel us to account for, must look upon a Sum of 60 or 70,000 *l.* with some Sort of Attention, and must think, that the Discovery of a Fraud of that Value,

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or at least a publick Loss (occasioned by Misconduct) of that Value, nay of a much greater, as I shall presently demonstrate, is no such Discovery as deserves the Name or Character of *Parturiunt Montes*; for I dare venture to say, that if such a Discovery had been made in the Times of our Ancestors whatever the Mountains might have conceived, the Resolutions of this House would have brought forth an Impeachment.

‘ Whether to call these Remitting Contracts a designed Fraud, or only a Piece of Mismanagement, I am really at a Loss to determine: The Damage the Publick was thereby to suffer was so obvious, and the right Method of contracting so well known, that it requires a great Stock of Charity to believe, that the Mismanagement proceeded entirely from Inattention. The many Advertisements we see almost daily in our News Papers from the Commissioners of Navy and Victualling, could not but put our Lords Commissioners of the Treasury in mind, that the proper Method for remitting the publick Money abroad, if it was to be done by Bills of Exchange, was to advertise in the *Gazette*, or at least to give Notice to all the great Remitters in the City to send in Proposals; and it was the more necessary for the present Lords of the Treasury to take this Method, because when they entered upon their Trust, there was a general Suspicion, that every publick Contract was made a Jobb, and that no Proposal, however beneficial for the Publick, was ever attended to, unless it came from one who was a Friend of the Minister’s. Whether this Suspicion was well founded or no, is not my Business at present to enquire into; but that there was then such a Suspicion, and that this Suspicion had for some Time been very general, is certain and well known in the City of *London*; so that no Man ever thought of offering any Proposals to the Publick, but such as thought they could make an Interest with the Minister; and Proposals from such Men never were, nor ever will be, the most advantageous for the publick Service. Our present Lords of the Treasury could not therefore expect that, upon their Accession to * that Board, any Gentleman would give himself the Trouble to send them Proposals of any Kind, without some publick or private Invitation to do so; for whatever Character they might formerly have had for Candour and publick Spirit, their precipitate Accession to that Board was very far from removing the general Suspicion that had before prevailed; and the Treatment they gave to the Proposals of Mess. *Wilkinson* and

Muilman

* See Vol. xiii. p. 115.

Muilman has already made this Suspicion as strong against An. 16. Geo. II
 them as ever it was against their Predecessors.

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‘ Another Reason, Sir, which made it necessary for them to give Notice to the Remitters to send in Proposals, was this: Tho’ it was generally known, or at least supposed, that Troops were to be sent abroad, yet it neither was nor could be known, that the Money for subsisting them was to be sent abroad by Bills of Exchange, because the Publick might have resolved to send it in Gold or Silver at its own Risk, and upon its own Account, which, considering that the Balance of Trade with *Holland* is against us, would have been the best and most frugal Method; for, I hope, we have now got over that silly old Prejudice, against sending Gold or Silver out of the Country; because it is now fully understood, that every Country must send out its Gold or Silver when the general Balance of Trade is against it. As long as the general Balance is in our Favour, we may supply the Demands of one Country by sending thither the Bullion or foreign Coin we receive from another: We may, for Example, supply the Demands of *Holland* by the Gold or Silver we receive from *Portugal* and other Countries; but if the general Balance should turn against us, that Balance must be made good out of our national Stock of Gold and Silver, and will always be so, let you make ever so severe Laws against it. Therefore, when our Government has occasion for Money in *Holland*, or any other Country where the Course of Exchange is against us, it ought to send over Gold or Silver for that Purpose upon its own Account, because it need pay nothing for Freight or Commission, and being sent over in Men of War, the Risk can never be so great to the Government as it must be to private Men. It is therefore ridiculous in the Government to pay for Risk, Freight, and Commission, to private Men, when it can so easily save all these Charges, by sending over Gold or Silver upon its own Account; and if our Government had done so upon this Occasion, it would have saved above six per Cent. which is now paid to Mr *Gore* and the other Gentlemen concerned in our publick Remittances.

‘ From hence, Sir, you must see, that the Merchants in the City, who understand the Nature of Trade and Exchange, could not know, nay they could not suppose, that the Government would have Occasion to deal in Bills of Exchange, for subsisting the Troops that were to be sent abroad; and therefore, since it was resolved to remit all the publick Money by that Method, a proper Notice should have

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have been given to all the great Remitters in the City to send in their Proposals. Besides, it is generally thought by the Merchants, to be officious in them to trouble Ministers with Proposals, unless they be desired to do so; and that this is the Way of thinking in the City could not but be known to the Lords of the Treasury, or at least to such of them as were concerned in the Inquiry into the famous *Jamaica* Contract; for they were there expressly told, that the Reason why none of the Merchants offered Proposals for remitting the publick Money to *Jamaica*, was because the Treasury did not communicate their Intentions to Merchants, and that if they had done so, several Merchants would have offered Proposals for serving them. It is therefore very surprising, that those Lords of the Treasury who were Members of the Secret Committee, should not think of giving Notice to the Merchants to bring in Proposals for remitting Money to *Holland*, before they concluded any Contract with Mr *Gore*; and when we consider, that the Inquiry was carrying on at the very Time this Contract was made, it is hard to believe, that this Neglect was the Effect of mere Inattention, and not the Effect of a Design to give Mr *Gore* a very profitable Bargain, in order to have some Friend admitted into a Share of the Profits.

Having now shewn, that the Lords of the Treasury were upon this Occasion manifestly guilty of a most surprising Piece of Neglect, I shall next beg Leave to examine the Bargain they made. They could not but know, that when Mr *Gore* brought in his Proposals, the then Current Course of Exchange was about ten Guilders eighteen Stivers *Dutch* Money, for every Pound Sterling; and, barring the Custom, I defy them, or any Man, to shew me a Reason, why the Publick should pay more for remitting its Money than any private Man. I can shew several, why it should pay less: In private Contracts for remitting, there is generally a Broker employ'd, and therefore Brokeridge must be paid, but in publick Contracts no Broker is ever employ'd, and consequently no Brokeridge to be paid: In remitting 100 *l.* there is as much Trouble, as in remitting 100,000 *l.* except only the Difference of telling, which, since Bank-Notes came in Fashion, is next to nothing; and therefore a Man who has 100,000 *l.* to remit, ought to pay less proportionably than a Man who remits a single Hundred. For these Reasons, if a private Man has ten Guilders eighteen Stivers for a Pound Sterling, the Publick ought to have at least ten Guilders eighteen Stivers and a half; and if the Publick had threatened

threatned to send over what Money it wanted in Gold and Silver at its own Risk, I believe, to prevent its taking this Method for supplying itself, the Remitters would have been glad to give their Bills at the Rate of ten Guilders eighteen Stivers *per* Pound Sterling; for even at that Rate their Profit would have been very considerable, which I shall beg Leave to explain.

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As the Hon. Gentleman who opened this Debate has before observed, when the Exchange is at the Rate of ten Guilders seventeen or eighteen Stivers for a Pound Sterling, it is about five and a half *per Cent.* to our Disadvantage; therefore if a Dealer in Exchange sends over to *Holland* 100,000 *l.* in Gold, in order to have an Opportunity to draw for it, that Gold will produce him in *Dutch* Money 1,149,950 Guilders; from which I shall deduct one *per Cent.* for Freight and Insurance in sending his Gold over, being more than the usual Price; there will then remain 1,138,450 Guilders ten Stivers. Having thus lodged his Money, let us suppose, he draws for it at the Rate of ten Guilders eighteen Stivers for the Pound Sterling, at that Rate he must receive for his Bills in Money here, 104,445 *l.* Sterling; so that by this Transaction he has got 4435 *l.* Sterling, out of which he has nothing to pay but Commission to his Correspondent in *Holland*, which I shall reckon at one *per Cent.* for receiving and paying, amounting to 1044 *l.* 9 *s.* consequently he has 3390 *l.* 11 *s.* clear Profit to himself, without any Risk or Charge; and as he may renew this Transaction every two or three Months, we may see what a Profit a Remitter would have, even suppose he were to remit the publick Money at that Rate of ten Guilders eighteen Stivers *per* Pound Sterling. And, indeed, when I consider this, I am surpris'd how the Agents of Mess. *Gore, Gulton, and Poyntz*, could have the Assurance to represent, as they did to the Paymaster General, in a Representation signed by them, and now upon our Table, that their whole Profit consisted in the Difference between the Rate of Exchange they agreed to draw at, and the then Current Rate of Exchange; and that even from this Profit they were to deduct their Hazard of Bills, Commission, Brokeridge, Postage of Letters, and other Charges. Surely, they must imagine, either that the Paymaster did not, or that he would not understand what he was about; for suppose he had known nothing of Trade, common Sense would have told him, that even according to the common Course of Exchange, the Remitter must have a Profit sufficient for
answering

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answering his Trouble, Risk, and Charges; and that in remitting the publick Money there could be no greater Trouble, Risk, or Charge, than in remitting the Money of private Men; but, on the contrary; that in remitting the publick Money there is no Expence of Brokerage, or Risk of Bills; and that, therefore, if the Remitter paid less, or gave his Bills for less than the common Course of Exchange, it would be so much clear Profit, over and above the Profit usually made in remitting the Money of private Men.

‘ I know very well, Sir, that when great Sums are to be remitted, and an absolute Necessity to remit them by Bills of Exchange, it necessarily raises the Price of those Bills, that is to say, it lowers the common Course of Exchange; but I have shewn, that the Government was so far from being under a Necessity to remit the publick Money by Bills of Exchange, that it would have been right and frugal to have sent over to *Holland*, in Gold or Silver, the whole Money, they were to have Occasion for at that Place; and if they had done so, it would only have been doing what Mr *Gore*, or any one other that contracts with them, must do at their Expence; therefore, the Danger of the Exchange falling below its common Course, on Account of the great Sums the Government was to have Occasion for in *Holland*, was a meer Bugbear, that could frighten none but Infants in the Business of Trade and Exchange; for the Course of Exchange, or the Price of Bills of Exchange, does not depend upon the Demand for Money at any certain Place, but upon the Difficulty and Danger of sending Gold or Silver from one Place to another; and therefore, the Course of Exchange can never rise much above the Value People put upon that Difficulty and Danger, which with respect to our Government’s sending Gold or Silver to *Holland* must be very trifling; and if the Lords of the Treasury had but threatned to take this Method, it would soon have put an End to any Combination that could have been entered into by the Remitters.

‘ No Pretence, therefore, can from thence be taken for justifying either the Terms, or the Precipitancy of the Contract they made with Mr *Gore*; but suppose there had been some Reason for their being in a Hurry, can this justify their agreeing to give him such monstrous Profits? I have already shewn what Profits a Remitter makes according to the common Course of Exchange, and in order to make the extravagant Terms of this Contract the more apparent, I shall state the Profits Mr *Gore* would have made according
to

to his first Contract, if he and his Friends had not gene- An. 16. Geo. II.
 rously offered more than the Lords of the Treasury desired 1742.
 of them. That every Gentleman may examine by himself
 whether or no I am right in my Calculations, I shall ground
 them upon Sir *Isaac Newton's* Table of the Value of foreign
 Coins, according to which a Pound Sterling, at the real
 Par of Exchange, is worth thirty-six Shillings and fifty-nine
 Hundredth Parts of a Shilling *Flemish* Bank Money, or
 thirty-eight Shillings and forty-two Hundredth Parts of a
 Shilling *Flemish* Current Money, which reduced into *Dutch*
 Currency is eleven Guilders ten Stivers and a Half for every
 Pound Sterling. Now, as by their first Contract they were
 to give but ten Guilders eleven Stivers and a Half for the
 Pound Sterling, if they sent over to *Holland* at their own
 Risk, from Time to Time, in Bullion, or in foreign Gold
 or Silver, such Sums as were necessary for answering their
 Draughts, they had a Profit of nineteen Stivers upon every
 Pound Sterling, which is very near nine *per Cent.* and as
 they were to deal in such large Sums, I am persuaded, their
 whole Charge of Freight, Commission, and Postage of Let-
 ters, could not amount to above One and a Half *per Cent.*
 so that they had a clear Profit of above seven *per Cent.* with-
 out running any other Risk than that of the Insurance, the
 Value of which is seldom above three Quarters *per Cent.*
 and if they had remitted abroad at this Rate the whole
 Money of last Year and this, amounting, as has been calcu-
 lated, to 1,826,089 *l.* their nett Profits would have amoun-
 ted to 127,826 *l.* Sterling, every Farthing of which, and
 more, might have been saved to the Publick by sending
 Gold and Silver over upon the publick Account, instead of
 employing Mr *Gore* to send it over for them.

* Whether the Lords of the Treasury knew what a pro-
 fitable Contract they had given to their Friend, or rather to
 the Friend of their Predecessor, I do not take upon me to
 determine. I cannot really suppose they did; for if I could,
 I should be very apt to suspect, that they did not, nor
 would give to any Man an Opportunity of making such
 monstrous Profits, without stipulating, in the Name of a
 Trustee, some Share of the Profits to themselves. But sup-
 pose they did not know the Value of the Contract they
 gave, which is the most charitable Supposition that can be
 made in their Favour, it shews, that they were guilty of a
 very great Neglect in the Discharge of their Trust; for had
 they talk'd with any indifferent Man that understood the
 Business of Exchange, he could easily have made them under-
 stand

An. 16. Geo. II. 1742.  derstand what they were about. And what happened afterwards, is a full Proof of the bad Bargain they had made for the Publick ; for when Mr Gore heard of the Proposals made by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, he came of his own Accord, there being no Appearance of his having been sent for, and generously agreed to give a Stiver and a Half more per Pound Sterling, than they had stipulated for the Publick, by which he reduced his Profits to a little above eight per Cent. so that we may reckon, he and his Friends have still six and a half per Cent. nett Profit, which upon 1,826,089 l. amounts to 118,695 l. Sterling.

‘ I see, Sir, the House is tired of Calculations, but I must beg their Patience a little ; for I cannot leave this Subject, without shewing the Ignorance, or something worse, of those Gentlemen with whom the Pay-master General was pleased to consult upon this Occasion, who gravely told him, according to his Report upon our Table, that by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*’s Proposals, they were to have but a Half per Cent. gross Profit, as they call it, (going still upon the Fallacy, that at the Current Course of Exchange the Remitter has no Profit) and then they wisely add, *that they cannot conceive how these Gentlemen make their Account, unless they flatter themselves with being indulged with the Liberty of exporting the Current Coin of this Kingdom.* Now, Sir, according to my Method of Calculation, which is free from that Fallacy, and certainly the right one, Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman* would, even at the Rate of Exchange they offered, have made a Profit of fourteen Stivers and a Half upon every Pound Sterling, which is six and near three Quarters per Cent. gross, and at least five per Cent. nett Profit ; so that if they had been obliged to export the Current Coin, it could not have proceeded from their not having a sufficient Profit ; and, indeed, it is ridiculous to talk of such an Effect’s proceeding from such a Cause. If the War continues but a small Number of Years, even Mr Gore and his Friends may be obliged to export our Current Coin, or melt it down in order to export the Bullion, which cannot, I am sure, proceed from their not having a sufficient Profit ; but they must do this, when they can find neither Bullion nor foreign Gold or Silver to export ; and this, I am afraid, they may be obliged to do, sooner than some People are aware of ; for we are now far from being in the same Circumstances we were at the Beginning of the War in the Queen’s Time. We are still Gainers, I believe, upon the general Balance of Trade, but, I fear, not so considerable

as we were at that Time ; and we have now a Load upon our general Balance of Trade, which we were then very little subject to, I mean the Interest payable yearly to Foreigners upon the Capitals they have in our several Funds, which, I believe, amounts to 5 or 600,000 *l.* a Year, and is a most grievous Drawback upon our general Balance of Trade. If by that Balance we are not supplied with an annual Recruit of Bullion or foreign Gold and Silver, sufficient for supplying the annual Demand for the Payment of this Interest, as well as for paying our Armies and subsidiary Princes upon the Continent, we must begin to inroad upon our national Stock of Gold and Silver, and, consequently, must export our Current Coin, or melt it down for that Purpose, which is the same Thing ; and this our Ministers ought seriously to consider before it is too late.

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After having shewn how profitable this Contract was to the Undertaker, I must consider the Dangers he was exposed to, which have been assigned as Reasons for giving him such a profitable Bargain. The Danger of lowering the Exchange I have already shewn to be altogether chimerical, because either the Government, or any private Man, may prevent it, by exporting Gold or Silver. The Danger of an Advance in the Price of Freight or Insurance for the Exportation of Gold or Silver, is still more chimerical, because it may, at all Times, be prevented by the Government's employing their Men of War, and is at all Times so trifling, especially the former, that it is not worth minding ; and as to the *Agio's* falling in *Holland*, the Importation of foreign Gold or Silver will prevent it ; but if it should not, it can be of no bad Consequence ; for as the *Agio* falls, the Course of Exchange will rise ; because Merchants or Dealers in Exchange never consider the Current Value of Bank, or any other Sort of Money in any Country : They consider only the Quantity and Fineness of the Gold or Silver they pay, and the Quantity and Fineness of the Gold or Silver they are to receive in lieu of it in another Country, and according to that they fix the Course of Exchange, so as to have a reasonable Profit for answering their Trouble and Expence.

Now, Sir, with regard to the Argument of the Publick's being no Loser by this Contract, however profitable it may be to the Undertaker : This, I acknowledge, surprised me ; for, I think, it is one of the most sophistical Arguments, with regard to our own Troops, that was ever made use of in any metaphysical Dispute in our Universities ;
and

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and with regard to the foreign Troops in our Pay, and the Subsidies payable to the Queen of *Hungary* and King of *Sardinia*, I shall shew, that it is absolutely false. But first, with regard to our own Troops, whatever the Hon. Gentleman may think, I shall always be of Opinion, that every Loss sustained by those brave Men who are fighting the Battles of their Country in a foreign Climate, is a Loss to their Country; and I must say, I hope our Ministers will take Notice of what I say, I wish our Troops may not, — But whether they do or no, I must say, it is an insufferable Hardship, to make the Troops we send abroad, pay for sending their Money after them. Wherever they go, they ought to be paid as if they were in *England*, and if they are paid in foreign Money, they ought to be paid at the Par of Exchange; That is to say, for every Pound Sterling due to them, they ought to receive, in the Money of the Country where they are, as much as that Pound Sterling would produce, if sent there in the Current Coin of this Kingdom; and, consequently, in *Holland*, or *Flanders*, they ought to receive at the Rate of eleven Guilders ten Stivers and a Half for every Pound Sterling that becomes due to them, instead of the ten Guilders thirteen Stivers they are to receive, according to the infamous Contract we have now under our Consideration. Thus, as a Soldier in *Flanders* receives, or ought to receive at least an *English* Groat a Day, or twenty eight Pence *English* a Week, Subsistence Money, if he were to be paid at the Par of Exchange, he would be intitled to receive, in *Dutch* Money, twenty-six Stivers and above fourteen Pennings, or near twenty-seven Stivers a Week; whereas if he be paid, as I suppose he is, at the Rate we have contracted with our Remitter Mr *Gore*, he does not receive above twenty-four Stivers and fourteen or fifteen Pennings *Dutch* Money for his Week's Subsistence; and this is the harder upon him, because, as we have not yet got into our Enemy's Country, and I do not know when we shall, a Soldier must not take so much as an Egg, or a Crust of Bread, without paying ready Money for it.

As few of our Soldiers are good Pen and Ink Men, I doubt much, Sir, if any of them can calculate the Loss they sustain by our Method of paying them, and as the Loss is not very remarkable, I believe, few of them take Notice of it; but it is evident, that they lose above half a Day's Subsistence Money in a Week, and tho' this Loss to each Soldier appears to be but a trifling Sum in a Year, yet to the whole Army the Loss becomes so considerable as to deserve

deserve the Attention of this House ; for from what happened in *Jamaica*, we may form some Notion of the Danger that may arise from the Army's taking Notice of this Loss, before we do. There, indeed, the Loss was so considerable, that it set the whole Army a computing, and every Soldier at last found out, that he was cheated of one Day's Pay in seven, which had like to have produced a Mutiny in that Army.

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Now, Sir, with regard to the Money remitted for paying our foreign Mercenaries, I hope, the *Hanoverians* have not, I am sure, no other Mercenaries ever had any Thing to do with the Grants or the Calculations made by Parliament. As we always agree to pay them in some foreign Currency, they have nothing to do with the Exchange we purchase it at, or with the Exchange it is calculated at in the Estimates laid before Parliament ; and therefore, if we make a good Bargain it is an Advantage, if a bad one it is a Loss to this Nation, and this Nation only. In the Estimates, 'tis true, the Exchange is always calculated at a low Rate, because our Ministers cannot then know the Rate they may purchase at ; but if they can purchase at a higher Rate, and they ought to make as good a Bargain as they can for their Country, they are obliged to give an Account of the Savings to the next Session of Parliament. In future Times, I hope we shall be more careful in this Respect than we have been in Times past ; for even according to the bad Bargains they have lately made for remitting the publick Money, there will a considerable Saving in the Money granted for the Pay of foreign Troops, because in the Estimates the Exchange is calculated at ten Guilders ten Stivers per Pound Sterling, whereas they have contracted for it at the Rate of ten Guilders thirteen Stivers, which is a Saving of three Stivers upon every Pound Sterling, and this is near one and a half *per Cent.* upon all the Money granted for the Pay of foreign Troops : There was likewise a Saving upon every one of the different Sums paid to the Queen of *Hungary* at *Amsterdam*, and consequently that Account, upon the very Face of it, appears to be wrong, with respect to the Sums set down in Sterling Money. I shall take Notice only of the second Article in that Account, by Way of Example : It is there said, Paid to her Minister in Bills upon Mr *Compton*, Deputy Paymaster at *Amsterdam*, 787,500 Guilders, at the Rate of ten Guilders ten Stivers for every Pound Sterling ; being the Rate settled by Treaty, which said Sum was furnished by the Remitter in Bills of Exchange,

An. 16. Geo. II. 1742. change, payable at *Amsterdam*, at the Rate of ten Guilders ten Stivers and a half *per* Pound Sterling; and this is computed to be in Sterling Money 75,000 *l.* Now, Sir, it is very true, that 787,500 Guilders, at ten Guilders ten Stivers *per* Pound Sterling, amounts to 75,000 *l.* but 787,500 Guilders, at ten Guilders eleven Stivers and a half *per* Pound Sterling, amounts to no more than 74,468 *l.* which was all that could be paid to Mr *Gore* for his Bills, and consequently by this Remittance our Ministers saved to the Publick 532 *l.* and might have saved a great deal more if they had made a better Bargain, tho' they seem to be unwilling to account even for what they did actually save.

‘ Whether the Queen of *Hungary*’s Minister took Directions from our Ministers, as to the Remitter he was to employ, I shall not determine: With regard to the Money to be paid at *Amsterdam*, he had no Business to trouble his Head about the Rate of Exchange, because as the Rate was settled by Treaty at ten Guilders ten Stivers *per* Pound Sterling, his Mistress was neither to get nor lose by the Bargain made for the Exchange; but with regard to the Money paid him here, I am sure, he would have served his Mistress very ill, if, without any Necessity or Direction, he had taken Bills at the Rate of ten Guilders eleven Stivers and a Half *per* Pound Sterling, when he might every Day have had undoubted Bills at the Rate of ten Guilders seventeen or eighteen Stivers *per* Pound Sterling; and, for the same Reason, it must be allowed, that our Ministers did not serve their Country well in accepting of such a low Rate of Exchange for the Money they remitted to *Amsterdam*; because, whatever they could get, or did get, above ten Guilders ten Stivers *per* Pound Sterling, was an Advantage to their Country, and ought to be accounted for to Parliament. It is therefore evident that with regard to some Part of the Money paid to the Queen of *Hungary*, the Publick is a Loser by this Contract; but with regard to the Money to be paid to the King of *Sardinia*, as we have been deny’d a Sight of that Treaty, and consequently do not know where, or in what Currency, the Money is to be paid, I can say nothing about it.

‘ As to the private Reasons our Lords of the Treasury might have had for preferring Mr *Gore*, if they were such as related to the Publick, they were fully answered by the Security offered by Mess. *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, which was likewise an Answer to the Argument founded upon the Experience they had of Mr *Gore*’s Punctuality; and, indeed,

deed, when the Money is paid upon the Delivery of the Bills, I do not see how any Man that is honest can fail of being punctual, because it may be sent over to answer his Draughts with the same Packet that carries his Bills. And as to the discretionary Power contended for, the Hon. Gentleman himself allowed, that it ought never to be made use of, but when the Difference between one Bidder and another is trifling. Can it be said that it was so in this Case? Sir, the Difference between the Proposals of Mr Gore and his Friends, and those offered by Messrs *Wilkinson* and *Muilman*, was near one and a Half *per Cent.* and this upon 1,826,089 *l.* the Sum that had been or was to be remitted, amounted to above 27,391 *l.* Can this Difference be said to be trifling? I am sure, it will appear so to no Man in *England* but such a one as a Lord of our Treasury; and if this Contract escapes our Censure, I am afraid, that such a Sum will very soon begin to look big even in the Eyes of a Lord of our Treasury; for, by Jobwork, Extravagance, and Neglect, the Nation will very soon be so reduced as to have very little Money to put into their Hands. This fatal Consequence we ought to prevent, if possible; and therefore I shall be for agreeing to this Motion.

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A Motion being made, and the Question put, that the Chairman do leave the Chair, it was carried in the Affirmative, by 112 against 82. By this a Stop was put to any farther Inquiries.

Mr Waller's Motion for censuring the Lords of the Treasury, over-ruled.

March 11. An ingross'd Bill, For indemnifying Persons who have omitted to qualify themselves for Offices, &c. was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords by Mr *Phillips*.

March 14. Upon the Motion of Mr Alderman *Calvert*, seconded by Vice Admiral *Vernon*, Mr *Cornwall*, Mr *Sydenham*, and the Lord *George Graham*, a Bill was order'd in, *Nem. Con.* For the more speedy and effectual Manning of his Majesty's Fleet.

Bill for better manning the Fleet.

March 15. Mr *Henry Archer* presented to the House a Bill, to continue several Laws, For granting an Allowance on the Exportation of *British* made Gunpowder; For further encouraging the Importation of Naval Stores from his Majesty's *British* Plantations in *America*; For Licensing 100 Additional Hackney Chairs; and, For continuing certain Clauses relating to the Powers and Authorities of Justices of the Peace, and of the Commissioners for licensing and regulating Hackney Coaches and Chairs, and the Rules and Pen-

Ap. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

nalties therein mention'd ; and, For apprehending and punishing the Hawkers of unstamp'd News Papers, which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

March 16. A Petition of the Freeholders, &c. of *North Holland*, in the County of *Lincoln*, to the same Effect as those for *Grantham*, was order'd to lie on the Table.

A Motion being made, that an engross'd Bill from the Lords, For restoring *Francis*, Duke of *Buccleugh*,* to the Dignities and Titles of Earl of *Doncaster* and Baron *Scot of Tindal*, be now read the first Time : Mr *Pelham*, by Command, acquainted the House, that the King recommended the Consideration thereof to the House, whereupon it was read a first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Lace Bill pass'd ;

An ingross'd Bill, For the more effectual preventing the Importation and Wear of Gold and Silver Thread, Lace, Fringe, or other Work made of Gold or Silver Wire, manufactur'd in Foreign Parts, was read a third Time, pass'd, and sent to the Lords.—As also a Bill, For allowing further Time for Inrollment of Deeds and Wills made by Papists, and for Relief of Protestant Purchasers, Devisees, and Lessees.

And for Relief of
Protestant Pur-
chasers.

March 17. Sir *Hugh Smithson* presented a Bill, to explain and amend an Act pass'd in the fourteenth Year of his present Majesty, for the Preservation of the Publick Roads in England, which was read the first Time, and order'd a second Reading.

Bill relating to
Elections for Bo-
roughs drop'd.

March 18. The farther Consideration of the Bill, touching the Election of Members for Cities, Boroughs, &c. in England, was defer'd for a Month †.

Bill pass'd for
restoring the
Duke of Buc-
cleugh to his
English Honours.

March 21. An ingrossed Bill from the Lords, for restoring *Francis* Duke of *Buccleugh*, &c. was read the third Time,

* His Grace is Grandson to the Duke of *MONMOUTH*, by whose Attainder An. 3. *JACOB I.* the Title was forfeited.—See an Account of the Rebellion at that Time and the Consequences thereof, in *TIMBERLAND's History of the House of Lords*, Vol 1.

† The Author of *FACTION DETECTED* thus accounts for the Loss of this Popular Bill, ' The true Reason why this Bill was not pass'd, ' was one which equally affected all Parties, and which will everlastingly ' prevent an effectual Bill of this Kind ; and this arises from the various ' Rights of Election, which are so numerous, that they distract and con- ' found the different Interests of Gentlemen, which, to speak fairly on ' all Sides, induces them, by one plausible Pretence or other, for their ' private Regard, to oppose, or to propose, so many different Clauses, that ' such Bills at length become impracticable and impalatable to all — The ' Burgage Tenures too, which Gentlemen will neither part with, nor ' can tell how to regulate, are another invincible Obstruction ; and the ' Powers and the Penalties create further Difficulties, which no Human ' Wisdom has been yet able to surmount,

Time, pass'd, and sent by Mr *Pelham* to the Lords. ^{As An. 16. Geo. II.}
 was the next Day, A Bill to make more effectual the Law^s ^{1743.}
 relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, &c. by Mr *Carew*.

March 25. A Bill to continue the Act of the fifth of his present Majesty, to prevent the committing of Frauds by Bankrupts, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent by ^{Several Bills} Mr *Henry Archer* to the Lords. ^{pass'd.}

March 29. A Bill for continuing several Laws relating to the Allowance upon the Exportation of *British* made Gun-powder; to the Importation of Naval Stores from the *British* Colonies in *America*; to the additional Number of 100 Hackney-Chairs, and to the Powers given for regulating Hackney-Coaches and Chairs; for punishing Venders of Unstamp'd News-Papers; for allowing the Importation of Hemp or Flax, &c. manufactur'd in *Ireland*, though not sworn to be of the Growth of that Kingdom, was read the third Time, pass'd, and sent by Mr *Francis Fane* to the Lords.

The same Day Mr *Francis Fane* having reported from the Committee of Supply the Bill, for granting a certain Sum out of the Sinking Fund; a Motion was made for re-committing the Clause of Appropriation therein, but it pass'd in the negative.

March 30. A Bill for granting One Million out of the ^{Address for Pa-} Sinking Fund, and for applying a farther Sum, for the ^{pers relating to} Service of the Year 1743, was read the third Time, pass'd, ^{Georgia.} and sent to the Lords: As was also another for allowing Carts to be drawn by four Horses. Then it was resolv'd, to present an Address to the King, to give Directions, that there may be laid before the House, Copies of General *Oglethorpe's* Letters to the Duke of *Newcastle*, of *April 28*, *May 12*, *July 19*, 1741, as also from the Secretary to the Lords of the Regency, to the said General, *Octob. 19*, 1741, relating to the Provisional Troops and Vessels propos'd by him, as necessary to be continued in *Georgia* during the War, after raising the Siege of *Augustine*. All which Mr Comptroller presented the next Day.

April 12. A new Writ was order'd for *Saltaſh* in the Room of *John Cleveland*, * Esq; made a Commissioner of the Navy. As was the next Day another for *Grantham*, on the Death of Sir *Michael Newton* †. Then the House having taken into Consideration the Amendments made by the Lords to the Vagabond Bill, two of which were disagree'd

* Stamp Brooksbank, Esq; was elected.

† Sir John Cust, Bart. was elected.

An. 16. Geo. II. to, *Nem. Con.* a Committee was appointed to draw up Reasons at a Conference ; but before this Point cou'd be settled between the two Houses, the King put an End to the Session, so that the Bill was for this Time lost.

1743.

April 19. Ordered a new Writ for *Calne*, in the Room of Lieutenant Col. *Elliot*, † made one of the Equeries to the King. And the next Day another for the Shire of *Linlithgow*, in the Room of *George Dundas*, † Esq; appointed Master of his Majesty's Works in *Scotland*.

New Writs.

April 21. Another Writ was order'd for *Soutbawark*, in the Room of *Thomas Inwen*, Esq; § decess'd ; and on the same Day the King came to the House of Peers, and put an End to the Session with the following Speech.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

King's Speech
at putting an End
to the Session.

“ T H E Zeal, Prudence, and Dispatch, with which you have carried on the Publick Business, during the Course of this Session; give me the greatest Satisfaction.

“ That this Nation, and the Common Cause, may reap the most beneficial Fruits of your vigorous Resolutions, I have, at the Requisition of the Queen of *Hungary*, ordered my Army, in Conjunction with the *Austrian* Troops, to pass the *Rhine*, as Auxiliaries to Her *Hungarian* Majesty, and for Her Support and Assistance, and to oppose any dangerous Measures, that might affect the Balance and Liberties of *Europe*, or hinder the Re-establishment of the Publick Tranquillity, upon just and solid Foundations. I have continued a strong Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, and another in the *West-Indies*, in order to carry on the great Work of distressing our Enemies, the *Spaniards*, and reducing them to safe and honourable Terms of Peace, as well as of maintaining the Rights of Navigation and Commerce, belonging to my Subjects: And from the former of these Squadrons, my Allies in *Italy* have found, and still continue to receive, a most useful and advantageous Support.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,


“ I return you my Thanks for the ample Supplies, which
“ you

† † They were both re-elected.

No. on the Poll. After the Scrutiny.

| | | |
|--|-----|-----|
| § Alexander Hume, Esq; was elected | 792 | 732 |
| [See Vol. xiii. P. 114.] Hammond, Esq; | 863 | 691 |

Majority for Mr Hume 41

“ you have granted for the Service of the current Year, An. 16. Geo. II.
 “ and which you may be assured, shall be applied to those ^{1743.}
 “ great Ends, for which they were given. 

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

“ I have a firm Confidence in your Good Affections ;
 “ and it is the fixed Purpose of my Heart, to promote the
 “ true Interest, and Happiness, of my Kingdoms. In re-
 “ turn for this, I expect, on your Part, that you will exert
 “ your best Endeavours, in your respective Stations, to ren-
 “ der my Government easy, and to preserve the Peace and
 “ Quiet of the Nation.

After which the Lord Chancellor prorogued the Parlia-
 ment to the 7th of *June*.



A
 T A B L E
 OF THE

Publick ACTS pass'd during the Second
 Session of the Third Parliament of King
George II.

AN ACT, For granting a Land Tax for the Service of the
 Year 1743.

An ACT, For continuing the Duties upon Malt, Mum, Cy-
 der, and Perry, for the Service of the Year 1743.

An ACT, For repealing certain Duties on Spirituous Liquors,
 and on Licences for retailing the same, and for laying other
 Duties on Spirituous Liquors, and on Licences to retail the said
 Liquors.

An ACT, To explain and amend the Laws touching the
 Elections of Members in Parliament, for Scotland, and to re-
 strain the Partiality, and regulate the Conduct of Returning
 Officers at such Elections.

An

An. 16. Geo. II.
1743.

An Act, For repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Victuallers and Retailers of Beer and Ale, within the Cities of London and Westminster and the Weekly Bills of Mortality; and for transferring the Exchequer Bills unsatisfied thereupon, to the Duties for Licences to sell Spirituous Liquors and Strong Waters by Retail; and also for enabling his Majesty to raise a certain Sum of Money, for the Service of the Year 1743; to be further charged on the said Duties for Licences.

An Act, For raising by Annuities and a Lottery in Manner therein menioned, the Sum of 1,800,000 l. at 3 l. per Cent. per Annum, for the Service of the Year 1743.

An Act, For punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters.

An Act, For the more easy and effectual Conviction of Offenders found at large within the Kingdom of Great Britain, after they have been ordered for Transportation.

An Act, For the Relief of Insolvent Debtors.

An Act, To empower Justices of the Peace to act in certain Cases, relating to Parishes and Places, to the Rates and Taxes of which they are rated or chargeable.

An Act, For rectifying Mistakes in the Names of the Commissioners for the Land-Tax for the Year 1742, and for the appointing other Persons, together with those named for the said Year, to put in Execution an Act of this present Session of Parliament, intituled, An Act for granting an Aid to His Majesty by a Land-Tax to be raised in Great Britain, for the Service of the Year 1743.

An Act, For granting to his Majesty the Sum of One Million out of the Sinking Fund, and for applying a further Sum therein mentioned, for the Service of the Year 1743; and for the further appropriating the Supplies granted in this Session of Parliament.

An Act, For continuing several Laws relating to the Allowance upon the Exportation of British made Gunpowder; to the Importation of Naval Stores from the British Colonies in America; to the additional Number of One hundred Hackney Chairs; and to the Powers given for regulating Hackney Coaches and Chairs; for punishing the Venders of unstamped News Papers; for allowing the Importation of Hemp or Flax manufactured in Ireland, though not sworn to be the Growth of Ireland; and for the Relief of Bryan Blundell, in respect to the Duty on some white Salt lost in a Storm at Sea.

An Act, To continue an Act made in the Fifth Year of his present Majesty, intituled, An Act to prevent the committing of Frauds by Bankrupts.

An

An Act, For allowing Carts to be drawn by four Horses. An. 16. Geo. II.

1743.

An Act, To indemnify Persons who have omitted to qualify themselves for Offices and Employments within the Time limited by Law, and for allowing further Time for that Purpose; and also for amending so much of an Act made in the 25th Year of the Reign of King Charles II, intituled, An Act for preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants, as relates to the Time for receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper now limited by the said Act.

An Act, For the further Punishment of Persons who shall aid or assist Prisoners to attempt to escape out of lawful Custody.

An Act, For allowing further Time for Inrolment of Deeds and Wills made by Papists, and for Relief of Protestant Purchasers, Devisees, and Lessees.

An Act, For improving Charterhouse Square, Co. Middlesex.

An Act, To enable the Parish of St Botolph, without Aldgate, London, to raise a certain Sum of Money.

An Act, To make Bethnal Green, Co. Middlesex, a separate Parish.

Also to Eleven Acts relating to the Repairing the following Roads, viz. From Bowes, Co. York, to Brough under Stainmore, Co. Westmoreland. Also, Between Hockliffe and Woburn, Co. Bedford; and through Woburn to Tickford Bridge in Newport Pagnel, Co. Bucks. Also, From Warminster, Co. Wilts. Also, From Borough-Bridge, Co. York, to Catherick in the same County, and from thence to Piers Bridge on the River Tees. Also, From Marlborough through West Kennet to Shepherd's Shord; and from the Hare and Hounds in Beckhampton, to the Top of Cherill Hill; and from the Town of Avebury to the Cross-way at Beckhampton, Co. Wilts. Also, From Wade's Mill, Co. Hertford, to Barley and Royston, in the said County. Also, From the North Part of Harlow Bush Common to Woodford, Co. Essex. Also, From the Dun Cow in Dunchurch, to Hillmorton, Co. Warwick, and from thence to Saint James's End in the Town of Northampton. Also, From the City of Gloucester to the Top of Birdlip-hill, being the Road to London; and from the Foot of the said Hill to the Top of Crickley-hill, being the Road to Oxford. Also, From Cirencester, Co. Gloucester, to Monument upon Lansdown in the same County. Likewise, From Luton, Co. Bedford, to Westwood-gate in the said County; and from Luton to St Alban's, Co. Hertford.

And to several Private Bills.

F I N I S.

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APPENDIX.

*A LIST of the MEMBERS who
voted for and against the HANOVER
Troops to be in BRITISH Pay, De-
cember 10, 1742.*

*Those with a * voted for the Inquiry into the Conduct of
Robert Earl of Orford in the First Session.*

For the HANOVERIANS.

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| A Bercomby James, Esq; | Banffshire. | An. 16. Geo. II. |
| Acourt Pierce, Esq; | Heytsbury. | 1742. |
| Archer Thomas, Esq; | Bramber. | |
| Arlcott John, Esq; | Ashburton. | |
| Arundel Hon. Richard, Esq; | Knarelsborough. | |
| Ashe Edward, Esq; | Heytsbury. | |
| Bacon Edward, Esq; | Lynn. | |
| Baker Hercules, Esq; | Hythe. | |
| * Baltimore Lord, | Surry. | |
| * Bayntun Edward, Esq; | Chippenham. | |
| * Bathurst Hon. Henry, Esq; | Cirencester. | |
| Beaucherc Lord Harry, | Thetford. | |
| Beaucherc Lord Vere, | Plymouth. | |
| Beake Col. George, | St Ives. | |
| Bennet Philip, Esq; | Bath. | |
| Bentinck Lord George, | Droitwich. | |
| Bertie Lord Vere, | Boston. | |
| Bladen Martin, Esq; | Portsmouth. | |
| Bockland Col. Maurice, | Yarmouth. | |
| * Boone Daniel, Esq; | Grampound. | |
| * Bootle Thomas, Esq; | Midhurst. | |
| Bowles William, Esq; | Bewodley. | |
| Bradshaigh Sir Roger, Bart. | Wigan. | |
| Brand Thomas, Esq; | Shoreham. | |
| Brassey Nathaniel, Esq; | Hertford. | |
| Brereton Thomas, Esq; | Liverpool. | |
| Bristow John, Esq; | St Ives. | |
| Brodie Alexander, Esq; | Caitbness. | |
| Brown Sir Robert, Bart. | Ilchester. | |
| * Bruce Hope Sir John, Bart. | Shire of Kinross. | |
| VOL. XIV. | Brudenell | |

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

Brudenell Hon. James, Esq;

Burrard Harry, Esq;

Burrel Peter, Esq;

Butler John, Esq;

Calthorpe Henry, Esq;

Campbell John, Esq;

* Campbell Hon. Alex. Hume, Esq;

Cary Walter, Esq;

Carnegie Sir James, Bart.

* Carpenter Lord

Carter William, Esq;

Cavendish Admiral Philip,

Charlton, Job, Esq;

Cholmondeley Col. James,

Churchill Major General,

Churchill Charles, Esq;

Clayton Sir William, Bart.

Clayton Kendrick, Esq;

Cleveland John, Esq;

Clive Edward, Esq;

Coke Edward, Esq;

* Compton George, Esq;

Conway Henry, Esq;

Cope Monoux, Esq;

Corbet Sir William, Bart.

Corbet Thomas, Esq;

* Cornwallis John, Esq;

Cotes Charles, Esq;

Craigie Robert, Esq;

Crowle George, Esq;

Danvers Joseph, Esq;

Darcy Sir Conyers, Kt.

Doneraile Lord Viscount,

* Douglas James, Esq;

Downing Jacob, Esq;

Drury Sir Thomas, Bart.

Drummond, John, Esq;

* Dundas George, Esq;

Duncannon Lord,

Dupplin Lord

Earle Giles, Esq;

Earle William Rawlinson, Esq;

* Elliot Richard, Esq;

Elliot Col. William,

Ellis Wellbore, Esq;

Evans, Hon. George, Esq;

Evans Captain Richard,

* Evelyn, John, Esq;

*Chichester.**Lymington.**Haslemere.**East Grinstead.**Hindon.**Pembrokeshire.**Berwickshire.**Clifton.**Kincardineshire.**Weobly.**Kingsdon upon Hull.**Portsmouth.**Newark.**Montgomery.**Castle-Rising.**Stockbridge.**Bletchingly.**Ditto.**Saltaß.**St Michael's.**Norfolk.**Northampton.**Higham Ferrers.**Newport.**Ludlow.**Saltaß.**Eye.**Tamworth.**Tain and Dingwal.**Kingsdon upon Hull.**Totnes.**Richmond.**Winchelsea.**St Marks.**Dunwich.**Malden.**Perth, &c.**Linkithgow.**Derby.**Cambridge Town.**Malmsbury.**Ditto.**Leckard.**Calm.**Cricklade.**Westbury.**Queenborough.**Penryn.*

Eversfield

Eversfield Charles, Esq;
 Fane Francis, Esq;
 Fermanagh Lord Viscount,
 Finch Hon. Edward, Esq;
 Finch Hon. William, Esq;
 * Finch Hon. John, Esq;
 Finch Hon. Henry, Esq;
 Fitzroy Charles, Esq;
 Fonnerau Thomas, Esq;
 Forrester Brook, Esq;
 Fortrose Lord,
 Fox Henry, Esq;
 Frankland Frederick, Esq;
 Frederick Charles, Esq;
 French Jeffery, Esq;
 Gage, Sir William, Bart.
 Galway Lord Viscount,
 Garth John, Esq;
 Gashry Francis, Esq;
 Gibson Thomas, Esq;
 * Gilmour Sir Charles, Bart.
 Gildart Richard, Esq;
 Glenorchy Lord Viscount,
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 Shoreham.
 Milborn-Port.
 Seaford.
 Pontefract.
 Dewizes.
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 Edinburghshire.
 Liverpool.
 Orford.
 Helston.
 Bramber.
 Elgin, Cullen, &c.
 Elginshire.
 Borough-Bridge.
 Pool.
 Rye.
 Clifton.
 Truro.
 Wendover.
 Leominster.
 Boreaston.
 Ashburton.
 Hertford.
 Derbyshire.
 Haddingtonshire.
 Seaford.
 Ludgershall.
 Boreaston.
 Lyme.
 Newport.
 Ludlow.
 Wilton.
 Ditto.
 Bury.

An. 16. Geo. II. Hobby Sir Thomas, Bart.

1742.

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 Hungerford Walter, Esq;
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is Sir John, Kt.
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w Denzil, Esq;
w Richard, Esq;
l Robert, Esq;
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deston William, Esq;
i William, Esq;
enden Sir George, Bart.
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David, Esq;
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Sutherlandshire.
Fifehire.
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Whitchurch.
Cambridgehire.
Northallerton.
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Plymouth.
Hindon.

An. 16. Geo. II.
1742.

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Fowey.
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St Albans.
Retford.
Bridgnorth.
Ditto.
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Monmouthshire.
Northampton.
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Apulby.
Caernarvon.
Denbigh.
Honiton.
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Kellington.
Shrewsbury.
Eye.
Leftwithiel.
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Gatton.
Orkney and Zetland.
Dunwich.
Downton.
Coventry.
Thirsk.
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Barnstaple.
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Durham.
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Northumberland.
Cockermouth.
Haslemere.
Lewes.
Northallerton.
Dover.
Whitchurch.
Melcomb.
Wigtounshire.
Wigtoun, &c.
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Yorkshire.
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Bagot Sir Walter, Bart.
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Rippon.
Salop County.
Staffordshire.
Wallingford.
Grampound.

Banks

An. 16 Geo. II.
1742.

| | |
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| Barrington Lord, | Berwick. |
| Barrington Sir John, Bart. | Newtown. |
| Bathurst Benjamin, Esq; | Gloucester. |
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| Buck John, Esq; | Taunton. |
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| Buchanan Neil, Esq; | Glasgow, Rutberglen, |
| Buller James, Esq; | Easlow. [&c. |
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| Bury Thomas, Esq; | Newport. |
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| Cartwright Thomas, Esq; | Northamptonshire. |
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| Courteney Sir William, Bart. | Devonshire. |
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| Crawley John, Esq; | Marlborough. |
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Itham Sir Edmund, Bart.
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Lechmere Edmund, Esq;
Liddel Richard, Esq;

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b

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Roxburghshire.
Westminster.
Tavistock.
Preston.
Huntingdonshire.
Lancaster.
Newcastle upon Tyne.
Suffolk.
Herefordshire.
Droitwich.
Aberdeenshire.
Devon.
York.
Romney.
Southampton.
Flintshire.
Hertfordshire.
Agmondesham.
Staffordshire.
Newcastle under Line.
Ayr, Irwin, &c.
Stirlingshire.
Colchester.
Old Sarum.
Bucks.
Buckingham.
Chester.
Coventry.
Maidstone.
Dorchester.
Wells.
Leominster.
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Oxford City.
Milborn-Port.
Bishops-Castle.
Warwick.
Bristol.
Litchfield.
Hereford.
Hertfordshire.
Carlisle.
Northamptonshire.
London.
Worcestershire.
Bossey.

Lister

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

Lister Thomas, Esq;
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 Lowndes Richard, Esq;
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 M^rKye John, Esq;
 Mackworth Herbert, Esq;
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 Newton Sir Michael, Bart.
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Cirencester.
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Banbury.
Westmoreland.
Middlesex.
Gatton.
Grantham.
Rutlandshire.
Exeter.
St. Marws.
Bedford.
Morpeth.
Dysart, Kirkaldy, &c.
Anglesea.
Berkshire.
Peterborough.
Winchester.
Minehead.
Carmarthen Town.
Shaftsbury.
Old Sarum.
Wareham.
Dorsetshire.
Wils.
Somersetshire.
Cardiganshire.
Berkshire.
Sandwich.
Stamford.
Somersetshire.
Cardigan.
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Oxfordshire.
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Flint Town.
Montgomeryſhire.
Hereford.
Norfolk.
Leiceſter.
Denbiſhſhire.

A B S E N T.

Andover Lord,
Aſhby Thomas, Esq;

Caſtle-Riſing.
St Albans.

Barrymore

An. 16. Geo. II.

1742.

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 Blacket Walter, Esq;
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 Chafin George, Esq;
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 Southwark.
 Nottinghamshire.
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 Derby.
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 Leskard.
 Lincoln.
 Merionethshire.
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 Peterborough.

Since the Publication of the Proceedings of the First Session, An. 15. Geo. II. the following SPEECHES have been communicated to the Editor. 1741.

IN the Debate on Lord Limerick's Motion for an Inquiry into the Conduct of Affairs for the last Twenty Years, after Mr Pelham had spoke in Opposition to the Motion, [See Vol. XIII p. 161.] the Lord Viscount Quarendon * reply'd to the following Effect.

Some Additional Speeches on the Motion for an Inquiry into the Conduct of Affairs for 20 Years

Sir,

* I am always inclined to suspect a Man who endeavours rather to terrify than persuade. Exaggerations and Hyperboles are seldom made Use of by him who has any real Arguments to produce. The Reasonableness of this Motion, (of which I was convinced when I first heard it, and of which, I believe, no Man can doubt who is not afraid of the Enquiry proposed by it) is now in my Opinion evinced by the weak Opposition which has been made by the honourable Gentleman, to whose Abilities I cannot deny this Attestation, that the Cause which he cannot defend has very little to hope from any other Advocate. Ld. Quarendon.

* And surely he cannot, even by those who, whenever he speaks, stand prepared to applaud him, be thought to have produced any formidable Argument against the Enquiry, who has only urg'd that it is impossible to be performed.

* Impossibility is a formidable Sound to Ignorance and Cowardice; but Experience has often discovered, that it is only a Sound uttered by those who have nothing else to say; and Courage readily surmounts those Obstacles that sink the Lazy and Timorous into Despair.

* That there are indeed Impossibilities in Nature cannot be denied. There may be Schemes formed which no wise Man will attempt to execute; because he will know, that they cannot succeed; but surely the Examination of arithmetical Deductions, or the Consideration of Treaties and Conferences, cannot be admitted into the Number of impossible Designs; unless, as it may sometimes happen, the Treaties and Calculations are themselves unintelligible.

* The only Difficulty that can arise, must be produced by the Confusion and Perplexity of our publick Transactions, the Inconsistency of our Treaties, and the Fallaciousness of our Estimates; but I hope no Man will urge these as Arguments against the Motion. An Enquiry ought to be promoted, that

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* Since Earl of Litchfield.

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Confusion may be reduced to Order, and that the Distribution of the publick Money may be regulated. If the Examination be difficult it ought to be speedily performed; because those Difficulties are daily increasing; if it seem impossible it ought to be attempted, that those Methods of forming Calculations may be changed which make them impossible to be examined.

Lord *Percival*, (whose Speech we gave in Vol. XIII. p. 158.) was answered by Sir *William Yonge* to the following Purport.

Sir,

Sir W. Yonge.

‘ However I may be convinced in my own Opinion of the Impracticability of the Enquiry now proposed, whatever Confidence I may repose in the extensive Knowledge and long Experience of those, by whom it has been openly pronounc’d not only difficult but impossible; I think there are Arguments against the Motion, which though perhaps not stronger in themselves; (for what Objection can be stronger, than Impossibility) ought at least more powerfully to incite us to oppose it.

‘ Of the Impossibility of executing this Enquiry, those who have proposed it well deserve to be convinced not by Arguments but Experience; they deserve not to be diverted by Persuasions from engaging in a Task, which they have voluntarily determined to undergo; a Task which neither Honour, nor Virtue, nor Necessity has imposed upon them, and to which it may justly be suspected, that they would not have submitted upon any other Motives, than those by which their Conduct has hitherto been generally directed, Ambition, and Resentment.

‘ Men, who upon such Principles condemn themselves to Labours which they cannot support, surely deserve to perish in the Execution of their own Projects, to be overwhelmed by the Burdens which they have laid upon themselves, and to suffer the Disgrace which always attends the Undertakers of Impossibilities; and from which the Powers of Raillery and Ridicule, which they have so successfully displayed on this Occasion, will not be sufficient to defend them.

‘ They have indeed, Sir, with great Copiousness of Language, and great Fertility of Imagination, shown the Weakness of supposing this Enquiry impossible; they have proposed a Method of performing it, which they hope will at once confute and irritate their Opponents, but all their Raillery and all their Arguments have in reality been thrown away upon an Attempt to confute what never was advanced.

‘ They have first mistaken the Assertion which they oppose,

pose, and then exposed its Absurdity ; they have introduced a Bugbear, and then attempted to signalize their Courage and their Abilities, by shewing that it cannot fright them.

* The Honourable Gentleman, Sir, who first mentioned to you the Impossibility of this Enquiry, spoke only according to the common Acceptation of Words, and was far from intending to imply natural and philosophical Impossibility. He was far from intending to insinuate, that to examine any Series of Transactions, or peruse any Number of Papers, implied an Absurdity, or Contrariety to the established Order of Nature ; he did not intend to rank this Design with those of building in the Air, or pumping out the Ocean ; he intended only to assert a moral or popular Impossibility, to shew that the Scheme was not practicable but by greater Numbers than could be conveniently employed upon it ; or in a longer Space of Time than it was rational to assign to it ; as we say it is impossible to raise Groves upon Rocks, or build Cities in Desarts ; by which we mean only to imply, that there is no Proportion between the Importance of the Effect, and the Force of the Causes which must operate to produce it ; that the Toil will be great, and the Advantage little.

* In this Sense, Sir, and nothing but Malice or Perverseness could have discovered any other, the Motion may be truly said to be impossible, but its Impossibility ought to be rather the Care of those who make, than of those that oppose it ; and therefore, I shall lay before the House other Reasons, which unless they can be answered, will determine me to vote against it.

* It cannot be doubted but the Papers which must on this Occasion be examined, contain a great Number of private Transactions, which the Interest of the Nation and the Honour of our Sovereign require to be concealed. The System of Policy which the *French* have, within the last Century, introduced into the World, has made Negotiation more necessary than in any preceeding Time. What was formerly performed by Fleets and Armies, by Invasions, Sieges, and Battles, has been of late accomplished by more silent Methods. Empires have been enlarged without Bloodshed, and Nations reduced to Distress without the Ravages of hostile Armies, by the Diminution of their Commerce, and the Alienation of their Allies.

* For this Reason, Sir, it has been necessary frequently to engage in private Treaties, to obviate Designs sometimes justly, and at other Times perhaps unreasonably, suspected. It has been proper to act upon remote Suppositions, and to conclude Alliances which were only to be publicly owned, in Con-

An. 15. Geo. II.
1741.

sequence of Measures taken by some other Powers, which Measures were sometimes laid aside, and the Treaty therefore was without Effect. In some of these provisionary Contracts, it is easy to conceive, that Designs were formed not to the Advantage of some Powers, whom yet we do not treat as Enemies, which were only to be made publick by the Execution of them: In others, perhaps, some Concessions were made to us, in Consideration of the Assistance that we promised, by which the Weakness of our Allies may be discovered, and which we cannot disclose without making their Enemies more insolent, and increasing that Danger from which they apply to us for Security and Protection.

‘ If to this Representation of the Nature of the Papers, with which our Offices have been filled by the Negotiations of the last twenty Years, any thing were necessary to be added, it may be farther alledged, that it has been long the Practice of every Nation on this side of the Globe, to procure private Intelligence of the Designs and Expectations of the neighbouring Powers, to penetrate into the Councils of Princes and the Closets of Ministers, to discover the Instructions of Ambassadors, and the Orders of Generals, to learn the Intention of Fleets before they are equipt, and of Armies before they are levied, and to provide not only against immediate and visible Hostilities, but to obviate remote and probable Dangers.

‘ It need not be declared in this Assembly, that this cannot always be done without employing Men who abuse the Confidence reposed in them, a Practice on which I shall not at this Time trouble the House with my Opinion, nor interrupt the present Debate, by any Attempt to justify or condemn it. This I think may be very reasonably alledged, that whether the Employment of such Persons be defensible by the reciprocal Practice of Nations or not, it becomes at least those that corrupt them, and pay them for their Treachery, not to expose them to Vengeance, to Torture, or to Ruin, not to betray those Crimes which they have hired them to commit, or give them up to Punishment, to which they have made themselves liable only by their Instigation, and for their Advantage.

‘ That private Compacts between Nations and Sovereigns ought to be kept inviolably secret, cannot be doubted by any Man who considers, that Secrecy is one of the Conditions of those Treaties, without which they had not been concluded; and therefore that to discover them is to violate them, to break down the Securities of human Society, to destroy mutual Trust, and introduce into the World universal Confusion. For nothing less can be produced by a Disregard of those

those Ties which link Nations in Confederacies, and produce An. 15. Geo. II.
Confidence and Security, and which enable the Weak by
Union to resist the Attacks of powerful Ambition. 1741.

* How much it would injure the Honour of our Sovereign to be charged with the Dissolution of Concord, and the Subversion of the general Bulwarks of publick Faith, is superfluous to explain. To know the Condition to which a Compliance with this Motion, would reduce the *British* Nation, we need only turn our Eyes downwards upon the hourly Scenes of common Life ; we need only attend to the Occurrences which croud perpetually upon our View, and consider the calamitous State of that Man of whom it is generally known, that he cannot be trusted, and that Secrets communicated to him are in reality scatter'd among Mankind.

* Every one knows that such a Man can expect none of the Advantages or Pleasures of Friendship, that he cannot transact Affairs with others upon Terms of Equality, that he must purchase the Favours of those that are more powerful than himself, and frighten those into Compliance with his Designs who have any thing to fear from him ; that he must give uncommon Security for the Performance of his Covenants ; that he can have no Influence but that of Money, which will probably become every Day less, that his Success will multiply his Enemies, and that in Misfortunes he will be without Refuge.

* The Condition of Nations collectively considered is not different from that of private Men, their Prosperity is produced by the same Conduct, and their Calamities drawn upon them by the same Errors, Negligences, or Crimes ; and therefore, since he that betrays Secrets in private Life indisputably forfeits his Claim to Trust, and since he that can be no longer trusted is on the Brink of Ruin, I cannot but conclude that, as by this Motion all the Secrets of our Government must be inevitably betrayed, my Duty to his Majesty, my Love of my Country, and my Obligations to discharge with Fidelity the Trust which my Constituents have conferred upon me, oblige me to oppose it.

Mr *Lyttelton* * spoke next in Favour of the Inquiry.

Sir,

* It always portends well to those who dispute on the Side Mr *Lyttelton*. of Truth and Reason, when their Opponents appear not wholly to be hardened against the Force of Argument, when they seem desirous to gain the Victory, not by Superiority of Numbers but of Reason, and attempt rather to convince than to terrify or bribe. For tho' Men are not in quest of Truth
c 3 them

* Secretary to his Royal Highness the Prince.

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

themselves, nor desirous to point it out to others; yet while they are obliged to speak with an Appearance of Sincerity, they must necessarily afford the Unprejudiced and Attentive an Opportunity of discovering the Right. While they think themselves under a Necessity of Reasoning, they cannot but shew the Force of a just Argument, by the Unsuccessfulness of their Endeavours to confute it, and the Propriety of an useful and salutary Motion, by the slight Objections which they raise against it. They cannot but find themselves sometimes forced to discover what they can never be expected to acknowledge, the Weakness of their own Reasons, by deserting them, when they are pressed with contrary Assertions, and seeking a Subterfuge in new Arguments equally inconclusive and contemptible. They show the Superiority of their Opponents, like other Troops, by retreating before them, and forming one Fortification behind another, in hopes of wearying those whom they cannot hope to repulse.

Of this Conduct we have had already an Instance in the present Debate; a Debate managed with such Vigour, Order and Resolution as sufficiently shows the Advantage of regular Discipline long continued, and proves, that Troops may retain their Skill and Spirit, even when they are deprived of that Leader, to whose Instructions and Example they were indebted for them. When first this Motion was offered, it seems to have been their chief Hope to divert us from it by Outcries of Impossibility, by representing it as the Demand of Men unacquainted with the State of our Offices, or the Multiplicity of Transactions in which the indefatigable Industry of our Ministers has been employed; and they have therefore endeavoured to persuade us, that they are only discouraging us from an insuperable Labour, and advising us to desist from Measures which we cannot live to accomplish.

But when they found, Sir, that their Exaggerations produced Merriment instead of Terror, that their Opponents were determined to try their Strength against Impossibility, that they were resolved to launch out into this boundless Ocean of Enquiry; an Ocean of which they have been boldly told, that it has neither Shore nor Bottom, and that whoever ventures into it must be tost about for Life. When they discovered that this was not able to shake our Resolution, or move us to any other Disposition, they thought it proper to explain away their Assertion of Impossibility, by making a Kind of Distinction between Things impossible, and Things which cannot be perform'd; and finding it necessary to enlarge their Plea, they have now asserted that this Enquiry is both impossible and inexpedient.

‘ Its Impossibility, Sir, has been already sufficiently discussed, and shown to mean only a Difficulty which the Unskilfulness of our Ministers has produced ; for, Transactions can only produce Difficulties to the Enquirer, when they are confused ; and Confusion can only be the Effect of Ignorance or Neglect.

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1741.

‘ Artifice is, indeed, one more Source of Perplexity ; it is the Interest of that Man whose Cause is bad to speak unintelligibly in the Defence of it, and of him whose Actions cannot bear to be examined, to hide them in Disorder, to engage his Pursuers in a Labyrinth, that they may not trace his Steps, and discover his Retreat ; and what Intricacies may be produced by Fraud, co-operating with Subtilty, it is not possible to tell.

‘ I do not however believe, that all the Art of Wickedness can elude the Enquiries of a *British* Parliament, quickned by Zeal for the publick Happiness. The Sagacity of our Predecessors has often detected Crimes concealed with more Policy, than can be ascribed to those whose Conduct is now to be examined, and dragged the Authors of National Calamities to Punishment from their darkest Retreats. The Expediency therefore of this Motion is now to be considered, and surely it will not require long Reflection to prove, that it is proper, when the Nation is oppressed with Calamities, to enquire by what Misconduct they were brought upon it ; when immense Sums have been raised by the most oppressive Methods of Exaction, to ask why they were demanded, and how they were expended ; when penal Laws have been partially executed, to examine by what Authority they were suspended, and by what they were enforced ; and when the Parliament has for twenty Years implicitly obeyed the Direction of one Man ; when it has been known throughout the Nation before any Question was proposed, how it would be decided ; to search out the Motive of that regular Compliance and to examine whether the Minister was revered for his Wisdom and Virtue, or feared for his Power, or courted for the publick Money ; whether he owed his Prevalence to the Confidence or Corruption of his Followers ?

‘ It cannot surely be thought inexpedient, to enquire into the Reasons for which our Merchants were for many Years suffered to be plundered, or for which a War solicited by the general Voice of the whole Nation was delayed ; into the Reasons for which our Fleets were fitted out only to coast upon the Ocean, and connive at the Departure of Squadrons and the Transportation of Armies, to suffer our Allies to be invaded, and our Traders ruined and enslaved.

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

* It is in my Opinion convenient to examine with the utmost Rigour, why Time was granted to our Enemies to fortify themselves against us, while a standing Army preyed upon our People? Why Forces unacquainted with the Use of Arms were sent against them under the Command of Leaders equally ignorant? And why we have suffered their Privateers in the mean Time to rove at large over the Ocean, and insult us upon our own Coasts? Why we did not rescue our Sailors from Captivity, when Opportunities of Exchange were in our Power? And why we robbed our Merchants of their Crews by rigorous Impresses, without employing them either to guard our Trade, or subdue our Enemies.

* If the Parliament is not to be suffered to enquire into Affairs like these, it is no longer any Security to the People, that they have the Right of electing Representatives; and unless they may carry their Enquiries back as far as they shall think it necessary, the most acute Sagacity may be easily eluded; Causes may be very remote from their Consequences, the original Motives of a long Train of wicked Measures may lye hid in some private Transaction of former Years, and those Advantages which our Enemies have been of late suffered to obtain, were perhaps sold them at some forgotten Congress by some secret Article.

* Such are probably the private Transactions which the Honourable Gentleman is so much afraid of exposing to the Light: Transactions in which the Interest of this Nation has been meanly yielded up by Cowardice, or sold by Treachery; in which *Britain* has been considered as a Province subordinate to some other Country, or in which the Minister has enriched himself by the Sacrifice of the publick Rights.

* It has been, indeed, alledged with some Degree of Candour, that many of our Treaties were Provisions against Invasions which perhaps were never intended, and calculated to defeat Measures which only our own Cowardice disposed us to fear. That such Treaties have been made, that of *Hanover* is a sufficient Witness; but however frequently they may occur, they may surely be discovered with very little Disadvantage to the Nation; they will prove only the Weakness of those that made them, who were at one time intimidated by chimerical Terrors, and at another lulled into Confidence by airy Security.

* The Concessions from Foreign Powers which have been likewise mentioned, ought surely not to be produced as Arguments against the Motion; for, what could more excite the Curiosity of the Nation. If, indeed, this Motion were in reality produced by Malevolence or Resentment; if none were expected

expected to concur in it but those who envied the Abilities, or *An. 15. Geo. II.* had felt the Power of the late Minister, it might be perhaps defeated by such Insinuations; for, nothing could more certainly regain his Reputation, or exalt him to more absolute Authority, than Proofs that he had obtained for us any Concessions from foreign Powers. 1741.

* If any advantageous Terms have been granted us, he must be confessed to have so far discharged his Trust to his Allies, that he has kept them with the utmost Caution from the Knowledge of the People, who have heard during all his Administration of nothing but Subsidies, Submission, and Compliance paid to almost every Prince on the Continent who has had the Confidence to demand them; and if by this Enquiry any Discovery to the Disadvantages of our Allies should be struck out, he may with great Sincerity alledge, that it was made without his Consent.

* Another Objection to this Enquiry is, that the Spies which are retained in Foreign Courts may be detected by it, that the Canals of our Intelligence will be for ever stopped, and that we shall henceforth have no Knowledge of the Designs of Foreign Powers, but what may be honestly attained by Penetration and Experience. Spies are, indeed, a Generation for whose Security I have not much Regard, but for whom I am on this Occasion less solicitous, as I believe very few of them will be affected by this Motion.

* The Conduct of our Ministers has never discovered such an Acquaintance with the Designs of neighbouring Princes, as could be suspected to be obtained by any uncommon Methods, or they have very little improved the Opportunities which early Information put into their Power; for they have always been baffled and deceived. Either they have employed no Spies, or their Spies have been directed to elude them by false Intelligence, or true Intelligence has been of no Use; and if any of these Assertions be true, the publick will not suffer by the Motion.

* It was justly observed by the Honourable Gentleman, that a Parallel may be properly drawn between a Nation and a private Man, and by Consequence between a trading Nation and a Trader. Let us therefore consider what must be the State of that Trader, who shall never inspect or state his Accounts, who shall suffer his Servants to traffic in the Dark with his Stock and on his Credit, and who shall permit them to transact Bargains, in his Name, without enquiring whether they are advantageous, or whether they are performed.

* Every Man immediately marks out a Trader thus insatuated

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1741.

ated as on the Brink of Bankruptcy and Ruin; every one will easily foresee, that his Servants will take Advantage of his Credulity, and proceed hourly to grosser Frauds; that they will grow rich by betraying his Interest, that they will neglect his Affairs to promote their own, that they will plunder him till he has nothing left, and seek then for Employment among those to whom they have recommended themselves by selling their Trust. His Neighbours, who easily foresee his approaching Misery, retire from him by Degrees, disunite their Business from his, and leave him to fall without involving others in his Ruin.

* Such must be the Fate of a Trader whom Idleness or a blind Confidence in the Integrity of others hinders from attending to his own Affairs, unless he rouses from his Slumber and recovers from his Infatuation. And what is to be done by the Man who, having for more than twenty Years neglected so necessary an Employment, finds what must necessarily be found in much less Time, his Accounts perplexed, his Credit depressed, and his Affairs disordered? What remains, but that he suffer that Disorder to proceed no farther, that he resolutely examine all the Transactions which he has hitherto overlooked, that he repair those Errors which are yet retrievable, and reduce his Trade into Method, that he doom those Servants, by whom he has been robbed or deceived, to the Punishment which they deserve, and recover from them that Wealth which they have accumulated by Rapacity and Fraud.

* By this Method only can the Credit of the Trader or the Nation be repaired, and this is the Method which the Motion recommends; a Motion with which therefore every Man may be expected to comply who desires, that his Country should once more recover its Influence and Power, who wishes to see *Great Britain* again courted and feared, and her Monarch considered as the Arbiter of the World, the Protector of the true Religion, and the Defender of the Liberties of Mankind.

After Mr *Philips's* Speech, (Vol. XIII. p. 149) for the Motion, Col. *Cholmondeley* spoke against it.

Sir,

Col. Cholmondeley.

* It has been in all foregoing Ages the Custom for Men to speak of the Government with Reverence, even when they opposed its Measures or projected its Dissolution; nor has it been thought, in any Time before our own, decent or Parliamentary to give way to Satire or Invektive, or indulge a petulant Imagination, to endeavour to level all Orders by con-

contemptuous Reflections, or to court the Populace by echoing their Language or adopting their Sentiments.

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

‘ This Method of gaining the Reputation of Patriotism has been unknown till the present Age, and reserved for the present Leaders of the People, who will have the Honour to stand recorded as the original Authors of Anarchy, the great Subverters of Order, and the first Men who dared to pronounce, that all the Secrets of Government ought to be made publick.

‘ It has been hitherto understood in all Nations, that those who were intrusted with Authority had likewise a Claim to Respect and Confidence, that they were chosen for the Superiority of their Abilities and the Reputation of their Virtue ; and that therefore it was reasonable to consign to their Management, the Direction of such Affairs as by their own Nature require Secrecy.

‘ But this ancient Doctrine, by which Subordination has been so long preserved, is now to be set aside for new Principles which may flatter the Pride, and incite the Passions of the People : We are now to be told, that Affairs are only kept secret, because they will not bear Examination ; that Men conceal not those Transactions in which they have succeeded, but those in which they have failed ; that they are only inclined to hide their Follies or their Crimes ; and that to examine their Conduct in the most open Manner is only to secure the Interest of the Publick.

‘ Thus has the Nation been taught to expect, that the Counsels of the Cabinet should be dispersed in the publick Papers ; that their Governors should declare the Motives of their Measures, and discover the Demands of our Allies, and Schemes of our Policy ; and that the People should be consulted upon every Emergence, and enjoy the Right of instructing not only their own Representatives but the Ministers of the Crown.

‘ In this Debate the Mention of secret Treaties has been received with Contempt and Ridicule, the Ministers have been upbraided with chimerical Fears, and unnecessary Provisions against Attacks which never were designed ; they have been alledged to have no other Interest in View than their own, when they endeavour to mislead Enquirers ; and to have in reality nothing to keep from publick View but their own Ignorance or Wickedness.

‘ It cannot surely be seriously asserted by Men of Knowledge and Experience, that there are no Designs formed by wise Governments, the Success of which depends upon Secrecy ; nor can it be asserted, that the Enquiry now proposed will be-

An. 15. Geo. II. betray nothing from which our Enemies may receive Advantage.

1741.

‘ If we should suppose, that all our Schemes are either fully accomplished, or irretrievably defeated, it will not even then be prudent to discover them, since they will enable our Enemies to form Conjectures of the future from the past, and to obviate hereafter the same Designs, when it shall be thought necessary to resume them.

‘ But in reality nothing is more irrational than to suppose this a safer Time than any other for such general Discoveries; for why should it be imagined, that our Engagements are not still depending, and our Treaties yet in Force? and what can be more dishonourable or imprudent, than to destroy at once the whole Scheme of foreign Policy, to dissolve our Alliances, and destroy the Effects of such long and such expensive Negotiations without first examining, whether they will be beneficial or detrimental to us?

‘ Nor is it only with respect to foreign Affairs that Secrecy is necessary, there are undoubtedly many domestic Transactions which it is not proper to communicate to the whole Nation. There is still a Faction among us, which openly desires the Subversion of our present Establishment; a Faction, indeed, not powerful, and which grows, I hope, every Day weaker, but which is favoured, or at least imagines itself favoured by those who have so long distinguished themselves by opposing the Measures of the Government. Against these Men, whose Hopes are revived by every Commotion, who studiously heighten every Subject of Discontent, and add their Outcries to every Clamour, it is not doubted but Measures are formed, by which their Designs are discovered and their Schemes broken; nor can it be supposed, that this is done without the Assistance of some who are received with Confidence among them, and who probably pass for the most Zealous of their Party.

‘ Many other domestic Occasions of Expence might be mentioned, of Expence which operates in private, and produces Benefits which are only not acknowledged, because they are not known, but which could no longer be applied to the same useful Purposes, if the Channels through which it passes were laid open. I cannot therefore forbear to offer my Opinion, that this Motion by which all the Secrets of our Government will be discovered, will tend to the Confusion of the present System of *Europe*, to the absolute Ruin of our Interest in foreign Courts, and to the Embarrassment of our domestick Affairs. I cannot therefore conceive how any Advantages can be expected by the most eager Persecutors of the late

late Ministry, which can even in their Opinion deserve to be purchased at so dear a Rate.

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

He was replied to by Mr *Pitt*, [See Vol. XIII. p. 169.] and then Col. *Mordaunt* spoke to the following Effect.

Sir,

‘ Notwithstanding the Zeal with which the Honourable Col. Mordaunt, Gentleman has urged the Necessity of this Enquiry, a Zeal of which, I think, it may at least be said, that it is too vehement and acrimonious to be the mere Result of publick Spirit unmix’d with Interest or Resentment, he has yet been so far unsuccessful in his Reasoning, that he has not produced in me any Conviction, or weakened any of the Impressions which the Arguments of those whom he opposes had made upon me.

‘ He has contented himself with recapitulating some of the Benefits which may be hoped for from the Enquiry, he has represented in the strongest Terms the supposed Misconduct of the Ministry; he has aggravated all the Appearances of Wickedness or Negligence, and then has inferred the Usefulness of a general Enquiry for the Punishment of past Offences, and the Prevention of the like Practices in future Times.

‘ That he has discovered great Qualifications for Invective, and that his Declamation was well calculated to inflame those who have already determined their Opinion, and who are therefore only restrained from such Measures as are now recommended by natural Caution and Sedateness, I do not deny; but surely he does not expect to gain Profelytes by Assertions without Proof, or to produce any Alteration of Sentiments without attempting to answer the Arguments, which have been offered against his Opinion.

‘ It has been urged with great Appearance of Reason, that an Enquiry, such as is now proposed, with whatever Prospects of Vengeance, of Justice, or of Advantage it may flatter us at a Distance, will be in reality detrimental to the Publick; because it will discover all the Secrets of our Government, lay all our Negotiations open to the World, will show what Powers we most fear, or most trust; and furnish our Enemies with Means of defeating all our Schemes, and counter-acting all our Measures.

‘ This appears to me, *Sir*, the chief Argument against the Motion, an Argument of which the Force cannot but be discovered by those whose Interest it is to confute it, and of which therefore by appearing to neglect it, they seem to confess, that it is unanswerable; and therefore, since I cannot find the Motion justified otherwise than by loud Declarations of its Propriety, and violent Invectives against the Ministry,
I hope

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

I hope, that I shall escape at least the Censure of the Calm and Impartial, though I venture to declare, that I cannot approve it; and with Regard to the Clamorous and the Turbulent, I have long learned to despise their Menaces, because I have hitherto found them only the Boasts of Impotence.

ADDITIONAL SPEECHES in the Debate on the Lord Limerick's Motion for an Inquiry into the Conduct of Robert Earl of Orford, During the last TEN Years of his being Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of his Majesty's Exchequer.

Lord Limerick, (whose Speech we gave Vol. XIII. p. 189) was seconded by Sir John St Aubyn* to the following Effect.

Sir,

Sir J. St Aubyn.

‘ I hope you will forgive me, if I think it my Duty to rise up once more in Behalf of the People, to second a Proposition for an Enquiry; and I could wish, that former Defeats had not made it necessary to point it in so particular a Manner. But a general Enquiry has been denied; we are now reduc’d to the Necessity of confining it to one Object; and if we fail in this, all the Doors of Enquiry will be shut against us. The Supplies indeed will be granted, but National Grievances must go unredress’d.

‘ It is as little pleasing to me as to any Gentleman in this House to be engag’d in a personal Motion; but when I consider this noble Earl as the suspected Author of National Calamity; when nothing is desir’d but a fair Enquiry into his Conduct, to manifest his Innocence, or detect his Guilt; when Matters are arrived at this Point, that there is an open Contest between him and the People; when the Laws of my Country, the Right of Parliamentary Enquiry, are to be suspended to cover his Retreat; it is, I think, no longer a personal Motion: It is a publick Question, in which perhaps the Fate of our Constitution is involved. If he was united to me by the closest Ties of long Intimacy and mutual Affection, I would sacrifice my private Friendship to publick Spirit and National Justice.

‘ But in every Consideration of this kind, great Terrors have been rais’d at the Mention of a Secret Committee. It is called a most dangerous Delegation; and to intimidate the
After-

* This Gentleman had the Honour of every Vote in the House upon the Ballot for the Secret Committee. The Number of Members present was 518, See Vol. XIII. p. 218

Affertors of Justice it is represented so formidable, as to be able to controul that very Body from which it derives its Powers; and foreign Examples are produced, no ways similar, under different Constitutions, to support this Allegation. It has been called a Committee of Accusation, Tryal and Judgment.

An. 15. Geo. II.
1741.

‘ But, Sir, it is a constitutional Appointment, always practised when high Offenders are to be called to Justice. The noble Earl himself has been the great Patron * of such Appointments. It is a Committee of Enquiry which is only to proceed no farther than the Extent of their Commission, revocable at your Pleasure. It is only to collect and digest the Materials of Evidence, to produce Facts supported by such Evidence, Facts afterwards to be canvass’d, to undergo a strict Examination in the House, before you will found upon them a Vote of Accusation.

‘ You yourselves are but Accusers, and your Accusation must be carried to an higher Assembly for Tryal and Judgment. And it will not be an Enquiry into slight Facts, every little Error of Administration which human Prudence could not prevent, where the Party accused may be unable to recollect the Articles of his Defence; but into Facts of an high and enormous Nature; the Loss of National Honour, publick Grievances, premeditated Schemes of Corruption to render the independent Branches of our Constitution subservient to a Dictatorial Power; a Power unknown to our Laws, and necessarily destructive to the Liberties of the People; a Power which must be restrained at this Time by a strict and effectual Enquiry, or give me leave to say, it will be impracticable for any new Administration to carry on this Government with Reputation and Honour. They must have Reputation, they must have Confidence. Mankind are well inclined to trust them; nor do I fear but they will deserve Confidence, and then they need not doubt of Authority and Support.

‘ But first the Nation must have this Assurance, this Earnest, that it is to be an Administration of Government, not a Continuation of one and the same Scheme of ministerial Power; an Administration founded upon the Constitution, which I understand to be that wide, that extended Basis upon which only it can stand secure. With this View it is, that the Nation expects an Enquiry, and surely no Man will decline your Enquiry, who does not fear your Justice.

This

* The Earl of Orford was Chairman of the Secret Committee for Inquiring into the Conduct of Queen Anne’s last Ministry. Anno, 1715.

An. 15. Geo. II.
1741.

This Motion was opposed by Sir *William Yonge*, to the following Effect.

Sir,

Sir W. Yonge.

‘ That little can be said in Justification of this Motion which was not urged in favour of the former is, I believe, true ; since if any thing new could have been produced, it might be reasonably believed, that the same Investives would not have been so soon repeated, and that we should have heard Arguments instead of Declamations.

‘ The Gentleman who spoke last was pleased to assert, that this Motion is both just and seasonable ; and therefore such as ought to be complied with : But surely since he confesses, that it is a Motion nearly of the same Kind with that which was so lately rejected, he does not expect, that so much Reverence should be paid to his Opinion, unsupported by Evidence or Reason, as that this House should now approve what a few Days ago they thought improper, unless some new Arguments are produced to change their Sentiments ; and therefore he ought not to have contented himself with asserting what was principally to be proved.

‘ If the Arguments which were used on the former Occasion are of equal Force in Favour of this Motion, it may with Reason be imagined, that the Arguments by which the Defenders of the late Motion were defeated, may be again used against them, and may perhaps now produce the same Effect.

‘ That this Motion, Sir, is either so just or seasonable as it has been represented, I hope, I may be allowed to doubt, without incurring the Censure which has been so generally bestowed upon all those who have hitherto approved the Measures of the Government, and endeavoured to shew, that Liberty is consistent with Allegiance, and that to preserve the Happiness of the People, it is not always necessary to obstruct the Designs of the Court.

‘ It has never yet been thought a Proof of the Goodness of a Cause, that Slander and Reproach have been made use of to support it. It has generally been imagined, that Truth is able to stand without the Assistance of Artifice, and Reason desires only to be heard without Prejudice or Passion ; and consequently those who condemn the Principles of their Adversaries before they examine their Actions, and who endeavour to captivate the Publick with loud Boasts of their own Integrity, and pathetic Declarations of their Contempt of Money, of their Zeal for the public Happiness, and their Resolution to adhere to the Interest of the Nation in the midst of Discouragements, and Temptations, have by the wisest

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Part of the People been always suspected by hypocritical Professions, and of Inclinations to aggrandise themselves by the Fall of those whom they oppose.

An. 15. Geo. II.
1741.

* But our Patriots, Sir, have not contented themselves with Encomiums on the Purity of their own Hearts, the Rectitude of their Intentions, or the Force of their Abilities, they have not thought it sufficient to exalt themselves unless they likewise depressed others; whatever Qualities, therefore, they thought it necessary to ascribe to themselves, they judged it convenient to deny to every other Person, and not satisfied with being Wise and Brave and Virtuous in the same Degree with others, they have for many Years appropriated every human Excellence, and left no Choice to those who have presumed to differ from them, but of Folly or Corruption, of Ignorance, or Disregard of the true Interest of our Country, of a blind Submission to the Dictates of the Minister, or a perfidious Prostitution of their Votes for Power and for Wealth.

* Such are the Invectives, Sir, which with unwearied Industry they have from Year to Year scattered over the Nation; by these they have persuaded the Credulous and Weak among those whose State of Life hinders them from obtaining any Knowledge of publick Measures, that they who are in reality most studious of their Happiness, they whose constant Endeavour it has always been to preserve our Constitution unviolated, and to secure to the present Royal Family a firm Possession of the Throne, were the Hirelings of Men combined for the Destruction of Freedom, the Slaves of a Minister whose only View was to perpetuate his Power. By those Plunderers, as they are told, all the Profit of their Commerce was snatched out of their Hands, by these Oppressors they were loaded with unnecessary Exactions, and harrassed with standing Troops, whose real Use was to awe them into Submission to Tyranny, and to enforce the Execution of cruel Laws, to superintend the Infliction of unnecessary Hardships.

* By such Exclamations as these confidently vented, many People have imagined, that there must be some latent Danger which they did not foresee, or some secret Machinations which they had not detected, and that such vehement Outcries could not be continued without some real Injury either suffered or threatened; others, perhaps, more sagacious, but less sincere, might join in the Cry, when it began to be echoed by the People, from the natural Desire of Reputation and Applause, and confirm those Opinions by their Suffrages, which they could not oppose without the

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Disadvantage of Singularity, and the Danger of multiplying their Enemies and alienating their Friends.

* The Success of these Arts has encouraged the Favourers of the Motion, now under our Consideration, to try them once more; those whom their Arguments cannot gain are, therefore, to be represented as Men, not desirous of discovering Truth, as Men who have perplexed their Understandings by their own Sophistries, and whom a long Course of abandoned Wickedness has harden'd against Conviction; and they hope, that no Man will be so hardy as to rise up in Defiance of Censures so severe, and declare himself an Adversary to a Motion offered, and vindicated, by the Men who have distinguished themselves in this corrupt Age, as the only Lovers of their Country, the Patrons of distressed Integrity, and the Adherents to deserted Truth.

* But it has been very common among them, notwithstanding that Height of political Wisdom, at which they have arriv'd, to form chimerical Hopes, and to be overthrown after they have sounded a Triumph: What may be their Fate on the present Occasion I am not able to foresee; but shall make no Scruple to declare, that if their Declamations produce on others no greater Effects than upon me, they have been only Shot scattered in the Air that have fallen to the Ground without Use and without Regard; for I am yet hardy enough to affirm, that, in my Opinion, the Motion is neither just in itself, nor proper in the present State of our Affairs.

* In examining the Justice of this Motion, I am very far from intending to question, whether the Parliament has a Right to enquire into the Conduct of Affairs or the Distribution of Money; this is indeed a Right incontestable and sacred, the Foundation of all other Rights, and the Palladium of our Constitution: It was by the timely Exertion of this great Privilege, that our Ancestors have been so often in former Ages rescued from Destruction, and by this our Posterity must preserve that Liberty which we shall not doubt to transmit to them without Violation; unless Measures are pursued very different from those of the Minister, whose Conduct we are now called upon to examine.

* But the Exertion of this Privilege, which is the last Effort of our Constitution, ought not, in my Opinion, to be proposed on common Occasions; for the Decision of disputable Questions, or the Redress of trifling Grievances, which may be remedied without the Solemnity of a Parliamentary Inquiry, and without the universal Alarm which Proceedings so awful spread over the Nation. The Crimes which engage
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the Parliament in their Detection ought to be such as endanger the Common-wealth, and which cannot be left unpunished without inciting others to the same Corruption by the Prospect of the same Impunity.

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1741.

‘ That the Veneration due to the Legislature should be very solicitously preserved will, I suppose, Sir, be denied by no Man, who considers, that Obedience of the Many to the Few can last no longer than Respect; and as in private Life a Man who disturbs his Friends with loud Outcries and violent Efforts on trifling Occasions, never fails to become contemptible, and to want the Assistance in real Perplexity and Distress, which he used so earnestly to request without Necessity: So in the Transaction of publick Affairs, if the Parliament employs its utmost Power, and asserts its highest Privileges only to gratify Resentment, or to punish casual Negligence or petty Miscarriages, the most solemn Act of the Legislature may in time be considered as an empty Form, and will neither afford any Security to the Nation, nor produce any Terror in wicked Ministers.

‘ In most Forms of Government, there is some Power which is never exerted, but upon the most pressing Emergencies; some Office which is never erected but when the Publick is in real Danger, and some Resort to which no Application is made till every other Expedient has failed; and by these, great Advantages are often procured, and Affairs retrieved from a State almost desperate, because they are never prostituted for petty Purposes; and when they are thought necessary every Man is convinced that Danger is at hand, incited by his Regard to his own Safety to contribute his utmost Endeavours to that of the Publick.

‘ Such among us is the Inquiry that is proposed by this Motion, which Prudence, therefore, directs us to reject as disproportioned to the Occasion: For, what Crime is there charged with any Appearance of Justice upon the noble Person, that can reasonably raise an Alarm of Danger in the Nation, or incite the Parliament to a formal Inquiry?

‘ Among all the Invectives that Artifice has invented or Malice uttered against him, I remember none which could justly be considered as important enough to engage the Attention of this Assembly, or none but what he has on some Occasion fully confuted; and therefore, as I cannot think the Motion prudent with Regard to the Nation, in which it must necessarily produce some Disturbance, I am likewise inclined to censure it as unjust with respect to him to whom it immediately relates.

‘ An Inquiry undoubtedly implies Suspicion, and Suspicion

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is always in some Degree injurious to his Character on whom it falls; a Man that is tried and acquitted, is still considered as of a more doubtful Reputation than he that never was accused. The greatest Part of Mankind are tainted with Wick- edness, and gratify their Pride, or their Envy, by crediting and spreading Reports which reduce others to a Level with themselves. Every Man has his Enemies, whose particular Malevolence is too active to omit any Opportunity of destroy- ing that Reputation which is, perhaps, brighter than their own. And those who are without any Partiality may be reasonably excused, if they are inclined to distrust him whose Integrity they find suspected by others of equal Discernment with themselves, and of whose Motives or Proofs they have no exact Knowledge.

* If this be the Condition of a Man who, on common Oc- casions, is by any Accident or Negligence exposed to the Suspicion of Men not more regarded for their Wisdom or their Virtue than himself, what must be the State of him whom the Legislature of his Country thinks the proper Ob- ject of publick Inquiry? How loudly will his Enemies exult? and how boldly will his Accusers fortell his Condemnation? What Clamours will the artful Leaders of the People excite against him? and how widely will the Charge be spread among those whom, perhaps, the Answer may never reach? It is not impossible, that many of those whose Friendship he has merited by good Offices, who have hitherto adhered to him from their Opinion of his Virtue, may be bribed to at- tack him by the Prospect of Popularity, or frightened into Desertion by the Fear of falling with him; and that though he should be at last acquitted by his Judges, he may suffer by his Trial alone the greatest Evils that Condemnation can in- flict, the Loss of his Reputation and his Friends, and be left in Solitude and Infamy, without any Consolation but that of Innocence.

* So formidable are the Penalties which a Parliamentary Inquiry may inflict, even upon the Man whose Conduct shall be found to deserve no Censure; and so unhappy may Vir- tue be made by an unreasonable Regard to Clamours with- out Evidence, and Rumours without an Author: And, I doubt not, therefore, but this House will reject this Motion; unless some Proof is produced which may justify Suspicion, or some Crimes are alledged worthy of the National Resent- ment.

* In this Hope, Sir, I am confirmed by reflecting on the present Situation of the Affairs of our own Nation, and of those round about us in whose Interests we are necessarily en- gaged.

gaged. When I enquire into our domestick Affairs, I see us engaged in War against a Nation formidable for the Extent of its Dominions, and for the Abundance of its Wealth ; and yet more formidable for its Alliance with the most powerful Nation in the World, the ancient and implacable Enemy of the *British* Nation. I see the War, though not ignominiously unsuccessful, yet far from having produced that Honour or those Advantages which were expected from it, and very far from gratifying the People at whose Request it was declared, and at whose Expence it is carried on ; and therefore cannot but think, that it might be more worthy of the Parliament to enquire by what Measures *Spain* may be humbled, our Navigation protected, our Losses repaired, and our Commerce re-established ; by what Means the Seas of the *West Indies* may be opened to our Merchants, and our Colonies restored to Security, Plenty, and Happiness, than how the Resentment of a Party may be gratified, or how those Writers who have been engaged by Malice, or by Want, to scatter Calumny and propagate Scurrility, may be secured from the Charge of having filled the Nation with false Alarms, and calumniated a Ministry by which the publick Advantage was steadily pursued.

But, Sir, when I extend my Views to the other Nations of *Europe*, I discover still more Exigencies that may justly engage all that Attention which can be spared from our own Affairs ; I see the House of *Austria*, the ancient Ally of this Nation, the House by which the Equipoise of Power has been so long maintained, and by which the Liberties of *Europe* have been so long defended against the *Turks* on one Part and the *French* on the other, reduced not to the Brink of Ruin only, but to the Verge of Annihilation ; and the Family of *Bourbon* giving Laws to all the Princes of the Empire, laying the World in Desolation by its Armies, and creating new Dependencies by the Distribution of Dominions among those who will be content to submit to an universal Monarchy : I see all the Powers of *Europe*, under the Influence either of Insatuation or of Terror, connive at the Ravages of these Enemies of Mankind, and desirous, not of opposing the Deluge of War, but of turning it from themselves.

Is this a Time of Leisure and Amusement, of private Prosecutions, and petty Animosities ? Is it not rather an Emergence which requires every Hand and every Tongue, in which every Man ought to be ambitious of distinguishing himself by his Actions or his Counsels, and in which every Man who can attend to his own private Views, ought to be considered as a publick Enemy ?

For

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1741.

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‘ For my Part, I oppose this Motion, as others professedly defend it, upon the same Principles with the former ; and am so far from thinking it necessary, that I think it necessary to reject it among other trifling Considerations, that we may be at Leisure to reflect upon more momentous Questions, and examine without that Distraction which is produced by a Multitude of Objects, how the War against the King of *Spain* may be most successfully prosecuted, and how the House of *Austria* may be restored to its ancient Splendor, and exalted to its former Power, and the Liberties of Mankind may be once more preserved from the Encroachments of *France*.

Sir *William Yonge* was answer'd by Mr *Pulteney*. *

Sir,

Mr *Pulteney*.

‘ Nothing is more usual than for Men that have lost their Reputation to complain of those who exposed them to the Contempt of Mankind, by confuting their Falshoods, or detecting their Wickedness ; no Criminal was ever heard to extol the Integrity of the Witnesses by whose Testimony he was convicted. But Complaints and Murmurs are of little Efficacy when they are opposed to Evidence and Facts : When we see a Man always engaged in that Party which most liberally rewards its Adherents, and find him always receiving the Reward that is offered for his Service, it is to little Purpose that he declares, with whatever Asseverations, that he acts only in Consequence of his own Conviction, and that his Salary has no Influence on his Conduct.

‘ The Adherents to the late Minister have surely very little Reason to complain that Mankind are inclined to vilify and reproach them ; since it is well known, that it was one of the Principles avowed among those who were most distinguished for their Fidelity to him, that Praise and Infamy were empty Sounds, by which those might, indeed, be affected whom Experience had not enlightened, or who had never received Instructions from the Veterans of a Court, but to which very little Regard was to be expected from Men who had learn'd the Value of Money, and had been taught, that Profit, immediate pecuniary Profit, was the only Motive that pushed forward the Business of the World, and by which every Man ought to be directed, who would exempt himself from the Reproach of Ignorance and Folly.

* This Gentleman was absent when the First Motion was over-ruled by two Voices, his only Daughter dying that very Day, as was also Mr. Sandys, (who voted For This Inquiry) he being then gone to Worcester to be re-elected after Accepting the Post of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

* I believe, Sir, the Time is generally remembered in which those who complain of Clamour and Invectives, endeavoured to turn the Torrent of Ridicule upon their Adversaries, when their great Leader himself employed his adored Abilities to make the Name of Patriot contemptible, and when they pushed their Raillery with all the Alacrity of Success, and all the Spirit of Security. The Time is not yet forgotten when to be independent was the Subject of Reproach, and when a Courtier, in the Height of his Exultation, called out in this House to his Brother Placemen *to be true to one another*.*

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1741.

* This Time is, I hope, now at an End: The Placemen at least have now ceased to boast of their Slavery, they have found, that their Abilities were not able to support them in the Opinion of the Nation against the Force of Truth, and that the Splendor of Equipages, and the Profusion of Wealth have not been sufficient to preserve either the Esteem or Affection of the People: They find themselves now reduced from Insults to Complaints, they find their whole Establishment endanger'd, and call upon each other, though in a much lower Voice, to be faithful to the common Interest, and to join all their Hands for the Support of the tottering Fabrick of Corruption.

* Of their Fidelity to their common Cause they have, indeed, given many Proofs, of which, however, there was never perhaps any which deserved more Applause from their Master, than the Opposition which they made to the late Motion, and are now making to the present. On this Occasion they discover, indeed, how powerful is the Influence of a Pension, and in what laborious and unpleasing Tasks Avarice and Ambition will engage their Slaves; they dispute when they have nothing to urge, and struggle, though the whole Nation combines to overwhelm them.


* I have, indeed, been so long accustomed to their Effusions of Zeal, and habituated to hear from them such daring Assertions, that I am surpris'd when any Position is admitted by them, which it is their Interest to deny; and therefore cannot but acknowledge my Astonishment, that no Champion of Corruption has been yet sufficiently hardened, by the long Possession of a Place of Profit, to call into Question the Right claimed by the Parliament of enquiring into the Conduct of the Ministers of the Crown.

* It has not, indeed, been ever asserted, that this Privilege was either usurped unjustly by the ancient Parliaments, or that it has on any Occasion been abrogated: But it is at length discovered by that Acuteness which a lucrative Employment generally produces, that it ought never to be exerted,

* See the Speech hinted at, Anno 1737-8. p. 81.

An. 15. Geo. 11. ed.

1741.



ed, at least that it ought to lie dormant till the Nation is on the Brink of Ruin; a Time which those will never find, to whose Folly or Wickedness the Calamities of the Publick are to be imputed.

‘ It is alledged likewise, Sir, that the Crimes, for the Punishment of which a Parliamentary Inquiry is demanded, ought to be such as threaten the publick Security, and such as cannot be suffered to escape uncensured without inciting others to the same Practices.

‘ This is a Specimen of that unlucky Eloquence by which a bad Cause is often injured when it is intended to be supported; it is no pleasing Situation to be obliged to speak when there is nothing to be said; but this has been often the Misfortune of the late Minister and his Associates, and the Event has been, that they have been able to produce nothing but what, like the Vindication now attempted, fell back upon themselves.

‘ If it be a sufficient Reason for a Parliamentary Inquiry, that Crimes are enormous and dangerous to the National Felicity, surely this is an Occasion on which an Inquiry ought readily to be granted; for, what are the Crimes charged upon him whose Conduct is to be examined, but that he has given pernicious Counsel to the King, that he has employed the publick Money in publick Wickedness, that he has debauched the Morals of the People and endeavoured to corrupt the Parliament, that he has sacrificed to private Views the Honour and Wealth of his Country, that he has obstructed the Success of our Arms, and neglected or betrayed the Rights of our Commerce.

‘ Such, Sir, are the Crimes with which he is now charged by the general Voice of the *British* People, a Charge which surely deserves to be regarded, and to which a candid Attention will not diminish the Dignity which the Legislature ought to preserve, or the Veneration which the People pay to its Decrees.

‘ It is, indeed, said likewise, that the Crimes ought to be publick and undisputed: But how an Inquiry can be necessary when the Offence is undisputed, I am not able to discover; for when the Crime is proved, I know not what remains but to punish it, and should move not for an Inquiry but an Impeachment.

‘ As unfortunately likewise has it been asserted, that such Measures are only necessary when the publick Happiness is in Danger; for when can our Danger be greater than when we are engaged in an unsuccessful War? A War in which we are not overborn by the Power of an Enemy whose Forces are
more

more numerous, or whose Treasures are more affluent than our own, but by a State from which we expected no Resistance; and against which it was imagined only necessary to declare War, that we might prescribe Terms of Peace. When can we more justly have Recourse to Inquiries than when we see the Trophies of our Armies destroyed, and the Profit of our Commerce diminished, when we see Armies raised only for Show, and our Navies acting in Concert with those whom they were in appearance sent out to destroy; when we see that Family which has in all Ages endeavoured our Ruin, and which we so lately humbled at the Expence of Treasures and of Forces by which half the World might have been conquered, again setting us at Defiance, again aspiring to general Dominion, again invading the neighbouring Countries, and overwhelming the *German* Empire with a Storm of War.

‘ Surely when we are at once distressed within and threatened from without, when our Constitution is weakened by Corruption, our Trade invaded by a foreign Power, and our Allies sinking before the Violence of Invasion, when all the Nations of *Europe* are embarrassed by our Misconduct, when we find ourselves insulted by one Power, and forsaken by another, and are no longer courted, trusted, or feared, it is Time to inquire into the original Cause of such complicated Misery, and inflict some exemplary Punishment on that Man, whose Counsels have alienated our Allies, whose Treachery has assisted our Enemies, and whose Corruption has debauch’d the Nation.

‘ In order to the Detection of Crimes, an Inquiry is necessary, and that there might be no Appearance of Partiality or Personal Malice in Proceedings intended only for the Re-establishment of the publick Happiness, a general Inquiry was first proposed which equally affected every Transaction of the last twenty Years, and every Person who during that Time had been entrusted with the Care of National Affairs: But this Proposal, however equitable, however disinterested, and however rational, was opposed; the Opposition prevailed, and the Slaves of despotick Authority had one Opportunity more of boasting to their Master of their Steadiness, their Unanimity, and their Address. No Expedient now remains by which we may hope to discover the publick Enemy, drag him out into the View of the People, and fix him as a Spectacle of Infamy to warn future Ministers against the Pride of Power, and the Abuse of Confidence, but an Examination of his Conduct to whom numberless Calamities are generally imputed. There is no Method of Examination which our

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1741

Constitution has hitherto admitted, at once so candid and so efficacious, as the Appointment of a Secret Committee, which I, therefore, must for the Satisfaction of the People recommend, but from which I desire to be excepted; because I have, by some Expressions which broke from me in the Heat of Contest, and the Negligence of Passion, given Cause for Suspicion, that I am engaged by personal Resentment in an incessant Opposition to the Person to whom this Motion relates; and I suppose no Man will blame me for desiring, when I do right, to be thought to do it upon right Motives.

Mr Henry Fox spoke next as follows :

Sir,

Mr Henry Fox.

‘ I am not only determined to oppose this Motion by the Reasons for which I voted against the last; but by another which I am not ashamed or afraid to avow, my personal Regard for him whose Conduct is to be the Subject of the Examination proposed.

‘ As I have long known him, I have had more Opportunities of discovering his Designs, than the greatest Part of those who have so loudly censured him; and I am confident, that those who are incited to censure him by true Zeal for their Country, and unfeigned Concern for the Interest of the Publick, only persecute him because they do not know him, and because they have been deceived by false Representations of his Morals, his Politicks and his Intentions; all which have been aspersed with the greatest Industry, and blackened with the utmost Address of Malice and Ambition.

‘ That some of his Measures may have been erroneous, I will not deny; for my Veneration for his Abilities does not rise to a Belief of his Infallibility: But if no Man, after having been so long entrusted with the Administration of publick Affairs, is to escape Prosecutions and Impeachments, on any other Condition than that of having never failed in his Designs, we shall not easily find, even among the Patriots themselves, however celebrated for their Wisdom, and distinguish’d for their Confidence, any Man sufficiently qualified to succeed this honourable Person in his Employments.

‘ That any of them will bring into the Council, either a greater Extent of Knowledge, Acuteness of Judgment, or Purity of Intention, I shall not easily believe, and am very far from thinking, that any one of those who have so long harrassed this noble Person with Invectives and Clamours will, if it should be his Fortune to be engaged in the same Province, be able to support himself in it with equal Applause, or quit it with equal Safety.

‘ His

* His Conduct has, indeed, been such as ought to place him, not only out of Danger of Punishment, but out of the Reach of Suspicion, which, as has been already, with great Justice, asserted, is in itself a very heavy Penalty, though it be not followed by Condemnation. To a delicate and ingenuous Mind like that of the noble Person to whom this Motion relates, nothing can be more painful than to be thought capable of Guilt, such as that of which a Parliamentary Enquiry implies a Suspicion; and as, in my Opinion, his whole Conduct has been such as entitles him to Honours and Rewards, to Monuments and to Statues, I shall never consent, that the Tranquility of his Retirement should be interrupted by a Prosecution; or that those whose Artifices he has so often baffled, however subtle, and whose Arguments he has so often confuted, however specious, should have an Opportunity to revenge upon him in his Privacy the Defeats which they have received from him.

An. 15. Geo. I.

1741.

Mr *Lyttelton* replied to the following Effect:

Mr *Lyttelton*.

Sir,

* That there are Minds to which it would give no small Degree of Pain to be suspected of any enormous Wickedness, when I either examine my own Breast, or observe the Conduct of my Friends I am fully convinced; but should never have discovered, that human Nature was capable of such a Passion as the Fear of Suspicion, had I only obtained my Knowledge of Mankind from the Contemplation of the late Minister and his Associates.

* It is, indeed, a Degree of ministerial Effrontery at which every Man is not able to arrive, and at which those who know not by what Gradations it has been attained will look with Astonishment, for Men to speak and act for twenty Years in Opposition to the general Desires of the whole Nation, and often in open Defiance of their Petitions, Remonstrances and Menaces; to hear themselves every Day, without Fear and without Confutation, censured as the Violators of the Constitution, the Plunderers of the publick Treasury, the Corruptors of the Parliament, and the Betrayers of their Country; and to see them while they enjoyed the Reward of their Practices, hug themselves amidst the Hisses of Mankind, and hear their Names mentioned in the most opprobrious Language, without Shame and without Anger; and yet when their Salaries are in question, when they imagine, that they shall have no Solace in their Infamy, pretend to startle at Danger to their Reputation, and not only to abhor Guilt, but to be afraid of Suspicion.

* If

An. 15. Geo. II.

1741.

‘ If the noble Person to whom this Enquiry relates is, in reality, studious of Reputation, he has hitherto been very unfortunate in the Method by which he has endeavoured to acquire it; for perhaps, no Nation of the Earth can show a Man so universally abhorred, a Man on whom the general Execrations of human Kind have been so openly discharged.

‘ Yet this, Sir, is the Man whom his Adherents would now screen from the Malignity of Suspicion, whose Mind is too delicate to bear the Reproach of an Enquiry. I doubt not, indeed, but Detection will now affect him in a different manner than when he stood in this House with his Hirelings about him, haranguing on the Benefits of an Excise, and the Expedience of the Convention, when he supported the Farce of a Debate in the Presence of Wretches who had sold him their Votes, without hearing his Arguments, and who were equally prepared to approve contrary Measures, if they had discovered that he had changed his Inclination.

‘ But though he may yet be susceptible of Terror, I am very far from imagining, that he can feel Shame; and, therefore, think it unnecessary to prove what every Man knows, that if Suspicion gave him any Pain he would sollicit what the most Ardent of his Advocates are now endeavouring to avert.

‘ He has, indeed, less to fear from an Enquiry than any of his Predecessors since they have generally endeavoured to engage their Party by specious Appearances of publick Advantage; but he has trusted only to the Power of Money. It is, therefore, urged with very little Propriety, that his Friends will forsake him on this Occasion, for though Danger may, indeed, separate those whom only Interest has united, it cannot be conceived, that the Dread of Infamy, can deprive that Man of his Adherents whom it has for so many Years been infamous to support.

‘ It is now, Sir, in my Opinion, necessary to comply with the general Petition of the People, to show that our Constitution, however shaken by the long continued Attacks of a despotic Minister, is not wholly destroyed; and that Guilt, however prosperous, is not able to bid Defiance to the Laws. It is expedient to lay open to the King and the Nation the Sources of our present Calamities, by our Approbation of the Motion now before us.

The Question was then put, and carried in the Affirmative by seven Voices.

F I N I S.



I N D E X

O F T H E

N A M E S of the S P E A K E R S

I N T H E

Second Session of the Third Parliament of
King George II.

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